ORDER In this case, the petitioner has called in question the order passed by the 1st respondent dated 3-7-2008 withdrawing the recognition granted to it as per the provisions of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 (for short, 'the Act'). 2. Babasaheb Ambedkar Vidyavardhak Sangh (R) has been running the petitioner school at Kaul Bazaar, Bellary. The aforesaid school is imparting education from Class I to Class X. It appears that the roof of the school collapsed on 1-7-2008 due to which one of the students was killed and some of the students sustained injuries. In view of the aforesaid incident, the 1st respondent withdrew the recognition granted to the petitioner exercising the power under Section 39 of the Act. 3. Sri B.D. Hiremath, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the order of the 1st respondent is totally without jurisdiction and in contravention of Section 39 of the Act. It is contended that the 1st respondent has not issued any notice as provided under Section 39(2) of the Act before withdrawing the recognition granted to the petitioner-school. Thus, the impugned order is opposed to the principles of natural justice. On the other hand, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondents would contend that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 130 of the Act. On this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. Secondly, it is contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief as sought for in the writ petition. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel made at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record. 5. It is not in dispute that the Babasaheb Ambedkar Vidyavardhak Sangh (R) has been running the petitioner-school at Kaul Bazaar, Bellary, for over two decades. The petitioner has not denied the death of a student on account of the collapsing of the roof of the school building. Sri B.D. Hiremath, learned Counsel submits that the petitioner has constructed temporary structures and the students are undergoing their studies in the said structures and that they are in the process of constructing new school building. The petitioner has not denied the death of a student on account of the collapsing of the roof of the school building. Sri B.D. Hiremath, learned Counsel submits that the petitioner has constructed temporary structures and the students are undergoing their studies in the said structures and that they are in the process of constructing new school building. In this regard, an affidavit of the Secretary of the Sangha has been filed today along with the photographs of the said structures. It is evident from the letter Annexure-P that the parents of the students studying in the school have requested the first respondent to continue the recognition to the school. Be that as it may. It is not in dispute that the 1st respondent has not issued notice under Section 39(2) of the Act before withdrawing the recognition. 6. Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act provides for issuance of one month's notice before withdrawal of the recognition. It is as under: "Section 39. Withdrawal of recognition.-....... (2) Where the State Government is of the opinion that the recognition granted to any local authority, institution or private educational institution should in the public interest be withdrawn, they may after giving to the local authority or as the case may be the Government Council of the institution one month's notice to make any representation, withdraw by notification the recognition granted to the said institution". 7. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the 1st respondent has not issued any notice as contemplated under the aforesaid provision. It is well-settled that before withdrawal of the recognition or taking any action under Section 39( 1) of the Act, it must be preceded by a show-cause notice to enable the institution to make a representation. This is in conformity with the rule of audi alteram partem. This Court in the case of Sri Nooli Channayya Smaraka Sri Bannimahankali Education Society (Regd. J, Nargund, Gadag District v State of Karnataka and Others!, it is held that the audi alteram partem rule ensures that no one should be condemned unheard. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can adequately defend himself. The notice issued should be valid and adequate. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can adequately defend himself. The notice issued should be valid and adequate. The grounds given in the notice on which the action proposed to be taken should be clear, specific and unambiguous. In the case of Bharati (Private) Education Society, Anekal, Bangalore v State of Karnataka and Another', this Court has held that notice should be given to the institution concerned to make a representation before withdrawing the recognition. 8. Thus, it is clear that the impugned order is not only violative of Section 39(2) of the Act but also opposed to the principles of natural justice. It is true that the impugned order is appealable under Section 130 of the Act. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction. In the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others, this Court has held as under: "The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged". As noticed above, the 1st respondent has failed to follow the principles of natural justice. The order impugned is violative of Section 39(2) of the Act. Therefore, the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 9. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and it is accordingly allowed in part. The order passed by the 1st respondent dated 3-7-2008 (Annexure-J) is hereby quashed. However, liberty is reserved to the first respondent to issue notice to the petitioner as provided under Section 39i 2) of the Act and thereafter pass appropriate orders thereon in accordance with law. No costs.