Judgment :- C.R.P.PD.No.2433 of 2007: This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the Order dated 12.06.2007 passed in I.A.No.490 of 2006 in O.S.No.267 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem. C.R.P.PD.No.2767 of 2007: This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the Order dated 06.08.2007 passed by the I Additional District Munsif, Salem, dismissing the suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007. 2. As the parties and the issues involved are one and the same, a common order is being passed to dispose of the petitions. 3. C.R.P.No.2433 of 2007 has been filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.267 of 2006. 4. O.S.No.267 of 2006 has been filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants/respondents herein from presenting, negotiating or discounting the ten post-dated cheques described in the plaint schedule and also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants/respondents herein to hand over the 10 post-dated cheques to the revision petitioner/plaintiff. 5. The case of the revision petitioner in O.S.No.267 of 2006 is that, the revision petitioner/plaintiff is running a Dental College in Bhubaneswar in the Orissa State by name "Vinayaka Visions Lord Jagannath Institute of Dental Science and Research". The plaintiff decided to transfer the control and management of the Dental College and the first defendant/first respondent Trust was willing to undertake the same and run the Institute. Both the revision petitioner and the respondent herein entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on 27. 2000. But, disputes arose between the parties and therefore, by mutual discussions, the revision petitioner/plaintiff decided to hand over the College to the defendants/respondents to run the same by issuing a Letter of Authorisation dated 11. 2000. Again, further differences crept in between the parties and therefore, the letter of authorisation was revoked by the revision petitioner/plaintiff by issuing a public notice dated 111. 2000. This resulted in the defendants/ respondents herein filed an arbitration case under sEc.9 of the Act before "Khurdha Court" and they also obtained an order of injunction. The defendants/respondents herein also filed ICC Case No.829/2005 against the revision petitioner/plaintiff before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar. Thereafter, the parties decided to settle the differences and accordingly, the earlier Memorandum of Understanding dated 27. 2000 was cancelled and a new agreement was entered into between the parties on 19. 2006 and 19. 2006. As per the agreement dated 19. Thereafter, the parties decided to settle the differences and accordingly, the earlier Memorandum of Understanding dated 27. 2000 was cancelled and a new agreement was entered into between the parties on 19. 2006 and 19. 2006. As per the agreement dated 19. 2006, it was agreed to between the parties as follows: .(i) The total amount agreed to be paid to the defendants by the plaintiff was Rs.3.75 Crores. .(ii) The defendants must pay out of the 3.75 Crores, a sum of Rs.1.00 Crore towards the liabilities to the government of Orissa in respect of 40 acres of land allotted on lease to the plaintiff. (iii) The plaintiff must transfer 7 acres of land out of 40 acres as 33 acres were already remitted to the government. .(iv) It is the sole responsibility of the defendants to get a clearance from the government in respect of 7 acres of leasehold properties. .(v) Out of the 3.75 crores to be paid Rs.1.00 crore is to be paid by way of DD and 5 DDs were purchased in the name of the first defendant Trust Rs.1.00 crore was reserved for the payment to be levied by the government. Rs.1.75 crores have to be paid by way of 10 post dated cheques each of which is for Rs.17.5 lakhs and the same is morefully described in teh schedule hereunder to this suit as the same is the subject matter of the suit. .(vi) Simultaneously, the defendants must withdraw the criminal case ICC 829/2005, before the Senior Divisional Judicial Magistrate. The defendants must also withdraw the Arbitration case 239/2003 pending before the District Judge, Kurdha. On withdrawal of the above cases, the 10 post dated cheques, each of which is for Rs.17.5 lakhs, shall be handed over to the defendants. (vii)Within 15 days, from 19. 2006 the defendant must make arrangements with the government and obtain necessary notice of demand for the cess. .6. According to the revision petitioner/plaintiff, the defendants/respondents herein are not entitled to ten post-dated cheques unless and until they withdrew the criminal and arbitration cases. After receiving the cheques from the court, the defendants/respondents changed their mind and they have withdrawn only the criminal case and not the arbitration case which is still pending. The defendants/ respondents are not entitled to encash the post-dated cheques until both the cases are withdrawn. After receiving the cheques from the court, the defendants/respondents changed their mind and they have withdrawn only the criminal case and not the arbitration case which is still pending. The defendants/ respondents are not entitled to encash the post-dated cheques until both the cases are withdrawn. But now, the defendants are acting in detrimental to the interest of the revision petitioner/plaintiff, which is a breach of contract. The revision petitioner/plaintiff is under the apprehension that the respondents herein may present the cheques on the relevant dates and try to coerce the revision petitioner to pay the amount without performing their part of the contract dated 19. 2006. Hence, they have filed O.S.No.267 of 2006 for the aforesaid reliefs. 7. The respondents herein entered appearance before the trial court and filed an application in I.A.No.490 of 2006 under Sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to refer the parties in the suit for arbitration as provided under the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006. 8. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.490 of 2006, the respondents herein stated that, the entire suit is based on the alleged breach of contract and the refusal to withdraw the arbitration case as provided under the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006. The said agreement provides an arbitration clause for reference of disputes or differences arising out of and touching the terms of the settlement to arbitration and therefore, the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act will govern the field. They also referred to the notorised attested copy of the arbitration agreement filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff in the suit as document No.1. .9. I.A.No.490 of 2006 has been resisted by the revision petitioner herein by filing a counter. In the counter, it is stated by the revision petitioner that, the revision petitioner/plaintiff is neither disputing the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement nor alleging that the same has been brought about by fraud and mis-representation. Accordingly, there is no dispute with regard to the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement nor was there any dispute touching the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the arbitration clause is not attracted. It is only a civil dispute which does not warrant interference of the arbitrator. Accordingly, there is no dispute with regard to the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement nor was there any dispute touching the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the arbitration clause is not attracted. It is only a civil dispute which does not warrant interference of the arbitrator. The existence of valid agreement to refer the existing or future disputes to arbitration does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain the suit relating to the matter agreed to be referred to arbitration nor can such agreement be pleaded as a conclusive bar to the suit. It is the further case of the revision petitioner/plaintiff that the arbitration agreement does not contemplate what the party should do if there is a dishonour of cheque or if any party illegally encashes the cheque and therefore, such matters are out of the purview of the agreement. Hence, they prayed for the dismissal of I.A.No.490 of 2006. To this counter filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff, the respondents/defendants filed rejoinder for referring the matter for arbitration. 10. The trial court by order dated 16. 2007 allowed I.A.No.490 of 2006 and held that the suit is not maintainable in law, apart from referring the dispute to arbitration. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff in the suit has filed C.R.P.No.2433 of 2007 on 20.8.2000. 11. Thereafter, i.e., after the order passed by the trial court, viz., the Principal Sub Court, Salem, the revision petitioner herein has filed another suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 on the file of the Additional District Munsif, Salem. It is pertinent to refer to the fact that even before filing the C.R.P.No.2433 of 2007 on 20.8.2000, they filed a suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and obtained an order of interim injunction in I.A.No.946 of 2007 on 26. 2007. O.S.No.754 of 2007 has been filed by the revision petitioner/ plaintiff for a declaration to declare that the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant dated 27. 2000, 13/19. 2006 and 11. 2007. O.S.No.754 of 2007 has been filed by the revision petitioner/ plaintiff for a declaration to declare that the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant dated 27. 2000, 13/19. 2006 and 11. 2007 are unenforceable, for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit from holding or presenting or negotiating or dealing with the cheques described in the plaint B schedule and also for a permanent injunction restraining the third defendant Bank in that suit from honouring the cheques described in the plaint B Schedule, if presented either by the defendants 1 and 2 or anybody acting on behalf of them. .12. As per the plaint averments in O.S.No.754 of 2007, after entering into a Memorandum of Agreement dated 27. 2000, due to disputes and differences, the same was cancelled and thereafter another memorandum of agreement and Settlement dated 13/19. 2006 was entered into between the parties. Even subsequent to the memorandum of agreement dated 13/19. 2006, there were differences of opinion between the parties and therefore, they entered into a supplemental Memorandum of Agreement and settlement on 1. 2007 and by which, the contents of the entire agreement dated 13/19. 2006 were modified. Even then, there were no consensus between the parties and therefore, the first defendant sent a letter dated 20.01.2007 styled as "new terms of payment for withdrawal of criminal case and arbitration case", by which, the contents of the agreement dated 11. 2007 were modified and altered unilaterally. Thus, by the conduct of the first defendant, the agreements dated 13/19. 2006 and 1. 2007 were cancelled and they became unenforceable. But the defendants 1 and 2 trying to take steps to enforce the agreement which contains a clause of arbitration. The first defendant has withdrawn the criminal case as per the agreement dated 13/19. 2006. Without trying to withdraw the arbitration case, the first defendant is trying to present the post-dated cheques for payment for encashment. If the cheques are dealt with by the first defendant, the plaintiff would be put to loss and hardship. Hence, they filed O.S.No.754 of 2007 for the aforesaid reliefs. The defendants 1 and 2 in the suit entered appearance in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and filed a memo. If the cheques are dealt with by the first defendant, the plaintiff would be put to loss and hardship. Hence, they filed O.S.No.754 of 2007 for the aforesaid reliefs. The defendants 1 and 2 in the suit entered appearance in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and filed a memo. In the memo, the defendants 1 and 2 stated that the plaintiff had earlier filed another suit on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem in O.S.No.267 of 2006 for the relief of a permanent injunction from presenting or negotiating or discounting the ten post-dated cheques and obtained an order of interim injunction in I.A.No.443 of 2006. Since there was an arbitration agreement dated 13/19. 2006, the defendants 1 and 2 invoked Sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and filed an application in I.A.No.490 of 2006 to refer the matter for arbitration. The said application was allowed by the Principal Sub Judge, Salem on 12.06.2007 and the injunction granted also was vacated. Without challenging the order dated 16. 2007, the plaintiff suppressing the entire previous facts filed the present suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and obtained an ad-interim injunction. Hence, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit itself in the memo. An objection was filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff to the memo filed by the defendants 1 and 2, stating that the suit itself is not maintainable as the enforceability of the memo itself is in question. 13. The trial court by order dated 8. 2007 accepted the memo filed by the defendants 1 and 2 and dismissed the suit filed in O.S.No.754 of 2006. Aggrieved by the order of the court dated 8. 2007, the plaintiff in O.S.No.754 of 2007 has filed C.R.P.No.2667 of 2007 on 9. 2007. 14. This court granted an order of status quo. The respondents 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2 have entered appearance and filed a petition to vacate the status quo order. 15. Heard Mr.N.R.Chandran, the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2. I have also gone through the entire documents and the judgments filed in support of their submissions. 16. 15. Heard Mr.N.R.Chandran, the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents 1 and 2/defendants 1 and 2. I have also gone through the entire documents and the judgments filed in support of their submissions. 16. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner submits that the first suit was laid on the ground that there was a breach of contract on the part of the respondents and the second suit was mainly on the basis that the three agreements dated 27. 2000, 13/19. 2006 and the supplemental agreement dated 1. 2007 are unenforceable in view of the new terms put forth by the respondents by letter dated 20.01.2007. According to the learned Senior counsel, the disputes that have arisen between the parties are only civil disputes to be tried by a civil Court and there is no arbitral issue for reference of the disputes to arbitration. The learned Senior counsel contends that as per Sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the application filed under Sec.7 shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereon. Even though the revision petitioner/ plaintiff themselves filed a notorised copy of the arbitration agreement dated 13/19. 2006, in O.S.No.267 of 2006, the respondents have not filed either the original or a certified copy of the agreement except saying that a notorised copy of the agreement has already been filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff. Therefore, the non-filing of the original or certified copy of the arbitration agreement along with Sec.8(1) of the Act is contrary to the mandatory requirements under Sec.8(2) of the Act. The learned Senior counsel in support of the above submissions relied on a decision of the Honble Supreme Court reported in 2008(2) C.T.C. 856 (Atul Singh & others Vs Sunil Kumar Singh & others) 17. The next limb of the argument of the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner is that, the respondents have not indicated specifically to the arbitral dispute which is to be referred to arbitration, in the application filed under Sec.8(1) of the Act, in I.A.No.490 of 2006. The next limb of the argument of the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner is that, the respondents have not indicated specifically to the arbitral dispute which is to be referred to arbitration, in the application filed under Sec.8(1) of the Act, in I.A.No.490 of 2006. The next contention of the learned Senior counsel is that the dismissal of the second suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 by the District Munsif on the basis of a mere memo, was not proper and it is contrary to the provisions of Sec.8 of the Act. The learned Senior counsel urged that such disputes involving enforceability of the M.O.Us. can be gone into only by a civil court and in support of his submission, the learned Senior counsel relied on the following judgments namely: 1. 2001(3) C.T.C. 461 (G.D.R.Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. VS All Sec. Security Ltd.) 2. 2001(3) C.T.C. 269 (H.G.Oomor Sait and another Vs O.Aslam Sait) 3. 2008(2) C.T.C. 659 (M.K.Madhivadanan Vs R.Samarasam) 18. The learned Senior counsel also relied on another decision reported in 2008(2) C.T.C. 856 (cited supra) to submit that the suit filed in O.S.No.754 of 2007 is very much maintainable as it sought for a declaration to declare the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement containing the arbitration clause has become unenforceable. 19. Per contra, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents submitted that, the ten posted-dated cheques were obtained by the respondents on voluntary deposit by the revision petitioner before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate while withdrawing the criminal case. At any event, the respondents by letter dated 10. 2006 invited the revision petitioner to come to Bhubaneswar for filing of a joint memo for withdrawing the arbitration case. Without responding to the same, the revision petitioner filed a suit alleging as if there was a breach of contract and praying for permanent injunction against the honouring of the ten post-dated cheques. The revision petitioner has also obtained an order of injunction and on coming to know about that they filed I.A.No.490 of 2006 under Sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Sub Judge by order dated 16. 2007 referred the parties to arbitration. But, without disclosing the earlier suit and the order passed by the Sub Court, the revision petitioner filed another suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and obtained an order of injunction. The Sub Judge by order dated 16. 2007 referred the parties to arbitration. But, without disclosing the earlier suit and the order passed by the Sub Court, the revision petitioner filed another suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and obtained an order of injunction. On coming to know about this, they filed a memo and the Additional District Munsif passed an order accepting the Memo, holding that the second suit was not maintainable. The learned Senior counsel after referring to the Sec.8 of the Act, 1996 submits that both the suits are based on three agreements dated 27. 2000, 13/19. 2006 and 1. 2007, all containing an arbitration clause for reference of the disputes to arbitration. The learned Senior counsel pointed out to the supplemental Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 1. 2007, wherein the parties have specifically agreed not to resort to civil or criminal proceedings, but, would have reference only to arbitration. The learned Senior counsel points out that in O.S.No.267 of 2006, the revision petitioner filed a notorised attested copy of the arbitration agreement dated 13/19. 2006 as plaint Document No.1 They also admitted in the counter that, the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement is in existence containing an arbitration clause. While filing the rejoinder, the respondents have also filed a notorised attested copy of the arbitration agreement and only thereafter, I.A.No.490 of 2006 was disposed of by the trial court after satisfying that there is a Memorandum of Agreement and settlement containing an arbitration clause. Thus, the mandatory provisions contained, Sec.8(2) of the Act has been clearly complied with and in support of his submissions, the learned Senior counsel relied on the decisions reported in 1. 2007(3) SCC 686 (Agri Gold Exims Ltd. Vs Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens and others) 2. 2008(3) C.T.C. 740 (Union of India, owning Southern Railway and another Vs Rajesh Damani, Proprietor, Allied General Sales Corporation) 3. 2007(2) C.T.C. 818 (Sri Lakshmi Enterprises Vs R.Ramakrishnan) 4. 2006(4) C.T.C. 377 (Sporting Pastime India Ltd. and another Vs Kasthuri & Sons Ltd.) 5. 2006(5) C.T.C. 865 (The General Manager, Northern Railway Vs The Metal Powder Company Ltd. and another) 6. 2007(4) C.T.C. 186 (Andritz Oy. Vs Enmas Engg. Pvt. Ltd. and another) 7. 2006(1) SCC 417 (Ardy International (P) Ltd. and another Vs Inspiration clothes & U and another) 20. 2006(5) C.T.C. 865 (The General Manager, Northern Railway Vs The Metal Powder Company Ltd. and another) 6. 2007(4) C.T.C. 186 (Andritz Oy. Vs Enmas Engg. Pvt. Ltd. and another) 7. 2006(1) SCC 417 (Ardy International (P) Ltd. and another Vs Inspiration clothes & U and another) 20. With regard to the objections in respect of the dismissal of the second suit filed in O.S.No.754 of 2007, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents submits that as there was already an order of the higher authority i.e. Sub Judge, Salem referring the matter to arbitration in the light of the arbitration clauses, the memo is sufficient to bring to the notice of the trial court in the second suit. In any event, the learned Senior counsel contends that the judicial authority has power to refer the parties to arbitration suo motto on coming to know of the existence of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration clause. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision reported in 2006(1) SCC 417 (cited surpa). 21. The learned Senior counsel further submits that the arbitration clause in a contract shall be treated as an independent contract and cancellation of the agreement does not result in abrogation of the arbitration clause. In support of this submission, the learned Senior counsel relied on the decision reported in 2007(3) C.T.C. 699 (National Agricultural Co-op Marketing Federation India Ltd. Vs Gains Trading Ltd.) and 2005(2) C.T.C. 487 (Ford Credit Kotak Mahindra Ltd. Vs M.Swaminathan). Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the revision petitions. 22. I have considered the rival submissions carefully with regard to facts and citations. The following facts are not in dispute and in fact, they are admitted by both the parties. 1) The parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on 17. 2000 which contains an arbitration clause. 2) Thereafter, another Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006 was entered into between the parties and there also there is an arbitration clause. 3) O.S.No.267 of 2006 has been filed by the revision petitioner for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from presenting the ten post-dated cheques and also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to hand over all the 10 post-dated cheques. 4) In the plaint itself, in O.S.No.267 of 2006, the revision petitioner admitted the first agreement dated 27. 2000 and the second agreement dated 13/19. 2006. 4) In the plaint itself, in O.S.No.267 of 2006, the revision petitioner admitted the first agreement dated 27. 2000 and the second agreement dated 13/19. 2006. 5) A notorised attested copy of the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006 has been filed by the revision petitioner along with plaint as Document No.1. 6) I.A.No.490 of 2006 has been filed by the defendants in O.S.No.267 of 2006 under Sec.8 of the Act 1996. 7) Though a notorised copy has been filed by the revision petitioners themselves along with the plaint, the defendants have also filed a copy of the same along with rejoinder filed by them in I.A.No.490 of 2006. 8) A supplemental Memorandum of Agreement and settlement was entered into between the parties on 1. 2007 containing an arbitration clause. 9) In the order dated 16. 2007 made in I.A.No.490 of 2006, the trial court referred the fact that the agreement was not at all disputed by the plaintiff and as per the agreement, there is an arbitration clause. 10) The trial court has also found that already an Arbitrator was appointed by the defendants in the suit and this fact was not denied by the revision petitioner. 11) Without challenging the order passed by the trial court, on 16. 2007, the revision petitioner filed another suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 in another court for various reliefs, which includes the relief of declaration to declare that all the three agreements are unenforceable. 12) In the latter suit filed in O.S.no.754 of 2007, the facts and particulars about the filing of the previous suit and the order passed by the trial court in the Sec.8 application were not at all disclosed. 13) The respondents/defendants entered appearance and filed memo on 20.7.2007 in the latter suit filed in O.S.No.754 of 2007 and the trial court after noticing the earlier facts and the earlier suit filed in O.S.No.267 of 2006 accepted the memo, and dismissed O.S.No.754 of 2007 on 8. 2007. 23. In the light of the above admitted facts, now, let me consider the contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioner while assailing the orders of the trial court, challenged in the above revision petitions. 24. 2007. 23. In the light of the above admitted facts, now, let me consider the contentions raised on behalf of the revision petitioner while assailing the orders of the trial court, challenged in the above revision petitions. 24. The first and foremost argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that, the respondents herein have not filed the original agreement or a duly certified copy thereof along with the application filed by them in I.A.No.490 of 2006, in O.S.No.267 of 2006, which was filed under Sec.8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. It is contended on behalf of the revision petitioner that, by not filing the original agreement or a certified copy of the same, Sec.8(2) of the Act 1996 has been violated and therefore, the trial court ought not to have entertained I.A.No.490 of 2006 at all. In this context, heavy reliance was placed on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in 2008(2) C.T.C. 856 (cited supra). 25. In 2008(2) C.T.C. 856 (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the requirement of Sub-Sec.2 of Sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the applicant should file the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof along with the petition and failure to do so, will result in not passing orders in the application filed under Sec.8(2) of the Act. The relevant portion reads as under: "10. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act says that the Application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. As already stated in the earlier part of the judgment, defendant NO.3 had moved an Application on 211. 2004 under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceedings of the title suit and for referring the matter to arbitration. He filed a supplementary petition to the aforesaid Application on 112. 2004. Herein also reference was made to Sec.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940. Thereafter, he filed an application on 28.02.2005 praying that as the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been repealed and the suit is of the year 1998, to avoid any confusion, his earlier petitions may be treated to have been filed under Sec.8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 2004. Herein also reference was made to Sec.34 of Arbitration Act, 1940. Thereafter, he filed an application on 28.02.2005 praying that as the Arbitration Act, 1940 had been repealed and the suit is of the year 1998, to avoid any confusion, his earlier petitions may be treated to have been filed under Sec.8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. None of these petitions were accompanied by the original arbitration agreement dated 17.02.1992 or a duly certified copy thereof. In fact, there is no requirement of filing the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof under Section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940 and as such there was no occasion for defendant No.3 to file the aforesaid document. The third petition filed on 22. 2005 contained the following prayer: "It is therefore, prayed that your honour may graciously be pleased to treat the petitions dated 211. 2004, 112. 2004 and the present petition as supplement and part of each other for deciding the prayer with regard to stay of the proceedings of the aforesaid suit and/or to refer to arbitration in view of the arbitration agreement covering the subject matter of this suit." 26. On going through the above decision, I am of the considered view that the same will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. First of all, the petitioner themselves, in O.S.No.267 of 2006, filed the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 19. 2006 along with the plaint. This agreement was very much admitted by the petitioner themselves in O.S.No.267 of 2006. Further, in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.490 of 2006 filed under Sec.8 of the Act, 1996, the respondents have clearly mentioned in para 3 of the affidavit that, the revision petitioner/plaintiff has already filed a notorised attested copy of the arbitration agreement along with the suit as Document No.1 in the plaint. In the counter filed by the revision petitioner in I.A.No.490 of 2006, the revision petitioner admitted the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement, but, contended that there is no dispute with regard to the Memorandum of Agreement and settlement nor was there any dispute touching the terms of the agreement. Therefore, according to them, the arbitration clause is not attracted at all. The revision petitioner further added that the prayer sought for in the suit is only a civil dispute which does not warrant the interference of the arbitration. Therefore, according to them, the arbitration clause is not attracted at all. The revision petitioner further added that the prayer sought for in the suit is only a civil dispute which does not warrant the interference of the arbitration. According to the revision petitioner, even though there is a clause in the agreement regarding the reference to arbitration, it does not as a matter of course entitled the respondents herein/defendants in the suit to go for an arbitration. Thus, it is very clear that there is no dispute with regard to the arbitration agreement and the only contention of the revision petitioner is that, the arbitration clause does not get attracted and the matter is to be decided only by the civil court. To the counter filed by the revision petitioner in I.A.No.490 of 2006, a rejoinder was filed by the respondents/defendants, wherein in para 8, the respondents/defendants have clearly stated that they are filing the arbitration agreement dated 13/19. 2006 though the same has been filed by the revision petitioner/plaintiff. In the light of the above, the arguments advanced on behalf of the revision petitioner that I.A.No.490 of 2006 in O.S.No.267 of 2006 should have been rejected for not filing the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of the same, is devoid of merits and the same is only to be rejected. 27. In 2007(3) SCC 686 (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court held that when arbitration agreement exists, the court is obliged to refer the parties to arbitration. The Honble Supreme Court further observed that Sec.8 of the 1996 Act is peremptory in nature and in a case where there exists an arbitration agreement, the court is under an obligation to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement. In that case, the Honble Supreme Court found that the existence of the arbitration agreement is not disputed and therefore, the High Court is right in referring the disputes between the parties to arbitration. The relevant portions read as under: "16. We need not dilate on this issue as this aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co.1 wherein this Court noticed: (SCC pp. 285-86, paras 24-25) “24. Section 34 of the repealed 1940 Act employs the expression steps in the proceedings . The relevant portions read as under: "16. We need not dilate on this issue as this aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co.1 wherein this Court noticed: (SCC pp. 285-86, paras 24-25) “24. Section 34 of the repealed 1940 Act employs the expression steps in the proceedings . Only in terms of Section 21 of the 1940 Act, the dispute could be referred to arbitration provided the parties thereto agreed. Under the 1940 Act, the suit was not barred. The court would not automatically refer the dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal. In the event, it having arrived at a satisfaction that there is no sufficient reason that the dispute should not be referred and no step in relation thereto was taken by the applicant, it could stay the suit. 25. Section 8 of the 1996 Act contemplates some departure from Section 34 of the 1940 Act. Whereas Section 34 of the 1940 Act contemplated stay of the suit; Section 8 of the 1996 Act mandates a reference. Exercise of discretion by the judicial authority, which was the hallmark of Section 34 of the 1940 Act, has been taken away under the 1996 Act. The direction to make reference is not only mandatory, but the arbitration proceedings to be commenced or continued and conclusion thereof by an arbitral award remain unhampered by such pendency. (See O.P. Malhotra’s The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation, 2nd Edn., pp. 346-47.)” 17. The respondents had not filed any written statement in the suit. They had not disclosed their defence. They indisputably had raised a dispute in regard to the claim of the appellant. We have noticed the arbitration agreement entered into by and between the parties. It is of wide amplitude. The arbitration agreement brings within its fold dispute of any nature whatsoever. It is in broadest term. The respondents had made payments without prejudice to their rights and contentions. Payments were made keeping in view the ongoing business relationship between the parties. Out of the five post-dated cheques, two were dishonoured. But, despite pendency of the suit, payments had been made to satisfy the claim of the appellant in respect of the cheques which were dishonoured. Sufficient explanation has been offered by the respondents therefor. Certain contingencies of events, as indicated hereinbefore, are not in dispute. Out of the five post-dated cheques, two were dishonoured. But, despite pendency of the suit, payments had been made to satisfy the claim of the appellant in respect of the cheques which were dishonoured. Sufficient explanation has been offered by the respondents therefor. Certain contingencies of events, as indicated hereinbefore, are not in dispute. If the suit was confined to the amount in respect of those two cheques, the contention of Mr Rao could have been accepted. But it is not so. 18. The term dispute must be given its general meaning under the 1996 Act. 22. Section 8 of the 1996 Act is peremptory in nature. In a case where there exists an arbitration agreement, the court is under obligation to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement. (See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums2 and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd.1) No issue, therefore, would remain to be decided in a suit. Existence of arbitration agreement is not disputed. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was right in referring the dispute between the parties to arbitration." 28. In 2008(3) C.T.C. 740 (cited supra), this court following the judgment reported in 2007(3) SCC 686 (cited supra), held that it indicates that parties agreed to specific procedure for settlement of disputes or consensus is sufficient and refusal to refer the parties to arbitration for non production of agreement containing arbitration clause is erroneous. The relevant portions read as under: "11. It is evident from the Purchase Order placed by the revision petitioners that the order was placed subject to the Indian Railway Standard Conditions of Contract. It was only on the basis of the said Purchase order, the respondent had supplied the materials to the revision petitioners and as such, the general conditions of contract of the railways governs the transaction. It was only on the basis of the said Purchase order, the respondent had supplied the materials to the revision petitioners and as such, the general conditions of contract of the railways governs the transaction. As per clause 2900 of the terms of contract, in the event of any question, dispute or difference arising under the conditions or special conditions of contract, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Gazetted Railway Officer appointed to be the Arbitrator, by the General Manager in the case of contracts entered into by the Zonal Railways and Production Units; by any Member of the Railway Board, in the case of contracts entered into by the Railway Board; and by the Head of the Organization in respect of contracts entered into by the other organizations under the Ministry of Railways. 12. The learned trial judge rejected the Application filed by the Revision petitioners on the ground that the arbitration agreement has not been produced before the Court. However, the learned trial judge failed to note that even the Purchase Order produced by the respondent refers to the standard terms contract of Indian Railways and there is a clear indication in the Purchase Order that the order has been placed as per the terms of the said contract. Therefore, I am of the view that the learned trial judge was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground of non-production of the Arbitration Agreement. 13. It is trite that an agreement containing a clause for arbitration need not expressly refer the term arbitration and in case there is indication that the parties have agreed to a specific procedure for settlement of their dispute by referring the matter, the said consensus could be termed to be an Arbitration Agreement. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that the learned trial Judge committed a serious error in rejecting the application filed by the revision petitioners for reference to the Arbitrator and as such, the order of the learned trial judge is liable to be set aside." 29. In 2007(2) C.T.C. 812 (cited supra), this court held that when the dispute is covered under the arbitration agreement, it is mandatory on the part of the civil court to refer the dispute to arbitration for adjudication. 30. In 2006(4) C.T.C. 377 (cited supra), this court held as under: "15. In 2007(2) C.T.C. 812 (cited supra), this court held that when the dispute is covered under the arbitration agreement, it is mandatory on the part of the civil court to refer the dispute to arbitration for adjudication. 30. In 2006(4) C.T.C. 377 (cited supra), this court held as under: "15. Before considering the above issue, it would be useful and appropriate to analyse the provisions contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, 1996 which are having utmost relevance and importance to be borne in view to decide the issue: Section 8 of the Act, 1996 reads as Under: "A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. Notwithstanding that an Application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the Judicial Authority, an arbitration may be commenced and an arbitral award made." 16. By virtue of section 8 of the Act, 1996, it is mandatory for the Judicial Authority, before which an action has been brought in a matter, being the subject matter of an arbitration agreement, to refer the parties for arbitration provided, (a) the application under this Section is made any time before submitting the "first statement on the substance of the dispute" and (b) the Judicial authority is satisfied that there is a valid arbitration agreement. Sub-section (3) provides that an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award be made inspite of (a) application made under subsection (1) and (b) pendency of the issue before the Judicial Authority." 31. In 2006(5) C.T.C. 865 (cited supra), this court held that the agreement between the parties need not be produced along with the application under Sec.8(3) of the 1996 Act and further held that non production of the agreement between the parties along with the application will not dis-entitled the petitioner from claiming the relief under the said act. The relevant portion reads as under: "10. The relevant portion reads as under: "10. Though initially the counsel for the first respondent has raised an objection with regard to non-filing of the arbitration agreement along with with I.A.No.54 of 2003, stating that it is mandatory, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 later fairly submitted that they are not pressing that point. In view of the said fact and also in view of the fact that it has been held by the Apex Court as well as by this court that the agreement between the parties need not be produced along with the Application under section 8(3) of the said act, I am constrained to hold that non-production of the agreement between the parties along with the application will not disentitle the petitioner from claiming the relief under the said Act. 32. In the very same judgment, this court further held that as per Sec.16 of the Act 1996, the judiciary is empowered to decide the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement and therefore, the question whether there is an arbitral dispute can be very well gone into by the arbitrator himself. The following paragraphs are relevant in this regard. "13. It is obligatory on the part of the Court if it is brought to the notice of the Court that there exists an agreement containing a clause to refer the matter for arbitration. The arbitrator has got ample power to decide whether there is an existence of the arbitration clause in the agreement or he can give his own ruling about the validity of the arbitration agreement. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to Section 16(1) of the said Act which reads as follows: "16. Competence of Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction (1) the Arbitral Tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence o validity of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose, .(a) an Arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract; and .(b) a decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the Arbitration Clause." 14. The above said provision clearly gives power to the Arbitrator to decide the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. The above said provision clearly gives power to the Arbitrator to decide the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no Arbitration clause in the agreement and that even if there is a clause regarding arbitration in the said agreement, it has not been accepted by the first respondent, can be decided by the Arbitrator and on that count, the respondents cannot claim that the Application filed by the petitioner to refer the matter for arbitration under section 8 of the Act is invalid. 21. Therefore, in case where there is an Arbitration Clause in the agreement, it is obligatory for the court to refer the matter in terms of the arbitration agreement and nothing remains to be decided in the original action, namely, in the suit that has been instituted by the first respondent herein, after an Application is made under Section 8(3) of the Act, except to court to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator. In view of the mandatory for the Civil Court to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator. In view of the mandatory option, but to refer the dispute to arbitration. The main objects of the Act itself are as under: .(i) to comprehensively cover international and commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation; .(ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. The main objects of the Act itself are as under: .(i) to comprehensively cover international and commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation; .(ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. (iii) to provide that the Arbitral Tribunal gives reasons for its arbitral award; .(iv) to ensure that the Arbitral Tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; .(v) to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process; .(vi) to permit the Arbitral Tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other procedures during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement of disputes; (vii) to provide that every final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court; (viii) to provide that a settlement agreement reached by the parties as a result of conciliation proceedings will have the same status and effect as an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal; and (ix) to provide that, for purposes of enforcement of foreign awards, every arbitral award made in a country to which one of the two international conventions relating to foreign arbitral awards to which India is a party applies, will be treated as a foreign award." 22. Thus, the legislative intent underlying the 1996 Act is to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process and nominate/appoint the Arbitrator without wasting time, leaving all contentions issues to be urged and agitated before the Arbitral Tribunal itself. The contentious issues like whether there is an Arbitration clause or the parties have agreed for such clause, should not be gone into or decided at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to raise such an objection before the Arbitral Tribunal as laid down under section 16 of the Act which empowers an Arbitrator to rule about its own, jurisdiction." 33. In 2007(4) C.T.C. 186 (cited supra), this court held as under: "45. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to raise such an objection before the Arbitral Tribunal as laid down under section 16 of the Act which empowers an Arbitrator to rule about its own, jurisdiction." 33. In 2007(4) C.T.C. 186 (cited supra), this court held as under: "45. The scope of the enquiry under Sec.8, is only peripheral in nature in the sense that it is confined to the examination of a few aspects namely (a) the existence of an Arbitration Agreement, (b) whether the action brought before the Court is by one of the parties to the said Agreement against the other party, (c)whether the subject matter of the action before the Court is the same as the subject matter of the Arbitration Agreement, and (d) whether the other party moves the Court seeking a reference to Arbitration, before submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. In other words, the Judicial Authority is not empowered under Section 8 to get into the merits of the case to decide whether the parties should be referred to Arbitration under section is only on the Arbitration Agreement and not on the merits of the dispute that has arisen between the parties. It is perhaps on account of this fact that Section 7(2) equated an Arbitration Agreement made out in the form of a separate Agreement to an Arbitration clause contained in a main agreement." 34. In 2006(1) SCC 417 (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed that the situation contemplated by Sec.8, can arise only at the first instance of an opponent and defendant in a judicial proceeding or at the highest suo moto at the instance of a judicial authority, when the judicial authority comes to know of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In either event, there is no question of the court under Sec.8 of the 1996 Act, restraining the arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. The relevant portion reads as under: "4. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for both the sides and at the end of the day we are satisfied that the whole proceedings were started, continued and concluded under misconception of law. In the first place, Section 8 is not intended to restrain arbitration proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. The relevant portion reads as under: "4. We have extensively heard the learned counsel for both the sides and at the end of the day we are satisfied that the whole proceedings were started, continued and concluded under misconception of law. In the first place, Section 8 is not intended to restrain arbitration proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. The situation contemplated by Section 8 can arise only at the first instance of an opponent and defendant in a judicial proceeding, or, at the highest, suo motu at the instance of the judicial authority, when the judicial authority comes to know of the existence of an arbitration agreement. In either event, there is no question of the court under Section 8 of the 1996 Act restraining the arbitral proceedings from commencing or continuing. In fact, Section 8 is intended to achieve, so to say, the converse result. Unfortunately, in this case the application for interim relief was made by the respondent who was the plaintiff before the civil court. The relief sought therein is the restraint of arbitral proceedings. It could only have been decided as an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 for whatever it was worth. Once the objection to this application was filed by the appellant bringing to the notice of the court the existence of an arbitration agreement, thereafter the proceedings could have been continued only within the parameters of Section 8 of the 1996 Act. A proceeding under Section 8 could never result in an order restraining the arbitral proceedings, which is what finally the impugned order before us does." 35. In the light of the above judgments also, I am of the considered view that the application filed by the respondents in I.A.No.490 of 2006 in O.S.No.267 of 2006 should not be rejected on the ground that the original agreement or a certified copy of the same was not filed by the respondents herein along with the application filed under sec.8 of the Act. 36. The next contention raised by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the revision petitioner is that the respondents have not indicated specifically to the arbitral dispute which is to be referred to arbitration in the application filed under Sec.8(1) of the Act, in I.A.No.490 of 2006. .37. 36. The next contention raised by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the revision petitioner is that the respondents have not indicated specifically to the arbitral dispute which is to be referred to arbitration in the application filed under Sec.8(1) of the Act, in I.A.No.490 of 2006. .37. In the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.490 of 2006, the respondents have stated that the entire suit filed in O.S.No.267 of 2006 is based on the alleged breach of contract and the refusal to withdraw the arbitration clause as provided under the new Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006. As a dispute has now arisen touching the terms of the said agreement, the same is to be resolved through arbitration. These pleadings are sufficient to maintain the application filed under sec.8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and in fact, both the parties could adjudicate the matter in this regard also before the arbitration tribunal itself. Therefore, I do not find any merits in this contention also and the same is rejected. 38. The third objection raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the trial court has committed an illegality in dismissing the second suit filed in O.S.No.754 of 2007 merely on the basis of a memo filed by the respondents herein. 39. I am unable to accept this contention also. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior counsel for the respondents, the revision petitioner did not even mention about the previous suit filed in O.S.No.267 of 2006 and the orders passed by the trial court in I.A.No.490 of 2006. Since already a Civil Court has decided the issue in favour of the respondents by holding that the matter is to be referred to arbitration, it cannot be said that there is an illegality in dismissing the second suit on the basis of a memo filed by the respondents herein. In fact, the second suit was dismissed on the ground that already there was an order by another court between the same parties to refer the matter to arbitration on the basis of the very same agreements mentioned in both the suits and therefore, I do not find any illegality in the order of the trial court in dismissing the second suit warranting interference under article 227 of the Constitution of India. 40. 40. It was mainly argued on behalf of the revision petitioner that the two suits filed by them are outside the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement and the civil courts are competent to decide the issues raised by them in both the suits. .41. In 2001(3) C.T.C. 269 (cited supra), this court held that Civil Court is not prevented from proceeding with the suit despite an arbitration clause, if disputes involves serious questions of law or complicated questions of fact, adjudication of which would depend upon detailed oral and documentary evidence. This court further added that the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court is not to be readily and unconditionally assumed and civil court can refuse to refer the matter to arbitration if complicated question of fact or law is involved or where allegation of fraud is made. 42. In 2008(2) C.T.C. 659 (cited supra), on the facts and circumstances of that case, this court held that substitution of agreement regarding repayment of advance and part payment made by the petitioner gave new cause of action and obliterated earlier agreement and hence, suit is maintainable and dispute need not be referred to arbitration. 43. In 2008(2) C.T.C. 856 (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court held that the suit filed is for a decree for declaration of the reconstituted partnership deed was illegal and void and therefore, the relief for such a declaration could be only granted by civil court and not by arbitrator. 44. Relying on the above judgment, the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the arbitration clauses contained in the agreement did not get attracted in the present case and the suits are very much maintainable for the reliefs sought for. 45. I am unable to accept this submission made by the learned Senior counsel on behalf of the revision petitioner. 46. It is settled law that an observation or a decision made by a superior court should not be straightaway imported to a case without understanding the facts and circumstances of the decided case. Only when the facts and circumstances are similar and identical, the decisions rendered earlier should be applied and if the facts are totally different, the decisions decided earlier by the superior courts should not be imported straightaway to decide the latter cases. Only when the facts and circumstances are similar and identical, the decisions rendered earlier should be applied and if the facts are totally different, the decisions decided earlier by the superior courts should not be imported straightaway to decide the latter cases. A perusal of the above said judgments will make it very clear that the facts in those cases are totally different and they are easily distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Therefore, these decisions are not of any use to the revision petitioner. .47. It is not in dispute that in the present case, a Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 27. 2000 has been entered into between the parties containing an arbitration clause, which reads as under: ."In the event of there being any disputes or differences arising and touching the terms of this agreement, the parties agree to refer the disputes to arbitration and the provisions of Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act would apply to such disputes or proceedings." .48. It is also an admitted fact that another Memorandum of Agreement and settlement dated 13/19. 2006 has been entered into between the parties which also contains an arbitration clause. ."7. In the event of any disputes or differences arising out of and touching the terms of this Memorandum of Settlement, the same shall be referred to Arbitration and the Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act will govern. The parties agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the Courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute which may henceforth arise between the parties as a consequence of this Settlement Agreement." .49. It is also an admitted fact that on 1. 2007, a supplemental Memorandum of Agreement and settlement came into existence between the parties, in which also, there is an arbitration clause which reads as under: ."Both the parties to this final settlement mutually agree that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 will govern their future disputes. The parties further agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute or difference arising out of the Settlement Agreement dated 13/19. 2006 and this Supplemental Agreement." .50. The parties further agree that the Arbitration shall be held at Chennai and the courts in Chennai alone shall have jurisdiction over any dispute or difference arising out of the Settlement Agreement dated 13/19. 2006 and this Supplemental Agreement." .50. In such circumstances, there is no denying the fact that the parties have contemplated settling their disputes before the arbitral tribunal with regard to the disputes that would arise on the basis of the agreements entered into. In such circumstances, the trial court has rightly directed the parties to go before the arbitral tribunal and I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the orders passed by both the courts in both the suits. In fact, in the order dated 16. 2007, made in I.A.No.490 of 2006, the trial court has referred to the fact that the arbitration agreement has been produced and the same is not disputed at all by the revision petitioner. The trial court has also referred to the fact made on behalf of the respondents that already an arbitrator was appointed and arbitration notice was also issued and this fact was also not denied by the revision petitioner herein. 51. In such circumstances, I do not find any infirmity in the order of the trial court in referring the parties in O.S.No.267 of 2006 to arbitration and therefore, the same is to be upheld. 52. The second order dated 20.7.2007, made in O.S.No.754 of 2007 has been passed on the basis of the memo filed by the respondents herein wherein they have stated that already an order has been passed in O.S.No.267 of 2006 on 16. 2007 referring the parties to arbitration and suppressing the same, the second suit has been filed and an order of interim injunction has been obtained. The trial court after going through the entire matter, found that when already an order has been passed referring the parties to arbitration, the second suit is also not maintainable between the same parties on the basis of the same agreements and therefore, accepted the memo and rejected the suit itself. Thus, it is contended that the order passed in the second suit is consequent to the order passed in the first suit i.e., I.A.No.490 of 2006 in O.S.No.267 of 2006. I have already held that the trial court is right in passing the order in I.A.No.490 of 2006 and upheld that order. Thus, it is contended that the order passed in the second suit is consequent to the order passed in the first suit i.e., I.A.No.490 of 2006 in O.S.No.267 of 2006. I have already held that the trial court is right in passing the order in I.A.No.490 of 2006 and upheld that order. Consequently, I have to necessarily hold that the order passed by the trial court in the second suit in O.S.No.754 of 2007 is also valid and the same is to be upheld. 153. Though arguments have been advanced on behalf of both the sides on the question of maintainability of the Civil Revision petitions, I am not inclined to go into that question in view of the fact that I have passed orders disposing of the revision petitions on merits. 154. In the result, C.R.P. No.2433 of 2007 is dismissed. No cost. M.P.No.1 and 2 of 2007 are also dismissed. C.R.P.No.2767 of 2007 is dismissed. No cost. M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2007 are also dismissed. M.P.No.3 of 2007 filed by the respondents to vacate the status quo order is allowed.