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2008 DIGILAW 406 (ALL)

PRASHANT CHANDRA v. LUCKNOW GOLF CLUB LUCKNOW

2008-02-21

A.MATEEN, M.K.MITTAL

body2008
M. K. MITTAL, J. ( 1 ) -THIS first appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 17th July, 2007 passed by Civil Judge (S. D.), Lucknow in Regular Suit No. 428 of 2007, Prashant Chandra v. Lucknow Golf Club and others, whereby the learned Judge accepted the application filed by the defendant-respondents under Order VII, Rule 11, C. P. C. and dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the appellant filed the Regular Suit for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that the Lucknow Golf Club (hereinafter referred as club) is a registered Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, with office at 1 Kalidas Marg, Lucknow having its own memorandum and bye-laws to govern the affairs of the Society. The plaintiff was a permanent member of the Society. The plaintiff being a Senior Advocate was engaged to argue the contempt petition filed by one Mr. Amit Magon in respect of the dispute pertaining to the elections of the defendant No. 1 in the year 2005. On the contempt petition, notices were directed to be issued to the respondent contemnors vide order dated 15. 5. 2007. Amit Magon who is also a member of defendant No. 1, instituted a Regular Suit No. 372 of 2007 for declaration against the notice issued for convening a meeting on 27. 5. 2007. This Court had passed a status quo order dated 18. 5. 2007 and, against that order, Writ Petition No. 2562 of 2007 (M/s) was preferred by defendants No. 1 and 3 and the injunction order was set aside and the writ petition was allowed vide order dated 24th May, 2007. That petition was also argued by the present appellant Special Appeal No. 515 of 2007 filed against the order dated 24. 5. 2007 was also dismissed on 26th May, 2007 as the same was not maintainable. After dismissal of the appeal, the meeting was held on 27th May, 2007 in disregard of the orders dated 22. 11. 2006 and the Managing Committee of the Club was elected and the defendant No. 3 was elected as Hony. Secretary. 5. 2007 was also dismissed on 26th May, 2007 as the same was not maintainable. After dismissal of the appeal, the meeting was held on 27th May, 2007 in disregard of the orders dated 22. 11. 2006 and the Managing Committee of the Club was elected and the defendant No. 3 was elected as Hony. Secretary. According to the appellant, there is no provision in the bye-laws of the Club prohibiting any member to practice any trade or profession and the appellant also did not have any agreement with the Club that in discharge of his professional duties he would not argue against the Club. ( 3 ) THE defendant No. 3 pressurized the plaintiff not to appear in the matters against the Club and also not to press the contempt petition but the plaintiff did not succumb to the pressure and it annoyed the defendant No. 3 and he in order to take vengeance against the plaintiff pasted an order dated 28. 5. 2007 on the notice-board of the Club. In the said order, it was indicated that there were serious charges of misconduct and indiscipline against the plaintiff and it was desirable to place under suspension the Club membership of the plaintiff and an enquiry was also ordered and the Inquiry Committee was also constituted. According to the plaintiff, these allegations gave a set-back to him as well as his reputation. ( 4 ) THE plaintiff specifically pleaded in para 15 of the plaint as under:- "that apparently the letter dated 28. 5. 2007 is legally non est, illegal, unlawful and void ab initio inasmuch as there are no rules termed as Discipline and Appeal Rules of Lucknow Golf Club and as such the defendant No. 3 could not have resorted to such Rules to put the membership of the plaintiff under suspension. It is categorically stated that there was no such Rule nor there has been any rectification by any of the members in respect of the said Rules nor there is any approval of the Registrar of Firms, Chits and Societies. Thus, it would be seen that the Rules as mentioned above are absolutely non-existent and void ab initio and have apparently-been fabricated by the defendant No. 3 for personal gains and ulterior purposes. Thus, it would be seen that the Rules as mentioned above are absolutely non-existent and void ab initio and have apparently-been fabricated by the defendant No. 3 for personal gains and ulterior purposes. " ( 5 ) THE plaintiff also alleged that earlier, the membership of two other members of the Club was placed under suspension relying upon the Discipline and Appeal Rules of the Club (hereinafter referred as rules) and the members vide letter dated 12. 7. 2006 signed by several members and addressed to the President of the Club had sought clarification in respect of the existence and validity of the Rules and the defendant No. 3 vide letter dated 3. 8. 2006 replied that there was need to frame certain Rules which require change in the Memorandum of Association and Bye-laws but on account of the stay order passed by this Court, it was not possible to examine, enquire or comment upon the query. The plaintiff alleged that no such rules were in existence and even the Joint Secretary-cum-Treasurer, the defendant No. 3 had confirmed this fact. The plaintiff also took the plea that the alleged order dated 28. 5. 2007 was legally non est and the defendant No. 3 was not competent under the bye laws of the Club to take such action as there is no provision of suspension of membership as per the bye-laws. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff valued the suit at Rs. 50 lacs for the relief of declaration and Rs. 50 lacs for the relief of injunction on notional basis. The plaintiff prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from implementing and giving effect to the order dated 28. 5. 2007 as well as from interfering in the peaceful use and enjoyment of the permanent membership right of the Club and a declaration that the order dated 28. 5. 2007 is illegal, unlawful, legally non est, void ab initio, inoperative and not binding on him besides the costs of the suit. ( 7 ) IN the suit proceedings, the defendants appeared and filed written-statement and also an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter mentioned as code) alleging that the plaintiff had not properly valued the suit and that the plaint was liable to be dealt with under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 (b) of the Code. It was also alleged in this application that the membership of the plaintiff was suspended in exercise of powers conferred under the rules as framed by the Managing Committee of the Club and in case the plaintiff was aggrieved, he could have approached the Managing Committee of the Club which is vested with the powers to take appropriate action in the matter and, in view of this fact, the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code. The defendants also filed copy of bye-laws as well as the Rules, 2004. ( 8 ) THE perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Civil Judge was aware of the legal position that while considering the application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, only the allegations made in the plaint and the reliefs sought therein were to be considered. But the learned Judge not only referred the defendants case but also considered the documents filed by the defendants. He concluded that the membership of the plaintiff has been suspended and enquiry is pending and there is provision of filing appeal before the Management Committee under the bye-laws and the Rules and since there is alternative remedy available, the plaintiff could not be granted relief in suit in view of section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act and the plaint was barred by section 41 (h) and accordingly he dismissed the suit as aforesaid. However, on the question of valuation of the suit, he did not give any finding and held that in order to decide the question of valuation, it was necessary to frame preliminary issue and to invite Society i. e. Club empowered the Committee of Management to frame Rules and these Rules do not require an approval from the Registrar, Firms, Chits and Societies. Neither any registration is required under the provisions of Societies Registration Act for these rules. The suspension order was validly passed. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff filed the rejoinder-affidavit and contended that on 10th July, 2004, no meeting of the Managing Committee was held. The members were notified regarding holding of Annual General Meeting and in the meeting the then President was present. Mr. Adesh Seth, the then Captain and Mr. Javed Ahmad, Member of Managing Committee were also present in the meeting. The General House disbursed at 7. The members were notified regarding holding of Annual General Meeting and in the meeting the then President was present. Mr. Adesh Seth, the then Captain and Mr. Javed Ahmad, Member of Managing Committee were also present in the meeting. The General House disbursed at 7. 30 p. m. after deliberating upon the agenda. The minutes of the meeting (copy annexed as Annexures No. RA-1 and RA-2) signed by the then Hony. Secretary were also circulated to all the members. The Committee was constituted by the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 22. 4. 2002 for reviewing the provisions of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club and the appellant was made a member in that Committee (copy of letter Annexure RA-3 ). However, due to certain reasons, no rules could be framed by the Committee constituted for the purpose. A query was also made from the Deputy Registrar, Firms, Chits and Societies vide letter dated 26. 11. 2007 (Annexure RA-5) who informed that after 18. 7. 2003, no amended rule has been registered. It has also been alleged in the rejoinder-affidavit that the respondent No. 3 Devesh Rastogi has not disclosed the name of the person who had presided over the meeting on 10th July, 2004. ( 10 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 filed a counter-affidavit to supplementary affidavit in which he has alleged that in the suit preferred by the plaintiff-appellant no relief with respect to the validity and genuineness of the Rules had been claimed and mere assertions in the plaint were not sufficient to declare the Rules as non-existent and void ab initio and this fact itself proves that the Rules are very much in existence unless a decree contrary to the said effect is passed by the Court. The Rules came into existence on 10th July, 2004. The respondent also filed a copy of the alleged Rules as Annexure No. 1 to this affidavit. ( 11 ) WE have heard Sri Deepak Seth, leaned Counsel for the appellant, and Sri Anil Tewari, learned Counsel for the respondents and have perused the record including the Trial Court record. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in dismissing the suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. ( 11 ) WE have heard Sri Deepak Seth, leaned Counsel for the appellant, and Sri Anil Tewari, learned Counsel for the respondents and have perused the record including the Trial Court record. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in dismissing the suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. He has further contended that as per the legal requirements, the allegations made in the plaint are to be considered and the learned Judge has exceeded in his jurisdiction in considering the defendants case also as well as the documents filed by the defendants and has erred in concluding that the Rules were in existence and that the plaintiff could prefer appeal to the Management Committee under those Rules. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the Rules are not in existence and this fact was specifically pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint itself and the suit could not have been dismissed or the plaint could not have been rejected under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code at this stage. Learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that the impugned order has rightly been passed although in place of dismissal of the suit, the learned Trial Court should have mentioned the rejection of the plaint as required under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. He did not dispute the legal position that only the allegations made in the plaint are to be seen at this stage but contended that the plaintiff has cleverly drafted the plaint and in order to avoid the applicability/bar of section 41 (h) of Specific Relief Act and Clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, the plaintiff did not make any prayer seeking cancellation of the Rules as these Rules shall continue to be in existence unless they are declared void by any competent Court. He also contended that on account of crafty drafting of the plaint allegations, the plaintiff cannot get any benefit and the learned Trial Court has rightly concluded that the Rules are in existence and that the plaintiff had alternative remedy of filing appeal within those Rules. ( 12 ) IT would be relevant to refer the relevant portion of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code which reads as under:-The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a ). . ( 12 ) IT would be relevant to refer the relevant portion of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code which reads as under:-The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a ). . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; ( 13 ) THE plain reading of sub-clause (d) shows that where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected. It shows that only the statements and averments as made in the plaint have to be considered. ( 14 ) THE Honble Apex Court has considered the scope and effect of this provision and some of the judgments can be referred as under:-In the case of Saleem Bhai and others v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2003) 1 SCC 557 . it has been held in para 9 that the Trial Court can exercise the power under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under Rule 11 (a) and (d) of Order VII CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. In the case of Sapan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Asstt. Charity Commissioner and others, (2004) 3 SCC 137 . the case of Saleem Bhai (supra) has been followed and it has been further held In para 20 that Order VII, Rule 11 lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement for the purpose of deciding an application under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement for the purpose of deciding an application under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. Instead, the word shall is used, clearly implying thereby that Order VII, Rule 11 casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Order VII, Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In the case of Popat and Kotecha Property v. S. B. I. Staff Association,2005 (61) ALR 457 (SC)=2005 (99) RD 730=2005 (35) AIC 130 (SC ). it has been held in paras 10 and 20 that Clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 speaks of suits, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed question cannot be decided at the time of considering an application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII applies in those cases only where the statement by the plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. It has also been held that the real object Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of Courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, Order X of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the Court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised. In the case of Mauar (H. K.) Ltd. and others v. Owners and Parties Vessel M. V. Fortune Express and others, (2006) 3 SCC 100 . it has been held that plaint should be rejected only on the basis of what is contained in the entire plaint read as a whole allegation in the written statement and in application for rejection of plaint cannot be considered for determining the said question. it has been held that plaint should be rejected only on the basis of what is contained in the entire plaint read as a whole allegation in the written statement and in application for rejection of plaint cannot be considered for determining the said question. In the case of C. Natrajan v. Ashim Bai and another, (2007) 10 SBR 361. it has been held that an application for rejection of the plaint can be filed if the allegations made in the plaint appear to be barred by any law. For this purpose only the averments made in the plaint are relevant and the Court would not be entitled to consider the case of the defence at this stage. ( 15 ) THE legal position that emerges from these judgments of the Honble Apex Court is that the application under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC can be moved at any stage but the Trial Court has to consider the averments made in the plaint only and at this stage the defence case is not to be considered at all. Therefore, if the defendant raises any contentious issue or any dispute regarding the maintainability of the suit, which cannot be determined on the basis of the averments made in the plaint, the opportunity has to be given to the parties to lead their defence after framing of the issues so that the matter could be decided in proper perspective. In the instant case the plaintiff appellant took the specific plea that the Rules were not in existence. The facts as narrated above also show that according to the appellant even no meeting of the Managing Committee was held on 10th July, 2004, the alleged date of framing of the Rules. Contrary to it, the defence case is that the Rules were framed on 10th July, 2004 in the meeting of the Managing Committee and the Rules are in existence. There is, thus, a bona fide dispute between the parties regarding non existence or existence of the Rules and this matter could have been decided only after framing an issue on the point and thereafter permitting the parties to lead evidence. The learned Trial Court has held that under Rule 9 of the Rules, the plaintiff could have filed an appeal and therefore, the plaint was barred by section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. The learned Trial Court has held that under Rule 9 of the Rules, the plaintiff could have filed an appeal and therefore, the plaint was barred by section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act. But so far as the applicability of this Rule is concerned, the existence of the Rules itself being disputed, the learned Trial Court erred in coming to the hasty conclusion that these Rules were in existence and that the plaintiff appellant could have filed an appeal thereunder. ( 16 ) THE order passed by learned Trial Court shows that he also held that the plaintiff could have preferred appeal under Article 13 of the bye-laws of the Club. As far as the bye-laws are concerned, their existence has not been disputed by the plaintiff appellant. In the circumstances, it is relevant to refer Article 13 of the bye-laws. It provides as under:- "the Managing Committee shall have power from time to time to make or repeal such bye-laws or local rules as they shall think proper for the management of the Club. The exercise of this power shall not be inconsistent with these articles. The Committee shall have power to appoint and dismiss the Clubs servants. " ( 17 ) THE learned Trial Court has referred to second part of this article and concluded that the Committee had the power to appoint, or suspend the members under this article. But according to the learned Counsel for appellant this article refers to servants and not to club members and the conclusion as drawn by the learned Trial Court is incorrect. This contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is, correct. This article definitely refers to the appointment, punishment and dismissal of the Clubs servants and not the Club members. The learned Counsel for respondents referred the words management of the Club as given in this article and contended that under the management of the Club, the Managing Committee has the power to deal with the appointment and punishment of the members also. But under the words management of the Club, the members cannot be covered. The learned Counsel for respondents referred the words management of the Club as given in this article and contended that under the management of the Club, the Managing Committee has the power to deal with the appointment and punishment of the members also. But under the words management of the Club, the members cannot be covered. A perusal of these bye-laws shows that there is article 5 which deals with the termination of membership and provides that a member shall continue to be a member until his or her resignation in writing has been accepted by the Managing Committee and all his or her dues have been cleared or until he or she shall cease to be a member under other rules of the Club, or by death. Again Article 45 of these bye-laws deals with expulsion of member and it provides that if the conduct of any member is objectionable or obnoxious to the Club or detrimental to its interest, the extra ordinary general meeting of the Club may expel such a member by a majority of 2/3 of the members present and the member so expelled shall cease to be the member of the Club. There is no other provision regarding the suspension removal of the members of the Club in the bye-laws. Therefore, regarding the members there being specific provisions in the bye-laws and in view of these specific provisions in the bye-laws, Article 13 cannot be extended or stretched to cover the members and therefore, the plaintiff had no alternative remedy under the bye-laws of the Club. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Trial Court on the basis of the defence as raised by the defendant hastily concluded that the Rules were in existence. He has further contended that there was contentious dispute regarding the existence or non existence of the Rules and according to him even respondent No. 3 himself had stated in reply to a query regarding Rules made by some of the members in their letter dated 12. 7. 2006 vide his letter dated 3. 8. 2006 that in view of the stay order passed by this Court, it was not possible to enquire, examine or comment on the doubts raised by the members. The learned Counsel for plaintiff appellant has further contended that recently on 5. 1. 7. 2006 vide his letter dated 3. 8. 2006 that in view of the stay order passed by this Court, it was not possible to enquire, examine or comment on the doubts raised by the members. The learned Counsel for plaintiff appellant has further contended that recently on 5. 1. 2008 a notice has been issued by respondent No. 3 for extra ordinary general meeting to discuss and adopt revised and modified bye-laws and therein Rule 9 has been proposed for taking disciplinary action against the members including suspension of the member of the Club and on this basis he has contended that had there been any Rule, there was no occasion for such a notice. ( 19 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the relief of injunction prayed for is a consequential relief and in order to over come the bar of section 41 (h) of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff has not prayed for the relief of declaration regarding ultra vires character of the Rules. He also contended that the clever drafting will not make the plaint maintainable. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Hardesh Ores (Pvt. Ltd.) v. Hede and Company,2007 (68) ALR 481 (SC)=2007 (56) AIC 25. In that case it was held by the Trial Court and the High Court that the suit was not merely for injunction as prayed for in the plaint but was in effect for specific performance of renewal of the agreement, and the plaint was dismissed as time barred. The Honble Apex Court held that the real foundation of the suit was that the earlier agreement had stood renewed automatically containing the same terms and conditions as in the original agreement including the negative covenants. But subsisting renewed agreement did not exist in fact. In its absence no relief as prayed for in the plaint, could be granted by the clever device of filing a suit for injunction, without the appellants claiming a declaration that their rights were subsisting under a renewed agreement, which was barred by limitation and the appeal was dismissed. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel has further cited the case of N. V. Srinivas Murthy and others v. Mariyamma, 2005 (60) ALR 748 (SC)=2005 (32) AIC 18 (SC)=2005 (99) RD 395. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel has further cited the case of N. V. Srinivas Murthy and others v. Mariyamma, 2005 (60) ALR 748 (SC)=2005 (32) AIC 18 (SC)=2005 (99) RD 395. In that case also the plaintiff had omitted to claim relief warranted on facts and had claimed other relief to get around bar of limitation. It was held that declaration as to absolute ownership of property was necessary for claiming the relief on which the title was dependent and therefore, it was held that the plaint was rightly rejected as the suit was prima facie barred by the law of limitation. ( 21 ) BUT the facts of the present case are entirely different. Although the plaintiff has not claimed the relief of declaration regarding the validity of the Rules but the plaint can not be rejected on that ground. Moreover no such plea was taken in the Trial Court. Under the two cases, referred to above as cited by the learned Counsel for respondents, the plaintiff had drafted the plaint cleverly in order to over come the prohibition of limitation. In the instant case, the plaintiff has come with the case that the Rules are not in existence. He has not sought any relief challenging the validity of the Rules. It shows that if rules are found to be in existence, the plaintiff will have to act accordingly. In case it is found that the Rules are not in existence, then plaintiff would be entitled to the relief claimed. In other words, the fate of the suit depends on the non existence or the existence of the Rules and if the relief, as argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent, has not been claimed, the plaint cannot be rejected on this ground and it cannot be said that the plaintiff has cleverly drafted the plaint to avoid the provisions of any law. ( 22 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has further cited the case of Kamakhya Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, air 1957 Pat 30 . wherein it has been held that in a suit for declaration and injunction if no prayer in the relief portion for grant of any damages for breach of agreement has been made and no Court fee has been paid by the plaintiff for any such relief, the plaintiff will not be entitled to any such relief. wherein it has been held that in a suit for declaration and injunction if no prayer in the relief portion for grant of any damages for breach of agreement has been made and no Court fee has been paid by the plaintiff for any such relief, the plaintiff will not be entitled to any such relief. ( 23 ) THE learned counsel for respondent has also cited the case of Kamataka Bank Ltd. v. T. Gopalakrishna Rao,1994 Lab IC 1351. in that case, the plaintiff had challenged his suspension and it was held that it was a matter of private employment and was not covered by any statute and the employee had a remedy to sue for damages and the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC was held to be proper. ( 24 ) LEARNED Counsel for respondents has further cited the case of Capt. Atul Kumar Singh v. Ms. Jnlveen Rosha, air 2000 Del. 38 . In that case a suit was filed for declaration and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from using cheques issued to them. The suit was filed after institution of criminal case against the plaintiff under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and it was held that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. But in all these three cases the facts were different and the respondents cannot get any benefit out of them. ( 25 ) IN the circumstances of the case, the fact remains that the averments as made in the plaint show that there is a dispute regarding the non-existence or existence of the Rules and the learned Trial Court should have given opportunity to the parties after framing issue on this point and should have allowed them to lead their evidence on the same and only then he should have decided the point. Therefore, he has erred in summarily rejecting the plaint on the basis of the defence case. Thus we come to the conclusion that the impugned order is not legal and has to be set aside and the appeal is to be allowed. ( 26 ) THE appeal is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 17. 7. 2007 are here by set aside. Thus we come to the conclusion that the impugned order is not legal and has to be set aside and the appeal is to be allowed. ( 26 ) THE appeal is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 17. 7. 2007 are here by set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Trial Court with a direction to register it at its number and to proceed in the matter according to law. The learned Trial Court is further directed to expedite the hearing of the case and to conclude the same preferably, within a period of three months from the date, a certified copy of this order is filed before it. Both the parties are expected to co-operate in the expeditious disposal of the case. ( 27 ) THE Trial Court record be returned forthwith. Appeal Allowed. .