JUDGMENT: BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. (1) THIS first appeal is at the instance of a claimant in the proceedings under the Workmens Compensation Act and is directed against an award dated 5th may, 2000 passed by the learned Commissioner, Workmens Compensation, second Court, West Bengal, in Claim Case No. 728 of 1994, thereby rejecting the application filed by the appellant. (2) THE case made out by the appellant in the application claiming compensation may be summed up thus: (a) One Moni Mohan Biswas, since deceased, the husband of the appellant, was a Donkey/greaser, CDC No. 20031, a workman, employed by the respondent, received personal injury by an accident on 18th day of April, 1991, arising out of and in course of his employment, resulting in his death on 23rd day of August, 1992. (b) The cause of the injury was that while the deceased was working under the respondent in the vessel, named. Ex-MV "vishva Pankaj", due to the strenuous nature of the duty, he suddenly became sick and fell down on the ship at Bombay Port, causing serious injury in his chest. After the said accident, he was hospitalised at St. George Hospital, Bombay and thereafter, was transferred to May Flower Nursing Home, Calcutta, for further treatment, and ultimately, was declared permanently unfit for sea-service by the respondent on 3rd September, 1991. Lastly, he expired on 23rd August, 1992 due to the said accident. (c) The monthly wages of the deceased varied between Rs. 4,600/- and rs. 4,700/ -. The applicant, accordingly, was entitled to receive a lump sum payment of Rs. 2,94,367/- (Death Compensation as per N. M. B. Agreement, 1992). The application was contested by the respondent by filing written statement and the defence taken by the respondent may be summarised thus: (i) The respondent was not an employee in the Shipping Corporation of india. He only served for a particular period under the article of agreement and at the time of his death, he had no connection whatsoever with the Shipping Corporation of India Limited. (ii)The application was barred by limitation and the ground taken for condonation of delay was not true. (iii)It appeared from the record that on April 18, 1991, the deceased suffered from myocardial infarction and he was properly treated at bombay and thereafter, at Calcutta. Subsequently, on 3rd September, 1991, he was declared unfit for sea-service. (ii)The application was barred by limitation and the ground taken for condonation of delay was not true. (iii)It appeared from the record that on April 18, 1991, the deceased suffered from myocardial infarction and he was properly treated at bombay and thereafter, at Calcutta. Subsequently, on 3rd September, 1991, he was declared unfit for sea-service. Thereafter, on 23rd August, 1992, when he was not under the employment of the Shipping corporation of India, he died due to cardio respiratory trouble, which in no way, can be attributed to any injury during his employment. (3) AT the time of hearing, the appellant gave evidence in support of her claim, while one Gunendra Nath Ghosh, an Assistant Manager attached to the shipping Corporation of India, deposed in opposing the claim of the appellant. (4) THE learned Commissioner, by the award impugned herein, dismissed the claim-application on the ground that there was no material to show that there was any accident arising out of the employment and it appeared that the deceased died long after the termination of his service. The learned commissioner, however, found that the appellant had made out sufficient cause for not filing the application within the period of limitation. (5) BEING dissatisfied, the claimant has come up with the present appeal. Mr Roy, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, laboriously contended before us that it was apparent from the materials on record that due to strenuous work of a Donkey/greaser, the employee had fallen on the floor of the ship resulting in a heart attack. According to Mr Roy, the learned Commissioner totally overlooked the fact that the exhausting nature of the duty of a Donkey/greaser is the cause of the death of the employee, which arose out of his employment. (6) IN support of his contention, Mr Roy relied upon a decision of a Division bench of this Court in the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Kasturibai Pati, reported in 2002 ACJ 1898 and that of Kerala High Court, in the case of Chief Secretary, State of Kerala and Anr. Vs Ramaniamma and Anr reported in 1999 ACJ 1226. Vs Ramaniamma and Anr reported in 1999 ACJ 1226. (7) MR Bhattacharya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has opposed the aforesaid submission of Mr Roy and has contended that it has been clearly established from the materials on record that the employee had a heart attack for which he was adequately treated at the cost of the employer and long thereafter, even after the termination of his service, he breathed his last and, therefore, the widow of the employee was not entitled to claim any compensation for the said death. (8) THEREFORE, the question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether the learned Commissioner committed any substantial error of law in dismissing the claim-application in the facts and circumstances of the case. (9) IN order to attract the provision of payment of compensation under the workmens Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for death, it is necessary that there must be a personal injury caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment resulting in death as provided in Section 3 of the Act. (10) IN the case before us, it has appeared from the evidence on record that on 18th April, 1991, the workman, while he was working in the ship, all of a sudden, started perspiring profusely and felt pain in the middle of his chest. He was immediately sent to St. George Hospital, Bombay, where the illness was diagnosed to be Myocardial infarction. He was treated in the said Hospital for some days and subsequently, he was sent to Calcutta and was admitted in May flower Nursing Home. It further appears that the employer declared him unfit for the sea-service on September 3, 1991 in view of his heart trouble and thereafter, on August 23, 1992, he died due to such heart ailment. (11) IT is true that no material has been placed before the Court showing that there was any accident in the ship on April 18, 1991 nor was there any evidence of apparent injury on the body of the employee. (11) IT is true that no material has been placed before the Court showing that there was any accident in the ship on April 18, 1991 nor was there any evidence of apparent injury on the body of the employee. If an employee, in course of his employment, simply suffers a heart attack, that fact by itself, cannot be a ground for getting compensation in terms of Section 3 of the Act unless such heart attack is the outcome of an accident arising out of or in course of his employment. (12) IN this connection, we may profitably refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Jyothi Ademma vs. Plant engineer, Nellore and Anr. reported in A.I.R. 2006 SC 2830, in dealing with a case of heart attack during employment: "under Section 3 (1) it has to be established that there was some causal connection between the death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as natural result of the disease which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear of the employment no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death, or if the death was due not only to the disease but also the disease coupled with the employment, then it can be said that the death arose out of the employment and the employer would be liable. " (13) IN the case before us, it is not the case of the employer that the workman was previously suffering from any heart disease. According to Section 98 of the merchant Shipping Act, 1958, there is no scope of employing a medically unfit person in the employment of the ship and once a seaman is found to be medically unfit to perform the nature of duties he is entrusted with, the employer has a duty to declare him as unfit for the job. In this case, after the workman had a heart attack, he was declared unfit. Therefore, we can reasonably presume that he had no heart ailment prior to the April 18, 1991, the date of heart attack; otherwise, the employer would not permit him to do the job in question. In this case, after the workman had a heart attack, he was declared unfit. Therefore, we can reasonably presume that he had no heart ailment prior to the April 18, 1991, the date of heart attack; otherwise, the employer would not permit him to do the job in question. (14) IT has further been established that the nature of job of a donkey/greaser is a strenuous job and for that reason, after the illness had been discovered, he was never allowed to join and ultimately, declared unfit for the job. (15) THEREFORE, we can safely conclude that the employee not having any prior heart ailment and he having been required to do the tiring job of a donkey/greaser, "the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death" and "the death was due not only to the disease but also the disease coupled with the employment" even if he had any previous heart disease at all and in that situation, the employer was liable to pay compensation as laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned case. In that particular case before the Supreme Court, the workman was suffering from heart ailment and it was further established that his duty was only to switch on and switch off machineries which was not at all strenuous job and for that reason, by applying the aforesaid test, the Supreme Court held that the death had no connection with his employment; in the case before us, the workman was found to have no previous ailment and that is why he was entrusted with the job but the moment he was found to have heart attack, he was declared unfit in view of the tediousness of the job and thus, the employment is the contributory cause of or at least, has accelerated the death. (16) WE also do not find any substance in the contention of the employer that as at the time of death, the deceased was not an employee of the Shipping corporation of India, it had no liability. The law does not require that at the time of death, the victim must be in the roll of employment. (16) WE also do not find any substance in the contention of the employer that as at the time of death, the deceased was not an employee of the Shipping corporation of India, it had no liability. The law does not require that at the time of death, the victim must be in the roll of employment. All that is necessary is that the accident must be in course of and arising out of the employment, which is the contributory cause or which has, at least, accelerated the death of the workman and the claim-application, must be presented within the period of limitation; if, however, the same is filed beyond the period of limitation, the delay must be satisfactorily explained. In this case, the learned Commissioner has condoned the delay being satisfied with the explanation given by the applicant and the employer has not challenged such finding before us. Even if the same had been challenged, there was no scope of interference with the finding of the commissioner in this appeal where we can interfere only in case of substantial error of law committed by the learned Commissioner. (17) THE finding of the learned Commissioner on the question of condonation is quite reasonable and, at any rate, cannot be branded as a perverse finding nor is such finding based on no evidence. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we find that the learned Commissioner while dismissing the claim of the appellant did not properly construe the meaning of the phrase "accident arising out of and in course of employment" in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Ademma (supra), which amounted to substantial error of law and accordingly, we set aside the order impugned. (18) THERE is no dispute that the monthly wages of the deceased varied between Rs. 4,600/- and Rs. 4,700/-at the time of accident. The applicant, accordingly, is entitled to receive a lump sum payment of Rs. 2,94,367/-as death compensation as per N. M. B. Agreement, 1992. (19) WE, accordingly, allow this appeal and direct the respondent to pay rs. 2,94,367/-as death compensation with interest from the date of filing the application at the rate of 12% per annum till December 31, 1999 and thereafter at the rate of 8% per annum till the actual payment. The amount be paid within two months from today. (19) WE, accordingly, allow this appeal and direct the respondent to pay rs. 2,94,367/-as death compensation with interest from the date of filing the application at the rate of 12% per annum till December 31, 1999 and thereafter at the rate of 8% per annum till the actual payment. The amount be paid within two months from today. In the facts and circumstances, there will be however, no order as to costs.