Judgement PRATAP KUMAR RAY, J. :- Heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 2. Challenging the order dated 20th September, 2007 passed by the Learned Trial Judge in W.P. No. 2173 of 2004 allowing the application being G.A. No. 3560 of 2006 for amendment of the writ application whereby amendment was sought for seeking declaration of the Court that Section 192 of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is ultra vires, this application has been preferred by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. There is a delay in preferring this appeal for about 118 days. We are considering the averments made in paragraph 5 assigning the reason for such delay which is set out below : "5. That after the said Judgment and Order dated September 20, 2007 was passed, the Law Department of the KMC intimated the concerned department of the KMC about such order and the concerned department, in turn, intimated the appropriate and higher authority of the KMC regarding the same. The appropriate and higher authority asked the Law Department of the KMC through the concerned department to take opinion of Senior Counsel, specially when the Constitutionality of Section 192 of the KMC Act, 1980 is already settled before this Hon'ble Court. Upon obtaining Senior Counsel's opinion the direction was issued to obtain a certified copy of the order. Thereafter the appropriate and higher authority of the KMC took decision on the same. The appropriate and higher authority also asked the Law Department regarding the nature of the matter and the Law Department suggested that the matter involves a serious question of law. The Law Department also applied for the certified copy on February 8, 2008 and the Certified Copy was delivered on February 14, 2008. Thereafter, the certified copy was sent to the Junior Counsel to draw the Memorandum of Appeal and Application and thereafter the same was sent to the Ld. Senior Counsel for settling the appeal and the appeal was filed on 21-2-2008. However, in this process there has been delay of 118 days which was beyond the control of the petitioners and the same is required to be condoned." 3. This application has been opposed by the writ petitioners/respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein in paragraph 10 stand as taken by the writ petitioners/ respondents is to this effect : "10. However, in this process there has been delay of 118 days which was beyond the control of the petitioners and the same is required to be condoned." 3. This application has been opposed by the writ petitioners/respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein in paragraph 10 stand as taken by the writ petitioners/ respondents is to this effect : "10. With reference to the statements and/or contentions made in paragraph 5 of the said application, save and except what are the matters of records I deny and dispute the statements and/or contentions made therein. In reply thereto I further state that the points raised by the writ petitioners as per amended writ petition in respect of the arbitrariness, unreasonableness and illegality in certain provisions of Section 192 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 cannot be said to have finally been decided by the Hon'ble Court as has been wrongly alleged. Further, in respect of the period since the date of order dated 20th September, 2007 till the date of applying for certified copy on February 8, 2008, the appellants have utterly and deliberately failed to explain the every day delay even in filing the application for certified copy and thereby have failed to take a common and diligent step for fulfilling the requirements of filing an appeal. Furthermore under any stretch of imagination it can be said that the Law Department of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and the concerned Department are at a very far away distance but are in the same premises of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and furthermore it was the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ashok Das Adhikary himself who appeared on behalf of the Corporation in the case and as such for his opinion to decide the appeal it cannot be expected to take about four months or more time. In such circumstances, the appellants have failed to explain day to day and/or every day's delay in filing appeal on 21-2-2008 and as such their explanation of delay given in the said paragraph under reference may kindly be considered to be no explanation for condonation of the delay of 118 days and on this ground alone the said application is liable to be and may please be dismissed." 4. The learned Advocate for the appellants seeking condonation of delay has referred the judgment passed in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222 and the judgment passed in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. I. Chandrasekhara Reddy, reported in 1998 (7) SCC 141 : AIR 1998 SC 3311 . While justifying the reason for such delay the learned Advocate for the appellants has touched the merit of the matter by submitting that the impugned order under appeal is not sustainable for the reason that once the vires of Section 192 of the said Act has been declared as intra vires by the judgment delivered by Manoranjan Mallick, J. (as His Lordship then was) reported in AIR 1998 Cal 104 (sic) there is no scope to agitate that point further seeking amendment of writ application to insert the point of ultra vires of Section 192 of the said Act. In support of such contention, it has been contended that the Apex Court has also refused to entertain any argument on ultra vires point of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act on the logic that earlier the Apex Court declared the said provision as intra vires and reference has been made to the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shambhunath Mukherji, reported in AIR 1978 SC 8 , a judgment of three Judges' Bench. It has been further urged that the Judgment of Coordinate Bench namely, a Judgment delivered by Manoranjan Mallick, J. (as His Lordship then was) is a binding judgment upon the learned single Judge and as such amendment application ought to have been rejected in view of the settled law in the field. In support of such contention, reliance has been placed to the judgment of Ahamed Hossain Sk. v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2001 (2) CHN 762 , a judgment of Full Bench. The learned Advocate for the appellants has further urged that Section 192 of the said Act was considered about its applicability on the situations in terms of the statutory provision by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case Surendra Kumar Jalan v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 2003 (1) CHN 146 : ( AIR 2002 Cal 237 ). 5. 5. On the other hand, learned Advocate for the respondents/writ petitioners has submitted before us that the judgments as relied upon have no applicability for the simple reason that the learned Trial Judge by impugned order under appeal simply has allowed the amendment only which does not mean that the point that has now been urged by the learned Advocate for the appellants could not be thrashed at the time of final hearing and for that reason amendment cannot be said as bad in law. 6. Having regard to the rival contention of the parties the only question involved to consider the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is as to whether sufficiency of cause has been satisfied and whether any prejudice has been caused to the other side. Paragraph 5 is the only paragraph of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act wherein the reason has been assigned. On a bare reading of the said paragraph, it appears that though the order was passed on 20th September, 2007 but application for certified copy of the said order was filed only on 8th February, 2008 and certified copy was delivered on 14th February, 2008. It is contended in paragraph 5 of the application that the concerned Law Department referred the matter to the Higher Authority of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and thereby opinion of a Senior Counsel was sought for and ultimately as per direction of the Senior Counsel application for certified copy was filed. Nowhere it is mentioned who is the Higher Authority of the KMC than the Law Department dealing with the matter. The name of the Senior Counsel has also not been mentioned and the date when the Senior Counsel opined to prefer an appeal has also not been mentioned. It appears that there is no explanation of the delay for the period from 20th September, 2008 till the date of filing of the application for certified copy on 8th February, 2008 by giving the details of the different steps as were taken by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation to prefer an appeal. It is true that day- to-day explanation is not necessary. It is also true that sufficiency of reason must be there, otherwise the statute Limitation Act will have no meaning. It is true that day- to-day explanation is not necessary. It is also true that sufficiency of reason must be there, otherwise the statute Limitation Act will have no meaning. It is also equally true that door of the Court should not be closed on the technical ground of limitation but that does not mean that there will be a go-by of the time limit and entire statutory provision of the Limitation Act, should be made ineffective. Court is not unmindful of the judgment of the Apex Court regarding condonation of delay. In an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Apex Court held that for substantive justice, the technicality of the Limitation Act should not be bar and application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be allowed. It has been decided by the Apex Court that it should be construed in pragmatic and justice oriented approach in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandramoni, reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1623 ) wherein as many as earlier 17 cases of the Apex Court have been considered and dealt with. The Apex Court has settled the legal position that when there is an arguable case made out technicality of time limit should not be an embargo to condone the delay. Reliance may be placed to the judgments passed in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok A. O., reported in 2005 (3) SCC 752 : ( AIR 2005 SC 2191 ) and in the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu v. Gobardhan Sao, reported in 2002 (3) SCC 195 : ( AIR 2002 SC 1201 ). It is also the mandate of the Apex Court that while allowing any application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Court must record its satisfaction that sufficient cause has been properly pleaded and those are reasonable. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case of D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala, reported in 2007 (2) SCC 322 : ( AIR 2007 SC 2624 ). From the aforesaid views expressed by the Apex Court, it appears that sufficiency of cause for condoning the delay is the sine qua non of allowing any application. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case of D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State of Kerala, reported in 2007 (2) SCC 322 : ( AIR 2007 SC 2624 ). From the aforesaid views expressed by the Apex Court, it appears that sufficiency of cause for condoning the delay is the sine qua non of allowing any application. On the basis of the pleading as made in paragraph 5 it appears that there is no details of the different dates as would answer the bona fide intention of the appellant to move this Court assailing the order by detailing the sequence of different dates right from the passing of the order till the date of filing of the appeal. Only reason has been assigned that the Law Department consulted the Higher Authority though the name of the Higher Authority has not been mentioned. Thereafter, the Higher Authority consulted the Senior Counsel though the name of the Senior Counsel has also not been mentioned and thereby an application for certified copy has been filed. There is no particulars of the date when the Law Department consulted the Higher Authority as also the date when the Higher Authority informed the Senior Counsel to consult the matter and also there is no particular, date about the opinion of such senior counsel advising the Corporation to prefer an appeal. 7. Considering the pleadings, we are of the view that no sufficient cause has been mentioned for our consideration and appreciation of the matter to condone the delay of 118 days. Even on merit as has been urged by submitting that once the ultra vires point has been considered by learned single Judge of this Court there is no scope to challenge the said Act as ultra vires and as such amendment application ought to have been rejected, we are of the considered opinion that it has also no merit for our consideration. Allowing of amendment application does not mean that Court declared the Act as ultra vires but it only means that issue to be considered which has been categorically observed by the learned Trial Judge in the order by observing that at the time of final hearing Court may consider that there was no necessity for reconsideration of point as already considered by another learned single Judge declaring the Section 192 of the said Act as intra vires. 8. 8. Having regard to such state of affairs, we are of the view that the judgment of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) as referred to by the learned Advocate for the appellants has no applicability in the instant case as in that case at the time of final hearing the point was urged for consideration by the Apex Court about ultra vires of Section which earlier was considered and settled by the Apex Court. That was not a case for amendment of any application but that was a case of consideration of any point at the final time of argument for adjudication by the Court. Hence, the same has no applicability at the present moment which, however, may be argued at the time of final hearing of the writ application. The judgment of N. Balakrishnan (supra) relates to the principle of Rule of Limitation. The views expressed by the Apex Court is about the purpose of Limitation Act by holding that the Law of Limitation fixes the life span for legal remedy for its redressal by approaching the Court within the time limit to resist the dilatory tactics of the respective parties by keeping the litigation pending. It has been accordingly observed by the Apex Court in that case that unending period of limitation may create uncertainty and consequential anarchy and Law of Limitation accordingly is founded on public policy. The views expressed by the Apex Court is a settled principle of law and the jurisprudential concept as prescribed under the Limitation Act has been dealt with. This case will not help us to decide the issue raised in the present application. The other case as relied upon is I. Chandrasekhara Reddy (supra) wherein the delay in preferring the appeal was considered in the angle of merit of the matter. The Apex Court therein held that as huge amount of the public money was involved which was a case arose out of arbitration proceedings, the same was a fit case of condoning the delay. Factually in our case it has no applicability. It is settled law that the ratio decidendi of the judgment is a binding precedent when the question of law is involved and the factual matrix as grounded therein both are identical with reference to the other case. Factually in our case it has no applicability. It is settled law that the ratio decidendi of the judgment is a binding precedent when the question of law is involved and the factual matrix as grounded therein both are identical with reference to the other case. It is also settled proposition in the law that even change of a single word of factual matrix may result in different conclusion in between the two judgments. Reliance may be placed in the case of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 , a judgment of three Judges' Bench. 9. Applying those principle, the judgment as referred to by the learned Advocate for the appellants will not help us to resolve the present issue involved in this case. Here in this case the Court allowed the amendment application relating to ultra vires ground of a particular Section though that particular Section was considered by another learned single Judge of this Court in another proceeding whereby it was declared that the Section was not ultra vires. By amendment of a writ application only the pleading has been amended with grounds and prayers thereof but it does not mean that Court has allowed the final prayer holding particular Section as ultra vires. For distinguishing the earlier judgment of this Court, the point of consideration of that matter has been kept open for decision consciously by the learned Trial Judge as it appears from the finding which reads such : "Merely because the constitutional validity of Section 192 of the said Act has been upheld by this Court cannot also be a valid ground for not allowing the amendment, for, in the event this Court is ultimately convinced that the decision does not require reconsideration, it may concur with it and dismiss the petition." 10. By allowing amendment application to agitate the vires of Section 192 of the said Act, the Court practically has kept all the issues open for adjudication at the time of final hearing and by allowing the amendment the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way as because a legal question has been thrashed out in the amendment application for consideration by the Court. The point that once a judgment has been delivered by another learned single Judge on Section 192 of the said Act by not declaring it ultra vires has a binding effect upon another Co-ordinate Bench, is a point which is premature at this stage. 11. Considering all issues of the matter we do not find any merit in this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay and we are not also satisfied as to the sufficiency of the reasons from the pleadings as made in paragraph 5 as already quoted. The application, accordingly, stands dismissed. 12. Since the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been dismissed it is deemed that there is no existence of the appeal and accordingly, the appeal and stay application both stand dismissed. 13. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order be made available to the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all requisite formalities. 14. MANIK MOHAN SARKAR, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.