JUDGMENT :- (Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, against the fair and decretal order dated 28.02.2008 made in C.M.A.No.9 of 2006 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Sankarankovil confirming the fait and decretal order dated 17.11.2005 made in E.A.No.305 of 2004 in E.P.No.2 of 2002 in O.S.No.164 of 1999 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Sankarankovil.) These petitioners are daughters of the second respondent, who is defendant in O.S.No.164 of 1999 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Sankarankovil, which is filed by the first respondent for recovery of money. The third and fourth respondents are stated to be mortgagors from the second respondent. 2. (i) In the petition in E.A.No.305 of 2004 filed by the petitioners before the executing Court, it is stated that it has been filed by the first petitioner and the minor second and third petitioners through their mother by name Bagavathy. The first respondent was proclaiming that he was taking steps to bring the suit property namely, the residential house, in which the petitioners are residing, for the Court auction. On enquiry, the petitioners came to know that the second respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.18,000/-(Rupees eighteen thousand only) from the first respondent on a pronote and he filed a suit in O.S.No.164 of 1999 and obtained money decree on 03.01.2000 before the Principal District Munsif Court, Srivilliputhur and the decree has been transferred to the Principal District Munsif Court, Sankarankovil, that E.P.No.2 of 2002 was filed by the first respondent for attachment of the sale of properties, in which on 30.01.2002 the property was attached and thereafter on 26.07.2004, the first respondent bid the property in Court auction as directed by the Court for a sum of Rs.45,100/- and that he has deposited the sale consideration into the Court. (ii) It is further stated that on 15.04.1996 and on 30.01.2002, the second respondent executed the mortgage deed in favour of the third and fourth respondents respectively prior to the date of attachment, which is not known to these petitioners. These petitioners are entitled to 3/4th share in the suit properties and their share could not be brought for sale in Court auction. The property originally belonged to one Maria Ponnusamy Nadar, who is the paternal grand father of these petitioners ancestrally. It is not the self acquired property of the second respondent. These petitioners are entitled to 3/4th share in the suit properties and their share could not be brought for sale in Court auction. The property originally belonged to one Maria Ponnusamy Nadar, who is the paternal grand father of these petitioners ancestrally. It is not the self acquired property of the second respondent. The first respondent could only proceed with 1/4th share in the suit property in Court auction. (iii) Earlier these petitioners filed E.A.No.278 of 2003, which was dismissed for default on 08.07.2003 and the same was not restored. The debt, allegedly incurred by the second respondent, was not spent for the welfare of these petitioners and in a collusive manner the property was brought to Court sale. The property is worth more than Rs.60,000/-. Excepting this house, the petitioners have no other property to reside. 3. In the counter filed by the first respondent, it is alleged that the second respondent filed I.P.No.28 of 2002 on the file of the Sub Court, Srivilliputhur, which was dismissed on 25.11.2002. These petitioners filed E.A.No.278 of 2003 claim petition, and E.A.No.279 of 2003, a stay petition as well. In those petitions, the third and fourth respondents were not impleaded and the same were dismissed for default on 08.07.2003. They filed applications to restore the above said applications along with the petitions to condone the delay, which were also dismissed for default on 09.01.2004. The sale conducted by the Court on 26.07.2004 was well known by these petitioners. The second respondent borrowed the amount only for family necessity and he was acting as natural guardian for the petitioners. In view of the dismissal of the previous claim petition, this petition is not maintainable and hence the petition has to be dismissed. 4. The learned Principal District Munsif, Sankarankovil has dismissed the application after scrutinizing the oral evidence on record by stating that the petitioners have not established that the debt was incurred by their father for immoral purpose and the petition does not contain any allegation to the effect that there was no legal necessity for the father, who is Kartha of the family, to obtain loan from others for the benefit of her family and that the borrowal by the second respondent was an immoral purpose and There is no other averments in the petition that he was leading a wayward life. 5. 5. The petitioners preferred appeal from the order of the executing Court before the learned Subordinate Judge, Sankarankovil in C.M.A.No.9 of 2006, which also suffered dismissal on 28.02.2008. The learned Subordinate Judge, Sankarankovil, while appreciating the oral evidence on record, has observed that the first petitioner, during his examination, has admitted that she is a Christian and hence it transpires that the petitioners and their parents also belong to Christianity, wherein the concept of ancestral property is not available; since it is the categorical admission of the first petitioner, it has to be taken as such and there is nothing to repel in these circumstances. Both the Courts below have uniformly held that there is no pleadings that the second respondent borrowed money from the first respondent for immoral purposes, which are not for legal necessities. This Court endorses the view taken by both the Courts below. 6. The petitioners, being appellants, might have examined their mother to show that their father obtained the loan for his personal expenses ignoring the welfare of the minors. Such evidence is not available on record. 7. Mr. Muthugeethaian for Mr. V. Ramajagadeesan, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that there was no notice from the Court to the minor petitioners and that the minors' interests are prejudiced. It is his further contention that however, there is no other house excepting the property involved in the execution proceedings and that the father did not care about his daughters. 8. Conversely, Mr. A. Sivaji learned counsel for the first respondent would draw attention of this Court to a decision of this Court reported in 1998(3) M.L.J. 702 (Kamatchi Ammal and another Vs. S. Karunakaran and another), in which the learned Judge after following the Full Bench decision of this Court in A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610, (Venkatanarayana V. Somaraju) pronounced by the Privy Council which goes to the effect that where a decree has been obtained against the representative of the joint family in respect of a joint family liability, it will be binding on his undivided brothers and the entire joint family property can be taken in execution though the undivided brothers were not made a party to the suit. He would further say that answer for the question posed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is available in this decision. He would further say that answer for the question posed by the learned counsel for the petitioners is available in this decision. A Division Bench Judgment of this Court was also relied upon which was reported in A.I.R.1975 Mad. 206 (T.A.Sankaralingam V. T.N. Mani), in which it was observed that even assuming that the son did not know about the proceedings, in view of non-service of the notice in the execution proceedings, the decree would still be binding upon him because the same has been granted against his father also. It is further held that a decree obtained against the Manager in the suit will be binding on the individual coparceners and the entire joint family properties can be taken in execution of such decree even if a junior coparceners is not a party. 9. In the case reported in 1999 L.W.132 (S. Subramania Gothavari V. K.S.G. Sivajthiammal), this Court has held that the debt due by a Kartha of a Hindu joint family binds the joint family and its members cannot resist the execution of the decree as against the properties of the joint family on the ground that the individual shares of the co-parceners cannot be proceeded with and that can be done only if the debt incurred by the Kartha is tainted with illegality of immorality. It is also observed in the above decision that even if any member of the joint family is not impleaded in the suit, the decree will bind on him. As an epilogue, the learned Judge has concluded that the first respondent has come forward with the execution application only on the ground that no notice was served on him in the execution petition and in view of the decisions of this Court, the objection that has been raised by the first respondent cannot be countenanced. 10. In the identical cases involving the challenge of the acts of the head or the Kartha of the family, there must be specific pleadings to the effect that the debt was not incurred for the welfare of the family and was not for legal necessity. 10. In the identical cases involving the challenge of the acts of the head or the Kartha of the family, there must be specific pleadings to the effect that the debt was not incurred for the welfare of the family and was not for legal necessity. It is well settled that when certain members of a coparcenery were not added as parties to the suit, it is always open to them in execution proceedings to impeach the debt on the ground that it is tainted with illegality and immorality but certainly not on the ground that the decree is not binding upon them because they have not been made co nominee-parties to the suit. 11. Apart from the pleadings as such in the petition, it is bounder duty of the petitioners to lead convincing evidence on this aspect and establish before the Court that the debt was tainted with illegality and immorality. Significantly, these aspects are missing in this case and only one ground taken by the petitioners is that they had no notice about the execution proceedings. In view of the consistent view taken by this Court, such plea could not stand. 12. It is incumbent upon the petitioners to show that the debt involved is not an Avyavaharika debt incurred by the second respondent. Where Hindu sons challenge debts incurred by their father as not binding on them on the ground of their being Avyavaharika or immoral debts, the burden is theirs to prove by evidence that their father indulged in vices and led an immoral life and that the debts were tainted in the sense that direct connection was apparent between them and certain immoral purposes relating to the private life of the father. 13. The burden is not discharged by showing that the father lived an extravagant or immoral life; there must be a direct connection established between the debts and the immorality set up, as per the opinion of this Court contained in Division Bench decision reported in 1960(1) MLC 329 (Kothanda Naidu and others Vs. M. Kuppayya Naidu and another). A Full Bench of this Court in a decision rendered in Jagadeesan (minor) and another reported in 1962(1) MLJ 131 , has observed that the executing Court can, sell the son's interest under a mortgage decree against the father where there is no personal liability, if the father himself could do so. 14. M. Kuppayya Naidu and another). A Full Bench of this Court in a decision rendered in Jagadeesan (minor) and another reported in 1962(1) MLJ 131 , has observed that the executing Court can, sell the son's interest under a mortgage decree against the father where there is no personal liability, if the father himself could do so. 14. In a decision reported in 1964(1) MLJ 232 (Loganathan, minor and another by next friend and guardian A. Sundaram), this Court has held that an Avyavaharika debt is one involving an element of criminality and one which the father as a decent and responsible man ought not to have incurred and in order to decide whether a debt is illegal or immoral, the Court has to examine the nature of the debt, that is the character of it, when it originated and if on such examination it is found that at its inception the debt was not tarnished or tainted with illegality or immorality, it must be held that the debt would be binding on the son and that the son can claim immunity only where the debt in its origin was immoral or illegal by reason of the money having been obtained by the commission of an offence, but not where the father came by the money lawfully but subsequently misappropriated it. 15. In the text books, the terms of "Pious obligation" has been described as, every son, grandson or great grandson is under a pious duty to discharge the debts with interest of the father, the grandfather, or great grandfather provided he had not become divided from them at the time the debts were incurred and that they are neither immoral nor illegal. Under the doctrine of "pious obligation" a duty is cast upon the persons challenging to discharge that the debt incurred by his father to the second defendant. In case, if the debt is challenged by a son, the son is liable even in respect of debts not incurred for legal necessity or for payment antecedent debt and even after sale has taken place, had the father as Manager incurred the debt for the benefit of the joint family. If the debt is alone to be held as not binding, it should be shown non existence of immoral character of it. 16. If the debt is alone to be held as not binding, it should be shown non existence of immoral character of it. 16. In view of the above observations of this Court, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioners woefully failed to establish that their father incurred debt for his own purpose and not for the welfare of the family and that it was tainted with illegality and immorality. It is also deducible from the evidence available on record, that the debt was obtained for legal necessity. 17. In the light of the above said discussions, this Court does not find any merits in the petition which suffers dismissal. The orders passed by the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmities. 18. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.