Judgment N.K.MODY, J. ( 1. ) Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 23/12/1999, passed by XIIth Additional District Judge, Indore, in Civil Suit NO.12-A/1989, whereby the suit filed by the appellant for eviction was dismissed, the present appeal has been filed. ( 2. ) Short facts of the case are that the appellant filed a suit for eviction against the respondents on 19/12/1988 under Section 12(l)(a)(c)(f)(k)(m)and (o) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (which shall be referred hereinafter as Act). It was alleged that respondent M/s. Sharma Motor Transport Co. is a Partnership Firm and is tenant of the appellant in the suit accommodation situated at 6, New Loha Mandi, Indore, @ Rs.1,691/- per month, which includes water charges of RS.10/-. It was alleged that respondent is in arrears of rent from 01/07/1998, which has not been paid inspite of demand. It was also alleged that appellant is in need of the suit accommodation for bonafide requirement of his sons for carrying on business of steel. It was alleged that previously appellant was having rental shop at Khatiwala, Indore, but the same has been got vacated by the landlord of that premises from the appellant. It was alleged that appellant is having no other alternative accommodation of his own for carrying on the business of steel. It was prayed that a decree of eviction be passes against the respondent. ( 3. ) During pendency of the suit appellant gave up the ground under Section 12(1)(c)(k)(m)and(o) of the Act and the suit was contested between the parties under Section 12(l)(a)and(f) of the Act. After framing of issues and recording of evidence learned Court below dismissed the suit on 29/09/1993, against which an appeal was filed by the appellant, which was numbered as F.A. No.233/93. During pendency of appeal, appellant filed certain documents along with an application I.A. No.2405/99. Vide judgment dated 12/05/1999, the appeal and the application was allowed and the documents were taken on record. Judgment and decree passed by learned Trial court was set aside and the case was remanded back to the learned Trial Court for re-deciding the suit. After recording of the additional evidence vide judgment and decree dated 23/12/1999, again the suit filed by the appellant was dismissed, against which present appeal has been filed. ( 4. ) Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. A.K. Sethi, sr. After recording of the additional evidence vide judgment and decree dated 23/12/1999, again the suit filed by the appellant was dismissed, against which present appeal has been filed. ( 4. ) Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. A.K. Sethi, sr. advocate, submits that the ground for dismissal of the suit taken by the learned Trial Court was that the appellant and his sons Sanjay and Vinod are alleging themselves to be broker in steel business and since the necessary documents has not been produced by the appellant to prove that appellant is continuing the business, therefore, the requirement cannot be said to be bonafide. Learned counsel submits that the findings of the learned Court below is vitiated under the law as the appellant has not filed the suit for continuing the business of steel, but the suit was filed for the need of starting the business of steel. It is submitted that in the circumstances there was no necessity for the appellant to file such documents, ( 5. ) Learned counsel further submits that another ground taken by the learned Court for dismissing the suit was that out of the two sons Vinod and Sanjay, appellant has not examined Vinod, for whose requirement the suit was filed. Learned counsel submits that since the need was for two sons Sanjay and Vinod and out of them Sanjay was examined, therefore, suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that Vinod has not examined. It is submitted that even otherwise it was not always necessary to examine the person for whose requirement the suit was filed. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Smt. Sohan Bai Vs. Mazir Hussain. reported in 1985. MPRCJ S.No. 69, wherein this Court has held that non-examination of the son of plaintiff cannot be a ground for dismissal of the suit when the requirement is proved from other evidence. ( 6. ) Learned counsel further submits that the another ground for negativing the decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement is that the appellant is having plot No.329 at Loha Mandi, Indore, and its ownership has been suppressed by the plaintiff / appellant. ( 6. ) Learned counsel further submits that the another ground for negativing the decree of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement is that the appellant is having plot No.329 at Loha Mandi, Indore, and its ownership has been suppressed by the plaintiff / appellant. Learned counsel submits that in F.A. No.233/93 appellant submitted necessary documents relating to plot No.329 of Loha Mandi, Indore, according to which appellant executed a registered power of attorney on 20/08/1982, in favour of one Hitesh Kumar Mehta on behalf of M/s. Saraf Traders. Learned counsel submits that the registered power of attorney was executed by the appellant after taking full consideration, therefore, appellant was no more owner of the property, which has been shown as alternative accommodation w.e.f. 20/08/1982, i.e. prior to the date of filing of the suit. Learned counsel submits that Hitesh Kumar Mehta executed sale deed on 01/06/1991, which is Exhibit P-3, in favour of Ajay Kumar, therefore, it cannot be said that it was a sale during pendency of the suit. In alternative learned counsel further submits that the plot which has been shown as alternative accommodation was a lease hold plot and was open piece of land, which cannot be said to be an alternative accommodation for the purpose of defeating the claim of appellant for eviction under Section 12 (1)(F) of the Act. Learned counsel further submits that even if it is assumed that it is in the hands of appellant then too, keeping in view the law laid down in the matter of R.C. Tamrakar Vs. Nidi Lekha, reported in (2001) 8 SCC, 431, wherein it was held that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement in deciding the question of the bonafide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. It is-submitted that in view of the aforesaid position of law the judgment and decree passed by learned Trial Court be set aside. ( 7. ) Mr. Brijesh Pandya, learned counsel for the respondents argues at length and submits that learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. Learned counsel submits that in evidence it has came that appellant was having a plot bearing plot No.329 at Loha Mandi, Indore. ( 7. ) Mr. Brijesh Pandya, learned counsel for the respondents argues at length and submits that learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit. Learned counsel submits that in evidence it has came that appellant was having a plot bearing plot No.329 at Loha Mandi, Indore. This alternative accommodation is not suitable to the appellant has not been pleaded by the appellant in the plaint. It is submitted that since the availibility of alternative accommodation has not been pleaded by the appellant, therefore, it is obvious that appellant has not come with clean hands. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Hakimuddin Saifi Vs. Prem Narayan Barchhiha, reported in 1997(2} MPLI 360, wherein this Court has observed that the plaintiff must mention the fact in his plaint, if he had an alternative vacant accommodation, and that this alternative accommodation was not reasonably suitable for the purpose for which he is seeking eviction. For it, it is necessary that the claim of landlord must be bonafide. ( 8. ) Reliance was also placed on a decision in the matter of Vikas Kumar Vs. Radhamal Sindhi, reported in 1998 (1) JLJ, 149, wherein it was held that alternative accommodation not pleaded in plaint even non-suitability of such alternative accommodation also not averred, the suit is liable to be dismissed. ( 9. ) Learned counsel submits that the suit was filed on 19/12/1988, while the alternative accommodation was sold on 01/06/1991, which was on long lease, with the appellant for a period of 99 years w.e.f. 1985. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case learned Court below has rightly dismissed the suit. For this contention reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Chainmal Vs. Rani Bai, reported in 2005(1) MANISA 165, wherein it was held that: "It is revealed that after the need accrued, two shops were sold to Golcha. On going through the evidence, it is perceivable that 3-4 time different type of agreement was settled with Golcha for the sale of the entire building including the suit shop and, therefore, it can not be said that the need is bonafide. The landlady has to prove the bonafide need objectively. The bonafide requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and should not be a mere desire or wish." ( 10. The landlady has to prove the bonafide need objectively. The bonafide requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and should not be a mere desire or wish." ( 10. ) From perusal of the record it is evident that to prove the case appellant has filed power of attorney Exhibit P-2, dated 20/08/1982, which was executed by the appellant Harvilas, S/o. Harcharandas, Proprietor of M/s. Giraj Brothers in favour of M/s. Saraf Traders, wherein it is specifically mentioned that appellant has already sold the plot to M/s. Saraf Traders and also received the consideration and Saraf Traders has also raised the construction over the plot, therefore, the Power of Attorney has been executed in favour of Hitesh Kumar Mehta, to execute the sale deed. The document is registered document Exhibit P-3, is the sale deed, which has been executed by Hitesh Mehta, as Power of Attorney in favour of Ajay Kumar, S/o. Kiran Kumar, whereby the sale deed was executed. Appellant has also examined himself as P.W.-l, Prakash Chandra Jain, as P.W.-2, Sanjay, as P.W.-3,Ratanlal Saraf, as P.W.-4, R.S. Bhadoriya, as P.W.-5, Hitesh Mehta, as P.W.-6 and Ajay, as P.W.-7, while respondent has examined Gopal Sharma, as D.W.-l. It is true that initially appellant did not pleaded the fact that appellant is also owner of the plot No.329, situated at Loha Mandi, Indore, the reason for not stating the fact is obvious. The suit was filed in the year 1988, while power of attorney was executed by the appellant long before in the year 1982, which is registered irrevocable power of attorney and in that it was specifically mentioned that appellant has already received the consideration and purchaser has also raised the construction over the property. Thus, for all practical purposes the appellant was no more owner of the property since 1982. However, since it was not pleaded and it was brought on record that appellant is owner of the plot, therefore, the suit was dismissed and in appeal filed by the appellant all the related documents were filed by the appellant and the case was remanded by this Court to the learned Trial Court. However, since it was not pleaded and it was brought on record that appellant is owner of the plot, therefore, the suit was dismissed and in appeal filed by the appellant all the related documents were filed by the appellant and the case was remanded by this Court to the learned Trial Court. At this stage also appellant did not make any amendment in the plaint and the suit was again dismissed Since appellant was not owner of the plot No.329 of Loha Mandi, Indore, and already sold the plot for which power of attorney was also executed, therefore, it was not necessary at all for the appellant to plead that appellant is no more owner of plot No.329, Loha Mandi, Indore. Therefore, the dismissal of the suit by the learned Court below on this ground is illegal. ( 11. ) So far as non-examining of one of the person for whose requirement the suit is filed is concerned, since appellant examined one of the son for whose need the suit accommodation was required, therefore, there was no necessity to examine another son to prove the necessity. It is not the law that each and every person for whose requirement suit is filed has to be examined. So far as dismissal of the suit on the ground that appellant has not filed any document relating to the business of broker is concerned, since appellant was not asking for eviction on the ground that appellant requires the accommodation for continuing the business of steel, therefore, there was no justification for dismissing the suit on the ground that appellant has failed to file and prove the documents relating to his business. Had it been a case of continuing the business, then it was absolutely necessary for the appellant to submit the cogent evidence, which includes documentary evidence to prove that appellant requires the suit accommodation for continuing his business. In the present case the need of the appellant is for starting the business of steel, therefore, it was not necessary for the appellant to file all such documents. In the facts and circumstances of the case this Court is of the view that appellant has proved that appellant requires suit accommodation for starting the steel business of his sons and for that purpose appellant is having no alternative vacant accommodation of his own in the city of Indore. In the facts and circumstances of the case this Court is of the view that appellant has proved that appellant requires suit accommodation for starting the steel business of his sons and for that purpose appellant is having no alternative vacant accommodation of his own in the city of Indore. In view of this the appeal stand allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court stands set aside. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed.