Judgment :- Petitioner seeks writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the orders of the 1st Respondent in G.O.(Nilai) No.414 Revenue (Per 10(2) Department, dated 15.07.2005 and other prior proceedings and to direct the Respondents to settle all retirement benefits, pension, gratuity and General Provident Fund to the Petitioner. 2.Factual background which led to the filing of writ petition are as follows: .(i) Petitioner entered the service as L.D.C in Revenue Department on 02.01.1956 and gradually promoted to the post of Tahsildar in 1983 and in that capacity he worked in several places. The Petitioner was posted to work as special Tahsildar in respect of 27 villages and in that post he had worked from 10.02.1989 to 10.01.1990. .(ii) While the Petitionerwas working as special Tahsildar (Natham Survey), Ramanathapuram, certain complaints were received alleging that Petitioner misused his powers and received illegal gratification from ryots for issue of house-site pattas. Investigating agency of the Government conducted enquiry into the above allegations and held the allegations as substantiated against the Petitioner. The appropriate agency recommended initiation of departmental disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. Accepting the recommendations, Government directed to initiate departmental disciplinary action against the Petitioner. (iii) The Collector of Ramanathapuram District has initiated disciplinary action and framed charges under rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules. He has placed him under suspension with effect from 23.01.1992. As the disciplinary action was pending, the Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service on his attaining the age of superannuation on 31.01.1992 but was retained in service under fundamental Rules 56(1)(c) vide G.O.(2D)No.5, Revenue (SCG) Department, dated 29.01.1992. .(iv) The Collector of Ramanathapuram district passed final order in his proceedings Roc.A5/96177/91, dated 05.09.1994 imposing a punishment of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect for a period of three years. The Petitioner preferred an appeal against the above punishment orders and after examination in detail, the orders of the Collector were set aside by the 2nd Respondent in his proceedings No.D4/95627/94, dated 27.07.1995 for the reasons that the Petitioner has no future increments to be earned as the individual had already attained the age of superannuation on the date of issue of punishment orders. The order was set aside on the only ground that punishment of stoppage of increments cannot be implemented. .(v) The Government in Lr.No.264/Ser.3(2)/95-15, Revenue, dated 112. The order was set aside on the only ground that punishment of stoppage of increments cannot be implemented. .(v) The Government in Lr.No.264/Ser.3(2)/95-15, Revenue, dated 112. 1997 decided to review the orders of the Collector, Ramanathapuram district and the orders of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration under rule 36 of the said Rules and issued a show cause notice to the Petitioner to offer his explanation within a period of 21 days from the date of service of the notice as to why the Petitioner should not be removed from service. .(vi) After consideration of the explanation of the Petitioner, the Government vide Lr.No.11786/Ser.3(2)/199-44, Revenue, dated 010. 2003 issued another show cause notice to the Petitioner to offer his explanation as to why he should not be removed from service for the proved charges. The Petitioner offered his explanation on 111. 2003. The Government after careful consideration of the explanation of the Petitioner report of the Enquiry Officer and views of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission have decided that all the charges are proved and ordered that the Petitioner is removed from service vide their G.O.(Ms) No.414, Revenue (Ser.10(2)Department, dated 15.07.2005). (vii) Petitioner challenges the impugned order on the ground that the conclusion reached by the 1st Respondent is erroneous and it is a case of no evidence to prove the charges. According to the Petitioner, punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the alleged charges in view of the fact that the alleged charge of demand and acceptance was not proved as per the findings of the Enquiry Officer and therefore the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 3. Opposing the petition, Respondents have filed common counter stating that the charges itself reveal the lapses committed by the Petitioner are serious and grave in nature. As per G.O.(2D)No.5, Revenue (SCG). Department, dated 29.01.1992, the Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service under FR Rule 56(1)(c) but was retained in service until the enquiry into the grave charges of the criminal misconduct. According to the Respondents sufficient opportunity was given to the Petitioner calling upon him as to why punishment of removal from service should not be imposed on him. Department, dated 29.01.1992, the Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service under FR Rule 56(1)(c) but was retained in service until the enquiry into the grave charges of the criminal misconduct. According to the Respondents sufficient opportunity was given to the Petitioner calling upon him as to why punishment of removal from service should not be imposed on him. The Respondents have pleaded that upon consideration of report of the Enquiry Officer and other materials and after obtaining opinion of TNPSC Petitioner was removed from service and punishment imposed is in accordance with rules and the same cannot be challenged. 4. Challenging the impugned order learned counsel for the Petitioner Mr.R.Muthukannu, has contended that it is a case of no evidence and therefore the impugned order cannot be sustained. Learned counsel further submitted that the delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings would vitiate the same and the final order. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that sequence of events would indicate that there was no application of mind and even before passing the final order the authority had made up its mind to remove the Petitioner from service. 5. Placing reliance upon number of decisions the learned counsel would submit that at every stage delay was noticed and such unexplained delay would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. The learned counsel further argued that in any event punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the proved charges. 6. The learned Additional Government Pleader Mr.N.Senthilkumar, submitted that the proceedings was in accordance with rules. The learned Additional Government Pleader further submitted that FR 56(1)(c) was duly complied with and the Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service but was retained in service until the conclusion of enquiry. It was further submitted that the delay in passing the order has been properly explained. In respect of charge no.7, the Learned Addl.Govt.Pleader submitted that the Petitioner himself has admitted charge and after obtaining the opinion of TNPSC and having regard to gravity of charges the punishment of removal from service was imposed upon him. 7. First and foremost contention of the Petitioner is that it is a case of no evidence and the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority is unsubstantiated by any evidence. Charges 1 to 6 levelled against the Petitioner is that he received illegal gratification for issuing house-site pattas. 7. First and foremost contention of the Petitioner is that it is a case of no evidence and the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority is unsubstantiated by any evidence. Charges 1 to 6 levelled against the Petitioner is that he received illegal gratification for issuing house-site pattas. The Petitioner is alleged to have received money from beneficiaries through one Hameed Sultan. The Petitioner has denied the charges. The stand of Petitioner is that out of 27 Villages except Puthuvalasai Village, no complaint was received from the rest of the Villages i.e. 26 Villages. Petitioner has alleged that Hameed Sultan, former president of Puduvalasai Panchayat Union has submitted certain applications seeking issuance of pattas for various persons of the said village. The Petitioner has referred the same to the Deputy Surveyor Sundaram to make enquiry and according to the Petitioner he passed order of issuance of patta in respect of genuine applications. It was the further case of the Petitioner that said Hameed Sultan pressurized the Petitioner to pass favorable orders in all the applications and that the Petitioner is refused to do so to wreak vengeance, the said Hameed Sultan acted against the Petitioner by sending anonymous petitions. It was pointed out that the said Hameed Sultan turned hostile during the enquiry. 8. Pointing out certain discrepancies in the evidence of witness Enquiry Officer held that charges 1 to 6 are not proved; but held that charge No.7 proved and that the Petitioner himself had admitted the 7th charge and Petitioner submitted that because of enquiry on the genuineness of the applications by the Deputy Surveyor there was delay in passing the orders and by so Petitioner had admitted the 7th charge. 9. Though Enquiry Officer has held that the charges 1 to 6 are not proved, Disciplinary Authority/ 3rd Respondent disagreed that the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The 3rd Respondent in the order dated 05.09.1994, held that the charges are proved on the following circumstances down below: " Petitioner had not taken assistance of Village Assistants and other officials but had taken the assistance of middle man Hameed Sultan. " It was more probable that the Petitioner had received illegal gratification from the beneficiaries. " Sequence of events would indicate secret arrangement between the Petitioner and Hameed Sultan and the circumstance would indicate that the Petitioner had received gratification. 10. " It was more probable that the Petitioner had received illegal gratification from the beneficiaries. " Sequence of events would indicate secret arrangement between the Petitioner and Hameed Sultan and the circumstance would indicate that the Petitioner had received gratification. 10. The charges 1 to 6 are also proved against the Petitioner by circumstantial evidence the 3rd Respondent had passed the order of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect for 3 years. 11. The contention of Petitioner is that before adopting a definite finding on charges 1 to 6, 3rd Respondent ought to have sent show cause notice to the Petitioner and by giving opportunity to the Petitioner has to propose differing views. 12. Placing reliance upon 2003 LLJ 124 , United Insurance Company Ltd Vs. Chandra Kali, the learned counsel submitted that when the Disciplinary Authority differs from views of Enquiry Officer, it would be incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to issue a 2nd show cause notice. It was further argued that even before issuance of 2nd show cause notice the Respondents ought to have considered the representation of the Petitioner and without doing so, the Disciplinary Authority had arrived at the conclusion finding the Petitioner guilty of charges 1 to 6. .13. The above contention insisting for issuance of another show cause notice by the 3rd Respondent does not merit acceptance. As pointed out earlier the Petitioner has admitted the 7th charge since Petitioner has admitted the 7th charge the 3rd Respondent might have thought fit that 2nd show cause notice may not be necessary for differing from the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of charges 1 to 6. 14. That apart issuance of 2nd show cause notice for differing from the findings of Enquiry Officer does not vitiate the entire enquiry proceedings. In fact, order of District Collector dated 05.09.1994 was subsequently set aside by the 2nd Respondent by the order dated 27.07.1995 for the reason that the Petitioner has no future increments to be earned and that punishment of stoppage of increment for 3 years with cumulative effect cannot be implemented. In fact, order of District Collector dated 05.09.1994 was subsequently set aside by the 2nd Respondent by the order dated 27.07.1995 for the reason that the Petitioner has no future increments to be earned and that punishment of stoppage of increment for 3 years with cumulative effect cannot be implemented. When the 2nd Respondent has directed the 3rd Respondent to send proposal under Rule 9(2) of Tamil Nadu Pension Rules for initiating action against the Petitioner there is no point in challenging order of the District Collector on the ground that 2nd show cause notice was issued by the 3rd Respondent for taking a different view from the findings of the Enquiry Officer. 15. Placing reliance upon AIR 1998 SC 3058 , M.S. Bindra Vs Union of India = 1999(2) S L J (SC)-1996, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that it is a case of no evidence and therefore the High Court has to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the 1st Respondent. The High Court would venture to quash the final orders in disciplinary proceedings only if it stands vitiated by certain fundamental flaws like refusal of admissible evidence or erroneously admitting any inadmissible evidence or where the finding is based on no evidence or the findings are perverse by misreading of evidence etc., 16. In the present case though the Enquiry Officer has held that the charges are not proved on the available materials Disciplinary Authority has arrived at a different conclusion that charges 1 to 6 are proved. It cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. Petitioner has admitted charge No.7 that he had kept number of petitions pending and approved the office note in the petition filed during 1989 for issuance of patta but omitted to make corrections in the records. In so far as charge No.7, Petitioner had admitted the same. Even in respect of other charges, only based upon the discrepancies in the evidences, Enquiry Officer has held that the charges were not proved. .17. In re appreciation of evidence and the circumstances the Disciplinary Authority held that there was every possibility for the Petitioner having committed misconduct. Disciplinary Authority further held that the circumstances would lead to the conclusion that the Petitioner must have accepted the gratification. Therefore Petitioner is not right in contending that it is case of "No evidence". 18. .17. In re appreciation of evidence and the circumstances the Disciplinary Authority held that there was every possibility for the Petitioner having committed misconduct. Disciplinary Authority further held that the circumstances would lead to the conclusion that the Petitioner must have accepted the gratification. Therefore Petitioner is not right in contending that it is case of "No evidence". 18. The District Collector/3rd Respondent was well within his limits to disagree that the views of the Enquiry Officer and arrived at independent findings on the principles of preponderance of probability. It is fairly well settled that the report of the inquiry officer is intended to assist the Disciplinary Authority in coming to a conclusion about the guilt of the Government servant. Its findings or recommendations are advisory in character and are not binding on the Disciplinary Authority who can disagree with them and come to its own assessment of the evidence forming part of the record of enquiry. If the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the inquiry officer on any article of charge, it will, while recording its own findings, also record reasons for disagreement. .19. The learned counsel for Petitioner contended that by imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for 3 years with cumulative effect the Respondents have indirectly permitted the Petitioner to retire from service. It was further argued that without compliance of FR 56(1)(c) the Competitive Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed against the Petitioner after the Petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.1992. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon 2005 (3) CTC 4, State of Tamil Nadu Vs. R.Karuppiah. In the said case delinquent was permitted to retire and thereafter departmental disciplinary proceedings was initiated. In such circumstance Division Bench of this Court has held that no disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against Government servant after he was allowed to retire after attaining age of superannuation unless FR 56(1)(c) was complied with. The above decision is not applicable to the case on hand. As pointed out earlier, in the present case, Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service on attaining age of superannuation on 31.01.1992; but was retained in service under FR 56 (1)(c) as per G.O.(2D)No.5, Revenue (SCG) Department, dated 29.01.1992. There is no substance in the contention of the Petitioner as to non compliance of FR 56 (1)(c). As pointed out earlier, in the present case, Petitioner was not permitted to retire from service on attaining age of superannuation on 31.01.1992; but was retained in service under FR 56 (1)(c) as per G.O.(2D)No.5, Revenue (SCG) Department, dated 29.01.1992. There is no substance in the contention of the Petitioner as to non compliance of FR 56 (1)(c). The alleged occurrence relates to the period between 10.02.1989 to 10.01.1990. Finally orders was passed on 15.07.2005. Petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 30.01.1992. About a week prior to superannuation, Petitioner was placed under suspension on 23.01.1992. Charge memo was issued on 27.01.1992. As many as 3 show cause notices were issued to the Petitioner and final order was passed on 15.07.2005 imposing punishment of removal from service. The impugned order is challenged mainly on the ground on delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings. The learned counsel for the Petitioner forcibly contended that keeping the Petitioner under the charges of corruption and the disciplinary proceeding protracted over a period of 13 years has caused mental agony and pain to the Petitioner. 20. Contending that delay would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon the learned counsel for the Petitioner place reliance upon 2005(5) CTC 451 , The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Chepauk 2005 (6) SCC 636 , P.V.Mahendran vs. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2006 (3) MLJ 621 , M.Elangovan Vs. Trichy District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd, 2008 (6) MLJ 139, Ranjit Singh vs State of Haryana & Other. In the above said decisions charge memo was issued long time after the alleged misconduct or like issuance of 2nd charge memo as in the case of 2007 (3) L.W. 384 , S.Durai singh Gangadaran vs. The Engineer-in-chief Water Resource Organisation and 4 others. Since the charge memos were issued long time after the alleged misconduct in those decisions courts have held that delay would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. .21. The present case is clearly distinguishable on facts. For the alleged misconduct during the period 10.02.1989 to 10.01.1990 charges were framed under Rule 17(b) as against the Petitioner as earlier as on 27.01.1992, petitioner has submitted his explanation on nearly 11 months thereafter on 211. 1992. .21. The present case is clearly distinguishable on facts. For the alleged misconduct during the period 10.02.1989 to 10.01.1990 charges were framed under Rule 17(b) as against the Petitioner as earlier as on 27.01.1992, petitioner has submitted his explanation on nearly 11 months thereafter on 211. 1992. By the time, the 3rd Respondent has passed the order since the Petitioner has already reached the age of superannuating the final orders could not be implemented and the same was set aside by the order dated 27.07.1995. Exercising Revision power under Rule 36 the 1st Respondent is statutorily competent to review the order of 3rd Respondent. The 1st Respondent has afforded reasonable opportunities to the Petitioner to show cause as to why punishment of removal from service should not be imposed on the Petitioner. After affording reasonable opportunities by issuing show cause notice and after obtaining views of TNPSC the 1st Respondent has passed the final order imposing punishment of removal from service for the proved charges by the order dated 15.07.2005. The delay in passing the order has been explained by the Respondents. The Petitioner is not right in contending that there had been unexplained delay which would vitiate the enquiry proceedings. 22. We are left with only question of quantum of punishment. In respect of charges 1 to 6 relates to alleged bribe from beneficiaries through one Hameed Sultan or from the beneficiaries. The 7th charge is in respect of omission of making corrections in records for issuance of patta even after approving office note. .23. In service matters, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. Unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. In B.C. Chaturvedi V.Union of India [1996 I LLJ 1231], the Supreme Court, after considering the various issues and case laws and the scope of interference in the punishment imposed by the authorities, has held as follows :- ."A review of the above legal position would establish that the Disciplinary Authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment, keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment, keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof". 24. The imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion of Disciplinary Authority. Power under Article 226 is one of the judicial review. It is not a appeal from a decision. If misconduct is established normally the court would not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the court. 25. The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. Referring to various decisions in 2007(2) MLJ 278(SC) [Union of India and Ors. v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari], the Supreme Court has held as follows: - "15. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesburys the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. 16. To put differently, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations, it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 17. Further to shorten litigations, it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 17. The above position was recently reiterated in Union of India and another v. K.G. Soni [ 2006(6) Supreme 389 : 2006 III LLJ 802b (SC)] following Domoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and ors. v. Munna Lal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584 : 2005(10) SCC 84 : 2005 I LLJ 730 (SC)." 26. As pointed earlier in respect of charges 1 to 6 Enquiry Officer has held that the charges are not proved. Only based upon the circumstance and from drawing inferences the Disciplinary Authority has held the charges 1 to 6 are proved. In respect of 7th charge which the Petitioner himself has admitted the same, accepting the charge for not carrying out the corrections in the record. 27. The Petitioner has nearly served for 36 years. Of course in para 19 of the counter the Respondents have pointed out 3 other proceedings in which the Petitioner was awarded some other punishment for the proved charges, i.e., Stoppage of increment for two years without cumulative effect. 28. The Petitioner is said to be now aged 72 years and is also said to be a diabetic patient. Taking into consideration the length of service, the Petitioner had put in and taking into consideration the report of the Enquiry Officer and other circumstances, in my considered view punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the proved charges. 29. The punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is modified as reduction in pension. As per Rule 9 (1) (a) the Government can with hold the pension if the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct during his period of service 9 1 (a) reads : "(1)(a). 29. The punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is modified as reduction in pension. As per Rule 9 (1) (a) the Government can with hold the pension if the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct during his period of service 9 1 (a) reads : "(1)(a). The Government reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or part thereof, whether permanently or for a specified period if, in any departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon reemployment after retirement, and such withholding or withdrawing the pension may be effected irrespective of the fact whether or not any pecuniary loss on account of such grave misconduct or negligence was caused to the Government, to any local body or to any co-operative society comprising of Government servants and registered under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. 30.In the result the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. "The impugned order G.O.(Nilai) No.414 Revenue (Per 10(2) Department, dated 15.07.2005 imposing punishment of removal from service is modified. As per Rule 9 (1) (a) of pension rules punishment is modified as reduction of 1/4th pension payable to the Petitioner. "Respondents are directed to settle the retirement benefits 3/4th pension (deducting the prorata subsistence allowance already paid) gratuity, GPF due to the Petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. "Respondents are also directed to process the pension papers within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently W.P.M.P.Nos.38776&38777 of 2005 are also closed.