Judgment : The petitioner, has challenged the order of the Director of Teacher Education, Research and Training, Chennai, the second respondent herein dated 010. 1996 and sought for a direction to the second respondent to declare that Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden Teachers Certificate (Secondary Grade) is equivalent to that of Pre-School Teacher Training Course Certificate and to consider the petitioner for appointment as Secondary Grade Assistant, according to the Employment Exchange Seniority with all consequential benefits. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that after completing Higher Secondary Education, the petitioner underwent Kinder Garden Teacher Training Course in Brindavan Pre-Primary Teacher Training School, Mylapore, Chennai. The duration of the course is two years. After completion of the course, the petitioner appeared in the public examination conducted by the Education Department and passed the said examination. The Tamil Nadu Education Department also issued Teachers Training Certificate of Secondary Grade in Kinder Garden. The subjects taught in the above course during 1987-1989 were classified into three groups. .(a) group of three papers .(b) group of one paper and .(c) group of four papers. .3. The petitioner has submitted that the course was introduced by the Government for the purpose of giving training to the Teachers, to acquire special knowledge, to handle L.K.G, U.K.G and First standard students. After 1989, the Department of Education, changed the nomenclature of course as Pre-School Teacher Training Course. After completion of the aforesaid course, a certificate called Pre-School Teacher Training Course Certificate would be issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu viz., the Department of Government Examination. Hoping that she would be provided with appropriate posting by the Department of Education, the petitioner requested the Employment Exchange, Pudukottai to register her name. The District Employment Exchange, entertained a doubt as to whether the certificate possessed by the petitioner is equivalent to other certificates, so that her name could be sponsored along with other candidates for the post of Secondary Grade Teachers, which was directed to be filled up according to seniority in the Employment Exchange. The District Employment Exchange, entertained a doubt as to whether the certificate possessed by the petitioner is equivalent to other certificates, so that her name could be sponsored along with other candidates for the post of Secondary Grade Teachers, which was directed to be filled up according to seniority in the Employment Exchange. Since no orders were passed on the clarification sought for by the District Employment Exchange, Pudukottai, the petitioner was constrained to file Original Application in O.A.No.6037 of 1996 in which, the Tribunal directed the Director of Teacher Education, Research and Training, Madras to pass orders, as to whether the certificate possessed by the petitioner was equivalent to that of Pre-School Secondary Grade Teacher Training Certificate. Pursuant to the directions, the Head of the Department, Teacher Education has rejected the request of the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 4. The Directorate of Teacher Education, Research and Training, Chennai in their counter affidavit, have submitted that both in the Madras Educational Rules as well as in Tamil Nadu Private Schools Regulation Act, 1973, it is stated that teachers, who have passed Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden School Leaving Certificate Examination of Secondary Grade, are eligible to handle standards 1 and 2 only. The department grant permission to conduct the above course because the Government had taken a decision to grant permission to the Private Managements to start Nursery Schools. In that schools, the Teachers, who had undergone the above course can be utilized and meet the manpower needs of the teaching personnel. Therefore, the Department had granted permission to the schools to conduct course of Pre-Primary Teacher Training Certificate Course. The respondents by furnishing the difference in the syllabus, curriculum pattern of examination etc., have contended that Pre-School Teacher Training Course Certificate is not equivalent to that of Diploma in Secondary Grade Teacher Training Course. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. .6. Pleadings disclose that as a policy decision, Government have permitted Private Managements to start Nursery Schools. Teachers, who had passed Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden School Leaving Certificate Examination of Secondary Grade, were permitted to handle standards 1 and 2 only. The syllabus, subject taught in the course pattern of examination of Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden Teachers Certificate (Secondary Grade) are entirely different. .6. Pleadings disclose that as a policy decision, Government have permitted Private Managements to start Nursery Schools. Teachers, who had passed Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden School Leaving Certificate Examination of Secondary Grade, were permitted to handle standards 1 and 2 only. The syllabus, subject taught in the course pattern of examination of Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden Teachers Certificate (Secondary Grade) are entirely different. The standard prescribed for Diploma in Teacher Training Course and the variation between the two courses stated in the counter affidavit is so apparent and under no such imagination, the qualification viz., Kinder Garden Teachers Certificate (Secondary Grade) can be called as equivalent for the purpose of recruitment to the post of Secondary Grade Teachers. The permission granted by the Government to start Pre-Primary Classes and to conduct examination for the benefit of young children of standards 1 and 2 cannot be taken advantage, by those who had completed only a Pre-Primary Teacher Training Course. It is well settled that while determining the equivalence of qualifications, the authorities in the field of education are the best judges and Court has no expertise to revert their opinion. 7. Some of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court on this aspect are as follows: (i) In University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 , a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 12 and 13, held as follows: "12. In our opinion, in coming to the conclusion that appellant. No. 2 did not satisfy the first qualification, the High Court is plainly in error. The judgment shows that the learned judges concentrated on the question as to whether a candidated obtaining 50 per cent marks could be said to have secured a high Second Class Degree, and if the relevant question had to be determined solely by reference to this aspect of the matter, the conclusion of the High Court would have been beyond reproach. But what the High Court has failed to notice is the fact that the first qualification consists of two parts -the first part is : a high Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University, and the second part is : its equivalent which is an equivalent qualification of a foreign University. But what the High Court has failed to notice is the fact that the first qualification consists of two parts -the first part is : a high Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University, and the second part is : its equivalent which is an equivalent qualification of a foreign University. The High Court does not appear to have considered the question as to whether it would be appropriate for the High Court to differ from the opinion of the Board when it was quite likely that the Board may have taken the view that the Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham University which appellant No. 2 had obtained, was equivalent to a high Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University. This aspect of the questions (sic) purely to an academic matter and courts would naturally, hesitate to express a definite opinion, particularly, when it appears that the Board of experts was satisfied that appellant No.2 fulfilled the first qualification. If only the attention of the High Court had been drawn to the equivalent furnished in the first qualification, we have no doubt that it would not have held that the Board had acted capriciously in expressing the opinion that appellant No. 2 satisfied all the qualifications, including the first qualification. As we have already observed though the High Court felt some difficulty, about the two remaining qualifications, the High Court has not rested its decision on any definite finding that these qualification also had not been satisfied. On reading the first qualification, the position appears to be very simple; but unfortunately, since the equivalent qualification specified by cl : (a) was apparently not brought to the notice of the High Court, it has failed to take that aspect of the matter into account. On that aspect of the matter, it may follow that the Masters Degree of the Durham University secured by appellant No. 2, would satisfy the first qualification and even the second. Besides, it appears that appellant No. 2 has to his credit published works which by themselves would satisfy the second qualification. Therefore, there is no doubt that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said to have secured a high Second Class Master Degree of on Indian University he did not satisfy the first qualification. Therefore, there is no doubt that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said to have secured a high Second Class Master Degree of on Indian University he did not satisfy the first qualification. It is plain that Masters Degree of the Durham University. which, appellant No. 2 has obtained, can be and must have been taken by the Board to be equivalent to a high Second Class Masters Degree of in Indian University, and that means the first qualification is satisfied by appellant No. 2. That being so, we must hold that the High Court was in error in issuing a writ of quo warranto, quashing the appointment of appellant No.2. 13. Before we part with these appeals, however, reference must be made to two other matters. In dealing with the case presented before it by the respondent, the High Court has criticised the report made by the Board and has observed that the circumstances disclosed by the report made it difficult for the High Court to treat the recommendations made by the expert with the respect that they generally deserve. We are unable to see the point of criticism of the High Court in such academic matters. Boards of Appointments are nominated by the Universities and when recommendations made by them and the appointments following on them are challenged before courts, normally the courts should be slow to interfere with the opinions expressed by the experts. There is no allegation about malafides against the experts who constituted the present Board; and so, we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the courts generally can be. The criticism made by the High Court against the report made by the Board seems to suggest that the High Court thought that the Board was in the position of an executive authority, issuing an executive fiat, or was acting like a quasi-judicial tribunal, deciding disputes referred to it for its decision. In dealing with complaints made by citizens is regard to appointments made by academic bodies, like the Universities, such an approach would not be reasonable or appropriate. In dealing with complaints made by citizens is regard to appointments made by academic bodies, like the Universities, such an approach would not be reasonable or appropriate. In fact, in issuing the writ, the High Court has made certain observations which show that the High Court applied tests which would legitimately be applied in the case of writs of certiorari. In the judgment, it has been observed that the error in this case is undoubtedly a manifest error. That is a consideration which is more germane and relevant in a procedure for a writ of certiorari. What the High Court should have considered is whether the appointment made by the Chancellor had contravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should have shown due regard to the opinion expressed by the Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted. In this connection, the High Court has failed to notice one significant fact that when the Board considered the claims of the respective the Board clearly show that they considered the relevant factors carefully and applicants, it examined them very carefully and actually came to the conclusion that none of them deserved to be appointed a Professor. These recommendations made by ultimately came to the conclusion that appellant No. 2 should be recommended for the post of Reader. Therefore, we are satisfied that the criticism made by the High Court against the Board and its deliberations is not justified." (ii) In Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University reported in 1986 Supp. SCC 740, the Supreme Court held that it is for each universities to decide the question of equivalence of the examination and it would not be right for the Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the University relating to the academic question of equivalence because it is not a matter on which the Court possesses any expertise. The University is best fitted to decide whether any examination held by a University outside the State is equivalent to an examination held within the State having regard to the courses, the syllabus, the quality of teaching or instruction and the standard of examination. The University is best fitted to decide whether any examination held by a University outside the State is equivalent to an examination held within the State having regard to the courses, the syllabus, the quality of teaching or instruction and the standard of examination. (iii) The Supreme Court, while considering the scope and power of the Court to interfere with the decision of the Government or the Competent Authority in prescribing the minimum educational qualification for admission to a course and recognising certain educational qualification as equivalent or higher than the prescribed one, in the State of Rajasthan v. Lata Arun reported in 2002 (6) SCC 252 , at Paragraph 10, held as follows: "10. The points involved in the case are twofold: one relating to prescription of minimum educational qualification for admission to the course and the other relating to recognition of the Madhyama Certificate issued by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad as equivalent to or higher than +2 or 1st year of TDC for the purpose of admission. Both these points relate to matters in the realm of policy decision to be taken by the State Government or the authority vested with power under any statute. It is not for courts to determine whether a particular educational qualification possessed by a candidate should or should not be recognized as equivalent to the prescribed qualification in the case. That is not to say that such matters are not justiciable. In an appropriate case the court can examine whether the policy decision or the administrative order dealing with the matter is based on a fair, rational and reasonable ground; whether the decision has been taken on consideration of relevant aspects of the matter; whether exercise of the power is obtained with mala fide intention; whether the decision serves the purpose of giving proper training to the candidates admitted or it is based on irrelevant and irrational considerations or intended to benefit an individual or a group of candidates." (iv) This Court in R.Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2005 Mad. 278 , had an occasion to consider the non-recognition of M.S., degree awarded by BITS Pilani. 278 , had an occasion to consider the non-recognition of M.S., degree awarded by BITS Pilani. The Directorate of Technical Education, Chennai, by his impugned order, informed the lecturers working in various colleges with B.E./B.Tech degrees and who pursued M.S. Degree awarded by BITS Pilani, with the permission from their respective colleges, as not equivalent to M.E., degree awarded by the Tamil Nadu Universities. While testing the correctness of the orders of the Director of Technical Education, Chennai and following the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathurs case, this Court, at Paragraph 37, held as follows: "The above judgment of the Honourable Apex Court is not only the law of the land but also squarely applies to the case in hand and needless to mention that the petitioners cannot compel the respondents particularly the respondents 1, 2, 5 and 7 with such impositions that they should recognise the degree conferred by the BITS, Pilani for any purpose much less for the purpose of appointment/promotions/higher studies for doing Ph.D., etc. It is relevant to mention that no University or Deemed University or its graduates could compel for demand any other university to recognise the degrees of other universities. It aptly applies to the petitioners as well and therefore, no mention need be necessary that the petitioners have no case to offer. Hence the above writ petition becomes only liable to be dismissed." (v) In Bihar Public Service Commission and others v. Kamini and others reported in 2007 (5) SCC 519 , the Supreme Court considered a case, where, the candidate having B.Sc., Honors in Chemistry with Zoology and Botany was allowed to appear for the interview. Lateron, her candidature was rejected on the ground that she did not possess the qualification for the post, viz., B.Sc., Zoology. A learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, accepting the report of the Expert Committee, which stated that B.Sc. Honors in Chemistry with Zoology as ancillary subject is not equivalent to B.Sc., Degree in Zoology. The Division Bench of the Court reversed the decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court, following the Constitutional bench judgment in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao [ AIR 1965 SC 491 ], at Paragraph 8 of the judgment, held that, "It is well settled that in the field of education, a Court of law cannot act as an expert. The Division Bench of the Court reversed the decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court, following the Constitutional bench judgment in University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao [ AIR 1965 SC 491 ], at Paragraph 8 of the judgment, held that, "It is well settled that in the field of education, a Court of law cannot act as an expert. Normally, therefore, whether or not a student/candidate possesses requisite qualifications should better be left educational institutions. [vide University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, (1964) 4 SLR 576 : AIR 1965 SC 491 ] This is particularly so when it is supported by an Expert Committee." 8. The prayer to declare that Nursery/Montessory/Kinder Garden Teachers Certificate (Secondary Grade) is equivalent to that of Pre-School Teacher Training Course Certificate, is wholly misconceived, as Courts cannot be called upon to declare the equivalence of a course, with that of the other. As rightly contended by the respondents, Pre-School Teacher Training Course Certificate cannot be claimed as equivalent to Secondary Grade Teacher Training. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the writ petition. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for and hence, this writ petition is dismissed.