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2008 DIGILAW 418 (PNJ)

Dungar Dass v. Municipal Council

2008-02-15

RANJIT SINGH

body2008
Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. The petitioners filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining respondents No. 1 to 4 from interfering in their possession over the suit property and from changing the nature thereof and further from alienating the same. The petitioners also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and.2 seeking direction for the respondents not to interfere in their possession changing or alienating the suit property during the pendency of the suit. This application was rejected by the trial Court. The appeal against the said order is also dismissed. Both the orders are now impugned in the present revision petition. 2. The petitioners have claimed that a suit property measuring 6 Kanals 16 marlas owned by Municipal Committee, Rewari is being used by the petitioners, who belong to Chamar Community for the purpose of Rangdari. This property is allegedly allotted to ancestors of the petitioners prior to the year 1900. The petitioners claimed to be in possession of the suit property ever since then. It is alleged that respondent Nos. l to 4 are threatening to interfere in the peaceful possession of the petitioners as they want to alienate the suit land and hence the suit by the petitioners. 3. Respondents Municipal Committee, Rewari has filed reply to the application taking a stand that the petitioners being from Jatav Caste have no concern with the suit property. It is otherwise conceded that the persons belonging to Chatnaran community were licensee over the property, which is possessed and owned by the Municipal Committee, Rewari. It is further claimed that no work of tanning is being done over the suit property. It is also claimed that there is no license now with the petitioner and even if there be one with them, then it can be revoked at any time without assigning any reason. Additionally, the respondents have also relied upon the ratio of law laid down in the case of Premji Ratansey Shah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. Additionally, the respondents have also relied upon the ratio of law laid down in the case of Premji Ratansey Shah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (1) Civil Court Cases 1, in which it is held that the interest or right not shown to be in existence can not be protected by injunction and that the injunction can not be issued against the true owner., Relying upon the case of Mohan Lal v. Mohan Singh, it is submitted that the courts have to bear in mind and see as to whether the grant of injunction would be conducive or detrimental in public interest. Counsel representing the respondents before the appellate Court had produced a Haryana Government Gazette Notification dated 6.9.1982 of Haryana Municipal (Dangerous and Offensive Traders) bye-laws 1982, wherein a provision was made for requirement of a special licence for using any premises for storage of dry or wet hides and skins, boiling bones, blood or offal. It was accordingly pleaded that the petitioners had failed to show if they had obtained a licence for doing the job of tanning. 4. Mr. Arun Palli, senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, by referring to the pleadings as averred, says that the petitioners are shown to be in possession of the suit land and could be dispossessed only in accordance with the procedure established bylaw and, as such, could rightly ask for interim injunction as prayed for. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the case of Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naiduand Anr. It is observed in this case that occupant in settled position can not be dispossessed without recourse of law. For determining the settled position the test laid down in Puran Singh Case, reiterated. 5. Learned Counsel has also drawn my attention to the case of Anamallai Club v. Government of T.N. and Ors., to say that the law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. It is further observed that the law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. It is further observed that the law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. As observed by the Honble Supreme Court, the object is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with high hand and eject such person. In support of this observation, learned Counsel submits that the injunction can be sought even against a true owner. 6. I have considered the submissions made by Mr. Palli. The case was initially heard on 8.2.2008. On the request made by counsel for the petitioners, it was adjourned to enable him to find out in case the petitioners have any license in tanning purposes or not. The counsel very fairly concedes that the petitioners have no licence for this purpose. In Premjis case (supra), it is held by Honble Supreme Court that the injunction can not be issued against the true owner. The law laid down in the case of Mohan Lal (supra) is also to be kept in view. As observed the Government holds the property as a trustee of the people and where any attempt is made by an individual or a group of individuals to misappropriate/misuse or otherwise interfere with the enjoyment of public in general, the Courts have to be extremely cautious in granting injunction in favour of such person on the ground that he is in possession of the property. In a way the possession of a public property by such an individual or group of individuals can not be considered to be a valid possession in the eyes of law. No doubt that even owner can not be permitted to take law into his own hands and eject the person in judicial possession or settled possession without recourse to law but as held in the case of Anamallai Club (supra) law does make a distinction between the person in judicial possession and the rank tress-passers. Observations made in this case and as relied by the petitioners counsel apparently are made in a slightly different context. In this case the true owner was held entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force. Observations made in this case and as relied by the petitioners counsel apparently are made in a slightly different context. In this case the true owner was held entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force. It is, thus, observed that this position would not be any ground to permit the owner to take the law into his own lands. Even in the case of Rame Gowda (supra) it is observed that a person in possession of a land in assumed character of owner and exercising peacefully the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. 7. Here in the present case there is no dispute about the title of the land in question. The petitioners have conceded that respondent-Municipal Committee is the rightful owner of the property. The proposition of law that a possession or prior peaceful settled possession is in itself evidence of a title would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Here no occasion would arise for rebutting the title which is not even being claimed by the petitioners. The observations in the case of Rame Gowda (supra) are made purely on the basis of prior possession without determining the question of title. It is observed that a rightful owner who has been wrongly dispossessed of a land, may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without use of unreasonable force. A fact of significance which may need a notice from the case of Rome Gowda (supra) is that even defendant failed to prove his title over the disputed land in this case so as to substantiate his right to evict the plaintiff in the said case. The injunction was decided on the basis of established position. 8. The law as cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners would not strictly apply to the facts of the present case. There is nothing to show that there is any wrong, irregular and illegal exercise of discretion by the Courts below in this case. I would not thus interfere in the discretion exercised by the Courts below. Dismissed.