Soibam Ningol Arambam Ongbi Binodini Devi v. Union of India and Ors.
2008-05-27
M.B.K.SINGH, T.VAIPHEI
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
T. Vaiphei, J.:- 1. The short but interesting question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether a notice under section 10(4) of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 ('the AR Act') is necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (as amended in 1994), before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the said Act. Having held by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Manipur that such a notice is necessary by the order dated 21.2.2004, the appellant has now preferred this appeal. 2. Before proceeding further and with a view to appreciate the controversy involved in this appeal, a brief narration of the material facts is called for. On 1.6.2003 at about 10:10 AM the Officer-in-Charge, Imphal Police Station registered a suo motu case being FIR No. 154(6)7 03 under section 279/338/427, IPC in connection with the vehicular accident, i.e., TATA 407, belonging to Assam Rifles bearing registration No. MN-OSC-4882. While coming out from 17 Assam Rifles, Kangla on Southern Gate along Sanjenthong Road, the said vehicle driven by one Shri G.D. Manojkumar dashed against a motorcycle bearing registration No. MN-04/1128 driven by one Shri Arambam Ibomcha @ Jeevan Singh with 2 pillion riders which was coming towards Sanjenthong. It is alleged by the appellant that the accident took place due to the rash and negligence driving of the TATA Driver. It appears that the 3 motorcycle riders sustained injuries due to the said accident and were hospitalized at J.N. Hospital. Subsequently, one of the injured persons, viz.; Arambam Bihari Singh succumbed to his injury on the same date at 11:30 AM. In the course of investigation of the case, the said G.D. Manojkumar (respondent No. 2 herein) was arrested and the TATA vehicle was seized by the police. 3. On the death of the deceased, the appellant who is his wife, filed a claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV Act') claiming compensation and an interim compensation of Rs. 50,000 under section 140 of the of the MV Act. It would appear that the respondents contested the claim petition and raised a preliminary objection contending that since the claimant/appellant failed to give notice under Section 10(4) of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 ('the AR Act'), the claim petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.
50,000 under section 140 of the of the MV Act. It would appear that the respondents contested the claim petition and raised a preliminary objection contending that since the claimant/appellant failed to give notice under Section 10(4) of the Assam Rifles Act, 1941 ('the AR Act'), the claim petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The learned Member, MACT, Manipur accepted the preliminary objection of the respondents and passed the impugned order disposing of the claim petition by directing the appellant to file her case after observing the appropriate procedure. This order is now under challenge in this appeal. 4. Mr. K. Madhusudon Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Member, MACT, Manipur wrongly interpreted the provisions of section 10(4) of the AR Act by holding that notice of institution of a claim petition is required by law. He further contends that a claim petition under MV Act is neither a criminal proceeding nor a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 10(4) of the AR Act, and, therefore, no prior notice of institution of the claim petition is required. In support of his contention, the leaned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Ranu Bala Paul v. Bani Chakraborty, 1999 ACJ 634 (Gau.) and Union of India v. Abdulla Khan, 1992 ACJ 1001 . In Ranu Bala Paul's case (supra), this court takes the view that a claim petition before the MACT is neither a criminal case nor a civil case and that the Tribunal is not expected to take or to adopt the nicety of a civil or of a criminal case, after all, it is a summary enquiry and the provision for claim petition is a legislation made for the welfare of the society. In Abdulla Khan's case (supra), it was held that for filing a claim petition, notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not necessary. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 5. Per contra, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Central Govt.
In Abdulla Khan's case (supra), it was held that for filing a claim petition, notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not necessary. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 5. Per contra, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Central Govt. Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents contends that a claim petition under MV Act is based on common law and law of Torts and if no Claims Tribunal has been constituted, a civil court would continue to exercise jurisdiction in regard to claims arising out of motor accidents by applying the same law of Torts and, as such, a claim proceeding for relief against infringement of civil right of a person is a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 10(4) of the AR Act. He further contends that the fact that a claim petition under section 166 of the MV Act is to enable the injured or the legal representative of a deceased who died in a motor accident to have a quick and cheap remedy or to avoid the payment of large amount of court fee cannot detract from the legal position that a claim petition is a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 10(4) of the AR Act. It is thus contended by the learned CGSC that a notice under section 10(4) of the AR Act is the pre-requisite for filing a claim petition and the appellant herein having failed to comply with the aforesaid mandatory provisions of law, is barred from filing the claim petition. The learned CGSC has placed strong reliance on (1) New Delhi Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 , (2)Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna, AIR 1977 SC 1248 , (3) Smt. Sarmanya Bai & Ors. v. M.P. Rajya Parioahan Nigam & Ors., AIR 1990 MP 306 (FB), (4) P.M.A Metropolitan & Ors. v. Moran Mar Marthoma & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 2001 and (5) Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431 . 6. At the outset, it will not be out of place to reproduce herein below the provisions of section 10 of the AR Act: - "10. Privileges of, and protection for acts done by, Commandant, Assistant Commandant, etc.
6. At the outset, it will not be out of place to reproduce herein below the provisions of section 10 of the AR Act: - "10. Privileges of, and protection for acts done by, Commandant, Assistant Commandant, etc. - (1) A Commandant, Assistant Commandant or Rifleman shall be entitled to all the privileges which a police office has under section 125 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and any other enactment for the time being in force. (2) In any suit or proceeding against a Commandant, Assistant Commandant or Rifleman for any act done by him in pursuance of a warrant or order of a competent authority, it shall be lawful for him to plead that such act was done by him under the authority of such warrant or order. (3) Any such plea may be proved by the production of the warrant or order directing the act, and if it is so proved, the Commandant, Assistant Commandant or rifleman, as the case may be, shall thereupon be discharged from liability in respect of the act so done by him, notwithstanding any defect in the jurisdiction of the authority which issued such warrant or order. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any legal proceeding (whether civil or criminal) which may lawfully be brought against a Commandant, Assistant Commandant or rifleman for anything done or intended to be done under the powers conferred by, or in pursuance of, any provision of this Act or the orders or rules made thereunder, shall be commenced within three months alter the act complained of was committed and not otherwise, and notice in writing of such proceeding and of the cause thereof shall be given, where the defendant is a rifleman, to his superior officer, and in other cases, to the defendant, at least one month before the commencement of such proceeding." 7. A close look at the aforesaid provisions will show that an intending litigant is prohibited from commencing a legal proceedings, civil or criminal, before the expiry of three months after the commission of the act complained of and such a litigant is further barred from commencing any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, unless a notice in writing is given at least for one month.
A combined reading of the various provisions of section 10 of the Act seems to show that at least one month notice before the commencement of a legal proceeding against the personnel of Assam Rifles is the sine qua non. The use of a non obstante clause in section 10(4) of the AR Act has apparently given the impression that it overrides any law for the time being in force including the provisions of the MV Act. Logically, therefore, even for filing a claim petition under section 166 of the MV Act, the claimant is required to comply with the provision of section 10(4). No doubt that by the non obstante clause, the Legislature devises means which are usually applied to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other statute. But to attract the applicability of the phrase, the whole of the section, the scheme of the Act and the object and reasons for which such enactment is made have to be kept in mind [See Vishin N. Khanchandani v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani, (2000) 6 SCC 724 ]. 8. It may be noticed that the original provisions of section 10 was substituted by the Assam Rifles (Amended) Act, 1962 and the protections claimed by the respondents herein were incorporated by this amendment. The statements of objects and reasons of this amendment provide that under section 10 of the Act, only the Commandants and Assistant Commandants are entitled to all the privileges which a police officer has under sections 42 and 43 of the Police Act, 1861, section 125 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and any other enactment for the time being in force and that it is considered necessary to confer such privileges on the riflemen also. It is also mentioned therein that it is considered that the Commandants, Assistant Commandants and riflemen should have the same protection for acts done by them in the discharge of police duties as has been conferred on the members of the Central Reserve Police Force.
It is also mentioned therein that it is considered that the Commandants, Assistant Commandants and riflemen should have the same protection for acts done by them in the discharge of police duties as has been conferred on the members of the Central Reserve Police Force. Thus, the protections made available to the Assam Rifles personnel by virtue of section 10 of the AR Act are in terms of the protection given to the notice under sections 42 and 43 of the Police Act, 1861, section 125 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and any other enactment for the time being in force. What are the nature of protection granted to the Assam Rifles personnel under section 10 of the AR Act can broadly be understood by reproducing hereunder the said provisions of the Police Act and Evidence Act : - Police Act, 1861, sections 42 and 43 : - "42. Limitation of actions. - All action and prosecutions against any person, whioh may be lawfully brought for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act, or under general police powers hereby given shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed, and not otherwise ; and notice in writing of such action and of the cause thereof shall be given to the defendant, or to the District Superintendent or an Assistant District Superintendent of the District in which the act was committed, one month at least before the commencement of the action. Tender of amends. No plaintiff shall recover in any such action if tender of sufficient amend shall have been made before such action brought, or if a sufficient sum of money shall have been paid into court after such action brought, by or on behalf of the defendant, and, though a decree shall be given for the plaintiff in any such action, such plaintiff shall not have costs against the defendant, unless the Judge before whom the trial is held shall certify his approbation of the action Proviso. Provided always that no action shall in any case lie where such officers shall have been prosecuted criminally for the same act. 43. Plea that act was done under warrant.
Provided always that no action shall in any case lie where such officers shall have been prosecuted criminally for the same act. 43. Plea that act was done under warrant. - When any action or prosecution shall be brought or any proceedings held against any police officer for any act done by him in such capacity, it shall be lawful for him to plead that such act was done by him under the authority of a warrant issued by a Magistrate. Such plea shall be proved by the production of the warrant directing the act, and purporting to be signed by such Magistrate and the defendant shall thereupon be entitled to a decree in his favour, notwithstanding any defect of jurisdiction in such Magistrate. No proof of the signature of such Magistrate shall be necessary, unless the court shall see reason to doubt its being genuine : Proviso. Provided always that any remedy which the party may have against the authority issuing such warrant shall not be affected by anything contained in this section." Evidence Act, 1872 Section 125 : "125. Information as to commission of offences: - No Magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence, and no Revenue officer shall be compiled to say whence lie get any information as to the commission of any offence against the public revenue." 9. Before proceeding further, we may also notice the provisions of sections 10A and 11 of the AR Act, since they are likely to furnish the key to understanding the protections actually made available to the personnel of the Assam Rifles under sections 10(4) and the same read, thus : - "10A. Powers and duties that may be conferred or imposed by the Central Government on Commandant, Assistant Commandant, etc. - (1) The Central Government may, by general or special order, confer or impose upon any Commandant, Assistant Commandant or rifleman, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on a police officer or any class or grade by any law for the time being in force.
- (1) The Central Government may, by general or special order, confer or impose upon any Commandant, Assistant Commandant or rifleman, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on a police officer or any class or grade by any law for the time being in force. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Central Government may invest any Commandant or Assistant Commandant with the powers or a Magistrate of any class for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence committed by a rifleman and punishable under this Act or any offence committed by a rifleman against the person or property of another rifleman or of any person acting with or assisting the Assam Rifles. 11. Members of the Assam Rifles to be deemed part of the Indian Army for certain purposes. - For the purposes of sections 128, 130 and 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, a Commandant. Assistant Commandant, Subadar Major, Subadar or Jemadar of the Assam Rifles shall be deemed to be an officer; a Havildar - Major, Havildar or Naik shall be deemed to be a non-commissioned officer and a bugler or rifleman shall be deemed to be a soldier of the Indian Army." 10. A combined reading of the provisions extracted above unmistakably indicates that the Assam Rifles personnel are also given the power of the Civil Police for dispersal of unlawful assembly even by use of armed forces and of other duties imposed upon a police officer of any class or grade and that some protection is given to them for any act or omission done or intended to be done by them for exercising the powers conferred by and for discharging such duties under the AR Act. In our considered view, what emerges from the aforesaid provisions is that the protections granted to the AR personnel under section 10(4) are necessarily confined to their act or omission, arising out of the exercise of powers conferred under, or in the discharge of their duties imposed by the Act, which are in the nature of police duties. Therefore, such protection would be available them for incidents resulting from policing acts and not for ordinary accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles or any accident akin to motor accidents. This will become clear if the provisions of the MV Act are taken into consideration.
Therefore, such protection would be available them for incidents resulting from policing acts and not for ordinary accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles or any accident akin to motor accidents. This will become clear if the provisions of the MV Act are taken into consideration. 11. Section 165 of the MV Act deals with the constitution of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Thus, this section unequivocally indicates that the Claims Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain application for compensation both by the persons injured or legal representatives of the deceased when the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. The crucial expression conferring jurisdiction upon the Claims Tribunal constituted under the MV Act is the accident arising out of the use of a in for accident. The jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to certain application for compensation flows from the provisions of sections 166 read with section 165(1).The question to be considered is whether section 10(4) of the AR Act, by the use of a non obstante clause can override the provisions of section 166 read with section 165 (1) of the MV Act. It must be remembered that a statute like the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing cheap, speedy and effective remedy to the injured or legal representative of the deceased when the accident arose out of the use of motor vehicle. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain application for claim of compensation under MVAct depends essentially on the fact whether there had been any use of a motor vehicle in the accident. In our considered view, if the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to entertain a claim petition is automatically attracted. 12. To held that a claim petition, cannot be filed without issuing prior notice for one month under section 10(4) of the AR Act will also militate against the intention of the Legislature in amending the Act in 1994.
12. To held that a claim petition, cannot be filed without issuing prior notice for one month under section 10(4) of the AR Act will also militate against the intention of the Legislature in amending the Act in 1994. Section 158(6) of the MV Act (as amended in 1994) casts a statutory duty upon the Officer-in-Charge of a police to forward to the Tribunal a copy of the information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury recorded by him within 30(thirty) days from the date of recording of such information. Similar duty is casts upon the owner of the vehicle where the copy is made available to him. Section 166(4) is the crucial provision, which reads, thus :- "(4) The claim Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 168 as an application for compensation under the Act." 13. The provision extracted above plainly shows that the report of accidents so forwarded to the Claim Tribunal can be the basis of making an award of compensation even if no claim petition is filed by the injured or the legal representative of the deceased who died in an accident, which arise out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, the MVAct is a self-contained code which prescribes the mode of filing the application or the mode of treating an information regarding a motor accident as application for compensation under the Act, the procedure to be followed and the award to be made. Parliament, in its wisdom, realized the grave injustice and injury being caused to claimants and legal representatives of the victim who die in motor accidents by even making a provision for treating any report of motor accident forwarded under section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation. If compliance with Section 10(4) of the AR Act, by virtue of the use of the use of non obstante clause therein, is insisted upon before the filing of a claim petition under section 166 of the MV Act, the very intention of the Legislature to provide quick, cheap and effective remedy to the victims of the motor accidents or their legal representative would being be frustrated, the intendment of the Legislature being to ensure immediate relief to such classes of persons untrammeled by the technicalities of procedural laws.
As observed earlier, the jurisdiction of the claims Tribunal to pass an award for compensation is founded on an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Thus, it is an accident and not an incident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle which confers the jurisdiction upon a Claims Tribunal to entertain a claim petition. In the view that we have taken, we reject the contention of to learned CGSC that prior notice under section 10(4) of the AR Act is the condition precedent for filing a claim petition under section 166 of the MV Act. Consequently, in our judgment, it is not necessary to consider whether a claim petition is a civil suit or a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 10(4) of the AR Act. 14. We have gone through the decision of the Apex Court in Naga Peoples Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 431 upon which the learned CGSC places strong reliance. In that case, the Apex Court was considering the question whether previous sanction of the Central Government under section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 is required before a criminal prosecution or a suit or other civil proceeding is instituted against the armed forces personnel. The Apex Court held that a protection in the form of previous sanction of the Central Government is required before a criminal prosecution or a suit or other civil proceeding is instituted against such persons. It is obvious that the Apex Court therein was not considering the impact of section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 on the provisions of section 166 of the MV Act, Therefore, the case is clearly distinguishable on facts or on law. However, the act or omission complained of contemplated as law to protection relate to or arises out of the discharge of duties imposed by the Act, such as combating insurgency or for maintaining public order, etc. 15. For what has been stated above, we, therefore, hold that a notice under section 10(4) of the AR Act, 1941 is not necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 166 of the MV Act, 1988 (as and ended in 1994).
15. For what has been stated above, we, therefore, hold that a notice under section 10(4) of the AR Act, 1941 is not necessary for an application for compensation when filed under section 166 of the MV Act, 1988 (as and ended in 1994). In the result, the impugned order dated 21.2.2004 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Manipur is not sustainable in law and is hereby set aside. Accordingly the MAC Case No. 153 of 2003 stands restored to the file of the learned Member, MACT, Manipur, who shall immediately proceed with and expeditiously dispose of the same in accordance with law, preferably within a period of 4 (four) months from the date of receipt of the LC records. No order as to costs. Registry is directed to transmit the Lower Court Records forthwith.