Judgment : These Writ Petitions are filed challenging the enquiry report dated 30.08.2004 and Surcharge notice dated 112. 2007 and the Surcharge order passed on 25. 2008 for the alleged loss caused to the 2nd Respondent – Ettimarathupatti Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank by omissions and commissions to the tune of Rs.1,00,32,150.97. 2. Second Respondent – Ettimarathupatti Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank borrows money from State Central Co-operative Bank and lends money to agriculturists. On Petitions from the public and on the proceedings of the then Dy. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Dharmapuri Circle, Sec.81 enquiry was ordered under Na.Ka.3070/03 Tho.Va dated 23. 2003. During enquiry several instances of falsification of accounts, creation of forged records and misappropriation were found by the Enquiry Officer. Enquiry Officer started her enquiry on 23. 2003 and two extensions on 26. 2003 and on 29. 2003 were granted to her. Enquiry Officer completed her enquiry on 212. 2003 and submitted her report on 01. 2004. Enquiry Officer found 8 employees of the Bank viz., Writ Petitioners, Kumarasamy, Mohan, Special Officer and Raju, H/o.Minerva (Petitioner in W.P.No.16329/2008 and 9 members of the Board of Management are guilty of the charges levelled against them. Report of the Enquiry Officer was received on 25. 2004. Explanations were called for from the Enquiry Officer as to the delay in submitting and certain other queries were also raised. Enquiry Officer submitted her second report clarifying the queries raised by the Dy. Registrars Office on 30.8.2004 and 09. 2004. 3. Writ Petitioners (1) G.Pannerselvam-Circle Inspector [W.P.Nos.10451, 10452/2008 & 16710/2008]; (2) K.V.Krishnan-Circle Inspector [W.P.No.15520/2008]; (3) V.Chinnasamy-Assistant [W.P.No.16135/2008]; (4) S.K.Perumal-Field Manager [W.P.No.16342/2008] were all working as employees of the Bank. Writ Petitioners (1) M.Vadivel (Ex. Vice President of the bank); (2) P.Jayavel (Ex. Director); (3) Sivalingam (Ex. Director) in W.P.No.16484/2008 were the Directors in the Board of 2nd Respondent. 4. Based on the enquiry report, 1st Respondent initiated Surcharge proceedings u/s.87 (1) of Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. Each of the Writ Petitioners were included in various items as indicated in the Surcharge order. Surcharge notice was issued to the Writ Petitioners calling upon them to appear for enquiry on 23. 2008. After issuance of notice u/s.87(1) of the Act, enquiry was posted on 23. 2008. On 23. 2008, Writ Petitioners attended the enqury and the same was adjourned to 15.04.2008. 5. On 14. Surcharge notice was issued to the Writ Petitioners calling upon them to appear for enquiry on 23. 2008. After issuance of notice u/s.87(1) of the Act, enquiry was posted on 23. 2008. On 23. 2008, Writ Petitioners attended the enqury and the same was adjourned to 15.04.2008. 5. On 14. 2008, Writ Petitioners N. Periyasamy, G.Pannerselvam, K.V.Krishnan, S.K.Perumal, N.Kumarasamy and R.Minerva appeared for enquiry, but did not give evidence. They undertook to appear on 05. 2008. Writ Petitioners are said to have appeared for enquiry and requested for adjournment to 6. 2008 stating that they have filed W.P.Nos.10451 & 10452/2008. On 05. 2008 only Writ Petitioner R.Minerva (W.P.No.16329/2008) appeared for enquiry and enquiry was adjourned to 25. 2008. On 25. 2008, first Respondent has passed the impugned Surcharge order. 6. Challenging the enquiry report and Surcharge order these Writ Petitions are filed. There are three categories of Writ Petitions:- 1) W.P.No.10451/2008 challenging the enquiry report dated 30.08.2004. 2) W.P.Nos.10452/08, 15520/08, 16135/08, 16329/08, challenging the Surcharge notice dated 112. 2007 u/s.87(1) of the Act and Surcharge order dated 25. 2008. 3) W.P.Nos.16342/08, 18299/08, 16484/08 challenging the enquiry report dated 30.8.2004 and also Surcharge order dated 25. 2008 and W.P.No.16710/08 challenges Surcharge order dated 25. 2008. 7. Case of the Writ Petitioners is that enquiry report allegedly completed on 01. 2004 and filed on 25. 2004 has no validity in the eye of law. Further case of the Petitioners is that statutory period contemplated u/s.81(4) is only three months and enquiry report filed on 25. 2004 and the further enquiry reports dated 30.8.2004 and 09. 2004 were beyond the statutory period prescribed u/s.81(4) of the Act and Rule 104(6)(a) of the rules. According to the Petitioners, 1st Respondent having ordered initiation of proceedings u/s.81(1) of the Act on 23. 2003 and the 3rd Respondent should have completed the enquiry within three months i.e. on or before 26. 2003 as contemplated u/s.81(4) of the Act and there was delay in submitting the enquiry report and the delay would vitiate the enquiry report. 8. Insofar as, Surcharge order passed on 25. 2008, grievance of the Petitioners is that no opportunity was given to the Writ Petitioners and there was violation of principles of natural justice and is based on no evidence and is liable to be quashed. 9. 8. Insofar as, Surcharge order passed on 25. 2008, grievance of the Petitioners is that no opportunity was given to the Writ Petitioners and there was violation of principles of natural justice and is based on no evidence and is liable to be quashed. 9. Opposing the Petitions, 2nd Respondent has filed common counter stating that Enquiry Officer had conducted due enquiry from 23. 2003 and sought two extensions dated 26. 2003 and 29. 2003 and concluded enquiry on 212. 2003 and enquiry report was submitted within the time on 01. 2004. It is further alleged that due opportunities were given to the Petitioners before passing Surcharge order. 10. First Respondent – Arbitrator – Dy. Registrar has also filed counter stating that enquiry was posted on 23. 2008, 14. 2008, 05. 2008. In the counter-affidavit of 1st Respondent, it is further averred that on 05. 2008, Writ Petitioners Minerva, Kumarasamy, Perumal Krishnan, Pannerselvam and Ranganathan appeared for enquiry and requested for adjournment on 6. 2008 stating that they have filed Writ Petitions. 1st Respondent has further averred that on 25. 2008, none of the Bank employees appeared for enquiry and Surcharge order was passed after affording sufficient opportunities to the Writ Petitioners. 1st Respondent also averred that enquiry report was furnished to the Petitioners on 21. 2008 and for Pannerselvam on 31. 2008 and there was no violation of principles of natural justice. 11. Challenge to the enquiry report dated 30.8.2004:- Mr.G.Ethirajulu, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners submitted that enquiry u/s.81(1) of the Act was ordered on 23. 2003 and as contemplated u/s.81(4) of the Act, 3rd Respondent should have completed the enquiry within three months on or before 26. 2003. But the Enquiry Officer submitted her enquiry report only on 25. 2004, 30.8.2004 and 09. 2004 and there was delay of nearly one year in submitting the report. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further argued that in view of violation of mandatory provisions u/s.81(4) of the Act and Rule 104(6)(a) of Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Rules,1988, the enquiry report is non-est. Learned counsel for the Petitioners vehemently contended that the time stipulated in Sec.81(4) of the Act is mandatory and when the enquiry was not completed within the stipulated time as per Sec.81(4), the Surcharge proceedings initiated u/s.87 of the Act is vitiated. 12. Mr. Learned counsel for the Petitioners vehemently contended that the time stipulated in Sec.81(4) of the Act is mandatory and when the enquiry was not completed within the stipulated time as per Sec.81(4), the Surcharge proceedings initiated u/s.87 of the Act is vitiated. 12. Mr. M.S.Palaniswamy, learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent Bank submitted that during enquiry there were several instances of falsification of accounts and creation of forged records and because of voluminous work involved, Enquiry Officer had taken two extensions and has submitted enquiry report on 01. 2004 and that there was no violation of time limit contemplated u/s.81(4) of the Act. Learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent would further submit that the time stipulated u/s.81(4) is not mandatory in view of the principles laid down in W.A.No.949/2008 [S.V.K.Sahasramam v. The Dy. Registrar of Coop. Societies and others] and in (2007) 7 MLJ 1048 [Senthil Kumar v. Co-operative Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Madurai and others]. 13. Enquiry Officer started her enquiry on 23. 2003 and two extensions were granted to the Enquiry Officer dated 26. 2003 and 29. 2003 and Enquiry Officer has submitted her report on 01. 2004 which was received by the Office of Dy. Registrar on 25. 2004. Explanation was called for from the Enquiry Officer for the delay in submission of report and also raising various other points. Enquiry Officer has submitted her 2nd report on 30.8.2004 clarifying the queries raised and had also given explanation for the delay. Enquiry Officer is said to have explained the reason for the delay that because of heavy work and voluminous work involved, there was delay in submission of the report. It is relevant to note that omissions and commissions relate to several loan transactions which must have required much deliberation. It is pertinent to note that enquiry report runs to nearly 199 pages. The volume of enquiry report speaks for itself explaining the delay. 14. The point falling for consideration is whether time stipulated u/s.81(4) of the Act can be construed as mandatory. 15. Sec.81 (4) of the Act reads as under:- "The inquiry shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of ordering the inquiry or such further period or periods not exceeding three months at a time as the next higher authority may permit, provided that such extended periods shall not exceed six months in the aggregate". 16. Sec.81 (4) of the Act reads as under:- "The inquiry shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of ordering the inquiry or such further period or periods not exceeding three months at a time as the next higher authority may permit, provided that such extended periods shall not exceed six months in the aggregate". 16. Observing that use of word shall in Section 81(4) of the Act itself is not decisive to hold that the time stipulated thereon is mandatory in (2007) 7 MLJ 1048 [Senthil Kumar v. Co-operative Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Madurai and others] I have held as under:- "14. Thus the enquiry under Section 81 is for the purpose of regulating the business of the Society, rectifying the defects and enquire into the financial impropriety, misappropriation or fraudulent retention of any money etc. Enquiry under Section 81 and Enquiry Report is the basis of the Surcharge Proceedings. The Surcharge Proceedings emanates only from the enquiry under Section 81 where there appears to be misappropriation of funds of the Society or breach of trust etc. 15. The word "shall" is used only for completion of enquiry within the time frame, mainly for the purpose of further action and to initiate Surcharge Proceedings. In case of proved surcharge, to hold that non completion of enquiry under Section 81(4) within the stipulated period, would vitiate the entire Surcharge proceedings and would amount to doing violence to the section. What would be the consequences if the person is bent upon dragging on the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer or in the Surcharge Proceedings. In such cases, can it be said that the delay in completing the proceedings would vitiate the Surcharge Proceedings. Any such interpretation would not be in consonance with the object and scope of the enactment. In consideration of the object of the Section and the context in which it is used and the consequences, this Court holds that the word "shall" used in Section 81(4) and second proviso to Section 87 are only directory. Whether non-completion of the enquiry within the time stipulated vitiates the Surcharge Proceedings would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case." 17. Referring to the above decision in Senthil Kumars case, in W.P.No.20310/2007 Justice S.Nagamuthu has taken the same view that the time stipulated u/s.81(4) of the Act is not mandatory. 18. Whether non-completion of the enquiry within the time stipulated vitiates the Surcharge Proceedings would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case." 17. Referring to the above decision in Senthil Kumars case, in W.P.No.20310/2007 Justice S.Nagamuthu has taken the same view that the time stipulated u/s.81(4) of the Act is not mandatory. 18. The order in W.P.No.20310/2007 was challenged in W.A.No.949/2008. Before first Bench of this Court, question which arose for consideration was whether the time limit provided under Section 81(4) of the Act is mandatory or not and whether the word "shall" used in Section 81(4) of the Act has to be construed as mandatory or not. Observing that the time stipulated u/s.81(4) of the Act cannot be held to be mandatory and referring to various decisions, first Bench of this Court held as under:- "7. .... In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 181 , it was held as under:- Generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done. 12. .... We are of the view that in a case where there are allegations of embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, the members of general public who have been cheated have no control over those who hold the enquiry in respect of the time limit. To hold that such an enquiry which has been continued beyond the time limit is bad would cause great injustice. 13. Therefore, if such enquiry is continued beyond the time limit mentioned in the relevant statute, the said time cannot be held to be mandatory in view of the principles laid down in Montreal Street Railway Company (supra), which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court." 19. In W.P.No.10451/2008 enquiry report is challenged mainly on the ground of delay in filing the enquiry report. In W.P.No.10451/2008 enquiry report is challenged mainly on the ground of delay in filing the enquiry report. Applying the ratio of the above decisions, challenge to the enquiry report raised by the Petitioners is unsustainable. 20. Challenge to initiation of Surcharge Proceedings:- Case of the Petitioners is that major portion of the alleged irregularities mentioned in the enquiry report are dated 09. 2000, 110. 2000 to 011. 2000 and 011. 2000 and no action could be initiated u/s.87(1) of the Act after expiry of seven years from the date of any act or omission. 21. Learned counsel for the Petitioners vehemently contended that enquiry report was submitted on 30.8.2004 whereas Surcharge proceedings u/s.87(1) of the Act was initiated only on 112. 2007 nearly after 3½ years whereas under Rule 104(9)(a), action should have been taken within two months from the date of the report and therefore, the Surcharge proceedings initiated u/s.87(1) of the Act is invalid and should not be proceeded with. 22. Based on the enquiry report dated 25. 2004 and 30.8.2004, Surcharge proceedings was initiated on 112. 2007. Enquiry u/s.81(1) started on 23. 2003 and report submitted on 25. 2004 and further report on 30.8.2004. Of course, proviso to Sec.87(1) of the Act stipulates that no action could be initiated after the expiry of seven years from the date of any act or omission. In the present case after the enquiry report, Surcharge proceedings was initiated within the reasonable time. Time stipulated under the proviso to Sec.87(1) of the Act cannot be said to be mandatory. When a public duty calls for initiation of Surcharge proceedings and when the statute requires that it shall be performed within a certain time, such prescriptions may well be regarded as directory. 23. In AIR 1994 SC 1818 [T.V.Usman vs. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edn., at page 362 it is stated as under: Where, indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other manner, no doubt can be entertained as to the intention; that is to say, such a requirement would be imperative. It is further stated on page 364 that: The general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. When a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative." To hold that the time stipulated u/s.81(4) of the Act is not mandatory in W.A.No.949/2008 [S.V.K.Sahasramam v. The Dy. Registrar of Coop. Societies and others], first Bench of this Court also referred to T.V.Usmans case. 24. Enquiry report dated 01. 2004 was received on 25. 2004. Further enquiry report dated 30.8.2004 was also received. Surcharge proceedings dated 112. 2007 was initiated within a reasonable time and in my considered view there is substantial compliance of Sec.87(1) of the Act. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners that Surcharge proceedings initiated on 112. 2007 is beyond the stipulated period of seven years from the alleged acts or omissions. 25. Challenge to the Surcharge order:- Learned counsel for the Petitioners forcibly contended that no opportunities were afforded to the Writ Petitioners and Surcharge order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners made strenuous efforts in contending that in view of violation of principles of natural justice, Writ Petition is maintainable. Learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners contended that on 23. 2008 Petitioners attended the enquiry and the same was adjourned to 14. 2008 and the Writ Petitioners appeared for enquiry and the enquiry was adjourned to 05. 2008. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that on 05. 2008, Writ Petitioners attended the enquiry and sought time for hearing on 6. 2008 on the ground that they have filed W.P.Nos.10451 & 10452/2008 and the Petitioners were not informed about the next hearing date. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would further submit that the impugned Surcharge order was passed on 25. 2008 without affording sufficient opportunity to the Petitioners and therefore, availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain the Writ Petitions. 26. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would further submit that the impugned Surcharge order was passed on 25. 2008 without affording sufficient opportunity to the Petitioners and therefore, availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain the Writ Petitions. 26. Learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners has drawn Courts attention to the enquiry proceedings and submitted that on 05. 2008, Petitioners were not informed about the next hearing date and on 25. 2008 Surcharge order was purportedly passed. 27. Denying Petitioners averments of violation of principles of natural justice, first Respondent/Arbitrator has filed counter explaining the conduct of Surcharge proceeding on various dates. In Para-9 of his counter, 1st Respondent has stated as under:- 23. 2008 : 1st appearance of the parties. All the bank employees charged numbering 8 appeared for enquiry and undertake to appear on the next date of hearing. For the remaining 9 person notices were sent through RPAD. 15.04.2008 : N.Periyasamy, G.Pannerselvam, K.V.Krishnan, S.K.Perumal, N.Kumarasamy and R.Minerva appeared for enquiry but did not give evidence. They undertake to appear on 05. 2008. Summons to 11 persons were sent. 05. 2008 : Only R.Minerva appeared for enquiry, P.Mohan required documents by a letter through post. The enquiry officer directed them to receive the document required for. The enquiry was adjourned to 25. 2008. Later R.Minerva, N.Kumarasamy, S.K.Perumal, K.V.Krishnan, G.Pannerselvam, and P.Ranganathan appeared for enquiry and requested for an adjournment to 6. 2008 the date on which W.P.Nos. 10451 & 10452/08 were posted." According to the Respondents, reasonable opportunities were given to the Writ Petitioners and that only the Writ Petitioners have adopted dilatory tactics and tried to protract the enquiry. 28. Having regard to the contra stand of parties, Court has called for the enquiry report. I have carefully perused the file/order sheet of the enquiry proceedings. By perusal of the order sheet, it is seen that on 05. 2008 1) Nagaraji (Ex. Director), 2) Sivalingam (Ex. Director), 3)Madhu (Ex. Director), 4) Vadivel (Ex. Vice Chairman), 5) Jayavel (Member), 6)Ranganathan (Ex. President), 7) Mohan (Special Officer), 8) Minerva (Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.16329/08) attended the enquiry and they have signed in the order sheet undertaking to appear for enquiry on 25. 2008. Writ Petitioners Minerva, Kumarasamy, Perumal, Krishnan, Pannerselvam, Periyasami are said to have personally appeared and sought time till 6. 2008 stating that they have filed W.P.Nos.10451 & 10452/2008. 29. President), 7) Mohan (Special Officer), 8) Minerva (Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.16329/08) attended the enquiry and they have signed in the order sheet undertaking to appear for enquiry on 25. 2008. Writ Petitioners Minerva, Kumarasamy, Perumal, Krishnan, Pannerselvam, Periyasami are said to have personally appeared and sought time till 6. 2008 stating that they have filed W.P.Nos.10451 & 10452/2008. 29. There is no denying that the above Writ Petitioners appeared for enquiry on 05. 2008. According to the Petitioners, they were not informed about the next hearing date. Per contra, according to the Respondents including Arbitrator, Writ Petitioners were informed about the next hearing date i.e. 25. 2008. In such circumstances, the following questions emerge:- =Whether Petitioners had been informed about the next hearing date i.e. 25. 2008? =Whether Petitioners deliberately did not appear for enquiry on 25. 2008 with a view to protract the enquiry proceedings as alleged by the Respondents? =Whether there was substantial compliance of principles of natural justice? =Whether Writ Petitioners were adopting dilatory tactics in protracting the Surcharge proceedings? The above questions are questions of fact which cannot be determined exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of Constitution of India. Such disputed questions of fact could be determined only in the statutory appeal preferred u/s.152 of the Act. It is relevant to note that Surcharge order was passed against the Petitioners and also against others. Kumarasamy [Ex. Field Supervisor], Periyasamy [Ex. Director] and Mohan [Ex. Special Officer] have preferred C.M.A.Nos.65, 66 and 70/2008 before Co-operative Tribunal (District Court), Dharmapuri and the same are pending. When efficacious alternative remedy is available, the above disputed questions of fact could be determined only in such statutory appeal upon hearing both parties. 30. As against the award passed by the Arbitrator u/s.152 of the Act, statutory appeal lies before the Co-operative Tribunal/Prl. District Court. When efficacious alternative remedy is available, Writ Petition is not maintainable. 31. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would submit that once Writ Petition is admitted, availability of alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain the Writ Petition. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners placed reliance upon 2002 (1) LW 318 [Sri Palani Dhandayuthapani Devasthanam rep. by its Executive Officer, D.Ramachandran, Palani v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Palani Circle II, Palani], 2007 (2) CTC 135 [M.S.Munivenkatappa v. State Bank of India, rep. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners placed reliance upon 2002 (1) LW 318 [Sri Palani Dhandayuthapani Devasthanam rep. by its Executive Officer, D.Ramachandran, Palani v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Palani Circle II, Palani], 2007 (2) CTC 135 [M.S.Munivenkatappa v. State Bank of India, rep. by its Chief General Manager, Chennai and others] and 2007 (6) Supreme 172 [M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. & Another v. Jahan Khan]. 32. Learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that Writ Petitions filed by the Petitioners directly in High Court were not maintainable in view of the settled position of law that alternative remedy under Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act must be availed. 33. In (2005) 8 SCC 264 [ U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S.Pandey], the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "20. In a catena of decisions it has been held that Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out." .21. In (2004) 4 SCC 268 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 637 [U.P. Sate Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P.Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karamachari Sangh], it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To the same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70]; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ]; Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad [ (2002) 2 SCC 542 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 317] and Scooters India v. Vijai E.V.Eldred [ (1998) 6 SCC 549 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1611] .22. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ], it was observed as follows: (SCC pp.91-92, para 28) ."[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ], it was observed as follows: (SCC pp.91-92, para 28) ."[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedure followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerned them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them." 23. In Besant Kumar Sarkar v. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. [ AIR 1964 SC 1260 ], the Constitution Bench of this Court observed as follows:(SCR p.920) It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the contention, we would confirm the finding of the High Court that the proper remedy which is available to the appellants to ventilate their grievances in respect of the said notices and circulars is to take recourse to Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, or seek relief, if possible, under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act. The above position was recently highlighted in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Employees Union [ (2005) 6 SCC 725 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 899]. 34. Merely because, Writ Petition was ordered to be admitted, it cannot be contended that this Court has to necessarily go into the merits of the matter. In view of the alternative remedy available by way of statutory appeal u/s.152 of the Act, all the Writ Petitions are liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 35. In the result, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed. It is open to the Writ Petitioners to challenge the Surcharge order dated 25. 2008 by way of filing statutory appeal u/s.152 of the Act. If any such appeal is preferred, the time during which Writ Petition was pending shall be excluded in calculating the period of limitation as contemplated u/s.14 of Limitation Act. Once such appeals are filed, the Co-operative Tribunal/Prl. District Judge, Dharmapuri shall expedite the further proceedings and enquire in the appeals and dispose them within six months from the date of appearance of the Respondents in the appeals. Consequently, all the M.Ps. are dismissed. Interim stay already granted is vacated. Views and opinions expressed in respect of challenge to Surcharge order (dated 25. 2008) may not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the matter.