ORDER N. Kumar J. The Petitioner has challenged in this Writ Petition the order at Annexure-E dated 27.6.2008 passed by the Government of Karnataka removing the petitioner from the Chairmanship of the Karnataka State Haj Committee from office with immediate effect under sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Haj Committee Act, 2002. 2. The case in brief is as under:- The petitioner was nominated by the State Government as a Member of the Karnataka State Haj Committee by a notification dated 16.8.2006, along with 15 other members for a period of three years. The petitioner was unanimously elected as the Chairman of the Statet Committee as per Annexure-A. The said Committe is the first committee constituted by the State Government after the enactment of the Haj Committee Act, 2002 (hereinafter for short referred to as ‘the Act’). On 12.5.2008 the petitioner received a show cause notice from the first respondent asking him to show cause why action should not be taken against him as provided under Section 25(1)(ii) of the Act. The said show cause notice discloses that on a representation received by one Sri Abdul Azeem, a member of the Committee, an enquiry was directed to the conducted by the Director, Minority Welfare Department and a report has been furnished to the first respondent. The show cause notice listed out the allegations which are held to be prima facie proved in the said enquiry report. It is at Annexure-C. The petitioner submitted a reply denying all the allegations on 16.6.2008. However, on consideration of the said reply, as the first respondent was not satisfied with the explanation offered, proceeded to pass the impugned order removing the petitioner from the Chairmanship of the Committee and consequently he was also removed from the membership of the Committee with immediate effect. It is that order which is challenged by the petitoner in this petition. 3. Respondents have filed a detailed statement of objections substantiating their action. They contend that the petitioner has indulged in malpratices as clearly set tout in the show cause notice. As required under law a show cause notice was issued. His explanation was received and as the explanation was not satisfactory, the impugned order came to be passed. It is legal and valid and cannot be found fault with. In fact subsequent to the orders they have taken several steps. 4. As required under law a show cause notice was issued. His explanation was received and as the explanation was not satisfactory, the impugned order came to be passed. It is legal and valid and cannot be found fault with. In fact subsequent to the orders they have taken several steps. 4. The petitioner has also filed a rejoinder reiterating the allegations made in the Writ Petition and also denying the allegations made against him in the statement of objections. 5. Sri Prabhuling Navadgi, the learned cousel appearing for the petitioner, assailing the impugned order contended that, though a show cause notice was issued and the reply was given by the petitioner, unless the allegations made against the petitioner were held to be proved in an enquiry, the authorities could not have imposed the punishment of removal. The petitioner specifically requested in the statement of objections, that he should be given an opportunity to disprove the allegations. Ignoring the same the authorities have proceeded to pass the impugned order which is in violation of not only the statutory provisions but also the principles of natural justice. Therefore, it is liable to be quashed. 6. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate submitted that it is not obligatory on the part of the authorities to give a personal hearing or hold an enquiry. All that is expected of them is to issue a show cause notice, receive the explanation and consider the same and pass orders which has been done in this case. Therefore, he submits there is no violation of principles of natural justice. 7. Therefore, the question that arise for consideration is whether the impugned order is an administrative order or a quasi-judicial order, whether it has any civil consequences, and before passing the order whether any enquiry was necessary and the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine and lead evidence. 8. A reading of the impugned order shows that the subject matter of the proceedings is the allegations against the petitioner which is submitted to His Excellency the Governor of Karnataka by one Sri Abdul Azeem, Member of the Legislative Council and also a Member of the Karnataka State Haj Committee alleging serious irregularities in the selection of Haj pilgrims for the Haj-2007 and misuse of office by the petitioner. On such complaint, the Government by an order dated 20.3.2008 directed Sri N.M. Panali, Director, Minorities Department, Government of Karnataka to enquire into the charges with reference to the reords maintained in the office of the Karnataka State Haj Committee and to submit his findings. The main charges against the petitioner were that, he committed several irregularities in selecting the Haj pilgrims for the Haj-2007, in not maintaining the records properly, not following the KTPP Act in executing various works in the Haj Committee, etc., 9. The aforesaid enquiry officer submitted a report dated 5-4-2008 to the Government that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner. As various actions of the petitioner were found prejudicial to the interest of the State Committee and the interest of the pilgrims of the State and since a prima facie case was established against the petitioner in the aforesaid enquiry, a show cause notice was issued to him as to why action should not be taken against him under Section 23(viii)(b) and Section 25(1)(ii) of the Act. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 16.6.2008, denying all the charges and alleging that the complainant had made the allegations in order to remove him from the post and to become Chairman himself of the Committee. However, after examining the entire material in its entirety it was found that the allegations which have been enquired into by the enquiry officer after examining the files and documents available in the Committe are found to be true. Therefore, the Government was pleased to order for removal of the petitioner and also from the membership of the Committee. 10. From the order it is clear that allegations of misconduct were made against the petitioner. Behind him an enquiry was ordered. Prima facie the said allegations were found to be true. It is thereafter show cause notice was issued and the petitioner denied all those allegations. However, without holding an enquiry, it was held that the allegations were proved and the Government has proceeded to pass the impugned order. 11. From the aforesaid facts it is clear that the petitioner was nominated by the Government under a statute as a Member of the Committee. In the election held for the post of Chairman, the petitioner was elected as the Chairman of the Committee unanimously. It was a civil post and certain privileges were attached to the said post. 11. From the aforesaid facts it is clear that the petitioner was nominated by the Government under a statute as a Member of the Committee. In the election held for the post of Chairman, the petitioner was elected as the Chairman of the Committee unanimously. It was a civil post and certain privileges were attached to the said post. It is that civil post from which he has been removed and, therefore, the impugned order has civil consequences. Whether the impugned order is purely an administrative order or a quasi-judicial order, whether the principles of natural justice should have been followed, what particular rule of natural justice should apply is concerned, the law on the point is well settled. 12. Prof. Wade in his book Administrative Law has stated as under:- “A judicial decision is made according to law. An administrative decision is made accordingly to administrative policy. A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A quasi-judicial decision is, therefore, an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure, such as the principles of natural justice.” (Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade 6th Ed. Pp. 46-47) 13. In Rex Vs. Electricity Commissioner (1924) 1 KB 171 Lord Atkin L.J. has defined what a quasi-judicial body is, as under:- “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.” 14.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Radheshyam Vs. State of M.P. ( AIR 1959 SC 107 ) relying on the aforesaid observations of Lord Atkin has held as under:- “It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be quasi judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a Court or a quasi-judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressely or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin L.J. 15. In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation ( AIR 1959 SC 308 ), Subba Rao, J., after referring to the various decisions on this subject held:- “............. Whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if ther is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially.” 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Koshy Vs. University of Kerala ( AIR 1969 SC 198 ) held as under:- “The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case.” Further, it was held in the case before them, there was a fair inquiry against the appellant, the officer appointed to inquire was an impartial person, he could not be said to have been biased against the appellant, the charge against the appellant was made known to him before the commencement of the enquiry; the witness who gave evidence against him were examined in his presence and he was allowed to cross-examine them and lastly he was given every opportunity to present his case before the inquiry officer. In that context it was held there was really anything more that is to be required to comply with the principles of natural justice. 17. Following the said judgment, a Constitution Bench in the case of A.K. Kraipak Vs. Union of Inida ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) held as under:- “The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring the power, the consequences ensuring from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.” The net effect of these and other decisions was that the duty to act judicially need not be super-added, but it may be spelt out from the nature of the power conferred, the manner of exercising it and its impact on the rights of the persons affected and where it is found to exist, the rules of natural justice would be attracted. “The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.............Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validly of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice on fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Oftentimes it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in Character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more for reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. 18. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in Character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more for reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S.M.K. Parasurama Gurukul, ( AIR 1973 SC 2237 ) at para 3 dealing with the test for determining whether a decision is an administrative one or a quasi-judicial one has held as under:- “The test for determining whether a decision is an administrative one or quasi-judicial has been clearly specified in a number of decisions of this Court. Essentially, they are three in number. 1. There must be a lis between the two parties; 2. The opinion should be formed on the objective satisfaction and should not depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the tribunal; and 3. There must be a duty to act judicially.” 19. In Kumari Neelima Misra Vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal ( AIR 1990 SC 1402 ) the Supreme Court held as under:- An Administrative function is called quasi-judicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called ‘purely administrative’ and there is no third category. An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. It means that the decision maker should afford to any party to a dispute an opportunity to present his case. The shift now is to a broader notion of ‘fairness’ or ‘fair procedure’ in the administrative action. As far as the administrative officers are concerned the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. For this concept of fairness, adjudicative settings are not necessary, nor it is necessary to have lites inter partes. There need not by any struggle between two opposing parties giving rise to a ‘lis’. There need not be resolution of lis inter partes. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. There need not by any struggle between two opposing parties giving rise to a ‘lis’. There need not be resolution of lis inter partes. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non-adjudicative administrative decision making are now covered under the general rubric of fairness of in the administration. But then even such an administrative decision unless it affects one’s personal rights or one’s property rights, or the loss of or prejudicially affects something which would judicially be called at least a privilege does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice.” 20. It is now well settled that even in an administrative procedure which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more for reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. A quasi-judicial decision is also an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure such as principles of natural justice. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi is “not exactly”. An Administrative function is called quasi judicial when there is an obligation to adopt a judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. When there is no such obligation the decision is called purely administrative. Whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder. If there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. Thus, in the cae of purely administrative action and authority is under an obligation to act fairly but in the case of non-judicial authority is concerned, the said authority has to act not only fairly but also judicially. That is the difference between administraive action and quasi judicial function. In the case of a quasi judicial function, the opinion should be formed on the objective satisfaction and should not depend to the subjective satisfaction of the Tribunal. 21. In this background it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Act. The Parliament has passed the Haj Committee Act, 2002 for the purpose of establishing a Haj Committee of India and State Haj Committee for making arrangements for the pilgrimage of Muslims for Haj, and for matters connected therewith. Section 3 of the Act deals with the Constitution and Incorporation of Haj Committee of India and Composition of Committee is contained in Section 4. Section 7 deals with Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson. Section 8 deals with Reconstitution of Committee whereas Section 9 deals with the duties of the Committee. The Act also provides for Meetings of the Committee and Appointment of Standing Committees and Sub-Committees and Disqualification for being nominated or for continuing as a member of the Committee. Chapter III deals with State Haj Committees. Section 17 provides for Establishment and incorporation of State Haj Committee. Section 18 deals with Composition of State Committee. Section 20 of the Act provides for term of office of the members of State Committees which shall be for three years, commencing on the day following the publication of the list of members under Section 19. Section 21 deals with election of a Chairperson from among the members. Section 23 deals with Disqualification. Section 25 deals with removal of chairperson and members which reads as under:- “25. Section 21 deals with election of a Chairperson from among the members. Section 23 deals with Disqualification. Section 25 deals with removal of chairperson and members which reads as under:- “25. (1) Removal of Chairperson and Members: The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, remove the Chairperson of the State Committee or any members thereof, if he- (i) is or becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Section 23; or (ii) refuses to act or is incapable of acting or acts in a manner which the State Government, after hearing any explanation that he may offer, considers to be prejudicial to the interests of the State Committee or the interests of the pilgrims; or (iii) fails, in the opinion of the State Committee, to attend three consecutive meetings of the State Committee, without sufficient excuse. 2. Where the Chairperson of the State Committee is removed under sub-section (1) he shall also cease to be a member of the State Committee”. 22. The aforesaid provision deals with revmoval of Chairperson and members. The State Government has been vested with the power to remove Chairperson of the State Committees or any member by issue of a notification in the official gazette. But before such removal is done the said provision sets out under what circumstances the Chairperson or the members could be removed. Sub-clause (ii) categorically states, when the Chairperson or a member refuses to act or is incapable of acting or acts in a manner which the State Government, after hearing any explanation that he may offer, consideres to be prejudicial to the interests of the State Committee or the interests of the pilgrims can remove such member. 23. The order appointing a member of the Committee under Section 18 of the Act is an administrative order. So also the removal. However, if a chairperson or member of the Committee is removed on the ground that he acts in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the State Committee or the interests of the pilgrims, it amounts to removal on the ground of proved misconduct. A stigma is attached to the person who is removed. Such an order could be passed by the Government only after hearing any explanation that he may offer. A stigma is attached to the person who is removed. Such an order could be passed by the Government only after hearing any explanation that he may offer. After hearing, the Government has to consider the explanation, and only if it is satisfied that his acts are prejudicial to the interests of the Committee or the interests of the pilgrims, the order of removal could be passed. Therefore, the statute imposes an obligation to act judicially and accordingly the proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and the impugned order is a quasi-judicial order. 24. Therefore, when serious allegations of misconduct are made and the same being denied, evidence has to be adduced before the authority and on appreciation of the said evidence, the authority is expected to record its objective satisfaction. The evidence includes oral and documentary and the said evidence should be tested in cross-examination. Unless the evidence is tested in cross-examination, in law it is no evidence at all. Therefore, it follows, the parties to the lis should have an opportunity to adduce evidence, opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and thereafter to have their say in the matter. It is more so in the case of an order, the basis of which is a case of proved misconduct, because the said order attaches a stigma to the person affected by the said order. Mere issue of a show-cause notice and receipt of a written explanation in those circumstances would not satisfy the requirements of natural justice. 25. It is contended on behalf of the State that as the jurisdiction to appoint members exclusively lies with the State Government, the members enjoy the office at the pleasure of the Government and it is open to the Government which appointed them to terminate their membership. Though the members of the Committee are appointed by the Government, the Act provides for their removal. A specific provision like Section 25 is engrafted in the Act. Once the law provides for a procedure, then the Government has to follow the procedure. It cannot invoke the doctrine of pleasure. 26. When a person is removed on the allegations of misconduct the said removal attaches a stigma to that person. A specific provision like Section 25 is engrafted in the Act. Once the law provides for a procedure, then the Government has to follow the procedure. It cannot invoke the doctrine of pleasure. 26. When a person is removed on the allegations of misconduct the said removal attaches a stigma to that person. When a person is appointed as a member who in turn is elected as a Chairperson and holds a responsible post under the statute, if such a person is removed on the ground of misconduct it results in civil consequences. Before a person could be removed from such office on the ground of misconduct not only should he be heard in the matter, but also that hearing should be in accordance with law. The language employed in sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 25 makes it clear that it is after hearing an explanation which a member or a Chairperson may offer and if the State Government considers that the action of the said member is prejudicial to the interest of the State Committee or the interest of the pilgrims, then only he could be removed. In other words as the word “hearing” and “explanation” both are used in the said provision and the “hearing” precedes the word “consideration”, in substance it amounts to an enquiry to be conducted in the event of the said Chairperson or member denying the allegations in the show cause notice. Therefore, the word hearing used in the aforesaid provision necessarily means an oral hearing and an enquiry. It is only after such enquiry from the material on record, if it is established that the conduct of such member or Chairperson is prejudicial to the interest of the State Committee or the interest of the pilgrims then only the Government could remove the said person. Therefore, the argument that mere giving opportunity to submit his explanation to the show cause notice would satisfy the requirement in the aforesaid set of facts cannot be countenanced. It is to be remembered that the action initiated under the aforesaid provision is not an administrative action. Therefore, the argument that mere giving opportunity to submit his explanation to the show cause notice would satisfy the requirement in the aforesaid set of facts cannot be countenanced. It is to be remembered that the action initiated under the aforesaid provision is not an administrative action. It is in the nature of a quasi judicial action and once authorities are acting as quasi judicial authorities, the principles of natural justice requires, not only the person who is accused of misconduct should have an opportunity to put forth his case in writing, but he should also have an opportunity to disprove his case. It includes cross examination of the complainant and his witnesses. It is after such enquiry if the allegations against him are proved then only the authorities would get jurisdiction to remove him from the said office. 27. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed by the Government under Section 18 of the Act. Thereafter he was elected as a Chairperson. In his capacity as Chairperson he has functioned for considerable time. Behind his back on a complaint received from a member, an enquiry was ordered. That enquiry report discloses that the complaint is prima facie proved. It is thereafter a show cause notice was issued setting out the irregularities, misconduct and dereliction of duty which is said to have been prima facie proved in the enquiry report and the petitioner was called upon to show cause. He has filed a detailed reply denying all those allegations and he has made it clear that the said report has been obtained behind his back and he did not have an opportunity to have his say in the matter and, therefore, he must be given an opportunity to disprove those allegations. In other words he sought a personal hearing to disprove the allegations made against him and to cross-examine the witnesses who have deposed against him which is the basis for the report which was submitted behind his back. However, the authorities without properly appreciating the tenor of the statement of objections, requirement of law as contained in sub-section (1) of Section 25 has proceeded to pass the impugned order. However, the authorities without properly appreciating the tenor of the statement of objections, requirement of law as contained in sub-section (1) of Section 25 has proceeded to pass the impugned order. Though before passing the order, the petitioner was given an opportunity to offer his explanation, as no enquiry was conducted, the allegation against the petitioner was not proved in accordance with law, the said order is illegal and cannot be sustained. Under those circumstances, I do not find any justification in the stand taken by the reposndents. Hence, I pass the following order:- (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order is hereby quashed. (iii) However, it is open to the respondents in the event they want to continue the proceedings initiated against the petitioner to continue the proceedings after giving him a personal hearing and an opportunity to adduce evidence which includes the right to cross examine and then pass appropriate orders. (iv) No costs.