Judgment :- E.P. 25 of 2004 was instituted before District Court, Alappuzha for execution of Ext.P2 arbitration award dated 212.1999 as provided under section 36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Petitioner was the surety to the second respondent who purchased an ambassador car under hire purchase agreement. The hire purchase agreement contains an arbitration clause by which all disputes are to be settled by arbitration. So also the arbitration is to be at Chennai. A Retired District Judge, who was appointed the sole arbitrator, passed Ext.P2 award on 211.1995 in favour of first respondent decree holder for realization of Rs.3,31,529/- with interest @ 18% per annum till realization. For execution of the award, E.P.25 of 2004 was filed before District Court, Alappuzha and immovable property of the petitioner was sold on 112.2005. Later the sale was confirmed on 12.2006. When the decree holder/auction purchaser sought delivery of the property and delivery was ordered, petitioner filed E.A.55 of 2007 to set aside the sale and E.A. 56 of 2007 to review the order directing delivery of the property. The petitioners were originally dismissed by Additional District Judge, Alappuzha. It was challenged before this court in W.P.(C) 15527 of 2007. Under Ext.P7 judgment, that order was set aside and Additional District Judge after hearing both parties, as per common order dated 10.1.2008 dismissed the petitioners holding that Additional District Court, Alappuzha has jurisdiction to execute the award as provided under Section 36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the property was validly sold in execution. This petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India contending that Additional District judge, Alappuzha has no jurisdiction to execute the award and hence the entire execution proceedings including the sale is void. 2. Learned counsel appearing for petitioner and first respondent were heard. 3. The learned counsel, relying on definition of Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), argued that “Court” is defined under the sub-section as, means the Principal Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction and therefore the court, as defined under Section 2(e), could only be the principal District Court and not the Additional District Court. Learned counsel also argued that under section 36 of the Act an award is to be executed before that court where an application to set aside the arbitral award as provided under Section 34 of the Act would lie and when Ext.P2, award was passed at Chennai, only the Principal Civil Court, which is the District Court at Chennai has jurisdiction to execute the award under Section 36 of the Act and even if property at Cherthala is to be sold in execution of the award it is to be transferred to District Court, Alappuzha after filing execution petition at Chennai and then only District Court, Alappuzha can execute the award. The learned counsel argued that the hire purchase agreement exclusively provides for arbitration at Chennai and therefore only District Court at Chennai has jurisdiction to execute the arbitration award and finding of the learned Additional District Judge is not sustainable. Relying of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sulekha Clay Mines V. Union of India (2000(1) KLT 691) it was argued that the Court, as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act is only the District Court and that District Court could only be the principal District Court and not an Additional District Court. Relying on the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in M/s. Fountain Head Developers Vs. Maria Arcangela Sequeira (AIR 2007 Bombay 149) it was argued that the court, as provided under subsection (e) of Section (2) is the District Court and it cannot even be the Additional District Court. Relying on the single Bench decision of the High Court of Karnataka in ICDS Ltd Vs. Mangala Builders Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 2001 Karnataka 364) it was argued that under Section 36 execution would lie only in the courts as defined under Section 2(e) and that could only in the court where a petition to set aside the arbitration award under Section 34 of the Act would lie and if so Additional District Judge, Alappuzha has no jurisdiction to enforce the award under Section 36 of the Act or sell the property and therefore the sale and the execution proceedings are all without the jurisdiction to enforce the award under Section 36 of the Act or sell the property and therefore the sale and the execution proceedings are all without the jurisdiction and are to be set aside. Relying on the decision of Apex Court in Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. V. Rama Mishra (2002 (9) SCC 613) it was argued that where two or more courts have jurisdiction to try a suit and parties by agreement choose one of such courts for adjudication of the disputes, jurisdiction of other courts is excluded and only that named court has jurisdiction to try the suit and when parties under the hire purchase agreement had chosen the Forum at Chennai, jurisdiction of the Court at Alappuzha is ousted and therefore execution petition would lie only before District Court, Chennai. Relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Younus Kunju Vs. Special Tahsildar (1988 (2) KLT 576) it was argued that when a special statute confer jurisdiction on the District Judge, only the District Judge could discharge the functions provided under the statute and that function cannot be made over to the Additional District Court and therefore Additional District Court is not competent to execute the award, when under Section 2(e) the court is only the Principal Civil Court. The learned counsel also relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in Mahesh B. Shah Vs. Joseph (2005 (3) KLT 787) wherein also it was held that the power to execute the award Section 36 is in that court where a petition under Section 34 would lie. Learned counsel therefore argued that the order of the learned Additional District Judge is not sustainable. 4. Learned counsel appearing for respondent relied on the Division Bench decision of this court in Duroflex (P) Ltd. Vs. Technology Information, Forecasting & Assessment Council (2007 (4) KLT 165) and argued that as in this case the agreement provides for arbitration choosing the venue at Delhi. It was argued that when jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit was not ousted in the agreement and the agreement only provides for arbitration at Chennai, and a petition to set aside the arbitration award as provided under Section 34 would lie in the court within whose jurisdiction the party resides, District Court, Alappuzha had jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 34. It was also argued that if the award is to be executed in that court which has jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 34 and an application under Section 34 would lie before District Court, Alappuzha as held by the Division Bench in Duroflex (P) Ltd.’s case (supra), then in spite of the provisions in the agreement that arbitration shall be at Chennai, District Court, Alappuzha ahs jurisdiction to execute the award. Learned counsel also argued that execution petition was filed before District Court, Alappuzha and it was made over to Additional District Court by the District Judge and as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of Civil Courts Act, Additional District Judge has all the powers of the District judge while disposing the case and therefore Additional District Court has the power to execute the decree under Section 36 and the sale cannot be challenged for want of jurisdiction. Learned counsel also argued that Additional District Judge is not inferior to the District Judge and both District Judge and Additional District Judge are having equal powers and in such circumstances it cannot be said that additional District judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition or to proceed with the execution and therefore petitions are only to be dismissed. Learned counsel also argued that additional District Judge considered the contentions raised by the petitioners and rightly dismissed the objections and there is no illegality or irregularity warranting interference. Learned counsel also relied on the decision of a learned Single Judge of high court of Andharpradesh in Globsyn Technologies ltd., Calcutta Vs. Eskaaycee Infosys, Visakhapattanam (2004 (1) Arb LR 560) and argued that Additional District Judge is competent to execute the award. 5. Sub-section (e) of Section 2 of the Act defines “Court” as follows: “Court means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes”. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Sulekha Clay Mines Vs. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Sulekha Clay Mines Vs. Union of India (2000 (1) KLT 691) interpreting the said definition held that the court provided under Section 2(e) is Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District and it is only the District Court. 6. A Full Bench of Bombay High Court elaborately considered this aspect in M/s. Fountain Head Developers (Supra). After analyzing the various provisions it was found that Legislature clearly circumscribed and specifically narrowed down the definition of civil court to mean only the court of principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district and it is only the court of District Judge in a district, which is the principal civil court, the learned judge speaking for the Bench held: “12. In our opinion, a plain and literal reading of all the aforesaid worlds/expressions/terms employed in Section 2(e) clearly demonstrate the exact meaning of the term “Court”. It means the district Court is the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and not a civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court. The court of civil Judge, Senior Division may also be a civil Court of original jurisdiction, but in any cases it could not be termed as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district. 13. The Parliament, in the Act of 1996, has intendedly used the terms “court” and not the “District Court” as we usually find in various other enactments. From a plain and literal reading of the definition of “Court” it is apparent that the definition is inclusive. It specifically includes in the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Under Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 3(15) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 the term “District Judge” means the Judge of a principal civil Curt of original jurisdiction. The High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction is not included in these definitions. To get out of these definitions and with a view of include the High Court, the Parliament in the Act of 1996 has not used the term “District Court” and has used only “court” to mean and include the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction. 14. To get out of these definitions and with a view of include the High Court, the Parliament in the Act of 1996 has not used the term “District Court” and has used only “court” to mean and include the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction. 14. Thus, from the language of the definition of “Court” under Section 2(e) of the Act of 1996 the Parliament apparently intended to confer the power on the highest judicial authority in a district. It must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the object to the achieved while framing the definition of the term “Court”. Besides, it intended to minimize supervisory role of the Courts in arbitral process, it also intended to add the greatest credibility to this process. We find support for the view in the judgments of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1996, in S.B.P. & Company (AIR 2006 SC 450) (supra) in paragraph 12 of the Judgment has observed that “the Court is defined in the act to be the principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction is normally the District Court. The High Courts in India exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction are not too many. So in most of the States the concerned Court would be the District Court”. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Garhwal Mandal Vs. M/s. Krishna Travel Agency in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18344 of 2004 decide on 21.2007, while dealing with the question whether it could entertain all objections to the award and holding that even if the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by High Court or the Supreme Court, the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction remains the same as contemplated under Section 2(e) of the Act of 1996, has observed that the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction remains the “District Court” even if the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by the High Court. It is thus clear that the Legislature clearly circumscribed and specifically narrowed down the definition of “Court” to mean only the Court of principal civil original jurisdiction in a district and it is only the Court of “District Judge” in a district which is such a “court” of principal civil jurisdiction.” 7. In view of the definition of Court under Section 2(e) of the act, the Court could only be the District or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction and no other court inferior to the District Court. 8. The Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 under section 2 Provides three categories of Courts, namely, (1) the Court of a District Judge (2) the Court of a Subordinate Judge and (3) the Court of a Munisiff. Section 3 provides for establishment of District Courts. Under sub-section (2) of Section 3 Government shall establish a District Court for each district and a Judge shall be appointed to such court. Section 4 provides for appointment of Additional District Judges. Under sub-section (1), when the state of business pending before a District Court so requires one or more Additional District Judges may be appointed to that Court for such period as is deemed necessary. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 provides the powers of the Additional District Judge so appointed. Under sub-section (2) an additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of District Judge in respect of all maters, which the District Judge may assign to him, or which under provision of Section 7 may be instituted before him. It further provides that in discharge of those functions Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as that of the District Judge. Section 7 provides the location of the courts. Under sub-section (2), with the approval of the Government, High Court may direct, by notification that all or any class of proceedings arising in a specified local area in a district, which would ordinarily be instituted in a District Court, may be instituted before an Additional District Judge of that court sitting in a place other than the place where the District Judge sits. Section 3 and 4 of Kerala Civil Court Act reads: “3. Section 3 and 4 of Kerala Civil Court Act reads: “3. Establishment of District Courts:- (1) For the purpose of this Act, the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, divide the state into civil district (hereinafter referred to as districts) and alter the limits or the number of such districts. (2) The Government shall establish a District Court for each district and a Judge (hereinafter called the District Judge) shall be appointed to such court. 4. Appointment of additional District Judges:- .(1) When the state of business pending before a District Court so requires one or more Additional District Judges may be appointed to that court for such period as is deemed necessary. .(2) An additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under this Act in respect of all matters which the District judge may assign to him, or which under the provisions of S.7 may be instituted before him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge.” Section 2 Provides for a court of District judge. Sub-section 2 of Section 3 provides for establishment of a District Court in each district. Sub-section 1 of section 4 provides for establishment of Additional District Courts and appointment of Additional District Judges to those courts. When such Additional District Courts are established and Additional District Judges are appointed, sub-section 2 of Section 4 empowers the Additional District judges so appointed with powers to discharge all the functions of a District Judge. It specifically provides that in discharge of the functions of the District judge, Additional District judge shall exercise the same powers as that of the District Judge. 9. Section 34 of the Act provides for an application for setting aside arbitral award. Under subsection (1) an application to set aside the award is to be filed before the court. That court is the court as defined under Section 2 (e). Section 35 provides for finality of arbitral awards. Section 36 provides for enforcement of the award. 9. Section 34 of the Act provides for an application for setting aside arbitral award. Under subsection (1) an application to set aside the award is to be filed before the court. That court is the court as defined under Section 2 (e). Section 35 provides for finality of arbitral awards. Section 36 provides for enforcement of the award. Section 36 reads: “Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has empire, or such application having been made, it been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.” The Court where an award is to be enforced is not specifically provided under Section 36. The Court could only be the Court as defined under Section 2(e). If so, it can only be the District Court. 10. Then the question is which is that Court. as held by learned single judge of Karnataka High court in ICDS Limited’s case (supra) the court where an award could be enforced as provided under Section 36 could only be the court where an application to set aside the award would lie under section 34. The learned Judge held: “This is also implied from the wordings of Section 36 itself. A right to enforce the award arises only after the period for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired or such an application having been made is rejected. That is to say, the Court executing the decree has to satisfy itself, before entertaining the application for execution that, the period for setting aside the award has expired or such an application having been made has been refused. If that be so, inferentially, the court that can exercise the power under Section 34 of the Act can alone entertain the steps to enforce the arbitral award. it means the “court as understood in Section 34 has alone the jurisdiction to entertain the enforcement of the arbitral award.” 11. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Mahesh B. Shaw Vs. it means the “court as understood in Section 34 has alone the jurisdiction to entertain the enforcement of the arbitral award.” 11. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Mahesh B. Shaw Vs. Joseph (2005 (3) KLT 787) considered this question and held that an award is to be challenged in the Court as defined under Section 2(e) and therefore this Court mentioned in Section 36 where the award is to be executed is also only the District Court. The question then is which is the District Court where an application under Section 34 is to be filed. 12. Section 34 does not provide to which principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district an application under Section 34 is to be filed. When the agreement provides for arbitration at Chennai and the award is passed at Chennai, the question is whether a petition to set aside the award is necessarily to be filed before District Court, which is otherwise having jurisdiction. It is in this context the Division Bench in Duroflex (p) Ltd. (supra) considered the question when the agreement only provides for a venue of arbitration at a particular location and does not provide the Court or place where a petition under Section 34 is to be filed, whether it should also be at the same venue and excludes jurisdiction of the Courts at any other places. It was held that a petition under Section 34 would lie before the court where a suit would otherwise lie. Based on clause (a) of Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure it was found that a petition under Section 34 of the Act would lie before District Court, Alappuzha even though the agreement provides for arbitration with venue is at New Delhi. The Division Bench held: “We also note that in the arbitration agreement there is no exclusion of jurisdiction by the Court in Alleppey or conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts in Delhi. It is true that by agreement, parties agreed that the place of arbitration shall be at Delhi. But at the same time there is no mention about the Court where the petition to set aside the award should be filed. In Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd. Vs. D Net Malayalam Digital Pvt. Ltd. (Arb. It is true that by agreement, parties agreed that the place of arbitration shall be at Delhi. But at the same time there is no mention about the Court where the petition to set aside the award should be filed. In Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd. Vs. D Net Malayalam Digital Pvt. Ltd. (Arb. A. No.10 of 2006) a Division Bench of this Court where one of us (Koshy, J) was a party, held that if two or more Courts have got jurisdiction the parties are free to file suits in any of the courts. While dismissing the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P. No.18867/06) from the judgment in Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court observed as follows: We are of the opinion that in a case where both the Courts have jurisdiction and the parties have voluntarily agreed to get their disputes adjudicated upon at one of the two Courts of competent jurisdiction then, in that case, it cannot be said that particular Courts has no jurisdiction. It is true that as said in Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. V. Rama Mishra ((2002) 9 SCC 613), where two or more courts have jurisdiction to try a suit, parties can by an agreement choose one of such Courts for adjudication of their dispute and if there is such an express agreement, suit filed in a different court would be invalid. In this case Alleppey Court has jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter of the dispute. If the respondent files civil suit, in view of S.20(a) Alleppey Court can also have jurisdiction and there is no exclusion of jurisdiction of Alleppey Court in the agreement. It is also not agreed that parties can approach the Court at Delhi. If a suit was filed by the respondent with the same subject matter as that involved in the arbitration it could have been filed in Alleppey as the defendant company/respondent was in Alleppey. Hence, we are of the opinion that Alleppey Court has jurisdiction to deal with the subject matter and the order of the District Court, Alleppey is set aside and the Alleppey Court is directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, if possible within three months.” Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner argued that though the Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Sreeram City Union Financial Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rama Misra (2002 (9) SCC 613) the dictum laid therein was not analyzed or properly considered and the Apex Court in unambiguous terms held that when two or more courts have territorial jurisdiction and parties have chosen one among them, only that court has jurisdiction to try the suit. It was argued that when the arbitration agreement provides for arbitration at a particular place, the jurisdiction to set aside the Award or to execute the Award could only be exercised by the District Court of that place and therefore in view of the decision of the Apex Court the decision of the Division Bench cannot be relied on. But when the Division Bench considered an identical provision in an agreement providing for an arbitration with venue at New Delhi and it was held by the Division Bench that District Court at Alappuzha has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition under Section 34(1) of the Act, judicial discipline warrants this court to follow the same. Though the learned counsel argued that the question is to be referred to Division Bench for a re-look on the question, Single Judge is bound by the decision of the Division Bench. Hence the submission cannot be accepted. If that be so, it can only be found that in spite of the provision in the agreement for arbitration at Chennai, as jurisdiction of the Court at Alappuzha within whose jurisdiction the property offered as a security lies was not excluded, it can only be found that a petition under Section 34 of the Act would lie before District Court, Alappuzha. If so, as canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for respondents, the award could be enforced before District Court, Alappuzha as provided under Section 36 of the Act. 13. Then the question is whether the Additional District Court has jurisdiction to execute the award. 14. As stated earlier, Section 2 of The Kerala Civil Courts Act provides for only a Court of District Judge and Section 4 provides for establishment of Additional District Courts, providing that Additional District Judge shall discharge all the functions of the District Judge and while discharging the functions they shall exercise the same powers. In such circumstances it cannot be contended that in view of the definition of Court in Section 2(e), Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to execute the award as canvassed by the learned counsel for petitioner. In such circumstances it cannot be contended that in view of the definition of Court in Section 2(e), Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to execute the award as canvassed by the learned counsel for petitioner. Though Karnataka High Court in ICDS Ltd.’s case (supra) held that Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction, it is evidently because of Section 14 of the Karnataka Civil Court Act which reads as follows: “14. Jurisdiction of District Court: (1) The District Court shall be deemed to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), the jurisdiction of a District Court shall extend to all original suits and proceedings of a Civil nature.” Hence it is clear that under Karnataka Civil Courts Act District Court shall be deemed to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Such a provision is not there in Kerala Civil Courts Act. Sub section 1 of Section 11 dealing with jurisdiction of District Court in Kerala Civil Courts Act. “(1) The jurisdiction of a District Court or a Subordinate Judge’s Court extends, subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) to all original Suits and proceedings of a civil nature.” In addition, sub-section 2 of Section 4 of Kerala Civil Courts Act specifically provides that Additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of District Judge under the Act and in discharge of the functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. 15. InAisha Potti Vs. The Returning Officer (2002 (2) KLT 146) a learned single Judge was considering the jurisdiction of Additional District Court to try an election petition under section 88(2) of Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Considering Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure it was found that though District Court and for the limited purpose of section 24, an Additional District Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court, as per Notification issued under the Panchayat Raj Act, Additional District Court is not empowered to dispose an election petition and therefore Additional District Court is not competent to dispose an election petition. As is clear from the decision, it is only for want of a Notification as provided under section 88 of Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, learned single Judge held that Additional District Court is not competent to dispose the election petition. 16. So also though reliance was placed on the decision of another learned single Judge in Younus Kunju Vs. Special Tahsildar (1988 (2) KLT 576), wherein it was held that the special jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge by special statutes like Raw Cashewnuts (Procurement and Distribution) Act, 1981 is different from the jurisdiction, the District Judge discharge under sections 11 and 13 of Civil Courts Act and District Judge in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on him under sub section (2) of section 4 of Civil Courts act cannot assign or delegate his jurisdiction or power under section 22 of the said act to Additional District Judge, that principle cannot be applied to the enforcement of the Award under Section 36 of the Act, when the section does not prescribe a particular court to execute the award and instead provides that award is to be enforced as if it is a decree. 17. Reliance was placed on the decision of a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd Allahabad Vs. District Judge, Allahabad (A.I.R. 1998 Allahabad 313). It was argued that learned Additional District Judge was not justified in distinguishing that decision, as there was no difference between the Kerala Civil Courts Act and Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. The learned Judge in that case held that a conjoint reading of Section 2(e) and Section 42 of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to make only one Court the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or, as the case may be, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction, whichever court is approached earlier as the venue for all matters connected with an arbitration agreement and award and all arbitral proceedings and principal District Judge alone is competent to entertain an application under section 34 of the Act. It was held “As a result of the foregoing discussion and upon regard being had to the definition of term “Court” as elucidated in Sec.2 (e) and the overriding effect of Sec.42 of the Act, I am persuaded to the view that the Court of the Additional District Judge is shorn of jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 34 of the Act and the District Judge cannot, by invoking the provisions contained in Sec.8 (2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, transfer the application for its disposal to the court of an additional District Judge. An application for setting aside an award under Section 34 of the Act is as much an application “with respect to an arbitration agreement” as it is for “setting aside the arbitral award” and it is a matter of statutory compulsion that such application is made to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district ‘or the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction’ having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit and it is again a matter of statutory mandate that the Court to which the application is made ‘alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement’, and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court except the appellate Court being in seisin over the matter. the power to transfer/assign the application to any other Court, otherwise having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration had it been the subject matter of a suit, has been impliedly taken away by Sec.42 of the Act which is couched in a language fraught with overriding effect.” In that case the Court was considering the powers of the Additional District Judge to try an application filed under Section 34 of the Act. Section 34 provides for an application to be filed as provided thereunder to a “Court” and Court is defined under section 2(e) of the Act which could only be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District which is the District Court. Section 34 provides for an application to be filed as provided thereunder to a “Court” and Court is defined under section 2(e) of the Act which could only be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District which is the District Court. The Power of Additional District Court, to enforce an award in view of Section 36 of Act, which only provides that Award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court, was not considered therein. 18. Justice B. Sundershan Reddy (as His Lordship then was) of the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered this aspect in Globsyn Technologies Ltd, Vs. Eskaaycee Infosys (2004 (1) Arb. LR 560 (AP). The learned Judge held:- “12. The short question that falls for consideration is as to whether Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge is a Civil Court of a grade inferior of the Principal Civil Court. The Court of the Principal District Judge and the Court of VI-Additional District Judge are of equal grade. The Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge is not a Court of a grade inferior to the Court of the Principal District Judge. The expression “court of a grade inferior” is required to be understood in its proper context. 13. The dictionary meaning of inferior is “lower in any respect, subordinate, and a person who is lower in rank or station.” One who, in relation to another, has less power and it’s below him; one who is bound to obey another. The term may denote any Court subordinate to the Chief appellate Tribunal in the particular judicial system (e.g. Trial Court) but it is also commonly used as the designation of a Court of special, limited, or statutory jurisdiction. 14. I find it difficult to accept the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that the Court of the learned VI-Additional District Judge at Viskhapatnam is a Court of a grade inferior to the Principal District judge’s Court. I am unable to persuade myself to accept the reasoning given and the ratio of the decision in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad (supra). The contention is accordingly rejected.” 19. I am unable to persuade myself to accept the reasoning given and the ratio of the decision in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad (supra). The contention is accordingly rejected.” 19. Sub section (2) of Section 4 of Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 specifically provides that an additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge in respect of all matters which the District Judge may assign to him and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as that of the District Judge. True, under Section 2(e) of the Act, the Court is the principal District Court. What is provided under Section 42 of the Act is only that notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement, any application under the Act has been made in a court, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and to no other court. Though it can be said that with respect to an arbitration agreement word Court used in the Section takes in its sweep, an application for setting aside an arbitral award as provided under section 34 of the Act, the sweep cannot embrace the enforcement of the Award. Section 36 of the act provides that the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree. It does not provide that it is to be enforced in the Court as defined under Section 2(e). If so the District Court has the jurisdiction to enforce the award as if it were a decree. There is no provision restricting the powers of the district Judge while enforcing the award under the Act. Hence the District Judge has all the powers vested in him, as the District Judge, while exercising the powers provided under Section 36 in enforcing the award as if it were a decree of the civil Court. Therefore while enforcing the award District Judge can exercise his powers provided under section 4(2) of Kerala Civil Courts Act and make over the execution petition to an Additional District judge. Therefore while enforcing the award District Judge can exercise his powers provided under section 4(2) of Kerala Civil Courts Act and make over the execution petition to an Additional District judge. In this case, the execution petition was originally filed before the District judge, who even according to the petitioner is competent to execute the award. Learned District Judge in exercise of his powers under sub section (2) of Section 4, make over the execution petition to Additional District judge. By virtue of sub section (2) of Section 4 additional District Judge has all the powers of the District Judge in discharge of the functions in respect of all matters including the execution petition assigned to him by the District Judge. Therefore as found by the executing Court, learned Additional District judge has the power to entertain an application under Section 34 of the Act in view of Section 2(e) of the Act. But as far as enforcement of the Award is concerned, so long as Section 36 does not provide that the award is to be enforced in the Court as defined under Section 2(e) and instead provides for enforcement of the Award in the same manner as if it were a decree, District judge is competent to make over the execution petition to an Additional District Court. in that event, Additional District judge in discharging the functions, is competent to execute the award. Therefore neither the execution proceedings nor the sale can be challenged on the ground of want of inherent jurisdiction. There is no merit in the writ petition. Writ Petition is dismissed.