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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 38 (HP)

L. A. C. v. Rani Rajindera Kumari

2008-02-25

KULDIP SINGH

body2008
JUDGMENT (Kuldeep Singh, J.) - This judgment shall dispose of RFA No. 243 of 1991, RFA No. 157 of 1997 and RFA No. 156 of 1997. The facts from each appeal are given below. RFA No. 243 of 1991 2.The H.P. Govt. for acquiring land measuring 2-77-17 hectres for Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board for public purpose for construction of approach road to Pachadda quarry at village Jhakri issued notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’) which was published in H.P. Rajpatra on 7.2.1987. The land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh predecessor of respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) comprised in Khasra No. 2010, 1986/1, 1991/1, 1992/1, 1994/1, 2002/1, 2008/1, and 2008/2 total measuring 2-44-55 hectres (32 Bighas and 10 Biswas) was involved in the acquisition. The Collector Land Acquisition Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (for short ‘Collector’) announced the award No. 4/89 on 24.2.1989. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1(1) to 1(d) was not satisfied with the award, he preferred reference petition under Section 18 of the Act. According to him the compensation awarded by Collector is less and he claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,40,000/- per bigha for the acquired land. The reference petition came to be registered at L.Ref. No. 21-S/4 of 1989 in the Court of learned District Judge (Forest), Shimla. 3.The appellants contested the reference petition and have submitted that compensation at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per bigha awarded by the Collector is reasonable. The compensation amount has been deposited in the H.P. State Co-operative Bank, Shimla due to dispute of ownership of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh. The learned District Judge announced the award on 23.7.1991 and assessed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 1,00,000/- per bigha alongwith other statutory payments. The objection of the appellants that acquired land had vested in the State under H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (for short Ceiling Act) was rejected by holding that on the date of acquisition Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was owner in possession of the acquired land, possession of the acquired land was not taken from Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh, therefore, he continued to be the owner of the acquired land even in presence of Ceiling Act. The land vests in the Govt. under Section 11 of the Ceiling Act from the date of taking possession. The land vests in the Govt. under Section 11 of the Ceiling Act from the date of taking possession. The State had not taken possession of the acquired land before the date of acquisition, hence the land had not vested in the State at the time of acquisition. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was held entitled to the amount of compensation. The appellants filed RFA No. 243 of 1991 against the award dated 23.7.1991 passed in L. Ref. No. 21-S/4 of 1989. On 9.1.1992 Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation (for short Corporation) was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the appeal. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh died during the pendency of appeal and his legal representatives respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) were brought on record. 4.The award dated 23.7.1991 has been assailed on the grounds that learned District Judge has not properly assessed the market value of the acquired land. The market value has been wrongly assessed on the basis of small area transactions. The respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) are not entitled to compensation due to dispute of title of their predecessor Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh regarding acquired land which was being determined in the proceedings under the Ceiling Act. According to respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) learned District Judge has rightly assessed the market value of the acquired land and has correctly assessed the market value of the acquired land and has correctly awarded compensation as per impugned award. The appellants filed CMP No. 260 of 1998 under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC for amendment of reply to reference petition under Section 18 of the Act to the effect that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had no title at the time of acquisition of the acquired land, in fact State was the owner at the time of acquisition of acquired land and therefore, Rajinder Singh Raj Kumar and after him respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) are not entitled to any compensation. The appellants supported this objection, by taking help of Section 27 of the H.P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (for short Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act) as well as Ceiling Act. The appellants also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC being CMP No. 147 of 1998 for additional evidence. Both these applications were contested by respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d). The appellants also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC being CMP No. 147 of 1998 for additional evidence. Both these applications were contested by respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d). According to respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) their predecessor Rajinder Singh Raj Kumar was owner in possession of the acquired land despite Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and Ceiling Act. In fact under the Act appellants have no locus standi to raise the question of pre-existing title in favour of State nor the Court has jurisdiction to determine this question under the Act. RFA No. 157 of 1997 5.The H.P. Govt. issued notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquiring 99-27-24 Hects land at village Jhakri for construction of residential colony for Nathpa Jhakri Hydel Project. The notification under Section 4 of the Act was published in H.P. Rajpatra on 18.6.1988. The Land Acquisition Collector Nathpa Jhakri Project H.P. State Electricity Board (for short Collector) announced the award No. 10/91 on 27.2.1991 and awarded compensation at different rates as per the classification of the land. He also allowed compensation for the trees and structures as per award. The Collector has held that amount of compensation for the land shown in exclusive ownership and possession of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh cannot be paid to him at this stage in view of pending decision of Land Ceiling Collector Rampur. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1 to 4 filed reference petition under Section 18 of the Act against award No. 10/91 dated 27.2.1991 which was registered as L.Ref. No. 18/R/4 of 1996/93. It was submitted that Ceiling Act is not applicable in the case. The possession of the acquired land was not taken over by the State of H.P. from Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh under the Ceiling Act before the acquisition of the land and therefore, despite Ceiling Act Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh remained owner in possession of acquired land at the time of acquisition. The market value of the acquired land was not less then Rs. 2,50,000/- per bigha of cultivated land and Rs. 2,00,000/- per bigha of banjar land. The Collector has not properly assessed the market value of the acquired land. The fruit bearing trees as well as non-fruit bearing trees have not been assessed properly, therefore, in the reference petition compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,50,000/- per bigha of cultivated land and Rs. 2,00,000/- per bigha of banjar land. The Collector has not properly assessed the market value of the acquired land. The fruit bearing trees as well as non-fruit bearing trees have not been assessed properly, therefore, in the reference petition compensation at the rate of Rs. 2,50,000/- for cultivated land per bigha Rs. 2,00,000/- for banjar land per bigha, Rs. 600/- per fruit bearing trees and Rs. 500/- per broad leave tree was claimed alongwith other statutory payments. This claim was contested by the appellants. The learned District Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur decided the reference petition by way of awarded dated 27.3.1997 and awarded Rs. 1,34,37,547.30/- compensation. 6.The appellants assailed the impugned award dated 27.3.1997 by way of RFA No. 157 of 1997 on the grounds that market value of the acquired land at Rs. 1,00,000/- per bigha assessed by the learned District Judge irrespective classification of land is wrong and illegal. The respondents No. 1 to 4 are not entitled to compensation as the land had already vested in the State of H.P. In support of this contention, the appellants have relied on Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act as well as Ceiling Act. In the appeal the appellants filed CMP No. 403 of 1997 under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC for additional evidence. Respondents No. 1 to 4 filed CMP No. 490 of 1997 for releasing the amount awarded in award No. 10/91. The Collector, Rampur under H.P. Ceiling on Land Holding Act, 1972 filed CMP No. 79 of 1998 for impleading him as respondent No. 5 in the appeal. The respondents No. 1 to 4 have taken the plea that their predecessor Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh continued to be the owner in possession of acquired land despite Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and Ceiling Act. The appellants in the reference petition cannot raise the question of title of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh on the acquired land. RFA No. 156 of 1997 7.The notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 8.9.1988 for acquired land measuring 99-97-24 Hects in village Jhakri and ultimately Collector announced supplementary award No. 17/91 on 4.7.1991 to award No. 10/91 dated 27.2.1991. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1 to 4 filed Ref. RFA No. 156 of 1997 7.The notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 8.9.1988 for acquired land measuring 99-97-24 Hects in village Jhakri and ultimately Collector announced supplementary award No. 17/91 on 4.7.1991 to award No. 10/91 dated 27.2.1991. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 1 to 4 filed Ref. Petition under Section 18 of the Act against supplementary award No. 17/91 and claimed enhanced compensation which reference petition was registered as L.Ref. No. 17-R/4 of 1996/93 in the Court of Learned District Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur. It was submitted that payment of awarded amount to Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh has been wrongly withheld in supplementary award. He has submitted that Ceiling Act is not applicable in the case. The possession of the acquired land was never given to the State before the acquisition of the land nor possession of the acquired land was taken from Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh under the Ceiling Act by the State. The market value of the acquired land at the time of acquisition was Rs. 2,50,000/- per bigha for cultivated land, Rs. 2,00,000/- per bigha for banjar land, Rs. 3,50,000/- per bigha for Kiyar land. The compensation for fruit trees should have been assessed at Rs. 600/- per fruit tree and that of broad leaves trees at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per tree. In addition to this statutory payments were also claimed in the reference petition. The appellants contested the reference petition and the learned District Judge announced the award on 27.3.1997 and awarded Rs. 57,04,700.66/-. 8.The award dated 27.3.1997 has been assailed by way of RFA No. 156 of 1997. The appellants have assailed the impugned award on the grounds that learned District Judge has erred in assessing the market value of the acquired land at flat rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per bigha irrespective of classification of land. The market value of the acquired land has not been assessed properly, small area transactions have been taken into consideration. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him respondents No. 1 to 4 are not owners of the appellant as the acquired land had already vested in the State and for that purpose the appellants have relied Section 27 of Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, as well as Ceiling Act. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him respondents No. 1 to 4 are not owners of the appellant as the acquired land had already vested in the State and for that purpose the appellants have relied Section 27 of Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, as well as Ceiling Act. The appellants have filed CMP No. 404 of 1997 under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC for additional evidence. CMP No. 489 of 1997 under Section 151 CPC was filed by respondents No. 1 to 4 for releasing the amount awarded in supplementary award No. 17/91. CMP No. 68 of 1998 was filed by Collector, Rampur under H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 for impleading him as respondent No. 5. The case of respondents No. 1 to 4 is that their predecessor Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh continued to be the owner in possession of acquired land despite Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and Ceiling Act. The acquired land never vested in State. The appellants in reference petition cannot taken the plea that there was pre-existing title in the State of the acquired land before issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. 9.On 11.8.1999 this Court dismissed CMPs No. 260 and 147 of 1998 in RFA No. 243 of 1991, CMP Nos. 403, 404, 68, 79, in RFA Nos. 156 and 157 respectively. RFA Nos. 243 of 1991, 156 of 1997 and 157 of 1997 were also dismissed. 10.On 18.8.1999 this Court stayed the operation of judgment dated 11.8.1999 for eight weeks in CMP No. 191 of 1999 in RFA No. 243 of 1991, in CMP No. 192 of 1999 in RFA No. 156 of 1997 and in CMP No. 193 of 1999 in RFA No. 157 of 1997. 11.The decisions dated 11.8.1999 and 18.8.1999 of this Court were assailed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in Civil Appeal Nos. 3741 to 3752 and 3753 to 3757 of 2001 the Apex Court on 3.5.2001 set aside the judgment of this Court and allowed and applications filed by appellants under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and remanded the matter to this Court for disposal in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties. After remanded respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) in RFA No. 243 of 1991 filed rejoinder to the amended reply. After remanded respondents No. 1(a) to 1(d) in RFA No. 243 of 1991 filed rejoinder to the amended reply. The parties produced documents and closed the evidence. 12.I have heard Mr. H.S. Hooda, Senior Advocate, for the appellants, Mr. S.R. Sharma, Advocate and Mr. M.S. Chandel, Advocate General, for the respondents and gone through the record. Mr. H.S. Hooda, learned Senior Counsel at the very outset has submitted that appellants do not dispute the market value of the acquired land assessed and quantum of compensation awarded by the learned District Judge in all the three cases. The appellants have accepted the rate as awarded by learned District Judge in the present case and in many other cases also. He has, however, seriously disputed the very right of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors to claim any amount of compensation as awarded by learned District Judge in all the three cases. He has submitted that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had no title in the acquired land which vested in the State much before the issuance of Section 4 notification in all the three cases. He has relied Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates as well as Ceiling Act in support of his contention that acquired land had vested in the State before the acquisition proceedings. He has also submitted that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had taken benefit of wrong revenue record. In CWP No. 256 of 1997 decided on 5.10.1994, this Court has adversely commented regarding the conduct of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh in earlier litigation. He has submitted that as per own saying of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh he had retained only 64.12 bighas land in Jhakri having specified Khasra Numbers which were not acquired. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh played fraud and got the awards in collusion with revenue authorities. In CWP No. 256 of 1979 decided on 25.10.1994 a Division Bench of this Court has taken note of fraud of late Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh. Mr. Hooda has submitted that fraud vitiates everything and, therefore, Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors are not entitled to any compensation of the acquired land as Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had no title in the acquired land. Mr. Hooda has submitted that fraud vitiates everything and, therefore, Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors are not entitled to any compensation of the acquired land as Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had no title in the acquired land. The State has erroneously issued Section 4 notifications for acquiring the land, even though the State was the owner of land for which notifications under Section 4 were issued. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors cannot take benefit of Section 4 notifications for acquiring the land. He has submitted that as per letter dated 6.8.1974 of Secretary MPP and Power, Govt. of H.P. the land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was ready in possession of H.P. State Electricity Board and was not required to be acquired as the same had already stood vested in the State of H.P. under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act w.e.f. 26.1.1955. According to Mr. Hooda, despite these facts, the notifications under Section 4 of the Act were erroneously issued regarding the acquired land. In alternative he has submitted that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had no title on the acquired land in view of the Ceiling Act under which the acquired land had vested in the State. The learned Advocate General reiterated the submissions of Mr. Hooda. 13.Mr. S.R. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of legal representatives of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh has submitted that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh continued to be owner in possession of the acquired land despite Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and Ceiling Act. Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act is applicable only to the tenancy land not other land owned and possessed by the owner. He has submitted that under Section 11 of the Ceiling Act unless possession is taken the land does not vest in the State. The acquired land was not part of tenancy land and therefore, it never vested in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act. He has submitted that under Section 11 of the Ceiling Act unless possession is taken the land does not vest in the State. The acquired land was not part of tenancy land and therefore, it never vested in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act. The possession of the acquired land was not taken under the Ceiling Act before the commencement of the acquisition proceedings, rather the possession of the acquired land was taken only after passing of the awards in terms of the awards, hence Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors had title in the acquired land till the possession of the acquired land was taken from them. The notifications under Section 4 of the Act for acquiring the land have established that State was not the owner of the acquired land. The State cannot acquire its own land. The appellants in the reference petition cannot raise the question of pre-existing title of State in the acquired land nor the Court under the Act has jurisdiction to determine the question of pre-existing title in favour of State as contended on behalf of the appellants. No undue benefit was taken by Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors of the revenue record as alleged on behalf of the appellants. He has submitted no fraud was committed by Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh as contended on behalf of the appellants. In reference petitions State at the most could be heard on quantum but in view of stand of Mr. Hooda on quantum of compensation now appellants nor State have any grievance regarding compensation. The appeals on behalf of Corporation are not maintainable as no leave for filing the appeals has been taken by the Corporation. He ultimately submitted that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors are entitled to compensation of the acquired land awarded in the three awards which have been assailed in the three appeals. 14.Mr. Sharma has submitted that pre-existing title in favour of State cannot be determined by the Court in a reference petition under the Act. The Corporation, a company is one of the appellants in RFA No. 156/97 and in RFA No. 157/97 and respondent No. 2 in RFA No. 243/91. The land in all the three cases was acquired for Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Bard. The Corporation, a company is one of the appellants in RFA No. 156/97 and in RFA No. 157/97 and respondent No. 2 in RFA No. 243/91. The land in all the three cases was acquired for Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Bard. The Corporation is a joint venture of Union of India and State of H.P. and it came into existence much after the acquisition process was started by the State by issuing notifications under Section 4 of the Act. According to him under Section 50 of the Act the scope of contest by a company is limited to the extent that company may appear and produce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation, but company shall not be entitled to demand the reference under Section 18 of the Act. He has submitted that company cannot file appeal without the leave of the Court and no such leave has been taken by the company. Mr. Hooda has opposed these submissions of Mr. Sharma. He has submitted that after permission to amend the reply and to lead additional evidence, the appellants have locus standi to raise the question of pre-existing title of the acquired land in favour of the State. 15.In UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (dead) by LRs. and others, 1995(2) Supreme Court Cases 326 in para 24 of the report, conclusions No. 1, 3, 7, 9 are as follows :- 1. “Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. 3. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference Court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act. 7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference Court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. 9. 7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference Court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. 9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar and another, 2003(3) Supreme Court Cases 128 in para 36 has held as follows :- “............A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil Court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil Court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the Civil Court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehar Rusi Dalal v. Union of India and others, 2004(7) Supreme Court Cases 362 in para-21 has held as follows :- “It is thus clear that persons who have notice of acquisition proceedings would have to apply for a reference under Section 18. To be noted that under Section 18 reference could be in respect of the measurement of the land and/or the amount of compensation and/or in respect of persons to whom it is payable and/or for apportionment of compensation amongst persons interested. Section 30 merely deals with apportionment of compensation when the amount of compensation has been settled. Thus, as set out in the abovementioned cases, Section 18 is to be invoked when a person claiming a pre-existing right has notice of the acquisition proceedings, whereas Section 30 comes into play only if a person had no notice of the acquisition proceedings or the rights came into existence after the acquisition proceedings. Thus, as set out in the abovementioned cases, Section 18 is to be invoked when a person claiming a pre-existing right has notice of the acquisition proceedings, whereas Section 30 comes into play only if a person had no notice of the acquisition proceedings or the rights came into existence after the acquisition proceedings. It is clear that the person who had notice of the acquisition proceedings and who, by virtue of Section 50, is debarred from filing a reference under Section 18 cannot be allowed to apply for a reference under Section 30. In this case, this Court has already held that the respondents were not entitled to apply for a reference under Section 18. This meant that they were not entitled to seek a reference not just in respect of the compensation but also for apportionment of the compensation. Once it has been held that they had no right to move under Section 18 there was no question of their being permitted to move under Section 30. To permit a party, who cannot apply under Section 18, to apply under Section 30 would be to render Section 50 nugatory.” In Ahad Brothers v. State of M.P. and another, 2005(1) Supreme Court Cases 545 one of the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the High Court was right in going into the question of title over the property acquired by the State and scope of permission granted by way of amendment. The Supreme Court after noticing Sharda Devi case supra in para-7 of the judgment has held as follows :- “The contention that it was not open to the appellants to urge that the Reference Court could not consider the question of title over the land having not challenged the order made by the High Court earlier permitting the amendment of the written statement, has no force. Merely because permission was granted to amend the written statement did not mean that the appellant could not resist the claim the respondent State as regards its right as owner over the land acquired. The respondent State itself has treated the appellant all along as the owner of the land. Not only in the notification acquiring the land, name of the appellant is shown as owner, even the revenue records also show the appellant as owner. The respondent State itself has treated the appellant all along as the owner of the land. Not only in the notification acquiring the land, name of the appellant is shown as owner, even the revenue records also show the appellant as owner. Further the Land Acquisition Officer passed award in respect of this land treating the appellant as owner entitled to receive compensation. If the State was owner of the land in question, there was no reason for it to acquire its own land. The State cannot be said to be a person interested to agitate any claim either under Section 18 or under Section 30 of the Act. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 could not decide the question of the title of the State over the acquired land. The position of law is clear in this regard by recent judgment of this Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar. The sole question that arose for consideration in that case was when the State proceeds to acquire land on an assumption that it belongs to a particular person, can the award be called into question by the State seeking a reference under Section 30 of the Act on the premise that the land did not belong to the person from whom it was purportedly acquired and was a land owned by the State having vested in it? In para 36 of the said judgment, having considered various aspects and the scheme of the Act, this Court has concluded thus : (SCC p. 147) “36. To sum up, the State is not a `person interested’ as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression `parties to the litigation’ carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector (as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act). If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil Court for determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.” The question of pre-existing title of the State also came before learned Single Judge of this Court in State of H.P. and others v. Satya Pal and others, 2004(2) Shim.L.C. 26 : 2004(2) Cur.L.J. (H.P.) 470 in para 10, the learned Single Judge has held as follows :- “In view of the above settled law, it is now not open to the appellant to contend that the State was the owner of the land acquired even before its acquisition and that the respondents, in whose favour the award was made by the Collector, are not the owners thereof and, therefore, not entitled to receive the compensation therefor.” In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Virendra and others, 1998(5) Supreme Court Cases 718, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined leave in terms of conclusion No. 7 of Constitution Bench in UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi and dismissed the appeal despite the fact that earlier special leave was granted by the Court. In the present case the Corporation has not taken leave from this Court in terms of conclusion No. 7 of UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi therefore appeals filed by the Corporation are not maintainable. 16.In all the appeals it is not the case of the appellants that title of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh or his successor had come to an end on happening of any event or change taking place after making of the award by the Collector. 16.In all the appeals it is not the case of the appellants that title of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh or his successor had come to an end on happening of any event or change taking place after making of the award by the Collector. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed above as well as judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in State of H.P. and others v. Satya Pal and others (supra), the pre-existing title of the State in the acquired land cannot be gone into under the Act. The State in all three cases has issued notification under Section 4 of the Act and acquired the land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and the Collector in all the three cases has passed the awards and on reference the learned District Judge in all the three cases has also passed the awards. In the present proceedings this question cannot be gone into that State was the owner of the acquired land and the land has been erroneously acquired and Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and his successors are not entitled to payments of compensation as awarded by the Collector and modified by the learned District Judge in all the three cases. 17.Mr. Hooda has relied order dated 12.4.1966 passed by the Compensation Officer, Mahasu in case No. 205 of 1965 that the land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had vested in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act on payment of compensation. The perusal of order dated 12.4.1966 would show that only the tenancy lands of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had vested in the State under Section 27. No doubt some land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh situate at Jhakri had vested in the State but Mr. Hooda has failed to point out whether acquired land in question was part of land in village Jhakri which had vested in the State. Mr. Hooda has also relied judgment dated 25.10.1994 in CWP No. 256/79 of this Court. No doubt some land of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh situate at Jhakri had vested in the State but Mr. Hooda has failed to point out whether acquired land in question was part of land in village Jhakri which had vested in the State. Mr. Hooda has also relied judgment dated 25.10.1994 in CWP No. 256/79 of this Court. He has submitted that in CWP No. 256 of 1979 decided on 25.10.1994 this Court has observed adversely about the conduct of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh who had earlier filed CWP No. 256 of 1979 in this Court on 27.9.1979 alleging therein that his land measuring 411.12 bighas comprised in Khasra No. 165 at village Jhakri was taken into possession by the respondents in that case in the year 1971, a notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 13.12.1972 for acquired the said land but said land was left out from declaration vide notification under Section 6 issued on 24.2.1973. He filed a writ petition seeking direction to the respondents to complete the formalities of acquisition in accordance with the Act or in the alternative restore possession of the said land to him. He has submitted that this Court in the judgment dated 25.10.1994 has given history of litigation initiated at the instance of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh. He filed WP No. 15 of 1962 in the Court of Judicial Commissioner H.P. submitting that the disputed land could not vest in the respondent/State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, WP No. 15/61 was allowed by learned Judicial Commissioner. The decision of Judicial Commissioner was assailed by the State in the Hon’ble Supreme Court and vide judgment dated 17.9.1969 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that lands covered under Sections 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act would automatically vest in the State with effect from 26.1.1955. The Supreme Court did not decide the actual controversy and remanded the case to Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench) for decision in accordance with law. The Delhi High Court decided the case on 9.7.1970 and held that the writ petition involved several disputed questions of facts which could not be adjudicated by the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did not decide the actual controversy and remanded the case to Delhi High Court (Himachal Bench) for decision in accordance with law. The Delhi High Court decided the case on 9.7.1970 and held that the writ petition involved several disputed questions of facts which could not be adjudicated by the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was directed to file civil suit within four months and accordingly he filed Civil Suit No. 15/70 in this Court which was decided on 26.6.1973 and this Court held that disputed land had automatically vested in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act on 26.1.1955 and the suit was dismissed. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh filed RFA No. 9/1973 against the judgment, decree dated 26.6.1973. It appears Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh gave statement before the Division Bench of this Court to the effect that the land in dispute has been acquired by the State and he has been paid compensation and the appeal has become infructuous. He sought permission to withdraw the suit which was granted by this Court on 23.6.1986 and he was permitted to file fresh suit in respect of subject matter of the suit on the same cause of action in case there is any necessity to file such subsequent suit. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh did not file the suit. Mr. Hooda has heavily relied on the observation of this Court in the judgment dated 25.10.1994 that the statement of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was patently false and must be deemed to have been given to avoid the effect of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in the Civil Suit. He has also submitted that at one point of time stand of Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh was that he had only 64.12 bighas land with specified Khasra numbers in village Jhakri which is not the subject matter of the acquisition. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had played fraud and got the awards in collusion with revenue authorities. 18.The fact remains CWP No. 256 of 1979 was dismissed in view of disputed facts. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh had played fraud and got the awards in collusion with revenue authorities. 18.The fact remains CWP No. 256 of 1979 was dismissed in view of disputed facts. The judgment and decree dated 26.6.1973 passed by learned Single Judge in civil suit No. 15/70 are not in existence in view of permission granted by the Division Bench of this Court to Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh to withdraw the suit in RFA No. 9/1993 on 23.6.1986. In the order dated 23.6.1986 the Division Bench has permitted Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh to file fresh suit on same cause of action if there is a necessity to file fresh suit. The non-filing of the fresh suit might be due to more than one reason. Therefore, it is difficult to assume that Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh acted smartly in withdrawing the suit as contended by Mr. Hooda. The Government issued notifications under Section 4 of the Act, mentioned above, for acquiring the land in question. The Government cannot acquire its own land. The judgment dated 25.10.1994 in CWP No. 256 of 1979 is of no help to the appellants so far the controversy in the present appeals is concerned. As per Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act only the tenancy land of the land owners would vest in the State. In Arun Sen Chand v. State of H.P. and others, 1996(2) CLJ (HP) 254, a Division Bench of this Court in para-31 has held as follows :- “Though Section 27 lays down that the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land with respect to which land revenue payable by the landowner exceeds Rs. 125/- per year, shall be deemed to have been transferred and vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, yet sub-section (2) is in the form of proviso. It specifically prescribes that sub-section (1) of Section 27, as reproduced above, shall not apply in respect of the land which is under personal cultivation of the landowner.” 19.In State of H.P. v. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh etc., ILR 1977 HP 537, in a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the Collector filed an objection taking the point that the respondent was not entitled to any compensation as the land in question has vested in State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act. In para 7 of the judgment, a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows :- “We are of opinion that it is not open to the State to take the plea in the present references that the land has vested in the State already when proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. It may be open to the State to raise such a plea by way of suit.” It is thus clear that question of vesting of acquired land in question in the State under Section 27 of the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act cannot be gone into in reference petition under the Act. 20.Mr. Hooda has also submitted that the acquired land had vested in the State under the Ceiling Act and therefore, Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors are not the owners of acquired land in question. The vesting under the Ceiling Act is provided under Section 11 which is as follows :- “Vesting of surplus area in the State Government. The vesting under the Ceiling Act is provided under Section 11 which is as follows :- “Vesting of surplus area in the State Government. The surplus area of a person shall, on the date on which possession thereof is taken by or on behalf of the State Government be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for a public purpose on payment of amount hereafter provided and all rights, title and interests (including the contingent interest, if any), recognized by any law, custom or usage for the time being in force, of all persons in such area shall stand extinguished and such rights, title and interests shall vest in the State Government free from any encumbrance : Provided that where any land within the permissible area of the mortgagor is mortgaged with possession and falls within the surplus area of the mortgagee, only the mortgagee rights shall be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest in it.” 21.In Ujjagar Singh (dead) by LRs v. Collector, Bhatinda and another, 1996(5) Supreme Court Cases 14 while considering Section 32-E of Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-5 has held as follows :- “The learned Counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, could not point out as to how in view of the admitted position that some area had been declared surplus in the year 1961-62 under the Pepsu Act, the possession thereof had not been taken either by or on behalf of the State Government till the coming into force of the Punjab Act, the right, title and interest of the appellant in the land which had been declared surplus under the Pepsu Act was extinguished. The taking of possession was a must, in absence whereof it shall be deemed that right, title and interest of the appellant had never been extinguished and the said land which had been declared surplus never vested in the State; fresh steps for fixation of the ceiling had to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Act.” 22.In State of H.P. v. Harnama, 1999(1) Shim.L.C. (38) in para-9 it has been held as follows :- “Section 11 of the Ceiling Act enacts that the surplus area of a person shall on the date on which possession thereof is taken by or on behalf of the State Government be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government for a public purpose on payment of amount thereafter provided and all right title and interests (including the contingent interest, if any) recognized by any law, custom or usage for the time being in force, of all persons in such area shall stand extinguished and such rights, title and interests shall vest in the State Government free from any encumbrance. Consequently, the vesting with consequent extinguishment of all rights free from any encumbrance of any interest of all persons becomes operative and effective only on the date on which the possession of the land in question is taken by or on behalf of the State Government. The act or the factum of taking possession, therefore, becomes a condition precedent for the very provision relating to vesting to take effect.” It has come on record that possession of the acquired land in question was to be handed over in pursuance of the awards. In award No. 4/89 the Collector has directed that the possession of the acquired land shall be handed over to the representative of the Board, similarly, in award No. 10/91 the Collector has ordered that possession of the acquired land shall be handed over to the representative of the acquiring department. In supplementary award No. 17/1991 the Collector has ordered that possession of the acquired land shall be handed over to the representative of the acquiring Board. Thus, in all cases, the possession of the acquired land was handed over to the acquiring department in pursuance of the award. In supplementary award No. 17/1991 the Collector has ordered that possession of the acquired land shall be handed over to the representative of the acquiring Board. Thus, in all cases, the possession of the acquired land was handed over to the acquiring department in pursuance of the award. The possession of the acquired land in question was not taken under the Ceiling Act, therefore, Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and after him his successors remained owners of the acquired land and the Ceiling Act has no effect on their rights to claim compensation of the acquired land. 23.Mr. Hooda has cited UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (dead) by LRs. and others, 1995(2) Supreme Court Cases 326. This case has already been noticed in the earlier part of this judgment. He has referred Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely and others, 1995(1) SCC 221. In this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that local authority or company for whose benefit land is acquired is a proper party and not a necessary party. Mr. Hooda has cited Santosh Kumar and others v. Central Warehousing Corporation and another, 1986(2) SCC 343 wherein it has been held that government, company or local authority cannot seek a reference except on the grounds of fraud, corruption or collusion. In the present case, reference was sought by Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh and not by Government or Corporation. The judgment Abdul Rasak and others v. Kerala Water Authority and others, 2002(3) SCC 228 is again on the point that local authority is a proper party and is entitled to impleadment before proceedings before the reference Court. 24.Maya Devi v. State of Haryana, 1999(3) ICC 309, Jogi Ram and others v. State of Haryana, 1997(4) ICC 720 and State of Haryana v. Ram Partap, 1999(3) ICC 328, relied by Mr. Hooda are not relevant on the point involved in the present appeals inasmuch as in these cases the question was with respect to the determination of the market value of the acquired land. Mr. Hooda during the course of his submissions has already submitted that market value of the acquired land assessed by the reference Courts in the three appeals is now no more in dispute in view of the stand of the appellants. Mr. Mr. Hooda during the course of his submissions has already submitted that market value of the acquired land assessed by the reference Courts in the three appeals is now no more in dispute in view of the stand of the appellants. Mr. Hooda in support of his submission that State has pre-existing title in the acquired land and Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh has played fraud for representing himself to be the owner of acquired land has relied MCD v. State of Delhi and another, 2005(4) SCC 605, that a litigant withholding a vital document, suppressing a material fact in order to gain advantage in the case would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. He has also relied State of A.P. and another v. T. Suryachandra Rao, 2005(6) SCC 149, that misrepresentation or false representation and suppression of material fact or document amount to fraud and when declarant clearly committed a fraud, tribunal was not divested of its powers to correct the error. The reference Court under the Act cannot go into the question of pre-existing title in favour of the State as noticed above, however, bar of determination of pre-existing title in favour of State under the Act would not debar the State from pursuing such other legal remedy before such other forum as may be available to the State. 25.No other point was urged. 26.The result of the above discussion, all appeals being RFA No. 243 of 1991, RFA No. 156 of 1997 and RFA No. 157 of 1997 are dismissed but keeping in view the controversy involved the parties are left to bear their own costs in all the three appeals. M.R.B. ———————