Judgment : 1. By consent, all the writ petitions were taken up for final disposal and since common questions are involved, a common order is passed. 2. In all the three writ petitions G.O. Ms. No. 447 (Education, Science and Technology) dated 16.7.1996 is under challenge. In W.P. No. 10583 of 2007 in addition to that, the G.O. Ms. No. 241 (School Education Department) dated 22.9.2007 and the consequent proceedings issued by the second respondent in Na.Ka. No. 31055/D1/07 dated 15.11.2007 are also under challenge. The facts that are necessary for disposal of these writ petitions are as follows. 3. The petitioner society in W.P. No. 10583 of 2007 has got 107 members on its role and they are all unemployed persons having Diploma in Teacher Education. The members of the petitioner association in W.P. No. 8474 of 2007 and the petitioners in W.P. No. 6377 of 2007 are all similarly qualified unemployed persons. Admittedly from the year 1960, the recruitments of Secondary Grade Teachers in the Government schools, panchayat union schools and corporation schools in the State of Tamil Nadu were made at District level by calling for the names of eligible candidates from the respective employment exchanges. The selection was made by holding interview. However, the Government changed its policy of selection for recruitment in the year 1991. From then onwards, the interview was dispensed with and instead, selection was made on the basis of the seniority alone in the role of the respective local employment exchange. Then the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 1251 Education dated 14.12.1992, by which, the selection of candidates for appointment to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers in Government, Corporation and Panchayat Union schools was entrusted to the Teachers Recruitment Board. Screening test was conducted by the Department of Government Examinations and based on the results of the same, final selection was made by the Teachers Recruitment Board by following rules of reservation, after conducting interview for the candidates who came out successful in the screening test. The selected candidates were appointed in various Districts, irrespective of their place of residence. 4. Subsequently, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 447 Education, Science and Technology dated 16.7.1996. The said G.O is thus: 5. The Government issued yet another order in G.O. Ms. No. 241 School Education Department dated 22.9.2007 ordering to fill up 7223 Secondary Grade Teachers posts by means of direct recruitment. 4. Subsequently, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 447 Education, Science and Technology dated 16.7.1996. The said G.O is thus: 5. The Government issued yet another order in G.O. Ms. No. 241 School Education Department dated 22.9.2007 ordering to fill up 7223 Secondary Grade Teachers posts by means of direct recruitment. 6. Based on the above said two Government Orders, the second respondent viz., the Director of Elementary Education has issued proceedings in Na.Ka. No. 31055/D1/2007 dated 15.11.2007, thereby issuing certain instructions in respect of selection procedure for appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers. 7. The above stated two Government Orders and consequent proceedings of the second respondent are under challenge in these writ petitions. 8. The common grounds raised in these writ petitions are as follows: (i) The District-wiseselection for employment of Secondary Grade Teachers as provided under the impugned GOs and proceedings would promote large scale discrimination and lack of equal opportunity among the qualified candidates located in various districts which offends Articles 14, 16 (2) and 19(1) of the Constitution of India, (ii) While the other classes-of teachers like Higher Secondary Head Masters, High School Head Masters, Post Graduate Assistants and B.T Assistants are made only at the State level and not at the district level, there is no reason as to why the posts of Secondary Grade Teachers alone should be made Districtwise. (iii) When there is constitutional freedom and fundamental right to move freely through out the territory of India to reside any where, the selection of Secondary Grade Teachers made through the employment exchange based on the permanent residences is not in tune with the Constitution and it offends Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India (iv) When the selection to Diploma in Teacher Education is done State wise through a single window system and the syllabus for the students who aspire to get such Diploma is also uniform throughout the state and since the selection and the teaching process of all the elementary schools students are also same, there are no reasons, much less valid reasons to make selection at District level as the same would not amount to reasonable classification so as to pass the test of virus of the Constitution. 9. A common counter has been filed by the second respondent which has been adopted by the first respondent. 10. 9. A common counter has been filed by the second respondent which has been adopted by the first respondent. 10. It is stated in the counter that with reference to the service conditions of Panchayat Union Teachers with regard to the method of appointment, age, qualification, unit of appointment authority etc., are governed by the Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Elementary Education Subordinate Services for various categories of the posts as enshrined in G.O. Ms. No. 1383 Education (PUS) Department dated 23.8.1988 and as per the above rules, the appointing authority in respect of Secondary Grade Teachers is the District Elementary Educational Officer of the District concerned and each panchayat union shall be a unit. As per the said Government Order, the appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers were made between 1980 to 1990 through employment exchange and based on interview. To ensure total objectivity in the selection, the Government took the policy decision to make appointment based on seniority of the candidates as registered in the employment exchange subject to rules of reservation. Subsequently, G.O. Ms. No. 1251 Education dated 14.12.1992 was issued by which appointment to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers in Government, Corporation and Panchayat Union Schools was entrusted with the Teachers Recruitment Board. The selection through the Board was made in the year 1995 alone and the persons so selected at State level were recruited at various Districts irrespective of place of residences. Since 50% of the vacancies in Elementary Education are earmarked for women candidates, a great deal of hardship was experienced by women candidates who were posted in districts other than the districts where they were residing. So, there were several requests for transfer and it was experienced that bulk transfers had to be made at the choice of those candidates. In some cases, even teachers belonging to a particular District and posted to the same district found it difficult to work in those remote schools and they also wanted transfer to near by places. Having regard to the said experience, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.447 Education, Science and Technology dated 16.7.1996 with a view to make the selection of the teachers transparent and also to create conducive atmosphere for the selected candidates. 11. Having regard to the said experience, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No.447 Education, Science and Technology dated 16.7.1996 with a view to make the selection of the teachers transparent and also to create conducive atmosphere for the selected candidates. 11. According to the Government, under Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rule, it is obligatory that the recruitments have to be made only by obtaining list of eligible candidates on the basis of the seniority only from the local employment exchange.. 12. The counter further reads that as per Rule 1(i) of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act 1959 and Rules 1960, the vacancies other than the posts of a technical and scientific nature carrying a basic pay of Rs. 1,400/- or more per month, shall be notified to the “ local employment exchange” itself. According to the said Rule, it is for the appointing authority to call for the list of eligible candidates only from the local employment exchange. Government Orders impugned in these writ petitions and the proceedings of the second respondent have been issued only in tune with Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rule and as per the relevant Rules of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act 1959 and Rules 1960. The procedure which is now followed under the impugned Government Orders is a time tested one which has been implemented for more than 11 years and no grievance whatsoever has been so far raised from any quarters. The impugned Government Orders and the proceedings of the second respondent do not offend Article 14, 16(2) and 19(1) of the Constitution of India. 13. I have heard Mr. Issac Mohanlal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 10583 of 2007, Mr. Prabhu Rajadurai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No. 6377 of 2007 and Mr. Ajmal Khan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No. 8474 of 2007 and the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. N. Kannadasan assisted by the learned Special Government Pleader (Education) Mr. G. Sankaran. 14. Reiterating-the grounds raised in all the writ petitions, the learned counsel, Mr. Issac Mohanlal, would submit that the selection for the post of BT Assistants and PG Assistants for higher secondary schools are made by direct recruitment only on the basis of State wise seniority in the employment exchange. G. Sankaran. 14. Reiterating-the grounds raised in all the writ petitions, the learned counsel, Mr. Issac Mohanlal, would submit that the selection for the post of BT Assistants and PG Assistants for higher secondary schools are made by direct recruitment only on the basis of State wise seniority in the employment exchange. When such is the case, there can be no reason for the Government to adopt a different procedure in the matter of appointment of the secondary grade teachers alone by making selection on the basis of the District wise seniority. When the persons like the petitioners are equally qualified, there can be no sub classification on them on the basis of their residences. He would further submit that the impugned Government Orders further impose prohibition on a particular candidate residing in a particular district to opt for job in any other districts simply because he has got his registration in the local employment exchange. When Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India gives a fundamental right to a citizen of India to reside anywhere in the country, denial of the opportunity for a particular candidate to get employment in a different part of the State other than the District where he is residing would be a clear violation of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that under Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India, the opportunity for employment should not be denied on the ground of residences. He would further submit that impugned Government Orders offend the fundamental right of equal opportunity as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India also. He would rely on the following decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court as well as this Court. 1. A. V. S. N. Rao v. State of A. P. AIR1970 SC 422: (1969) 1 SCC 839 2. National Life Insurance Employees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation of India 1989 WLR. 420 3. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1420 : (1984) 3 SCC 654 : 1984-II- LLJ-481 4. Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 6 SCC 562 5. Rajesh Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P. (2005) 5 SCC 172 6. Dist. Collector v. Arul Luther Singh (2007) 6 MLJ 112 7. P. Vasantha v. District Collector (2007) 6 MLJ 402 8. Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 6 SCC 562 5. Rajesh Kumar Gupta v. State of U. P. (2005) 5 SCC 172 6. Dist. Collector v. Arul Luther Singh (2007) 6 MLJ 112 7. P. Vasantha v. District Collector (2007) 6 MLJ 402 8. V. N. Sunanda Readdy v. State of A. P. 1995 Supp (2) SCC 235 I would refer to the above judgments at the appropriate places. 15. The learned counsel Mr. Prabhu Rajadurai, would supplement the arguments advanced by Mr. Issac Mohanlal by submitting that under Article 16(3) it is the prerogative of the Parliament to make any law prescribing any requirement as to the residence within that State. He would also rely on Article 35(A) of the Constitution of India wherein it has been stated that the Parliament shall have, and the Legislature of a State shall not have, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters which under Clause (3) of article 16, Clause (3) of article 32, article 33 and article 34 may be provided for by law made by the Parliament. 16. Heavily relying on these two provisions, the learned counsel would submit that since the Government Orders impugned in these writ petitions and the proceedings of the Director of School Education have not been made by the Parliament, they are without jurisdiction and violative of Articles 16 and 35-A of the Constitution of India. He would also bring to my notice the debate in the Constituent Assembly of India, while discussing on Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India in respect of the term ‘or residence‘. He would take me extensively through the speeches made by Shri Jaspat Roy Kapoor and Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and would submit that in the light of the above discussions and also in the light of the various judgments of Honourable Supreme Court, the impugned Government Orders are violative of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 17. The learned counsel Mr. Ajmal Khan would adopt the arguments of the other counsel and would further submit that the reasons stated by the Government in the counter for giving up earlier procedure of selecting the candidates through Teachers Recruitment Board on the Basis of State wise seniority are unreasonable and unacceptable and without any material to substantiate their stand. The learned counsel Mr. Ajmal Khan would adopt the arguments of the other counsel and would further submit that the reasons stated by the Government in the counter for giving up earlier procedure of selecting the candidates through Teachers Recruitment Board on the Basis of State wise seniority are unreasonable and unacceptable and without any material to substantiate their stand. According to him, to provide equal opportunity as required under the Constitution of India, the procedure of selecting and appointing through Teachers Recruitment Board as it was done in the year 1995 should be a reasonable procedure. It would advance the aim of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that though it is stated in the counter that there were practical difficulties in the transfer of teachers subsequent to the appointment made in the year 1995 through the Teachers Recruitment Board, that by itself would not validate the impugned Government Orders since they are violative of the fundamental rights. When the Governments stand is that in the matter of transfer of BT Assistants and PG Assistants, there has been no practical difficulty, but in the matter of the appointment of secondary grade teachers alone they have practical difficulties and bitter experience cannot be countenanced at all. 18. The learned Additional Advocate General Mr. N. Kannadasan would repel the arguments advanced by the Teamed counsel appearing for the petitioners. He would trace the history of the procedure for recruitment of Secondary Grade Teachers in the State of Tamil Nadu right from the year 1960. He would reiterate the stand taken in the counter and extensively argue about the difficulties experienced by the Government subsequent to the said appointments made in the year 1995 through Teachers Recruitment Board. He would further submit G.O. Ms. No. 447 Education, Science & Technology came to be issued in the year 1996 in suppression of G.O. Ms. No. 1251 Education dated 14.12.1992 only to prescribe the procedure for selection. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, it is the prerogative of the Government to decide about the procedure for selection and unless the said procedure which is taken by way of policy decision is shown as ultra virus of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be quashed. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, it is the prerogative of the Government to decide about the procedure for selection and unless the said procedure which is taken by way of policy decision is shown as ultra virus of the Constitution of India, the same cannot be quashed. To substantiate the stand of the Government, the learned Additional Advocate General would elaborately state the reasons for suppression of the earlier procedure and for adopting the present procedure. He would state that except one batch of recruitment made in 1995, for a total period of 46 years with few exception, the method, which is now under challenge, was followed, which proved no practical difficulty at all and there was no grievance whatsoever from any of the parties. Thus, the present procedure is a time tested one. He would further submit that there cannot be any quarrel that a law which prescribes a qualification in respect of residences can be made only by the Parliament as enshrined under Article 16(3) of the Constitution of India. He would however contend that the present selection procedure is strictly in tune with Article 14, 16(2), 16(3) and 19(1) of the Constitution of India. 19. According to him, Special Rules for the Tamil Nadu Elementary Education Subordinate Service was introduced by the Government in exercise of its power conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India (in short, Special Rule). According to Rule 3 of the Special Rule, the Appointing Authority is the District Elementary Education Officer. Under Rule 9 each panchayat union shall be treated as a unit. In view of Rules 3 and 9 of the Special Rules, selection as well as appointment is to be made for each unit by the Appointing Authority viz., the District Elementary Educational Officer. Selection and appointment of the Secondary Grade Teachers cannot be equated to the selection for the post of B.Ed Teachers and P.G. Teachers. The Appointing Authority for B.Ed teachers to teach classes 6 to 10 is a State level Officer viz., the Joint Director. Similarly, for P.G. Assistants to be posted in Higher Secondary Schools, the Appointing Authority is also a State level officer. They are governed by separate Rules. The Appointing Authority for B.Ed teachers to teach classes 6 to 10 is a State level Officer viz., the Joint Director. Similarly, for P.G. Assistants to be posted in Higher Secondary Schools, the Appointing Authority is also a State level officer. They are governed by separate Rules. As per those relevant Rules, since the Appointing Authority is a State level officer, the selection is made at the state level, whereas, for secondary grade teachers selection is made at panchayat union level and therefore, the selection of Secondary Grade Teachers cannot be either equated or kept par with the selection and appointment of B.Ed teachers and P.G. Assistants. 20. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that so long as Rule 10(A) of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules occupies the field, it is the obligation of the appointing Authority viz., DEEO to make only unit level selection and not state level selection. The learned Additional Advocate General would further submit that since appointment is to be made only by calling for names from employment exchange as provided under the Employment Exchanges (compulsory notification of vacancies) Act, 1959, the DEEO notifies the vacancies in respect of each unit to local employment exchange and after selection, appointment is made on the basis of the seniority. Since the said Act is a Central legislation and since the Special Rules is only in tune with the said Act, it cannot be stated that the present selection procedure is violative of Article 16(3) of the Constitution of India. 21. The learned Additional Advocate General has also taken me through the National Employment Service Manual issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation which provides for functions of the District Employment Exchange. He would further submit that there is no prohibition for any citizen who is a native of a particular district to seek employment in an another district, provided that he resides in the said district and gets himself registered in the employment exchange concerned in terms of the Central enactment. In the absence of any challenge to the above provisions of the Act and the manual, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, it is not open for the petitioners to raise the contention that the procedure violates Article 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of any challenge to the above provisions of the Act and the manual, according to the learned Additional Advocate General, it is not open for the petitioners to raise the contention that the procedure violates Article 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The learned Additional Advocate General would also submit that the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no application to the facts of the present case about which I will make reference at the appropriate stage of the judgment. The learned Additional Advocate General would rely on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh AIR 1998 SC 331: (1998) 2 SCC 332 and Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi AIR 2006 SC 1806 : (2006) 4 SCC 1 : (2006) 2 MLJ 326: 2006-II-LLJ-722. 22. I have considered the rival contentions and also carefully perused the entire materials available on record. 23. The registration in the employment exchange is governed by the Employment Exchange (compulsory notification of vacancies) Act 1959 and Rules framed thereunder and also the employment manual. The said Act provides for compulsory notification of vacancies to the employment exchange. But neither the Act nor the Rules prescribe anything regarding the residential qualification for a candidate to keep his name registered only in a particular employment exchange within whose jurisdiction he resides permanently. Under Section 2(d) of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of vacancies) Act, 1959, the term “employment exchange” is defined as follows: “‘employment exchange‘ means any office or place established and maintained by the Government for the collection and furnishing of information, either by keeping of registers or otherwise, respecting - (i) persons who seek to engage employees, (ii) persons who seek employment, and (iii) vacancies to which persons seeking employment may be appointed;” 24. The Act does not define the term ‘local employment exchange.” But the Rule 2(5) of the Local Employment Exchange Rules 1960 defines as follows: “2(5) “Local Employment Exchange” means - (a) in the whole of India except the Union territory of Chandigarh that Employment Exchange (other than the Central Employment Exchange) notified in the Official Gazette by the State Government or the Administration of the Union Territory as having jurisdiction over the area in which the establishment concerned is situated or over specified classes or categories of establishments or vacancies; and (b)…..” 25. In exercise of power conferred under Rule 2(5) of the above said Rules, the Government of Tamil Nadu has issued appropriate notification in the official gazettee ear marking the jurisdiction of the District Employment exchanges in the State of Tamil Nadu. Under the Employment manual, the place of registration has been defined in Part I, Chapter VII - 7.4, which is as follows: “Place of registration: 7. 4Applicants, unless specially exempted by the State Director or the Director General, shall be registered at the employment exchange under whose jurisdiction they normally reside.” 26. It is because of the said provision in the manual, the name could be registered in the respective local employment exchange where they normally reside. So long as the provisions of Rule 2(5) of the Employment Exchange Rules, the Clause 7.4 in the manual and the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu are not challenged, the petitioner scannot be heard to contend in these writ petitions that compelling them to register their names only in a particular employment exchange within whose jurisdiction they reside is unreasonable or violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. 27. Now it is to be briefed as to how the obligation to notify the vacancies to the local employment exchanges for appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers arise. Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules deals with the same, which is as follows: “10A. 27. Now it is to be briefed as to how the obligation to notify the vacancies to the local employment exchanges for appointment of Secondary Grade Teachers arise. Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules deals with the same, which is as follows: “10A. Recruitment to posts, which are outside the purview of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.-( a) “Where posts are outside the purview of the TNPSC, recruitment shall be made only by calling for names of eligible candidates from the Employment Exchange.” In respect of specialised posts for which candidates are not available with the Employment Exchange, the appointing authority shall get a certificate of a non-availability from the Employment Exchange, and call for applications from the eligible candidates by advertising the posts in prominent daily newspapers giving the number of vacancies and indicating the qualifications, etc.” 28. It is only because of the said clear provision which governs the recruitment to posts, which are outside the purview of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, the Appointing Authority is obliged to make appointments normally by calling for names of the eligible candidates from the employment exchange and the Appointing Authority can appoint by calling for applications from the eligible candidates by advertising the posts in the newspapers etc., only in the cases where there are no candidates available for the said special post in the employment exchange. It is to be remembered that the virus of Rule 10A has not been challenged at all. 29. Now the question arises as to which local employment exchange the vacancies are to be notified by the Appointing Authority. Rule 3 of the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1960 prescribes the same which is as follows: “3. Employment Exchanges to which vacancies are to be notified- (1) The following vacancies, namely - (a) vacancies in posts of a technical and scientific nature carrying a basic pay of Rs.1,400 or more per month occurring in establishments in respect of which the Central Government is the appropriate Government under the Act, and (b) vacancies which an employer may desire to be circulated to the Employment Exchanges outside the State or Union territory in which the establishment is situated, shall be notified to such Central Employment Exchange as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf. (2) Vacancies other than those specified in sub-rule (1) shall be notified to the focal Employment Exchange concerned. (emphasis supplied) 30. There can be no controversy that in accordance with the said Rule, the Appointing Authority viz., the employer is obliged to notify only to the respective local employment exchange. In view of the said statutory requirements, the appointing authority need not and in fact cannot notify the vacancy to any other local employment exchange. Therefore, the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that the appointing authority should notify to all the employment exchanges in the State to get the names, to combine them and then to select on the basis of state level seniority cannot be accepted at all. The procedure, which is now adopted by the Government is only in conformity with the said Rule. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the said procedure notifying the vacancies to respective employment exchange at District level violates any of the provisions of the Employment Exchange Act or any other law. 31. The learned counsel Mr. Issac Mohanlal appearing for the petitioners would submit that the duty to notify the vacancies is vested on the employer under Section 3-of the said Act; the DEEOs who have been delegated with the power only to issue appointment orders and for that they cannot be termed as employers as defined in the Act. In this case, in the matter of appointment of the Secondary Grade Teachers, since the Government is the employer, the Government should notify the vacancies to all the local employment exchanges through out the State and selection is to be made on the basis of state seniority, he contended. But, I am not persuaded by the said argument. To deal with the said argument, it is necessary to refer to the definition of the term ‘employer‘ as found in Section 2(2)(c) of .the Employment Exchanges Act, 1959, which is as follows: ‘employer‘ means any person who employs one or more other persons to do any work in an establishment for remuneration and includes any person entrusted with the supervision and control of employees in such establishment; 32. A close reading of the said provision would go to show that not only the person who employs, and also a person who has got power of supervision and control of the employees in the establishment shall also fall within the ambit of the term ‘employer‘ as defined in Section 2(2)(c) of the Employment Exchange Act, 1959. Of course, in this case, the Government is the ultimate employer as the employees are only Government servants. At the same time, since the District Elementary Educational Officers are having power of supervision and control of all these Secondary Grade Teachers and since they only appoint the teachers as per the Special Rules, for the purpose of this Act, it should be construed that the DEEOs are employers and so it is their obligation to notify to the local employment exchange and there is no obligation on their part under the Act to notify to any other local employment exchange outside their jurisdiction. 33. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the selection at the district level instead of adopting the procedure of making selection at state level as done in the case of B.Ed teachers and P.G. Assistants also cannot be countenanced, because, the appointment of P.G. Assistants and B.Ed teachers are governed by separate Rules. Under the relevant Rules, relating to B.Ed. teachers and P.G. Assistants, there are state level officers nominated by the Governmental Appointing Authorities viz., the employers and that is why, a separate procedure is adopted to select the candidates for B.Ed. teachers and P.G. Assistants at state level. But under the Special Rules relating to the Secondary Grade Teachers, every panchayat union has been defined as a unit and the Appointing Authority viz. the District Elementary Educational Officer has been nominated as employer. Unless the said provision making the District Elementary Educational Officer as an Appointing Authority is challenged, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the District level Selection instead of adopting the State level selection. So long as the said Rules continue to govern the field, the Appointing Authority viz., the District Elementary Educational Officer has to strictly adhere to the said Rules and the Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act and the manual. The Government Orders and the proceedings of the second respondent impugned in these writ petitions are strictly in tune with the above provisions. 34. The Government Orders and the proceedings of the second respondent impugned in these writ petitions are strictly in tune with the above provisions. 34. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the compulsion that a particular candidate should have tiis employment registration only in the local employment exchange within whose jurisdiction he resides, impliedly, curtails his right to reside any where as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India also cannot be accepted. Registration of employment seekers is dealt with in Chapter VII of the National Employment Manual. In respect of place of registration it is provided that applicants unless specifically exempted by State Director or Director General, shall be registered at the employment exchange under whose jurisdiction they normally reside. 35. The Government of Tamil Nadu has issued G.O. Ms. No. 66 Labour and Employment (N2) Department dated 157.2002 regulating the transfer of registration from one local employment exchange to another local employment exchange when the candidate shifts his residence. In the absence of challenge to the above provisions of the employment manual and the Government Order which provides for transfer of place of registration of the candidates, it is not open for the petitioners to challenge the consequential proceedings alone. If there is any challenge in respect of these provisions, in the context of Article 19(1)(e) and Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India, then this Court may have to examine the viruses of these provisions. 36. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that under Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India, no citizen on the ground of residence be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the impugned Government Orders infringe the above right guaranteed under Article 16. It is relevant to refer to Article 16 of the Constitution, which is as follows: “16. Equality of-opportunity in matter of public employment- (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for ail citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment. (4)….. (4A)… (5)……… 37. Way back in 1969, a Constitutional Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court had to interpret the right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India and the power of the parliament for making law prescribing the residence as a qualification in A. V. S. N. Rao v. State of A. P. (supra). In the said case, Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Requirement as to residence) Rules, 1959, came to be challenged. The said rule prescribed that a person shall not be eligible for appointment within the Telangana area unless he had been continuously residing within the said area for not less than 15 years immediately preceding the prescribed date. By testing the virus of the said rule, in the context of Article 16 (2) and (3), the Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court held that the intention behind Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India is to make every office of employment open and available to every citizen, and inter aliato make offices or employment in one part of India open to citizens in all other parts of India. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: “The legislative power to create residential qualification for employment is thus exclusively conferred on Parliament. Parliament can make any law which prescribes any requirement as to residence within the State or Union territory to employment or appointment to an office in that State or Union territory. Two questions arise here. Parliament can make any law which prescribes any requirement as to residence within the State or Union territory to employment or appointment to an office in that State or Union territory. Two questions arise here. Firstly, whether Parliament, while prescribing the requirement, may prescribe the requirement of residence in a particular part of the State; and, secondly, whether Parliament can delegate this function by making a declaration and leaving the details to be filled in by the rule making power of the Central or State Governments.” 38. In paragraph 9 of the judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court went on to hold as follows.- “…………. By the first clause equality of opportunity in employment or appointment to an office is guaranteed. By the second clause, there can be no discrimination, among other things, on the ground of residence. Realising, however, that sometimes local sentiments may have to be respected or sometimes an inroad from more advanced States into less developed States may have to be prevented, and a residential qualification may, therefore, have to be prescribed, the exception in Clause (3) was made. Even so that clause spoke of residence within the State. The claim of Mr.Setalvad that Parliament can make a provision regarding residence in any particular part of a State would render the general prohibition lose all its meaning. The words ‘any requirement‘ cannot be read to warrant something which could have been said more specifically. These words bear upon the kind of residence or its duration rather than its location within the State. We accept the argument of Mr. Gupte that the Constitution, as it stands, speaks of a whole State as the venue for residential qualification and it is impossible to think that the Constituent Assembly was thinking of residence in District, Talukas, Cities, towns or villages. The fact that this clause is an exception and came as an amendment must dictate that a narrow construction upon the exception should be placed as indeed the debates in the Constituent Assembly also seem to indicate. We accordingly, reject the contention of Mr. Setalvad seeking to put a very wide and liberal construction upon the words ‘any law‘ and “any requirement‘. These words are obviously controlled by the words residence within the State or Union territory which words mean what they say, neither more nor less. We accordingly, reject the contention of Mr. Setalvad seeking to put a very wide and liberal construction upon the words ‘any law‘ and “any requirement‘. These words are obviously controlled by the words residence within the State or Union territory which words mean what they say, neither more nor less. It follows, therefore, that Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957, insofar as it relates to Telangana (and we say nothing about the other parts) and Rule 3 of the rules under it are ultra vires the Constitution.” 39. Relying on the above judgment, the learned counsel Mr. Issac Mohanlal, would contend that in the case on hand, since the selection is made not treating the State as one unit but only treating the panchayat union as a one unit, it is ultra viresof Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India. Though there appears to be some substance in the said argument, still on that score, I am not able to hold that the impugned Government Orders offend Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India since these Government Orders have been issued only in tune with the Special rules. Without testing the virus of Rule 3 and 9 of the Special Rules and Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules, in the context of Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India, I apprehend that the validity of the above Government orders cannot be tested. The proper course for the petitioners would have been to challenge the above Rules also. 40. In National Life Insurance Employees Association v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra), the validity of the notification of the Life Insurance Corporation of India inviting applications to fill up ‘120 vacancies in the cadre of Assistants came to be challenged before this Court. In the said notice, it was stated that only candidates registered with employment exchanges of Chingleput, South Arcot, North Arcot district and also Union territory of Pbndicherry will be eligible for appointments the office of Chingleput, South Arcot, North Arcot District and Union Territory of Pondicherry respectively. In the said judgment, the Division Bench had to elaborately deal with the provisions of Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. In the said judgment, the Division Bench had to elaborately deal with the provisions of Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. While referring to Section 4 of the said Act, the Division Bench has held that there is no provision made in the said Act compelling recruitment to be made only througfi Employment Exchanges. In the said judgment, in paragraph 7, it is held as follows: “….. But, when recruitment is made to any post, applications are received from all over tine State. Therefore, when the ‘note‘ says that ‘only‘ candidates in the specified Exchanges alone are eligible to apply, it results in a classification, which is unwarranted, unjust and not provided, even in the Regulations of the respondent corporation. Under Section 49(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, the service conditions could be regulated only by Regulations framed by it and not by administrative decisions taken by different authorities stipulating terms and conditions, which offend Constitutional provisions. In the opening part of the advertisement, the intention of extending ‘preference‘ to those residing in the branches situate in the areas mentioned therein clearly bring about the intention of confining recruitment based on the residence of the applicants and to achieve it, the registration in the concerned Employment Exchanges had been adopted. (emphasis supplied) 41. As observed by the Division Bench, in the regulations of the Life Insurance Corporation, there is no provision enabling the Corporation to prescribe that those candidates who are in the local employment exchange concerned alone are eligible to apply and that is the main ground on which the employment notification was quashed. But, as narrated above, in the Special Rules relating to the Secondary Grade Teachers, there is a special provision in the form of Rule 9 and Rule 10A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules. Thus, so long as the said rules remain unassailed, the Government Orders issued only in tune with the said rules which prescribe only the procedure for selection cannot be assailed at all. 42. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel ton the petitioners is Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (supra). It was a case relating to admission to medical colleges. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows at pp. 484 & 485 of LLJ: “ 5. 42. The next decision relied on by the learned counsel ton the petitioners is Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (supra). It was a case relating to admission to medical colleges. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows at pp. 484 & 485 of LLJ: “ 5. We may point out at this stage that though Article 15 Clauses (1) and (2) bars discrimination on grounds not only of religion, race, caste or sex but also a place of birth, Article 16(2) goes further and provides that no citizen shall on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or discriminated against the State employment. So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. It would thus appear that residential requirement would be unconstitutional as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under, the State and having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word “State” in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, it is obvious that this constitutional prohibition would also cover an office under any local or other authority within the State or any corporation, such as, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. But Article 16(3) provides an exception to this rule by laying down that Parliament may make a law ‘prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union Territory prior to such employment or appointment‘. Parliament alone is given the right to enact an exception to the ban on discrimination based on residence and that too only with respect to positions within the employment of a State Government. But even so, without any parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so, many of the State Governments have been pursuing policies of localism since long and these policies are now quite widespread. Parliament has in fact exercised little control over these policies formulated by the States. But even so, without any parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so, many of the State Governments have been pursuing policies of localism since long and these policies are now quite widespread. Parliament has in fact exercised little control over these policies formulated by the States. The only action which Parliament has taken under Article 16(3) giving it the right to set residence requirements has been the enactment of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957 aimed at abolishing all existing residence requirements in the States and enacting exceptions only in the case of the special instances of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh. There is therefore at present no parliamentary enactment permitting preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh where the Central Government has been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate services. Yet, in the face of Article 16(2), some of the States are adopting sons of the soil‘ policies prescribing reservation or preference based on domicile or residence requirement for employment or appointment to an office under the Government of a State or any local or other authority or public sector corporation or any other corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Prima facie this would seem to be constitutionally impermissible though we do not wish to express any definite opinion upon it, since it does not directly arise for consideration in these writ petitions and civil appeal.” (emphasis supplied) 43. The Honourable Supreme Court has not expressed any definite opinion regarding the validity of the procedure prescribing local residence as a requirement since it does not directly arose for consideration in those writ petitions and civil appeal. But the principle evolved in paragraph 5 that ‘So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence‘ is to be necessarily followed by any State. 44. But the principle evolved in paragraph 5 that ‘So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence‘ is to be necessarily followed by any State. 44. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that though it is permissible for making any law prescribing any requirement as to residence within that State or union territory prior to such employment or appointment in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office, such law should be made only by the Parliament and the State Government has no such power and since these Government Orders, which prescribe such requirement of residence as a qualification for employment, have been issued by the State Government, it is ultra virusof Article-16 (3) of the Constitution of India. There can be no second opinion that such a law requiring residence as qualification is to be made only by the Parliament in those circumstances enumerated under Article 16(3) of the Constitution of India. But, in the case on hand, making residence as one of the requirements has not been made by the Government Orders which are under challenge. As I have already pointed out, the same has been made only by the Special Rules and the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules. As I have already narrated, these impugned Government Orders only prescribe the procedure to be followed to implement the above service rules. 45. Let me now come to the settled position of law in respect of recruitments based only on sponsorship by the employment exchange to the exclusion of others in the context of Article 14 and 16(2) of the Constitution of India. 46. In Union of India v. Hargopal AIR 1987 SC 1227 : (1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987-I- LLJ-545, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 550 of LLJ: “ 6. The Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. 46. In Union of India v. Hargopal AIR 1987 SC 1227 : (1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987-I- LLJ-545, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 550 of LLJ: “ 6. The Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. The object of the Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and the most efficient and to provide an opportunity to the worker to have his claim for appointment considered without the worker having to knock at every door for employment. The Act only places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may occur in his establishment before filling those vacancies. “Insistence on recruitment through Employment Exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16. The object of recruitment to any service or post is to secure the most suitable person who answers the demands of the requirements of the job. In the case of public employment, it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in tine matter of employment. There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointments as he likes, a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Articles 14 and 16 have to be given any meaning. The submission that Employment Exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. In the absence of a better method of recruitment any restriction that employment in government departments should be through the medium of employment exchanges does not offend Articles 14 and 16.” 47. In Excise Supdt., Malkapatnam v. K. B. N. Visweshwara Rao , (1996) 6 SCC 216 the Honourable Supreme Court following the law laid down in Union of India v. Hargopal ( supra) case has held as follows: “Having regard to the respective contentions, we are of the view that contention of the respondents is more acceptable which would be consistent with the principles of fair play, justice and equal opportunity. It is common knowledge that many a candidate is unable to have the names sponsored, though their names are either registered or are waiting to be registered in the employment exchange, with the result that the choice of selection is restricted to only such of the candidates whose names come to be sponsored by the employment exchange. Under these circumstances, many a deserving candidate is deprived of the right to be considered for appointment to a post under the State. Better view appears to be that it should be mandatory for the requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the employment exchange, and employment exchange should sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning departments for selection strictly according to seniority and reservation, as per requisition. In addition, the appropriate department or undertaking or establishment should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation and also display on their office notice boards or announce on radio, television and employment news bulletins; and then consider the cases of all the candidates who have applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter of employment would be available to all eligible candidates.” 48. In Arun Tiwari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: “In the present case the criteria and procedure have to be prescribed by the State Government itself in exercise of power conferred on it by Statutory Rules. This cannot be considered as executive delegation. Also, prescribing of separate criteria and procedure is permitted only in specific circumstances. In the present case, the departure from normal recruitment process has been occasioned on account of the time-bound programme of the Operation Blackboard Scheme. This necessitated a larger number of Assistant Teachers being recruited to strengthen the education programme of the State within a time-bound schedule. If the State Government felt that the existing procedure would be unduly time-consuming, and provided a special procedure which is not unfair, no objection can be raised to such procedure when an express power has been conferred on the State in this connection.” 49. In Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 111 the Honourable Supreme Court had to deal with the views expressed in the judgments cited supra. In Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 111 the Honourable Supreme Court had to deal with the views expressed in the judgments cited supra. In the said judgment, the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows: “The Supreme Court in Visweshwara Rao case held that intimation to the Employment Exchange, about the vacancy and candidates sponsored from the Employment Exchange is mandatory. It also held that in addition to and consistent with the principle of fair play, justice and equal opportunity, the appropriate department or establishment should also call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation, announcement on radio, television and employment news bulletins and consider all the candidates who have applied. This view was taken to afford equal opportunity to all the eligible candidates in the matter of employment. The rationale behind such direction is also consistent with the sound public policy that wider the opportunity of the notice of vacancy by wider publication in the newspapers, radio, television and employment news bulletin, the better candidates with better qualifications are attracted, so that adequate choices are made available and the best candidates would be selected and appointed to sub serve the public interest better. The law laid down by the three Judge Bench in Visweshwara Rao case is still holding the field.” (emphasis supplied) 50. A close reading of the above judgments, more particularly the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India (supra) would make it crystal dear that as per the law laid down in Visweshwara Raoscase, an intimation to the employment exchange about the vacancies and the candidates sponsored from the employment exchange is mandatory. But, in addition and consistent with the principle of fair play, justice and equal opportunity, the appropriate department or establishment should also call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation, announcement on radio, television and employment news bulletins and consider all the candidates who have applied. But the said procedure is not, of course, followed in the State of Tamil Nadu by bringing necessary amendments to the relevant service rules. But the said procedure is not, of course, followed in the State of Tamil Nadu by bringing necessary amendments to the relevant service rules. As of now, as per Rule 10(A) of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules, appointment is to be made only by calling names from the Employment Exchange except for special posts where there are no candidates available on the role of the employment exchange. 51. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (supra), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows at p. 332 of MLJ: “6…….. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. It is recognised that no government order, notification or circular can be substituted for the statuary rules framed under the authority of law. This is because, following any other course could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under the constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which are exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments based on the rules so framed.” 52. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above judgment, the Appointing Authority is obliged to follow the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Government is empowered to issue orders, notifications or circulars in tune with the said statutory rules framed under the authority of law and no such Government orders, notifications or circulars can be a substitute for the statutory rules. I have already held herein above that the impugned Government Orders and the proceedings of the second respondent have not been issued either in derogation and in substitution of the statutory rules viz., the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules and Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu Elementary Education Subordinate Service, but they have been issued only in conformity with the said statutory rules. Unless the said statutory rules are held to be ultra virus in an appropriate case where they are put under challenge, it is not at all possible to hold that these Government Orders and the proceedings of the second respondent as unconstitutional. 53. In result, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and accordingly, they are dismissed. No costs. 53. In result, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions and accordingly, they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MPs are also dismissed.