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2008 DIGILAW 38 (PNJ)

Surinderjit Singh v. State of Punjab

2008-01-09

L.N.MITTAL

body2008
JUDGMENT L.N. Mittal, J. (Oral):- Surinderjit Singh Mand and P.S. Parmar have filed the instant revision petition assailing order dated 23.12.2006 of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala thereby ordering framing of charge under Sections 211/220 (inadvertently mentioned as 230 in the order) and 330 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) against the petitioners and their co-accused. 2. According to prosecution version, police officials visited the house of complainant-respondent No.2 Usha Rani on 23.06.1999 and asked her to produce her elder son Neeraj Kumar in CIA Staff, Kapurthala. Accordingly, Piare Lal, husband of respondent No.2, produced Neeraj Kumar before petitioner No.1 who was then Deputy Superintendent of Police, CIA Staff, Kapurthala, on 24.08.1999. Petitioner No.1 took Neeraj Kumar into custody and handed him over to petitioner No.2 who was then the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Detective), Kapurthala. Neeraj Kumar was lodged in police lock up at Police Station City Kapurthala. On 25.06.1999, both the petitioners went to the said police station and gave beating to Neeraj Kumar, who resultantly had problem in his backbone. Swelling also appeared on his feet. On 27.06.1999 respondent No.2 and her husband appeared before Senior Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala and thereupon they were allowed to meet their son. Then telegrams were sent to various authorities. Thereafter, on coming to know thereof, Neeraj Kumar was shown to have been arrested in a false criminal case bearing FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999 of Police Station Kotwali, Kapurthala, Neeraj Kumar was released on bail on 30.06.1999. Criminal complaint was lodged against the petitioners and others. On direction of this Court, inquiry was also conducted by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, who in his report dated 25.09.2000 held that prima facie all the accused including petitioners were involved in the offence of illegal confinement of Neeraj Kumar and causing him injuries and falsely implicating him in the aforesaid case. 3. The learned Trial Magistrate vide impugned order dated 23.12.2006 found prima facie case for framing charge against the petitioners and other accused under Sections 211/220 and 330 of the IPC. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners have filed the instant revision petition. 4. 3. The learned Trial Magistrate vide impugned order dated 23.12.2006 found prima facie case for framing charge against the petitioners and other accused under Sections 211/220 and 330 of the IPC. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners have filed the instant revision petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that three inquiries were conducted by three different officers of Indian Police Services (prior to registration of FIR No. 46 dated 22.10.2002 of Police Station City, Kapurthala in which the charges have been framed against the petitioners and other co-accused by the impugned order) and the petitioners were found innocent in all the said inquiries. However, this argument does not help the petitioners at this stage because an inquiry was also conducted by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala and prima facie involvement of the present petitioners was also found in the commission of aforesaid offences. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that the petitioners after investigation were found innocent and were placed in Column No.2 of the challan. They have been summoned as additional accused vide order dated 06.09.2003 under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short “the Code”). However, in view of inquiry report of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala, the conclusion in the challan that the petitioners were innocent, cannot be taken at its face value at this stage. 6. The next emphatic contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that cognizance of the offences against the petitioners cannot be taken without sanction under Section 197 of the Code but such sanction has been obtained for prosecution of the petitioners. In this context it was also submitted that such sanction has been obtained against the remaining six co-accused of the petitioners. It was urged that the petitioners stand on parity with the other six accused, so far as the requirement of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is concerned. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners quoted extensively the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in, “Rakesh Kumar Mishra vs. State of Bihar and others” (2006) 1 SCC 557 and “Sankaran Moitra vs. Sadhna Das and another” (2006)4 SCC 584, in support of his aforesaid contentions. It was urged that Neeraj Kumar was arrested on 28.06.1999 in FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999 and therefore, the alleged acts were committed in discharge or purported discharge of the official duty by the petitioners. 8. It was urged that Neeraj Kumar was arrested on 28.06.1999 in FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999 and therefore, the alleged acts were committed in discharge or purported discharge of the official duty by the petitioners. 8. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of respondents that Neeraj Kumar was kept in illegal confinement since 24.06.1999 till 28.06.1999 when his arrest was shown in FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999 and during said illegal detention, Neeraj Kumar was beaten and tortured and these acts do not have even remot test nexus with official duty of the petitioners. It is also contended that arrest of Neeraj Kumar even on 28.06.1999 was made illegally because complaint had been sent by respondent No.2 and her husband. 9. As far as obtaining of sanction for prosecution of petitioners, co-accused is concerned, it has been submitted on behalf of respondents that the sanction was obtained by way of abundant caution and infact no such sanction was required for prosecution of the petitioners. The petitioners cannot derive any benefit merely because the prosecution thought it fit to obtain sanction for prosecution of petitioners’ co-accused. On the other hand, it has to be seen independently whether any such sanction is required for prosecution of the petitioners or not. If such a sanction is not required, the mere fact that such sanction was obtained for petitioners, co-accused, would not help the petitioners in any manner. 10. As far as question of sanction for prosecution of petitioners is concerned, the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners could possibly be applicable for the detention period since 28.06.1999 when Neeraj Kumar was shown to have been arrested in FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999. However, the petitioner are not entitled to protection of Section 197 of the Code for illegal detention and torture of Neeraj Kumar since 24.06.1999 till 28.06.1999 when his arrest was shown in FIR No. 30 dated 03.03.1999. The said period of illegal detention and torture has no nexus much less reasonable nexus with the discharge or purported discharge of the official duty of the petitioners. Consequently, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal because sanction for prosecution of the petitioners is not required for illegal detention and torture of Neeraj Kumari during the aforesaid period. 11. Consequently, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal because sanction for prosecution of the petitioners is not required for illegal detention and torture of Neeraj Kumari during the aforesaid period. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners could have shown the arrest of Neeraj Kumar even on 24.06.1999 instead of showing his arrest on 28.06.1999. However, this is a disputed question of fact, which can be adjudicated upon during the trial. Suffice to observe that if arrest of Neeraj Kumar had been shown on 24.06.1999, it would have been legally mandatory to produce him before the Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest and thereupon, he could not have been kept in illegal confinement for so many days so as to torture him in order to extort some confession. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that father of Neeraj Kumar had been placed under suspension by petitioner No.2 on 10.06.1999 and for this reason, the petitioners have been falsely implicated. This is again a disputed question of fact, which is to be decided by the Trial Court after recording evidence. It may, however, be observed that for this reason, petitioner No.1 and other six accused would not have been implicated in the above case. Moreover, respondent No.2 and her husband initiated action because their son had been detained and not because husband of respondent No.2 had been suspended, in as much as, their son was shown to have been arrested in a case on 28.06.1999 and therefore, it cannot be said that complaints were made on account of suspension of husband of the complainant and not on account of detention of their son. For the reasons recorded above, the inevitable conclusion is that the instant revision petition is devoid of merit. The same is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, expressly made clear that nothing observed herein shall have any bearing on the merits of the case. ————————