Judgment : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records pertaining to the Proceedings F.No.HUDCO/VIG-169 (VolI)/2000/332 on the file of the 1st Respondent/Appellate Authority dated 08. 2005 confirming the order of the 2nd Respondent made in Proceedings F.No.HUDCO/VIG-169 (VolI)/2000/980 dated 03. 2005 and quash the same and consequently direct the Respondents to extend all the attendant benefits to the Petitioner. Petitioner seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the Proceedings dated 08. 2005 passed by the 1st Respondent and consequently direct the Respondents to extend all the attendant benefits to the Petitioner. 2. Facts in nutshell are as follows:- (i) Petitioner joined the services of the Respondents on 03. 1980. He assumed charge as Regional Chief on 15. 1997 and continued to hold the said post till March 2004. During the year 1997-1998, Petitioner as Regional Chief recommended for sanction of Rs.7 crores to M/s. Premier Housing and Industrial Enterprises Limited (PHIEL). Acting on the recommendation of the Petitioner, Respondents disbursed a sum of Rs.7 crores to PHIEL. Loan was granted on the basis of Bank guarantee offered by Global Trust Bank and no other security was taken for securing the loan. It was found that the recommendation of the Petitioner was not proper in as much as Petitioner had failed to comply with the scrutiny norms prescribed by HUDCO. Therefore, Charge sheet was issued to the Petitioner on 12. 2002. Writ Petitioner offered his written explanation on 04. 2002 mainly contending that he has acted bonafidely and has shown due diligence in making recommendation for grant of loan. (ii) By order dated 19. 2002, one of the Executive Directors of HUDCO by name K.C.Batra was appointed as Enquiry Officer and Enquiry Officer has chosen to examine three witnesses and marked 15 documents. Delinquent examined one witness and marked 16 documents. On analysis of materials and evidence let in by both parties, Enquiry Officer has submitted his report holding that Charge No.3 proved. It was found that other four charges have not been proved. (iii) The Deputy Chief (Vigilance) of HUDCO bank issued a communication dated 18. 2004 enclosing copy of the Enquiry Officers report stating that Disciplinary Authority has tentatively agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and directed the delinquent to make his representation on the enquiry report within 15 days time. (iii) The Deputy Chief (Vigilance) of HUDCO bank issued a communication dated 18. 2004 enclosing copy of the Enquiry Officers report stating that Disciplinary Authority has tentatively agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and directed the delinquent to make his representation on the enquiry report within 15 days time. The delinquent had submitted his representation on 211. 2004 in respect of Charge No.3 which was held to be proved by the Enquiry Officer. (iv) The Disciplinary Authority had passed the impugned order dated 03. 2005 taking a different view than that of the Enquiry Officer holding that all the five Charges framed against the delinquent have been proved. Writ Petitioner was imposed with the punishment of :-(i) Reduction to the lower post of Dy. Chief; (ii) Reducing the basic pay by five increments in lower scale; and (iii) Not to consider for promotion for the next two years by virtue of the impugned order dated 03. 2005. (v) Aggrieved by the said order of the Disciplinary Authority, Writ Petitioner has preferred Appeal Memo raising grounds of victimisation, denial of opportunity etc. First Respondent/Appellate Authority confirmed the order of Disciplinary Authority by the impugned order dated 08. 2005 which is challenged in this Writ Petition. 3. Respondents have filed common counter-affidavit inter alia contending that the delinquent officer is responsible for issuing a wrong certification and has neglected in his duty in not adverting to the appraisal report of Indian Bank in regard to the financial status and repayment capacity of the loanee and that Writ Petitioner cannot pass on his liability and responsibility to the other Wings of the Bank. It has also been stated that undue favour shown to the loanee resulted in non-realisation of interest and penal interest which caused loss to the bank. 4. Submitting that no financial loss was caused to HUDCO, Mr.V.Ayyaduari, learned counsel for the Petitioner inter alia has raised the following contentions:- "No financial loss to HUDCO and the entire amount of Rs.7 crores was recovered and the charges are baseless. Even assuming that there was certain lapses on the part of the Writ Petitioner, it could only be an error of Judgment not amounting to misconduct. "No reasonings are indicated in the impugned order dated 03. 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority for holding the Petitioner guilty of all Charges. Even assuming that there was certain lapses on the part of the Writ Petitioner, it could only be an error of Judgment not amounting to misconduct. "No reasonings are indicated in the impugned order dated 03. 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority for holding the Petitioner guilty of all Charges. "No opportunity was afforded to the Petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority for differing with the views of the Enquiry Officer. "Communication dated 16.08.2004 states that the Disciplinary Authority has tentatively agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. "In the context of Disciplinary Authority taking a different view, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have obtained views of Central Vigilance Commission which is mandatory and not obtaining views of Central Vigilance Commission has caused serious prejudice to the Petitioner. "Multiple punishment imposed upon the Petitioner is unsustainable. 5. Submitting that the delinquent officer was the Chief of Tamil Nadu Region and had greater responsibilities, Mr. M. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the Respondents has made the following submissions:- "Petitioner had not taken steps to ascertain the financial position of PHIEL and that it had outstanding loans due to CANFIN Homes and HDFC. "Sufficient opportunity was afforded to the Writ Petitioner. "Taking views of Central Vigilance Commission is not mandatory and the only test is prejudice being caused to the delinquent in the present case, Writ Petitioner has preferred statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority and therefore, there is no question of prejudice being caused to the Writ Petitioner. .6. Before considering the merits of rival contentions, we may briefly point out the higher responsibilities cast upon the Petitioner. Petitioner being Chief of Tamil Nadu Region had over all responsibility of ensuring with the loans are being recommended for sanction with adequate security. As such duty was cast on him to ensure proper and adequate security was available for the loan being recommended for sanction. Whenever loan is being granted, it requires comprehensive verification as to the financial position of the loanee. 7. In the case of PHIEL, Petitioner had given statement regarding the financial soundness of PHIEL allegedly without factual verification. On two occasions, Petitioner had confirmed to Headquarters vide letters dated 211. 1997 and 211. 1997 stating that he was satisfied about the financial soundness of PHIEL. Draft appraisal prepared by Indian Bank for PHIEL clearly indicated that there were over due payments to CANFIN Homes and HDFC. 8. On two occasions, Petitioner had confirmed to Headquarters vide letters dated 211. 1997 and 211. 1997 stating that he was satisfied about the financial soundness of PHIEL. Draft appraisal prepared by Indian Bank for PHIEL clearly indicated that there were over due payments to CANFIN Homes and HDFC. 8. The gravamen of Charges against the Petitioner is that Petitioner had allegedly violated the approved guidelines of the Board for sanction of working capital of Rs.700 lakhs to M/s. PHIEL showing undue favour to the agency resulting in non-realisation of penal interest and thereby causing substantial loss to the agency. .9. Re.contention – Error of Judgment:- .According to the Petitioner, Rs.7 crores loan sanctioned to M/s. PHIEL was recovered on account of Bank guarantee and Rs.28 lakhs towards interest was also recovered and for collection of penal interest, recovery proceedings have been initiated before DRT and therefore, there is no financial loss to HUDCO. 10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that Writ Petitioner had acted on the basis of the reports of Legal Department, financial department and other Wings of the Bank as per the existing procedure and practice and made recommendation for sanction of the loan and delinquent had acted bonafidely in discharging his official duty. Main contention of the Petitioner is that there was no financial loss to the Bank and any act or omission cannot amount to misconduct and at the most it could only be an error of Judgment. 11. Contending that any shortcomings on the part of the Petitioner would not amount to misconduct warranting disciplinary proceedings, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon (1979) 2 SCC 286 [Union of India and others v. J.Ahmed] and placed reliance upon the following observations:- " 9. .... Lack of integrity, if proved, would undoubtedly entail penalty. Failure to come up to the highest expectations of an officer holding responsible post or lack of aptitude or qualities of leadership would not constitute as failure to maintain devotion to duty. The expression devotion to duty appears to have been used as something opposed to indifference to duty or easy-going or light-hearted approach to duty......... Some other act or omission may as well constitute misconduct. Allegations in the various charges do not specify any act or omission in derogation of or contrary to Conduct Rules save the general Rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty. Some other act or omission may as well constitute misconduct. Allegations in the various charges do not specify any act or omission in derogation of or contrary to Conduct Rules save the general Rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty. It is however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would themselves constitute misconduct. If it is so, every officer rated average would be guilty of misconduct. Charges in this case as stated earlier clearly indicate lack of efficiency, lack of foresight and indecisiveness as serious lapses on the part of the respondent. These deficiencies in personal character or personal ability would not constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. 11. ...... It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment in evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences directly attributable to negligence would be such as to be irreparable or the resultant damage would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high ......." 12. Yet another decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner is (2007) 4 SCC 566 [Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others] wherein the Honble Supreme Court has observed that an error of judgment perse is not a misconduct and negligence simpliciter also would not be a misconduct. 13. Applying ratio of the above decisions in the present case, the question falling for consideration is whether the act of the Petitioner in recommending sanction of loan to PHIEL is just only an error of judgment. As pointed out earlier, Petitioner being Regional head had over all responsibility of ensuring with the loan being recommended for sanction with adequate security. Draft appraisal report prepared by Indian Bank indicated that PHIEL had over due payments to CANFIN Homes and HDFC. But overlooking the same, Petitioner sent two communications to the Headquarters dated 211. 1997 and 211. 1997 stating that he was satisfied about the financial soundness of PHIEL. Draft appraisal report prepared by Indian Bank indicated that PHIEL had over due payments to CANFIN Homes and HDFC. But overlooking the same, Petitioner sent two communications to the Headquarters dated 211. 1997 and 211. 1997 stating that he was satisfied about the financial soundness of PHIEL. Out of seven banks from whom, first Respondent had requested for comments on the financial performance of PHIEL and only Global Trust Bank and Karnataka Bank had responded communicating a satisfactory performance. It is stated that other banks had not responded nor was any follow up action taken by the Petitioner to verify the actual financial position of PHIEL inspite of Indian Bank appraisal report indicating over due payments to CANFIN Homes to the extent of Rs.100 lakhs and HDFC to the extent of Rs.30 lakhs. It is alleged that Petitioner had not taken efforts to ascertain the current status of the accounts of PHIEL. 14. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Respondents that over due payments to CANFIN Homes and HDFC were over looked by the Petitioner. Being a Regional head with over all responsibilities, Petitioner had every responsibility to ascertain the financial position of loanee. 15. It is for the Petitioner to verify the files submitted by the finance section and legal section. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and findings of Enquiry Officer, it cannot be said that Petitioners act in recommending sanction of loan to PHIEL was merely an error of Judgment. But non-verification of its financial soundness is clearly a deliberate failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. Petitioner cannot abandon his over all responsibility. Failure to act is not mere negligence or omission but ipso facto constitutes misconduct. 16. Re.contention - Denial of opportunity: Disciplinary Authority taking a different view than that of the Enquiry Officer : Enquiry Officer found the Writ Petitioner guilty of Charge No.3 and hold Charge Nos.1,2,4 and 5 not proved. Disciplinary Authority had taken a different view and held that all Charges are proved against the Writ Petitioner. 17. In a communication dated 16.08.2004, Dy. Chief Vigilance of HUDCO enclosed copy of enquiry report stating that Disciplinary Authority was in tentative agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, whereas Disciplinary Authority held that all Charges are proved against the Writ Petitioner. 18. 17. In a communication dated 16.08.2004, Dy. Chief Vigilance of HUDCO enclosed copy of enquiry report stating that Disciplinary Authority was in tentative agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, whereas Disciplinary Authority held that all Charges are proved against the Writ Petitioner. 18. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that it is settled law that when Disciplinary Authority takes a different view than that of the Enquiry Officer should provide further opportunity and non-providing of opportunity would amount to denial of opportunity. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance upon (2006) 9 SCC 440 [Lav Nigam v. Chairman & MD ITI Ltd. and another]; (1998) 7 SCC 84 [Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Mista]; (2004) 13 SCC 797 [SBI and others v. Arvind K.Shukla] and (2008) 6 MLJ 621 [T.Shanmugasundaram v. Commissioner, Pollachi Muncipality, Pollachi and Another]. 19. The consistent view taken by the Supreme Court that in case Disciplinary Authority differs with the view taken by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed. 20. In AIR 1998 SC 2713 : (1998) 7 SCC 84 [Punjab National Bank and Others vs. Kunj Behari Misra], it has been held that if the Enquiry Officers report is in favour of the delinquent and the Disciplinary Authority proposing to differ must give opportunity of hearing to the delinquent before recording his conclusion. 21. The same view reiterated in 1999 (7) SCC 739 [Yoginath D.Nagade vs. State of Maharashtra]. In this cases also Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 did not specifically provide for a Disciplinary Authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. 21. The same view reiterated in 1999 (7) SCC 739 [Yoginath D.Nagade vs. State of Maharashtra]. In this cases also Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 did not specifically provide for a Disciplinary Authority to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer before differing with the view of the enquiry officer. The Honble Supreme Court has held: "But the requirement of hearing in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the TENTATIVE reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of not guilty already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with." Same principle was reiterated in (2003) 2 SCC 449 (State Bank of India vs. K.P.Narayanan Kutty). 22. Of course, in the communication letter dated 16.08.2004 sent by the Dy. Chief Vigilance, it has been stated that the Disciplinary Authority has perused the IOs report and is in tentative agreement with the findings of the IO and a copy of the report of the IO was enclosed and the Writ Petitioner was called upon to make any further report to the Disciplinary Authority. 23. Learned counsel for the Petitioner mainly contended that the communication dated 16.08.2004 created an impression that the Disciplinary Authority agreed the findings of IO (wherein only Charge No.3 was held proved) and while so, before holding the Writ Petitioner guilty of all charges, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have afforded further opportunity to the Writ Petitioner. 24. The above contention does not merit acceptance. It is not in all cases, non-affording of further opportunity would vitiate enquiry proceedings. 24. The above contention does not merit acceptance. It is not in all cases, non-affording of further opportunity would vitiate enquiry proceedings. Respondents relied upon the Judgment (1998) 4 SCC 310 [Union of India v. Vishwa Mohan] to contend that communication of the differing conclusions of Disciplinary Authority is not necessary in the instant case. In the said decision, Respondent being a bank officer, charged with taking bribe, failure to protect the interests of bank, failure to perform duties with utmost devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty, acting in a manner unbecoming of a bank officer. In such facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "9. ....... In our considered view, on the facts of this case, this principle has no application but assuming that it applied yet the High Court has erred in holding that the principle of severability cannot be applied in the present case. The finding in this behalf is unsustainable. As stated earlier, the appellant had in his possession the enquiry report/findings when he filed the statutory appeal as well as the writ petition in the High Court. The High Court was required to apply its judicial mind to all the circumstances and then form its opinion whether non-furnishing of the report would have made any difference to the result in the case and thereupon pass an appropriate order. In para 31, this Court in Managing Director, ECIL [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 has very rightly cautioned: "The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts." 12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry authoritys report/findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him." In the present case also, Petitioner was served with copy of order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Writ Petitioner also filed statutory appeal under Rule 33 of HUDCO CDA Rules. A reading of narration of facts and grounds raised in the appeal would disclose that no prejudice had been caused to him by non-issuing of notice setting out different view of the Disciplinary Authority vis-a-vis, report of the Enquiry Officer. 25. Non-affording of further opportunity to the Petitioner by itself would not make punishment non-est. It is settled position that principles of natural justice have to be complied with. One of the principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem ("Hear the other side"). But it is equally well settled that the concept natural justice is not a fixed one. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned with the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. .26. In the leading case A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 ], the Supreme Court held that:- ."What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the Constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." 27. Since Petitioner has filed statutory appeal and the alleged misconduct is in respect of sanction of loan by HUDCO, the decision in (1998) 4 SCC 310 [Union of India v. Vishwa Mohan] would apply. Since Petitioner has filed statutory appeal and the alleged misconduct is in respect of sanction of loan by HUDCO, the decision in (1998) 4 SCC 310 [Union of India v. Vishwa Mohan] would apply. HUDCO being a financial institution lending money to Corporates and other institutions for construction of houses, the Petitioner being in-charge of Tamil Nadu Region was expected to act with absolute devotion and diligence and integrity. 28. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket formula. The recent trend, however, is of prejudice. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that nonobservance had prejudicially affected the applicant. 29. Enquiry Officer held Charge No.3 (which more or less covers other Charges also) was proved. Any further hearing could not have been made much difference. To put it otherwords, when the Petitioner having submitted his explanation in respect of proved Charge No.3, he could not have offered any further explanation in response to further hearing by the Disciplinary Authority. .30. Re.contention – Failure to adhere the guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commission:- .As per the Central Vigilance Commission guidelines, consultation at various states before initiating disciplinary action, at the stage of enquiry report, passing final order by the disciplinary authority ought to have been done. The Chief Vigilance Commissions modified guidelines dated 29. 2000 obligates the Disciplinary Authority should have communicated its tentative views of the Commission for advice. According to the Petitioner, it is mandatory that views of the Disciplinary Authority along with advice of the Commission is to be made available to the concerned employee for making his representation. 31. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that consultation with Central Vigilance Commission at various stages is mandatory. It was further argued that it is cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that any procedure prescribed with regard to the proceedings which lead to penal conclusions are held to be mandatory. It was further submitted that obtaining views of Chief Vigilance Commissioner has avowed object of protecting the public exchequer and it also operates as check protecting the employee from victimisation. It was further submitted that obtaining views of Chief Vigilance Commissioner has avowed object of protecting the public exchequer and it also operates as check protecting the employee from victimisation. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that even if the said guideline is directory, in the present case since, Disciplinary Authority had taken a different view from the findings of the Enquiry Officer, non-obtaining of views of Central Vigilance Commission has caused serious prejudice to the Petitioner. It was also contended that when the aggrieved person proves prejudice being caused, non-observance of guidelines would inevitably vitiate the enquiry proceedings. 32. Circular issued by Central Vigilance Commission to Nationalised Banks, Public Sector Undertakings dated 29. 2000 reads as follows:- "Therefore, a copy of the Commissions first stage advice may be made available to the concerned employee along with a copy of the Charge Sheet served upon him, for his information. However, when the CVCs second stage advice is obtained, a copy thereof may be made available to the concerned employee along with IOs report, to give him an opportunity to make representation against IOs findings and the CVCs advice if he desires to do so." By reading of the above Circular, it is clear that the contents are only directory in nature and not mandatory. The said Circular has no statutory force and is merely an Administrative guidelines and hence no right would flow to the Petitioner. Noncompliance of guideline would not have the effect of vitiating enquiry proceedings. .33. Re.contention – Impugned order of Disciplinary Authority dated 09.03.2005 suffers from non-application of mind:- .The order of the Disciplinary Authority is challenged on the ground that no specific reasonings have been set out in the impugned order for arriving at the conclusion that all Charges framed against the delinquent had been proved and there is no discussion of evidence or assessment of materials available on record with regard to each and every Charge distinctively. It was further argued that Disciplinary Authority placed reliance on the extraneous factor such as report of Comptroller and Audit General No.3/2001 and consequently, the order of Disciplinary Authority is liable to be quashed as arbitrary and unreasoned one. .34. There is no force in the contention of the Petitioner that the order of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are non-speaking and suffer from non-application of mind. .34. There is no force in the contention of the Petitioner that the order of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are non-speaking and suffer from non-application of mind. In answer to the charges framed against the Petitioner, at no stage denied the lapses portrayed in the charges. Though, Enquiry Officer held Charge Nos.1,2,4 and 5 not proved, Enquiry Officer did record a finding that lapses had occurred. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Respondents, only defence of the Petitioner was that he had relied upon notes and reports submitted by his Subordinate Officers and that Petitioner had not independently scrutinised the documents submitted by PHIEL and the report furnished by other financial institutions regarding solvency/re-payment capacity of PHIEL. Defence of the Petitioner would clearly indicate that there was failure on his part to independently assess the capacity of the borrower to re-pay such a huge sum. 35. Bank guarantee being defective, Petitioner had only stated that he is not expected to go through each and every page, line by line, to make any addition or omission in the said documents. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the Respondents, bank guarantee was not in the form prescribed and the guarantor viz., Global Trust Bank had restricted its liability to the principal amount, thereby exposing HUDCO to the danger of loosing interest on the amount borrowed. Insofar as, Charge No.3, delinquent had stated that only omission on his part was that he had not examined 18 pages financial document viz., the report of the Indian Bank which had clearly stated that borrowing agency – PHIEL was a defaulter. But for recommendation of Petitioner, HUDCO would have never sanctioned the loan to PHIEL. Petitioner had also sought to downplay his role by blaming his Subordinates for furnishing inaccurate information. Disciplinary Authority considered all these aspects and therefore, the order of Disciplinary Authority cannot be challenged on the ground of non-application of mind or unreasoned one. .36. Re.contention – Imposing multiple punishment:- .Writ Petitioner was imposed with punishment of reduction in rank, curtailment of basic pay and denial of promotion for two years by over due of the impugned order dated 03. 2005. Placing reliance upon (2006) 3 SCC 167 [Union of India and another v. S.C.Parashar], it was contended that imposition of both minor and major penalties by the same order is illegal. 2005. Placing reliance upon (2006) 3 SCC 167 [Union of India and another v. S.C.Parashar], it was contended that imposition of both minor and major penalties by the same order is illegal. In the said case, penalty imposed upon the Respondent is amalgam of minor penalty and major penalty. In such circumstances, Honble Supreme Court held that Disciplinary Authority could not have taken such course of action in imposing both minor and major penalties. .37. In the present case, Petitioner was imposed major punishment of reduction to the lower post of Deputy Chief. The next limb of punishments are only consequential. When the delinquent employee was reduced to lower post, the concerned authority must indicate that in the reduced rank what should be the scale of pay of the delinquent employee. The next limb of punishment in fixing the basic pay at Rs.18,800/- in the pay scale of Rs.16000-400-28800 is only consequential. Likewise, imposition of punishment not to be considered for promotion for next two years is also consequential and as such there is no multiple punishment warranting interference. 38. In service matters, scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not its decision. By and large, exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution of India, Court would not interfere with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority, unless punishment is only disproportinate. Though the loan amount of Rs.7 crores is said to have been recovered, the interest and penal interest are yet to be recovered for which HUDCO has instituted proceedings before DRT. Having regard to the nature of charges, the punishments imposed upon the Petitioner cannot be said to be disproportinate shocking conscience of the Court warranting interference. 39. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed.