Judgment :- Petitioners seeking writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the Proceedings of the 1st Respondent determining the lease by invoking clause 22 of the lease deed. 2. Since common points are involved, all Writ Petitions shall stand disposed of, by this common order. 3. Facts in nut shell which led to the filing of Writ Petitions are as follows: .(i) Writ Petitioners are granted lease of the lands belonging to the salt department in Adhiramapattinam/Thambikottai salt factory for different spells. Lease deed was executed by the Writ Petitioners. Writ Petitioners are liable to pay the assignment fee based on manufacturing limit. During his visit to salt factory the Assistant Salt Commissioner noticed the indulgence of the Writ Petitioners in an unauthorised prawn culture activity and the matter was reported to the 1st Respondent. .(ii) Writ Petitioners were served with show cause notice to stop the unauthorised activities of prawn culture and dismantle the prawn bunds. In response, the Petitioners have sent their reply denying indulgence in prawn culture activity. Upon consideration of the representation, by the impugned order dated 10.08.2004 invoking Clause 22 of the registered lease agreement the lease was determined with a direction to the 2nd Respondent to resume the lands in question. Challenging the impugned orders, Writ Petitioners have filed the Writ Petitions. (iii) Grievance of the Petitioners is that the 1st Respondent has passed the impugned order without taking into consideration the explanation given by the Petitioners and also based on extraneous material which was not even supplied to the Petitioners and hence, these writ petitions. 4. Mr. L. Muralikumaran, learned counsel for the Petitioners has contended that the 1st Respondent has failed to furnish the documents relied upon by him for passing the impugned order. Main grievance of the Petitioners is that no opportunity was given to the Writ Petitioners and the 2nd Respondent failed to take into consideration the explanation offered by the Petitioners and the impugned orders are vitiated by non-application of mind. 5. Refuting the contentions of the Petitioners, Mr. S.M.Deenadayalan, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that there was violation of terms and conditions of the lease agreement and therefore, lease was determined invoking clause 22 of the lease deed. 5. Refuting the contentions of the Petitioners, Mr. S.M.Deenadayalan, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that there was violation of terms and conditions of the lease agreement and therefore, lease was determined invoking clause 22 of the lease deed. It was further argued that before determining the lease sufficient opportunity was afforded to the Petitioners and there is no basis for the grievance of the Petitioners as to violation of principles of natural justice. .6. Drawing attention of the court to Clause 23 of the lease deed the learned counsel further argued that Writ Petitions are not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause. Petitioners were granted lease for manufacture of salt for different spells. The details of lease of the Writ Petitioners are as under: .Table .7. During his visit to Adhirampattinam/Thambikottai salt factory, Assistant salt Commissioner has personally verified and noticed raising of unauthorised prawn culture activity by the Writ Petitioners. As per Clause No.4 of the lease deed, the land has to be exclusively used for manufacture of salt and sale of salt. Since, there was violation of terms and conditions of lease, the Assistant Salt Commissioner, Tuticorin issued notice to the Writ Petitioners (dated 21. 2004). In the show cause notice, Respondents were called to dismantle the prawn ponds and restore the land to its original salt work condition, failing which Clause 22 of lease deed would be invoked. 8. The impugned order of resuming the lands is challenged mainly on the grounds:- "Violation of principles of natural justice by non-furnishing of inspection report of Asst. Salt Commissioner. and "Non-application of mind. 9. Learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners mainly contended that the alleged personal verification of the Asst. Salt Commissioner raises doubts and in any event, Petitioners are entitled to the copy of report of such personal verification. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further argued that non-furnishing of copy of the report resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. 10. Placing reliance upon 39 STC 478 [State of Kerala v. K.T.Shaduli Yusuff], it was argued that when there was violation of fundamental rules of principal of natural justice in not supplying the information would vitiate the impugned orders. 10. Placing reliance upon 39 STC 478 [State of Kerala v. K.T.Shaduli Yusuff], it was argued that when there was violation of fundamental rules of principal of natural justice in not supplying the information would vitiate the impugned orders. Reliance was also placed upon AIR 1999 SC 2169 [Sahi Ram v. Avtar Singh and others] to contend that in view of violation of principles of natural justice, the impugned orders determining the lease and resuming the lands are to be set aside. It was urged that first Respondent is to be directed to furnish copy of the report and are to be directed to hold fresh enquiry by affording opportunity. 11. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that there was arbitrary exercise of power in canceling the lease. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance upon AIR SC 2169, Sahi Ram vs. Avtar Singh. In the said decision Honble Supreme Court has held that certain documents relating to inspection reports were not supplied and setting aside the order, the Honble Supreme Court has sent the matter for rehearing. 12. Contention that the impugned orders are vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice does not merit acceptance. As pointed out earlier, Asst. Salt Commissioner, Tuticorin visited Adirampatnam/Thambikottai salt factory and has personally verified the Writ Petitioners using leased lands for unauthorised prawn culture activity. The Asst. Salt Commissioner reported the matter to the first Respondent on 212. 2003. First Respondent issued show cause notice to the Writ Petitioners on 29.01.2004 calling upon the Writ Petitioners to stop the unauthorised activities of prawn culture and to dismantle the prawn ponds. In the show cause notice, Writ Petitioners were clearly informed that if the prawn bunds are not dismantled, the lease deed would be cancelled as provided in Clause 22 of the lease deed. The show cause notice contains the matters/ violations noticed by Asst. Salt Commissioner. It cannot be contended that Petitioners are prejudiced because of non-supply of copy of the report. 13. Principles of natural justice had undergone a great deal of change in recent years. After the decisions of the Supreme Court in S.K.Sharmas case [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ] and in Rajendra Singhs case [ (1996) 5 SCC 460 ], principles of natural justice is not applied in vaccum without reference to relevant facts and circumstances of each case. Principles of natural justice had undergone a great deal of change in recent years. After the decisions of the Supreme Court in S.K.Sharmas case [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ] and in Rajendra Singhs case [ (1996) 5 SCC 460 ], principles of natural justice is not applied in vaccum without reference to relevant facts and circumstances of each case. Principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula what is needed in the objective criteria. 14. Observing that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. In 2008 AIR SCW 6055, Harayana Financial Corporation & Another vs,. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, the Honble Supreme Court has held as under: "....... 25. It is settled law that principles of natural justice have to complied with. One of the principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem ("Hear the other side"). But it is equally well settled that the concept natural justice is not a fixed one. It has meant many things to many writers, lawyers, jurists and systems of law. It has many colours, shades, shapes and forms. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. .26. Before about six decades, in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109 : 65 TLR 225, Tucker, L.J. Stated: ."There are, in my view, now words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth". .27. In the oft-quoted passage from Byrne v. kinematograph Renters Society,(1958) 2 All Er 579, Lord Harman enunciated; ."What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I don not think that there really is anything more". .28. This Court has also taken similar view. First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I don not think that there really is anything more". .28. This Court has also taken similar view. In Union of India v P.K.Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850 :(1968) 2 SCR 196, speaking for the Court, Ramaswami, J.observed: ."(T)he extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the stature and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case". 29. In the leading case of A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 , Hegde, J.Stated; "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case". 30. Again, in R.S.Dass v. Union of India, 1986 Supp SCC 617, this Court said; "It is well established that rules of natural justice are not rigid rules; they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the background of statutory provision, nature of the right which may be affected and the consequences which may entail, its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case". 31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalized, can it not be argued that "notice would have served no purpose" of "hearing could not have made difference" or "the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever". 15. The ratio of the above decision is squarely applicable to the case on hand. 15. The ratio of the above decision is squarely applicable to the case on hand. Even if hearing was afforded to the writ petitioners, in my considered view such hearing would have served no purpose and the writ petitioners could not have offered any defence whatsoever and therefore there is no substance in the grievance of writ petitioners that impugned order is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice. 16. In response to the show cause notice, Writ Petitioners submitted their explanation stating that sea brine is about 2 to 4 km. away and to avoid scarcity of brine, Writ Petitioners have raised the bunds for the purpose of brine storage at the time of requirement. In their explanation, Writ Petitioners have denied raising of prawn culture. 17. Explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioners were considered by the first Respondent. Referring to the physical verification of the field by the Asst. Salt Commissioner, Tuticorin, first Respondent satisfied that each of the Writ Petitioners were actually engaged in unauthorised activities of prawn culture in the total area leased out to each of them. Supreme Court by its order dated 112. 1996 in W.P.No.561/1994 has imposed total ban on prawn/shrimp culture activities within the salt pan lands. It is relevant to note that Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.39590/2004 has admitted about raising of prawn in the salt pan lands leased out to him. 18. As per Clause 4 of the lease deed lessee shall utilise the demised premises exclusively for the manufacture, storage and sale of salt and for the works connected therewith and shall not erect any dwelling houses on the demised premises. On being satisfied that there was violation of terms and conditions of the lease, first Respondent has passed the impugned orders determining the lease for violation of lease conditions. 19. As pointed out earlier, only after issuance of show cause notice (dated 29.01.2004) to each of the Writ Petitioners, the impugned orders were passed determining the lease and directing the Factory Officer, Adirampatnam/Thambikottai Salt Factory to resume the lands for further re-settlement. There is no force in the contention of the Writ Petitioners that opportunity was not afforded to them and that there was violation of principles of natural justice. 20. Learned counsel for the Petitioners mainly contended that it is not the case of the department that Petitioners have not produced the required salt. There is no force in the contention of the Writ Petitioners that opportunity was not afforded to them and that there was violation of principles of natural justice. 20. Learned counsel for the Petitioners mainly contended that it is not the case of the department that Petitioners have not produced the required salt. It was further argued that because of scarcity of sea brine, there was no manufacture of salt throughout the year and therefore, Writ Petitioners are to necessarily raise bunds for the purpose of brine storage to be used at the time of requirement and that Writ Petitioners did not engage any illegal activities. It was further argued that if opportunity had been given to the Writ Petitioners, they would have explained their stand before the first Respondent and the impugned orders are vitiated for not affording sufficient opportunity. 21. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against the fundamentals of essential procedural propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. There are no inflexible rule of natural justice of universal application. As pointed out earlier show cause notice was issued to all the writ petitioners. Show cause notice contained the details of inspection by Assistant Salt Commissioner and breach of terms and conditions of lease by the writ petitioners. In my considered view, having regard to show cause notice issued to the writ petitioners no breach of natural justice can be complained of. 22 Disputes and differences arises in respect of or in connection with the lease which is a contract between the Writ Petitioners and the Salt Department. Contending that even in contractual matters writ petition is maintainable. Learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon AIR 1995 SC 1811 , L.I.C. Of India and another vs. Consumer Education and Research Centre and others.; AIR 1996 SC 11 , Tata Cellular vs. Union of India. Both in L.I.C case and Tata Cellular case, Honble Supreme Court has held that principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favoritism. In Tata Cellular case the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to Judicial control by Judicial review. 23. In Tata Cellular case the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to Judicial control by Judicial review. 23. In matters relating to maintainability of writ petitions in contractual matters there are catena of decisions dealing with the issue. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [ (2003) 7 SCC 410 ] it was held as follows: "........ 6. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court for refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised two questions viz.: (a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract. Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root of the matter. The High Court instead considered Question (a) and then chose not to answer Question (b). In our view, the answer to Question (b) is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in the cases of Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, [ (2000) 6 SCC 293 ] State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd, [ (1996) 6 SCC 22 ] and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh, [ (1989) 2 SCC 116 ] This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. Mr Dave, however, relied upon the cases of Verigamto Naveen v. Govt. of A.P, [ (2001) 8 SCC 344 ] and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 247 ]. These, however, are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed. 24. These, however, are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed. 24. In Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, [ (2000) 6 SCC 293 ] the Honble court dealt with the question of maintainability of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the desirability of exhaustion of remedies and availability of alternative remedies, as also difference between statutory contracts and non-statutory contracts. In paras 10 and 11 of the judgment it was noted as follows: "........10. We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr Raval. Learned counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature. 11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies." 25. In case of termination of contract there cannot be any grievance of violation of principles of natural justice reference can be made to State if Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj shah Charitable Trust [ (1994) 3 SCC 552 ]. In para 22 it was observed as follows: ".......22. We are unable to see any substance in the argument that the termination of arrangement without observing the principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem) is void. The termination is not a quasi-judicial act by any stretch of imagination; hence it was not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice. It is not also an executive or administrative act to attract the duty to act fairly. It was — as has been repeatedly urged by Shri Ramaswamy — a matter governed by a contract/agreement between the parties. It is not also an executive or administrative act to attract the duty to act fairly. It was — as has been repeatedly urged by Shri Ramaswamy — a matter governed by a contract/agreement between the parties. If the matter is governed by a contract, the writ petition is not maintainable since it is a public law remedy and is not available in private law field, e.g., where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract* . Be that as it may, in view of our opinion on the main question, it is not necessary to pursue this reasoning further." 26. From the above decisions it is clear that in contractual matters writ petition is not maintainable, save in exceptional circumstances where the order is vitiated by arbitrariness or unreasonableness . In the present case during personal verification Assistant Salt Commissioner has noticed raising of prawn culture, in violation of terms and conditions of lease. When it is a clear case of violation of contractual terms, it cannot be said that there was arbitrariness or favouritism so as to invoke jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. In (2003) 7 SCC 410 [National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "6. The Respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court for refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised two questions viz.: (a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b)whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract. Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root of the matter. The High Court instead considered Question (a) and then chose not to answer Question (b). In our view, the answer to Question (b) is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [ (2006) 6 SCC 293 ], State of U.P. vs. Bridge & Roof co. (India) Ltd. [ (1996) 6 SCC 22 ] and Eareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 116 ]. It has been so held in Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [ (2006) 6 SCC 293 ], State of U.P. vs. Bridge & Roof co. (India) Ltd. [ (1996) 6 SCC 22 ] and Eareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal singh [ (1989) 2 SCC 116 ]. This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. Mr.Dave, however, relied upon Verigamto Naveen v. Govt of A.P. [ (2001) 8 SCC 344 ] and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India [ (1986) 3 SCC 247 ]. These, however, are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed." 28. While dealing with the question of maintainability of Writ Petitions under Art.226 of Constitution and the desirability of exhaustion of remedies and availability of alternative remedies, as also difference between statutory contracts and non-statutory contract, in (2000) 6 SCC 293 [Kerala SEB v. Kurien E.Kalathil], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "10. We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr.Raval. Learned counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature. 11. ..... Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature. 11. ..... The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies." .29. As per Clause 23 of the lease agreement in cases of any disputes or differences arising in respect of or in connection with the lease, the same shall be referred to Arbitration of the Salt Commissioner to the Government of India. Clause 23 reads as under:- ."23. In the event of any question, dispute or difference arising in respect of or in connection with these presents (except as to any matters, the decision of which is specially provided for by these presents) the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Salt Commissioner to the Government of India or of some other person appointed by him. It will be no objection that the Arbitrator is a Government Servant, that he has to deal with matters to which these presents relate of that in the course of his duties as Government Servant, he has expressed views, on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties to this indenture. ......" 30. If the Petitioners are aggrieved, Petitioners could have well approached the Salt Commissioner invoking Arbitration Clause under Clause 23 and seeking reference. In view of availability of alternative remedy also, the Writ Petitions are not maintainable. .31. In (2008) 8 Supreme Court 172 Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation and Others vs. Gayatri Construction Company and Another , appellant Municipal corporation awarding a contract to Respondents for the work of improvement and widening of a road. Respondents failed to complete the work within a period of one year. .31. In (2008) 8 Supreme Court 172 Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation and Others vs. Gayatri Construction Company and Another , appellant Municipal corporation awarding a contract to Respondents for the work of improvement and widening of a road. Respondents failed to complete the work within a period of one year. Corporation terminated the contract and called for fresh tenders Agreement providing for in-house remedy for settlement of disputes. The Respondents filed writ petitions. Honble Supreme court has held that in respect of contractual transactions of Government, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition when the contract provides for alternate remedy by way of in-house remedy for settlement of disputes. 32. When efficacious alternative remedy is available for the Writ Petitioners, the Petitioners cannot invoke Art. 226 of Constitution of India. .33. In (2005) 8 SCC 264 [U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S.Pandey], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- ."In a catena of decisions it has been held that Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out." 34. In (2004) 4 SCC 268 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 637 [U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S.Karamchari Sangh], Supreme Court has held as follows:- "When the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To the same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke (1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ]; Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. Of Ahmedabad [ (2002) 2 SCC 542 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 317; and Scooters India v. Vijai E.V.Eldred [ (1998) 6 SCC 549 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1611 ]." 35. In the result, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. W.V.M.P is closed.