Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 418 (JHR)

Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State Of Jharkhand

2008-04-04

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body2008
JUDGMENT M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J. 1. Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, on being aggrieved by the order dated 31.7.2003 removing him from the service as Probationer Munsif, has filed this writ petition, seeking for quashing of the said order and for consequential direction to reinstate him with all consequential benefits. 2. The short facts are as follows: (A) The petitioner applied for the post of Munsif and consequently appeared in Pre-test, Main Test and interview conducted by the High Court. He was declared successful in the year 2001. Thereafter he attended the Orientation Course. On 21.5.2002, notification was issued by the Government of Jharkhand, appointing him as Probationer Munsif. On 23.5.2002, he was posted at Dhanbad by the notification issued by the High Court. On 4.6.2002. he assumed the charge as Probationer Munsif at Dhanbad. On 15.7.2002, he was conferred with the power of Judicial Magistrate 1st class. On 6.1.2003, he, acting as Judicial Magistrate 1st class, Dhanbad, passed an order discharging all the accused under Section 239, CrPC in G.R. No. 4698 of 1995 under Sections 406, 408, 420 and 120B. IPC without conducting trial. (B) A complaint from one Ram Kumar was received by the High Court on 4.3.2003, stating that the petitioner had discharged the accused persons despite rejection of revision application by the High Court earlier, for extraneous consideration. Thereupon the High Court called for the report from the District and Sessions Judge. On the basis of the direction, the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, sent a letter to the petitioner, directing him to offer his remarks to him (District and Sessions Judge). (C) Accordingly, remarks were sent. Thereafter, remarks and report along with confidential report were submitted by the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, before the High Court. On 28.4.2003, Honble Zonal Judge was pleased to refer the matter to the Standing Committee for further action. The matter was considered in the meeting of the Standing Committee held on 8.7.2003. After perusal of the remark and reports, the Standing Committee referred the matter to the Full Court for consideration as to whether the service of the petitioner was required or not. On 18.7.2003, the matter was considered in the meeting of the Full Court. After considering the report and performance of the Officer and quality of his Judgments, it was resolved that continuation of the service of the petitioner was no longer required. On 18.7.2003, the matter was considered in the meeting of the Full Court. After considering the report and performance of the Officer and quality of his Judgments, it was resolved that continuation of the service of the petitioner was no longer required. Accordingly the same was intimated to the Government. Then the Government, by the impugned order dated 31.7.2003, issued a notification removing the petitioner from the service in public interest with effect from 31.7.2003. Challenging the same, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit: The impugned order dated 31.7.2003 clearly makes it ex facie stigmatic and punitive. The order indicates that it was founded upon consideration of his activities that the service of the petitioner was no longer required in public interest. If an order is stigmatic and punitive and not simplicitor, enquiry under Article 311(2) of the Constitution is necessary. In this case, there is no enquiry by which opportunities have been given to the petitioner. Therefore, the order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Since the impugned order was founded on allegation, it is vitiated because no enquiry was conducted. Further ACR was prepared by the District and Sessions Judge with a view to removing the petitioner and the said ACR. which was not communicated, has been used against him. This is against law. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. The reply to the above submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-High Court in brief is as follows: The impugned order is neither stigmatic, nor punitive. Therefore, principles of natural justice has no application. Uncommunicated remarks in service records could be taken into consideration in the case of a probationer, while scrutinizing the suitability of the petitioner regarding continuation of his service. The case of the petitioner was referred by the Standing Committee to the Full Court for specific consideration and decision whether continuation of the service of the petitioner was required or not. Accordingly, the Full Court considered that his service was no longer required and as such, the impugned order has been passed in public interest and not by way of punishment. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would cite the following authorities: Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab . Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana . Accordingly, the Full Court considered that his service was no longer required and as such, the impugned order has been passed in public interest and not by way of punishment. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would cite the following authorities: Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab . Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana . Anup Jaiswal v. Government of India (1984) 2 SCC 3G9. Kamal Kishore Lakshmanan v. Pan American World Airways Inc. . Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences . Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar . V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab . Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. . 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent would cite the following authorities: High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha and Ors. . State of Punjab and Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh . 7. Elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, referring to the various observations made by the Supreme Court as well as High Court in those decisions. 8. The main question that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether the impugned order of removal of the petitioner is stigmatic and punitive so as to attract the applicability of the principles of natural justice in case of probationers without regular enquiry. 9. Before going into the above question, let us refer to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court on this aspect. The relevant observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the decisions cited by both the learned Counsel for the parties are as follows: Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab . Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of Inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object, no involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on any inquiry. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on any inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim protection... . Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana . It may be that in some cases the mere form does not indicate the exact nature of the result of the proceeding judged by its nature and its effects upon the probationer. To some extent Courts are bound to take into account what the incontrovertible evidence discloses. It is true that neither can be punished without a formal charge or enquiry but a less formal enquiry may be sufficient to determine whether a probationer, who has no fixed or fully formed right to continue in service, should be continued. On the facts found, the findings of the petitioners unsuitability to continue in service was rightly not interfered with. In the eye of law it is not a case of punishment but of termination of service simplicitor. State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji . Ordinarily and generally the rule laid down in most of the cases by this Court is that you have to look to the order on the face of it and find whether it casts any stigma on the Government servant. In such a case there is no presumption that the order is arbitrary or malafide unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the Government servant who challenges such an order. Anup Jaiswal v. Government of India . 12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. Anup Jaiswal v. Government of India . 12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee. Kamal Kishore Lakshmanan v. Pan American World Airways Inc. . 9. Loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and, therefore, this Court correctly held in Chandu Lal case [ that allegation of loss of confidence amounted to a stigma. ... High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha and Ors. . As regards a probationer, the law is well settled that he does not have a right to hold the post during the period of probation. The position of a probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has been substantively appointed on a post and has a right to hold that post. An order terminating the services of a probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Since a probationer has no right to hold the post on which he has been appointed on probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an order terminating his services is passed. The obligation to communicate the adverse material to a person before taking action against him on the basis of the said material is a facet of the principles of natural justice. But principles of natural justice have no application in the case of termination of the services of a probationer during the period of probation since he has no right to hold the post. But principles of natural justice have no application in the case of termination of the services of a probationer during the period of probation since he has no right to hold the post. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that there is an obligation to communicate the adverse material to a probationer before a decision is taken on the basis of the said material that he is not fit for being retained in service. Such material can be relied upon to show that such a decision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is not capricious. Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences . 31. Thus, it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the language or words employed in the order of termination of the probationer to Judge whether the words employed amount to a stigma or not. ... V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab . 7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences . One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination order has to be upheld. Generally speaking when a probationers appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationers appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. . A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationers appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. . If the form and language of the so-called order of termination simpliciter of a probationer clearly indicate that it is punitive in nature or/and it is stigmatic there may not be any need to go into the details of the background and surrounding circumstances in testing whether the order of termination is stmpliciter or punitive. In cases where the service of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simpliciter and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis and design to terminate the services of a probationer. In other words, the facade of the termination order may be simpliciter, but the real face behind it is to get rid of the services of a probationer on the basis of misconduct. In such cases it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination simpliciter to find out what in reality is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the services of a probationer. In that process it also becomes necessary to find out whether efforts were made to find out the suitability of the person to continue in service or he is in reality removed from service on the foundation of his misconduct. State of Punjab and Ors. v. Sukhwinder Singh . 8. Termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. v. Sukhwinder Singh . 8. Termination of service of a probationer during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment because the servant so appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to. The period of probation, therefore, furnishes a valuable opportunity to the master to closely observe the work of the probationer and by the time the period of probation expires to make up his mind whether to retain the servant by absorbing him in regular service or dispense with his service. Period of probation may vary from post to post or master to master and it is not obligatory on the master to prescribe a period of probation. It is always open to the employer to employ a person without putting him on probation. Power to put the employee on probation for watching his performance and the period during which the performance is to be observed is the prerogative of the employer. The Superior authorities of the departments have to take work from an employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued in service and made a permanent employee or not having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job. As mentioned earlier a probationer is on test and a temporary employee has no right to the post. If mere holding of an inquiry to ascertain the relevant facts for arriving at a decision on objective considerations whether to continue the employee in service or to make him permanent is treated as an inquiry "for the purpose of imposing punishment" and an order of discharge or termination of service as a result thereof "punitive in character", the fundamental difference between a probationer or a temporary employee and a permanent employee would be completely obliterated, which would be wholly wrong. 10. The perusal of the above decisions would make it clear that the important guidelines for consideration of the question posed in this case could be deduced as follows: (A) Before a probationer is confirmed, the authority concerned is under obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or he is suitable for the post. 10. The perusal of the above decisions would make it clear that the important guidelines for consideration of the question posed in this case could be deduced as follows: (A) Before a probationer is confirmed, the authority concerned is under obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer, the authority may come to the conclusion that the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. (B) The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer must result in dismissal or removal on any enquiry. In those cases, the authority may not hold a fullfledged inquiry and may discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without stigma at the time of termination of the probationer. (C) In cases where the services of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simplicitor and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis for taking a decision to terminate the services of the probationer. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (D) In some cases, it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination slmplicitor to find out what is the real background and what weighed the employer to terminate the services of the probationer. (E) A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. (F) The law is well settled as regards the probationer that he does not have the right to hold that post during the period of probation. The position of the probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has substantively appointed on a post. (F) The law is well settled as regards the probationer that he does not have the right to hold that post during the period of probation. The position of the probationer cannot be equated with that of an employee who has substantively appointed on a post. The order terminating the services of the probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. (G) Since a probationer has no right to hold the post on which he has been appointed on probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an order terminating his services is passed. The obligation to communicate the adverse materials to a person before taking action against him on the basis of the said materials is a facet of the principles of natural justice. But it is not possible to hold that there is an obligation to communicate the adverse materials to the probationer before a decision is taken on the basis of the said materials that he is not fit for being retained in service. Such material can be relied upon to show that such a decision not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. (H) Ordinarily the rule laid down in most of the cases that the Court has to look to the order on the face of it and find out whether it casts any stigma on the employee. The wordings in the impugned order does not cast any stigma in a particular case, then there is no presumption in that case that the order is arbitrary or malajide, unless a very strong case is made out and proved by the employee who challenges such an order that it is arbitrary and mala fide. (I) The tests to determine whether an order of termination is punitive or not are as follows: The Court has to see whether prior to the termination, there was (i) a full-scale formal enquiry; (ii) the sad enquiry conducted has gone into the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct; and (iii) the said enquiry culminated in a finding of guilt. Only if all three factors are present, the termination has to be held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Only if all three factors are present, the termination has to be held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. In other words, if any one of the three factors mentioned above is missing, the termination order has to be upheld. (J) When a probationers appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination a simple termination is not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes over and above unsuitability of the job. (K) The superior authorities of the Departments have to take work from the employee and they are the best people to judge whether an employee should be continued In service and made a permanent employee or not, having regard to this performance, conduct and overall suitability for the job, A probationer is on test and a temporary employee has not right to the post. Therefore, the employer has got a right to conduct preliminary enquiry to ascertain the relevant fact for arriving at a decision to continue the employee in service or not. This decision on the basis of the said enquiry is not punitive in character. 11. Bearing in mind the above principles, we have to deal with the question whether the impugned order is stigmatic or the decision taken is punitive. 12. First let us go through the English Translation of the impugned order dated 31.7.2003, which reads as follows: Government of Jharkhand Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha Department -Order- Ranchi - 31 July, 2003 Order No. 6/Stha,-022/2001Ka.-4348/ Considering the activities of Shri Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhanbad, it was found that his services are no longer required in public interest. Therefore, the State Government has decided to remove Shri Shrivastava from services with effect from the afternoon of 31.7.2003. Shri Srivastava would be entitled to payment of outstanding due salary etc. under Rule 95 of the Jharkhand Service Code. Therefore, the State Government has decided to remove Shri Shrivastava from services with effect from the afternoon of 31.7.2003. Shri Srivastava would be entitled to payment of outstanding due salary etc. under Rule 95 of the Jharkhand Service Code. By order of the Governor of Jharkhand Sd/- (Nitya Shankar Mukhopadhyaya) Deputy Secretary to the Government The above order would indicate that the Government, on the basis of the recommendation by the High Court and taking into consideration of the conduct and activities of Sri Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, fund that his service was no longer required in public interest and therefore, decided to remove him. 13. As indicated above, there is no dispute in the fact that the petitioner was appointed on 21.5.2004 as a Probationer Munsif. It is also not disputed that he continued to be a Probationer Munsif and his service was not confirmed. In the sad situation, the impugned order has been passed on the basis of the recommendation of the Full Court of the High Court. 14. In the light of the above fact situation, we have to consider the question raised in this case. 15. Though the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order is stigmatic and punitive, perusal of the impugned order dated 31.7.2003 does not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic, since it merely states that considering the activities of the Officer concerned, it was found that his service is no longer required in public interest and, therefore, Government decided to remove him. The language used in the impugned order does not show that it imputes something over and above unsuitability for the job. 16. Though it has been stated that the activities of the Officer concerned has been taken into consideration, it cannot be stated to be stigmatic or punitive, especially when the confidential report of the District and Sessions Judge against the petitioner was placed before the Zonal Judge and the Zonal Judge referred the matter before the Standing Committee, which, in turn, after considering the matter, resolved to place the matter before the Full Court for consideration and decision and ultimately the Full Court took decision and resolved that the service of the petitioner was no longer required. 17. In the present case, neither any departmental enquiry, nor fact finding enquiry has been held. 17. In the present case, neither any departmental enquiry, nor fact finding enquiry has been held. On the other hand, on the basis of the letter of the High Court, the District and Sessions Judge asked for remarks from the Officer concerned regarding the order of discharge passed by him. 18. The District and Sessions Judge sent a confidential report to the Zonal Judge, who, in turn, referred the matter to the Standing Committee and thereafter the Full Court decided the matter. Of course, the ACR prepared by the District and Sessions Judge for the year 2002-2003 gives details, which have been taken into consideration for assessing the suitability of the Officer concerned for the job. The ACR for the year 2002-2003 is as follows: ACR for the year 2002-2003-Learned District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, recorded the following: (i) Knowledge - C, Below Average (ii) Quality of judgment - Below Average (iii) Efficiency - He does not appear to be so (iv) Reputation - Nothing substantial was heard against him except in one case, i.e. G.R. 4698/95 (v) Attitude towards Colleagues -Average Officer (vi) Relation with Bar and Public -Average Officer (vii) Net result - On enquiry under the order of this Honble Court, it was found that the petitioner had discharged all the accused persons in G.R. Case No. 4698/95 under Sections 406, 408. 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and this order casts doubt in the integrity of the petitioner. 19. Having regard to the remarks in the confidential reports of the petitioner, High Court has taken the view, while assessing his performance and quality of judgment, that the petitioner was not suitable for confirmation for the post of Munsif. Admittedly no material has been placed by the petitioner to show that the decision of the High Court that the petitioner is not fit for confirmation is arbitrary, capricious or mala fide. The order of removal or of termination of the service is an order of termination simplicitor which admittedly does not contain any stigma. The position of a probationer, as indicated above, cannot be equated with that of an employee who has substantively been appointed on a post and who has right to hold that post. 20. The order of removal or of termination of the service is an order of termination simplicitor which admittedly does not contain any stigma. The position of a probationer, as indicated above, cannot be equated with that of an employee who has substantively been appointed on a post and who has right to hold that post. 20. The order terminating the service of a Probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Since the Probationer has no right to hold the post on which he has been appointed on probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an order terminating his service is passed. Non-communication of the confidential report can be relied upon by the Full Court to show that such a decision does not suffer from the vice of the arbitrariness and it is not capricious. 21. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order has been passed on the basis of the doubtful integrity, the provisions of Article 311(2), therefore, ought to be followed. The reading of the ACR would give the details of the opinion formed by the Superior Officer in respect of his knowledge, efficiency, attitude towards Bar, colleagues and public etc. Though it is mentioned that the discharge without any trial in serious offence under Sections 406 and 408, IPC etc. casts doubt on the integrity of the petitioner, it is the only opinion, but there is no finding of guilt. 22. As indicated above the real test to determine whether an order of termination is punitive is to find out the existence of the three mandatory requirements, Le., (i) prior to termination, there must be a full-fledged formal enquiry, (ii) the said enquiry should go into the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct and (iii) after the formal enquiry having been held, finding must be given regarding the guilt of the Officer concerned. Only if all the three requirements are present, the termination has to be held punitive. Only if all the three requirements are present, the termination has to be held punitive. Not only that, in order to amount to stigma, the order must be in a language, which imputes something over and above mere suitability for the Job, These requirements are absent in this case, especially when there is no full-fledged enquiry and also there is no finding of guilt. 23. As indicated earlier, we are only concerned with the impugned order. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that even in cases where an order of termination of the probationers service is an order of termination simplicitor and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic, the High Court in some cases may travel beyond the order of termination simplcitor to find out what in reality is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the service of a probationer. 24. In this case, we need not travel beyond the order of termination simplicitor to find out the background since it has not been established that the order is arbitrary or malajide. On the other hand, perusal of the impugned order would indicate that it is neither stigmatic, nor punitive. It merely shows that the Government has taken decision on the basis of the recommendation by the High Court on assessment of the performance and the quality of judgments of the petitioner by the High Court, who is the competent authority. As noted above, either ACR or impugned order does not give any finding of guilt against the petitioner. When there is no such finding, it cannot be called as stigmatic or punitive. 25. Admittedly, the petitioner is a probationer and as such, he does not have a right to hold the post during the period of probation. An order terminating the services of the probationer can be questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment, only then the question of compliance with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution would arise. It is contended that the entries in ACR have not been communicated to the petitioner. It is contended that the entries in ACR have not been communicated to the petitioner. In case of a probationer, there is no obligation for the employer to communicate the adverse materials to him.(A decision is taken on the basis of the said materials, namely, the opinion formed by the District and Sessions Judge, who alone can give a certificate regarding the performance or the quality of judgment of the Officer concerned. Such materials can be relied upon by the employer to show that such a decision has been taken in order to find out whether he is suitable for the job and to show that the said decision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and does not indicate that it is capricious. 26. As laid down by the Supreme Court, only the superior authorities of the Department have to take work from the Officer concerned and they are the best people to judge whether the Officer concerned should be continued in service or not, having regard to his performance, conduct and overall suitability for the. job. In this case, the District and Sessions Judge sent the report along with the confidential report relating to the petitioner and the same was considered by the Zonal Judge, Standing Committee and also the Full Court and ultimately, the Full Court decided that he is not fit to be continued in the job. Under those circumstances, the order impugned passed by the Government, on the basis of the recommendation of the High Court, cannot either be said to be stigmatic or punitive. Therefore, the question of violation of the principles of natural justice does not arise. 27. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 28. I agree.