JUDGMENT : A.K. Parichha, J. - Appellants along with Respondent No. 8 instituted Title Suit No. 92 of 1996 in the Court of Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri for declaration of title over the suit schedule land, confirmation of possession or in the alternative recovery of possession and for permanent injunction against Defendant No. 1 (present Respondent No. 1) impleading the other Respondents as proforma Defendants. Plaintiffs specifically pleaded that they are the owner in possession of the suit land, but the Defendant No. 1, who has no manner of right, title, interest or possession over the suit land is threatening to throw out the Plaintiffs from the suit land and occupy the same. Defendant Nos. 2 to 7 were set ex parte, but Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement, pleading, inter alia that the suit property has not been properly valued and that the Trial Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. Defendant No. 1 also pleaded that he purchased part of the suit plot in 1948 and came into possession of that land as owner thereof. He also claimed that he is in exclusive possession of the suit property openly, uninterruptedly and has otherwise derived title over the same by way of adverse possession. The Trial Court after considering the evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have right, title, and interest over the suit land, there was family partition in respect of the suit land, the Plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land and the suit has not been undervalued and the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. With such finding the Trial Court decreed the suit declaring the right, title and interest of the Plaintiffs over the suit land and confirming their possession over the same. The Court also permanently injuncted Defendant No. 1 from causing any disturbance in the possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit land. Defendant No. 1 challenged the said Judgment and decree in T.A. No. 2/60 of 2001/1999.
The Court also permanently injuncted Defendant No. 1 from causing any disturbance in the possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit land. Defendant No. 1 challenged the said Judgment and decree in T.A. No. 2/60 of 2001/1999. The lower Appellate Court on re-assessment of the evidence and the legal provisions held that the suit is undervalued, and that the Trial Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and accordingly, set aside the Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and directed for return of the plaint to the Plaintiffs for presentation of the same in the proper Court. That Judgment and decree of the Learned 1st Appellate Court is under challenge in this appeal. 2. The following substantial question of law was formulated for consideration in this appeal. Whether the ruling of the first Appellate Court that the suit is under-valued and was beyond the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, is legally acceptable? 2. Mr. S. Dash, Learned Counsel on behalf of M/s. S.P. Mishra and associates, Counsels for the Appellants stated that the Plaintiffs' suit being one for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and in the alternative recovery of possession coupled with the prayer for permanent injunction in respect of the suit land, the provision of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act was applicable and the Plaintiffs had the option to value their suit according to their choice. He stated that valuation of the suit and payment of Court fees thereon, is a matter between the Plaintiffs and the Court and the Defendants could not have any say in that matter. In support of his contention, he cited the cases of Gopal Chandra Jena v. Sri Sri Laxmi Narayan Bije Maura Alava and Anr. 1989 (II) OLR 409 , Nandakishore Nayak and Others Vs. State of Orissa and Others, and S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, . 3. Mr. P.K. Satpathy, Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, while supporting the impugned Judgment stated that no doubt the suit for declaration of title with consequential relief is covered u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and the Plaintiffs have the option to value their suit, but they could not be allowed to place an arbitrary valuation.
P.K. Satpathy, Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, while supporting the impugned Judgment stated that no doubt the suit for declaration of title with consequential relief is covered u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and the Plaintiffs have the option to value their suit, but they could not be allowed to place an arbitrary valuation. He stated that in such a suit the valuation put by the Plaintiffs should have some relation with the real market value of the property at the time of institution of the suit. In support of this argument, he relied on the gases of Sridhar Kumar Das ' Dr. S.C. Das ' Srihari Kumar Das v. Satish Ch. Giri and Ors. 56 (1983) CLT 475, Jhara Padhanuni v. Bhagarathi Padhan and Ors. 1976 ILR 707 and Indrajit Behera and Another Vs. Bhaja Meher and Another, . 4. In the case of Sathappa Chettiar (supra) analyzing the valuation given by the Plaintiff and it's effect on the jurisdiction of the Court, the Apex Court made the following observation. The computation of Court-fees in suits falling u/s 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act depends upon the valuation that the Plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the Plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of Court-fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for Court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for Court-fees stated by the Plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the Plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purpose of Court-fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. In the case of Gopal Chandra Jena (supra), after referring to the case of Sathappa Chettiar (supra), this Court observed as follows: While the Plaintiffs are free to put their own valuation on the relief claimed by them, yet it is the consensus of law that the valuation cannot be arbitrary so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of any particular Court but that the valuation has to be reasonable and based upon some nexus or criteria though it need not necessarily be the market value.
X x x Then concurring with the ratio laid down by the Patna High Court in the case of Krishna Prasanna Roy and Another Vs. Satyabati Roy and Others, the Court also observed that though the Court has power to revise the valuation of the plaint in appropriate cases, yet it does not mean that merely because the value could be higher than that put by the Plaintiff, the valuation must necessarily be revised and that if there is some rational indicating reasonableness of the value stated by the Plaintiffs, which cannot be said to be capricious or arbitrary, the Court will refuse to revise and rather, it cannot revise the same. In the case of Jhara Padhanuni (supra), the suit was for declaration of title and permanent injunction. The suit was challenged on the ground of under-valuation. After taking note of several previous decisions including the cases of Sathappa Chettiar (supra), Mt. Rupia Vs. Bhatu Mahton and Others Motiram v. Daulat AIR 1939 Nag 50, The Emperor v. Raila Ram AIR 1946 Lah 94 the Division Bench ruled that according to Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed for, Court fees are to be paid according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal and in all such suits, the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought and the Court would ordinarily accept the valuation put by the Plaintiff in respect of the relief claimed, but that would not necessarily meant that the Court is bound by the valuation put by the Plaintiff even if done arbitrarily. It was clarified that the Plaintiff is not at liberty to put any arbitrary valuation and he is to put the valuation honestly and the valuation should have some nexus with the real market value of the property at the time of institution of the suit. In the case of Indrajit Behera and Anr. (supra), the same principle was reiterated.
It was clarified that the Plaintiff is not at liberty to put any arbitrary valuation and he is to put the valuation honestly and the valuation should have some nexus with the real market value of the property at the time of institution of the suit. In the case of Indrajit Behera and Anr. (supra), the same principle was reiterated. In the case of Sudhir Kumar Das (supra), taking note of the earlier decisions, this Court observed that in a suit covered u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the Plaintiff is no doubt entitled to put the valuation at his option, but he cannot be allowed to place arbitrary valuation on the relief and that the valuation put by the Plaintiff should have some relation with the real market value of the property at the time of institution of the suit. In that case, the Plaintiff had put the valuation noted in the sale deed, which had been executed 16 years prior to institution of the suit. The Court said that the valuation noted in the sale deeds 16 years ago captiot be accepted as proper criteria for valuation of the suit property. 5. On a close and composite reading of the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act along with the above noted case laws, one can comfortably infer that in a suit for declaration coupled with the consequential reliefs, the Plaintiff as per the provisions of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act can value the suit at his option, but such valuation cannot be arbitrary and must have some relation with the real market value of the property at the time of institution of the suit. 7. In the present case, the Plaintiffs valued the suit at Rs. 2,000 for relief ordeclaration of right, title and possession and at Rs. 100/- for the relief of permanent injunction. The basis of this valuation is the consideration price noted in sale deed, Ext.1, wherein Ac.0.1 Idea of land had been purchased in the year 1946 for Rs. 2,000/-. The Defendants produced sale deeds, Ext.B to F, which were marked as exhibits without objection. These documents reveal that the market value of the lands in the area where the suit land situates was substantially high at or near the time of filing of the suit.
2,000/-. The Defendants produced sale deeds, Ext.B to F, which were marked as exhibits without objection. These documents reveal that the market value of the lands in the area where the suit land situates was substantially high at or near the time of filing of the suit. Taking note of such market value of the lands, the first Appellate Court inferred that the valuation given by the Plaintiff in the suit was arbitrary and shockingly low and had no nexus with the market value of the lands of the area prevailing at the time of institution of the suit. The Court also concluded that if the suit of the Plaintiff is reasonable and properly valued, it would be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Trial Court and accordingly held that the Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was without jurisdiction. Consequently, the first Appellate Court set aside the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court and directed for return of the plaint to the Plaintiffs for presentation in proper Court having jurisdiction after putting proper valuation of the suit. This approach of the 1st Appellate Court is very much in tune with the ratio laid down in the cases of Jhara Padhanuni (supra), Sridhar Kumar Das (supra) as well as Gopal Ch. Jena (supra). Therefore, the substantial question of law is answered against the Appellant. Consequently the appeal is dismissed on contest, but in the peculiar circumstances without any cost.