Judgment :- Challenging the award of the Second Respondent/Industrial Tribunal dated 12. 2003 in I.D.No.9/2002, ordering re-instatement of the first Respondent in service with continuity of service, back wages and other attendant benefits, Petitioner/Railway has preferred the Writ Petition. 2. Brief facts in nutshell are as follows:- (i) On 08.09.1980, first Respondent was appointed as a Clerk in Southern Railway at Trichy in the quota reserved for physically handicapped person. On 29.09.1984, first Respondent attended duty and as she was suffering from stomach pain, she submitted half-a-days leave application to the Office Superintendent/Stores Section. Thereafter, first Respondent received her payment and also received the pay of one Arokiamary Jacintha. According to the first Respondent, as her stomach pain increased due to pre-menses, she rushed home to change her clothes. After recovery of physical condition, first Respondent came to the office at 1.00 P.M. to hand over the salary of Arokiamary Jacintha, where she was stopped by RPF Staff at the armoury gate. First Respondent phoned up to Office Superintendent (General) about her coming to office and thereafter, she was let inside and she handed over the salary of Arokiamary Jacintha to Office Superintendent. (ii) On report by the Office Superintendent, Charges were framed on 010. 1984 under the Railway Servant (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968, alleging that (i) First Respondent was not available in the Office (Stores Section) from 10.15 hours on 29.09.1984 after signing the Muster Roll, thereby left the office without any proper authority from her superiors and (ii) she deliberately received the salary amount of Rs.709.25 of clerk Arokiamary Jacintha, from the Cashier and went away without informing to anybody about the same. (iii) Denying the charges, on 27.03.1985, Petitioner submitted her explanation. Being not satisfied with the explanation offered by the first Respondent, Mr.K.S.S.Madhvan, Assistant Works Manager / Night Shift / Ponmalai, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. An Enquiry was conducted and the report was submitted on 20.05.1985, wherein first Respondent was found guilty for the alleged charges. Based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, the first Respondent was removed from service on 06.06.1985. On appeal, the punishment order was confirmed by the Appellate Authority on 21.04.1986. The Revision filed by the first Respondent to the General Manager was rejected on 22.09.1992. (iv) Aggrieved, first Respondent raised an Industrial Dispute in I.D.No.9/2002 before the Second Respondent. Based on the report of the Enquiry Officer, the first Respondent was removed from service on 06.06.1985. On appeal, the punishment order was confirmed by the Appellate Authority on 21.04.1986. The Revision filed by the first Respondent to the General Manager was rejected on 22.09.1992. (iv) Aggrieved, first Respondent raised an Industrial Dispute in I.D.No.9/2002 before the Second Respondent. Observing that non-furnishing of Enquiry Officers report is clear violation of principles of natural justice, Industrial Tribunal held that the disciplinary proceedings is vitiated. Industrial Tribunal has further held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are based on no evidence and are perverse and on those findings, Industrial Tribunal ordered re-instatement of the first Respondent with continuity of service, back wages and all attendant benefits. Challenging the said award, Petitioner-Railway has preferred this Writ Petition. 3. Contending that the award of Industrial Tribunal is misplaced sympathy, Mrs. Lita Srinivasan, learned counsel for the Petitioner inter alia raised the following contentions: "Proper enquiry was conducted and findings are based on evidence and Industrial Tribunal had not given reasons as to why Enquiry Officers report is biased and perverse. "Furnishing of Enquiry Officers report has become mandatory only after Mohd. Ramzan Khans case [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] and that non-furnishing of Enquiry Officers report would not violate the principles of natural justice. "Statutory appeal was disposed of in 1986 whereas Industrial Dispute was raised in 2002 nearly after 16 years. 4. Contending that punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the first Respondent is highly disproportinate, Mr. M. Muthappan, learned counsel for the first Respondent has made the following submissions:- "Non-furnishing of Enquiry Officers report is violative of principles of natural justice which would vitiate the enquiry proceedings. "Enquiry Officer himself has acted as Presenting Officer and he himself has asked leading questions which is contrary to service jurisprudence and therefore the entire proceedings are biased. "First Respondent had given leave letter to the Office Superintendent which was not taken note of by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. 5. "Enquiry Officer himself has acted as Presenting Officer and he himself has asked leading questions which is contrary to service jurisprudence and therefore the entire proceedings are biased. "First Respondent had given leave letter to the Office Superintendent which was not taken note of by the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. 5. Charges levelled against the first Respondent is that – (i) she was not available in the office (Store section) from 10.15 hours on 29.09.1984, after signing the Muster roll, she left the office without any proper permission from the Supervisor; (ii) first Respondent deliberately received the salary amount of Rs.709.25 of co-employee Arockiamary Jacintha, Clerk from the Cashier and 1st Respondent went away without any information to anybody about the same. .6. To substantiate the charges, Management had examined number of witnesses – (1) T.Subbulakshmi-Cashier; (2)A.Joseph Sekar-Steno; (3)Ayyaru-Lascar and Arockiamary Jacintha. From the evidence, it was elicited that Arokiamary Jacintha had not asked the first Respondent to get her pay from the Cashier nor first Respondent infomed Arokiamary Jacintha anything about receiving the pay and without authorisation from Arokiamary Jacintha, first Respondent was proved to have taken the salary of coemployee. 7. Upon analysis of evidence, Enquiry Officer recorded the finding that after taking salary of co-employee, first Respondent left the office at 10.15 hours without any permission and Petitioner came back only at 1.15 P.M. Enquiry Officer further held that first Respondent has not handed over the salary of Arokiamary Jacintha to Subbulakshmi eventhough, Subbulakshmi asked the first Respondent to give her pay of Arokiamary Jacintha so that she could hand over the amount to Arokiamary Jacintha. On the basis of the evidence, Enquiry Officer has recorded the finding that first Respondent had deliberately received the salary of Arokiamary Jacintha inspite of her having "stomach ache/stomach pain" etc. and left the premises without even informing others. 8. First Respondent had taken a defence that it was a practice to receive the salary of co-employee and that she had received salary of Arokiamary Jacintha on an earlier occasions also. 1st Respondent had further stated that due to stomach pain, she left the office and on the same day evening, she came back to the office and paid the salary to Arokiamary Jacintha. It may be that it was the practice to receive the salary of coemployee. 1st Respondent had further stated that due to stomach pain, she left the office and on the same day evening, she came back to the office and paid the salary to Arokiamary Jacintha. It may be that it was the practice to receive the salary of coemployee. But in the charged instance, what is relevant is that after receiving the salary, 1st Respondent left the office without informing anyone in the office. Rejecting the defence plea, Enquiry Officer held that first Respondent had not been clear about her submission of leave letter to the required authority and lacks clarity and not convincing. Enquiry Officer has recorded the findings of facts based on the evidence. 9. Learned counsel for the first Respondent contended that the findings of Enquiry Officer are not supported by the evidence and are biased. Findings are challenged mainly on the ground that Enquiry Officer himself had put leading questions to the witnesses and Enquiry Officer himself has acted as Presenting Officer which is contrary to service jurisprudence. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the first Respondent has placed reliance upon 2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 1053 [Union of India and others v. Naman Singh Shekhawat] and 2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 819 [Moni Shankar v. Union of India and another]. 10. No doubt, Enquiry Officer himself had put questions to the witnesses and recorded the answers. By perusal of the Enquiry Officers report, it is seen that only with a view to elicit the facts, Enquiry Officer has put relevant questions. In a departmental proceedings, strict rules of procedure and legal evidence cannot be insisted upon. Contentions of the first Respondent that Enquiry Officers report is vitiated by bias lacks substance. .11. Considering the scope of judicial review of departmental proceedings, in (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 819 [Moni Shankar v. Union of India], the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:- ."17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts excluded therefrom, while proving misconduct against an employee. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles." 12. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts excluded therefrom, while proving misconduct against an employee. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles." 12. While considering the Management decision to dismiss/discharge or terminate the services of workman, Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management. 13. In (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1995 AIR SCW 4374 (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India), Supreme Court has held as follows:- "The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidene and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal." The Supreme Court has further held that:- "A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rate cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 14. In (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1994 AIR SCW 4833 (Government of Tamil Nadu v. A.Rajapandian), Supreme Court has held as under:- "It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. In (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1994 AIR SCW 4833 (Government of Tamil Nadu v. A.Rajapandian), Supreme Court has held as under:- "It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissa order by re-appreciateing the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority." 15. High Court/Industrial Tribunal is not a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence. Powers of the Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the cases of dismissal of workman is not unlimited. The Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management. The Industrial Tribunal will interfere:- .(a) Where there is want of good faith. .(b) When there is victimisation of unfair labour/practice. .(c) When there is Management has been guilty of the basic error or violation of the principles of natural justice. .(d) When on the materials before the findings is completely baseless or perverse. 16. Re-appreciation of evidence is not within the domain of Tribunal. In the present case, the entire approach of Industrial Tribunal appears to be to re-appraise the entire evidence. Industrial Tribunal repeatedly observed that Enquiry Officer exhibited bias and partisan attitude in the enquiry. In my considered view, the Industrial Tribunal erred in re-appreciating the entire evidence and arriving its own conclusion. Industrial Tribunal grossly erred in saying that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not based on legal and acceptable evidence. 17. The main ground on which the Tribunal has set aside the dismissal order was that copy of Enquiry Officers report was not given to the delinquent and that there was violation of principles of natural justice. Industrial Tribunal grossly erred in saying that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are not based on legal and acceptable evidence. 17. The main ground on which the Tribunal has set aside the dismissal order was that copy of Enquiry Officers report was not given to the delinquent and that there was violation of principles of natural justice. Placing reliance upon AIR 1994 SC 1074 [Managing Director Ecil Hyderabad v. V. Karunakar and others], the Industrial Tribunal held "refusal to furnish copy of Enquiry Officers report to the delinquent amounts to violation of principles of natural justice". Only in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case [ AIR 1991 SC 471 ] [decided on 20.11.1990] for the first time, Supreme Court had taken the view that copy of furnishing report to the delinquent officer is mandatory. In the present case, Charge memo was issued on 010. 1984. First Respondent submitted her explanation on 27.03.1985. Enquiry Officer was appointed on 211. 1984. Enquiry commenced on 04.01.1985 and completed on 20.03.1985. First Respondent was dismissed from service on 06.06.1985 and the appeal preferred by the first Respondent was dismissed on 21.04.1986. Punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on the first Respondent much prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case. .18. It is settled position that decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case is prospective in operation. Observing that decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case is prospective in operation, in AIR 1994 SC 1074 [Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad etc. v. B.Karunakar etc.], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- ."8. The need to make the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case ( AIR 1991 SC 471 (supra) prospective in operation requires no emphasis. As pointed out above, in view of the unsettled position of the law on the subject, the authorities/managements all over the country had proceeded on the basis that there was no need to furnish a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer to the delinquent employee, and innumerable employees have been punished without giving them the copies of the reports. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in courts at different stages. In some of the cases, the orders of punishment have long since become final while other cases are pending in courts at different stages. In many of the cases, the misconduct has been grave and in others the denial on the part of the management to furnish the report would ultimately prove to be no more than a technical mistake. To reopen all the disciplinary proceedings now would result in grave prejudice to administration which will far outweigh the benefit to the employees concerned. Both administrative reality and public interests do not, therefore, require that the orders of punishment passed prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case (supra) without furnishing the report of the Inquiry Officer should be disturbed and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise to the said orders should be reopened on that account. Hence we hold as above." 19. As pointed out earlier, Enquiry was completed on 20.3.1985 and the Petitioner was dismissed from service on 06.06.1985. Furnishing copy of enquiry report was mandatory only from the decision in Mohd Ramzankhans case decided on 20.11.1990. While so, Industrial Tribunal erred in finding that departmental proceedings is vitiated due to non-furnishing of Enquiry Officers report. The approach of the Industrial Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. .20. Learned counsel for the first Respondent submitted that first Respondent was suffering from stomach pain and she had menses and due to unavoidable circumstances, first Respondent had necessarily to move from the office and that she had come back and also paid the salary to Arokiamary Jacintha. Learned counsel for the first Respondent would further submit that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the Petitioner is disproportionate and placing reliance upon (2006) 1 MLJ 48 [RM. Palaniappan v. The Transport Commissioner, Chepauk, Chennai and others], learned counsel for the first Respondent submitted that punishment is only meant the offender and extreme punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate and Industrial .Tribunal rightly interfered with the punishment. 21. Learned counsel for the first Respondent submitted that Disciplinary Authority did not care to examine the medical aspects of the absence, awarded punishment of removal from service and there is total non-application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority. 21. Learned counsel for the first Respondent submitted that Disciplinary Authority did not care to examine the medical aspects of the absence, awarded punishment of removal from service and there is total non-application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the first Respondent placed reliance upon (2004) 4 SCC 560 [Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and others]. In the said case a Police constable was absent for more than two months on medical grounds. Observing that such absence cannot be recorded as grave misconduct or continued misconduct rendering him completely unfit for police service, the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "11. ....... Merely one incident of absence and that too because of bad health and valid and justified grounds/reasons cannot become the basis for awarding such a punishment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decision of the disciplinary authority inflicting a penalty of removal from service is ultra vires Rules 8 (a) and 10 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 and is liable to be set aside. The appellant also does not have any other source of income and will not get any other job at this age and the stigma attached to him on account of the impugned punishment. As a result of which, not only he but his entire family totally dependent on him will be forced to starve. These are the mitigating circumstances which warrant that the punishment/order of the disciplinary authority is to be set aside, 12. The disciplinary authority without caring to examine the medical aspect of the absence awarded to him the punishment of removal from service since their earlier order of termination of the appellants service under the Temporary Service Rules did not materialize. ......" 22. In the present case, it is not a case of mere absence; but absence coupled with taking salary of co-employee and leaving the office without informing any one. Defence plea of the first Respondent is that she left the leave letter was found to be lacking clarity. It was also submitted that first Respondent is a chronic absentee. ......" 22. In the present case, it is not a case of mere absence; but absence coupled with taking salary of co-employee and leaving the office without informing any one. Defence plea of the first Respondent is that she left the leave letter was found to be lacking clarity. It was also submitted that first Respondent is a chronic absentee. Learned counsel for the first Respondent has also submitted that earlier disciplinary proceedings had been taken against the first respondent and that she has been imposed with punishment for four times in the tenure of service for her unauthorized absence on various spells. That earlier the 1st Respondent had been dealt with four times for her unauthorized absence would only falsify Petitioners claim of unblemished record. 23. Latches on the part of the first Respondent is also yet another aspect to be noted. Punishment was imposed on 06.06.1985. Appeal preferred by the first Respondent was disposed on 24. 1986. Nearly 16 years thereafter, Petitioner has raised Industrial Dispute. Industrial Tribunal appears to have lost sight of the extreme latches on the part of the first Respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate warranting interference by the Industrial Tribunal. The approach of the Industrial Tribunal is nothing but to misplaced sympathy at the expense of legitimacy of process. 24. Observing that the reliefs granted by the Courts must be seem to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence, in 2007 AIR SCW 6157 [U.B. Gadhe & others v. G.M. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Pvt. Ltd.], the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "19. In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability [See: Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. A.Unnikrishnan and another (1994 (1) SCALE 631)] 20. Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power to reduce the quantum of punishment, it has to be done within the parameters of law. Possession of power is itself not sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law. 21. These aspects were highlighted in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani (AIR 2006 SC 615). 22. Power and discretion conferred under the Section needless to say have to be exercised judicially and judiciously. The Court exercising such power and finding the misconduct to have been proved has to first advert to the question of necessity or desirability to interfere with the punishment imposed and if the employer does not justify the same on the circumstances, thereafter to consider the relief that can be granted. There must be compelling reason to vary the punishment and it should not be done in a casual manner." 25. Observing that Labour Court has limited role to play and to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, in 2007 AIR SCW 7237, [U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Ram Kishan Arora], the Honble Supreme Court has held as under:- "8. In Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers" Union Ltd. v. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shai [ (2006) 6 SCC 548 ], this Court opined: "The Labour court although has jurisdiction to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment but it had a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the industrial courts do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor." 9. It is now well settled that the industrial courts do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor." 9. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Dehradun v. Suresh Pal [ (2006) 8 SCC 108 ], this Court stated the law, thus: "Normally, the courts do not substitute the punishment unless they are shockingly disproportionate and if the punishment is interfered or substituted lightly in the punishment in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction then it will amount to abuse of the process of court. If such kind of misconduct is dealt with lightly and the courts start substituting the lighter punishment in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then it will give a wrong signal in the society. All the State and Road Transport Corporations in the country have gone in red because of the misconduct of such kind of incumbents, therefore, it is time that the appellant invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Regional Manager, U.P.SRTC v. Hoti Lal wherein, this Court has very categorically held that a mere statement that it is disproportinate would not suffice to substitute a lighter punishment. This Court held as under (SCC p.606): "The court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court are not proper." In view of the above observation made by this Court there remains nothing more to be added." 10. In Amrit Vanaspati Co. Ltd. v. Khem Chand and another [ (2006) 6 SCC 325 ], this Court held: "... In our opinion, the High Court while exercising powers under writ jurisdiction cannot deal with aspects like whether the quantum of punishment meted out by the management to a workman for a particular misconduct is sufficient or not. This apart, the High Court while exercising powers under the writ jurisdiction cannot interfere with the factual findings of the Labour Court which are based on appreciation of facts adduced before it by leading evidence. In our opinion, the High Court has gravely erred in holding that the evidence of Respondent 1 was not considered by the Labour Court and had returned the finding that the evidence of Respondent 1 did not inspire any confidence. We are of the opinion that the High Court is not right in interfering with the well-considered order passed by the Labour Court confirming the order of dismissal." 26. In the present case, Industrial Tribunal erred in substituting its own view for the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The approach of the Industrial Tribunal in re-appreciating the evidence and interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed upon the first Respondent is perverse and unsustainable. The award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 12. 2003 in I.D.No.9/2002 is liable to the set aside. 27. In the result, the award dated 12. 2003 in I.D.No.9/2002 on the file of Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai is set aside and this Writ Petition is allowed. However, the amount paid to the first Respondent u/s.17(B) of I.D. Act may not be recovered.