Judgment :- This Civil Revision Petition arises out of the dismissal of an application seeking review of a judgment in a suit. 2. Heard Mr. K.S. Gnanasambandan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. C.S.K. Satish, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The respondent herein filed a suit for recovery of money against the petitioner in O.S. No. 2264 of 2005 on the file of the VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. The suit was dismissed by a judgment dated 24.11.2006. The respondent filed a first appeal in A.S. No. 139 of 2007 on the file of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. During the pendency of the said appeal, the petitioner/defendant took out an application before the trial Court in I.A. No. 4205 of 2008 under Section 152 C.P.C., seeking a small correction in the decree. The correction sought for by the petitioner was with regard to the date of presentation of the plaint. The date of presentation of the plaint was indicated in the decree as 29.03.2005. The petitioner sought a correction of the said date to 07.04.2005. The reason for the petitioner seeking such a correction was that though the plaint and other papers appear to have been presented on 29.03.2005, the papers were not admittedly accompanied by a vakalat duly signed by the respondent/plaintiff authorising their counsel to present the plaint. It appears that the plaint was returned on 30.03.2005 on the ground that it was not accompanied by the vakalat and the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff represented the papers along with the vakalat only on 07.04.2005. Obviously, the petitioner wanted the correction with regard to the date of presentation of the suit, on account of the fact if the date of presentation of the plaint is taken to be 07.04.2005, the suit was out of time. If it is taken to be 29.03.2005, it was within time. 4. Mr. K.S. Gnanasambandan, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the provisions of Section 26 read with Order III Rule 4 C.P.C., the plaint is deemed to have been presented only if it was accompanied by a vakalat, if the presentation was actually made by a counsel. If the plaint was presented by a counsel Without enclosing a vakalat, it is no presentation in the eye of law and cannot even be termed as an improper presentation. 5. If the plaint was presented by a counsel Without enclosing a vakalat, it is no presentation in the eye of law and cannot even be termed as an improper presentation. 5. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions: 1. Muhammad Ali Khan and Others v. Jas Ram and Others (1936 ILR Calcutta 46) 2. Nandamani Anangabhima and Another v. Modono Mohono Deo (AIR 1937 Madras 239 = (1936) 44 L.W. 528) 3. Sheikh Palat v. Sarwan Sahu and Others (AIR 1920 Patna 581) 4. Official Receiver, Aligarh v. Hira Lal and Another (AIR 1935 Allahabad 727) 5. Ramkaran v. Shrikishan and Others (AIR 1976 Rajasthan 130) 6. Tentu Lakshmu Naidu v. Vaisreddi Verda Rama Rao and Another (AIR 1980 Andhra Pradesh 62) 7. Parvati and Others v. Anand Parkash (AIR 1987 Delhi 90) 6. Before considering the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to have a look at the provisions, on which reliance is placed. Section 26 CPC reads as follows: “Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed.” 7. Order III Rules 1 and 4 C.P.C. read as follows: “1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognised agent or by pleader: Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader (appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be) on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. 4. Appointment of Pleader:— (1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment. 4. Appointment of Pleader:— (1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment. (2) Every such appointment shall be (filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub rule (1), be) deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit ended so far as regards the client. [Explanation:— For the purposes of this sub-rule, the following shall be deemed to be proceedings in the suit- (a) an application for the review of decree or order in the suit, (b) an application under Section 144 or under Section 152 of this Code, in relation to any decree or order made in the suit. (c) an appeal from any decree or order in the suit, and (d) any application or act for the purposes of obtaining copies of documents or return of documents produced or filed in the suit or of obtaining refund of moneys paid into the Court in connection with the suit.] [(3) Nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be construed (a) as extending, as between the pleader and his client, the duration for which the pleader is engaged, or (b) as authorising service on the pleader of any notice or document issued by any Court other than the Court for which the pleader was engaged, except where such service was expressly agreed to by the client in the document referred to in sub-rule(1)] (4) The High Court may, by general order, direct that, where the person by whom a pleader is appointed is unable to write his name, his mark upon the document appointing the pleader shall be attested by such person and in such manner as may be specified by the order. (5) No pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating- (a) the names of the parties to the suit, (b) the name of the party for whom he appears, and (c) the name of the person by whom he is authorised to appear: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of such party.]” 8. It is seen from the manner in which Section 26 C.P.C. is drafted that it talks only about the act of presentation of the plaint. It does not talk about the actor who presents the plaint into the Court. In other words, the focus under Section 26 C.P.C. is only on the act and not on the persons who perform the act, namely, the plaintiff or his duly authorised agent or his pleader. Similarly, Order III Rule 1 C.P.C. speaks about the appearance, application or act, in or to any Court, by a party, his recognised agent or his pleader. The focus in Order III Rule 1 C.P.C. is also on the performance of appearing, applying or acting and not on the performer. Order III Rule 4 C.P.C., which speaks about the appointment of pleader, makes it incumbent upon every pleader to have an authority of his appointment by a document in writing. Without the authority being conferred by a document in writing, a pleader is not entitled to act. Rule 4 of Order 3 is a State amendment under Act 22/1926. 9. The purport of Order III Rule 1 read with Rule 4 is that a person, who does not hold an authority by virtue of a document in writing, is not entitled to act on behalf of his client. Neither of the Rules declare the presentation of a plaint to be no presentation in the eye of law, merely because of the lack of authority on the part of the pleader who acted or appeared or applied on behalf of one of the parties to the proceedings, without a valid document in writing accompanying the papers. 10. Neither of the Rules declare the presentation of a plaint to be no presentation in the eye of law, merely because of the lack of authority on the part of the pleader who acted or appeared or applied on behalf of one of the parties to the proceedings, without a valid document in writing accompanying the papers. 10. A combined reading of Section 26 and the provisions of Order III C.P.C. shows that a plaint should be presented in a manner known to law and that a person who acts on behalf of a party to the proceeding is entitled to act only upon an authority conferred by a document in writing. Both these provisions do not travel beyond such a declaration, to say that any presentation of a plaint made de hors the above provisions would become no presentation in the eye of law. As a matter of fact, Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice, which also speaks about the presentation of pleading and documents, reads as follows: “21. Presentation of proceedings and documents: All plaints, written statements, applications and other proceedings and documents may be presented to or filed in Court by delivering the same personally to the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court at any time during office hours; the said officer shall at once endorse on the document the date of presentation, and if proceedings are thereby instituted, shall insert the serial number.” 11. Even here, the language employed does not refer to the person presenting or filing the plaint or other documents into Court. The emphasis is only on the act of presentation. It simply says that the plaint and other documents may be presented to or filed in Court by delivering the same personally to the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court at any time during the office hours. 12. Coming to the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is seen that the case in Muhammad Ali Khan and Others v. Jas Ram and Others (1936 ILR Calcutta 46), was one in which the name of the counsel was omitted to be mentioned in the body of the vakalatnama due to oversight. It was never rectified at any point of time and that was taken advantage of at the appellate stage. In other words, throughout the proceedings, the person who represented the party had no authority at all. It was never rectified at any point of time and that was taken advantage of at the appellate stage. In other words, throughout the proceedings, the person who represented the party had no authority at all. Therefore, the said decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. 13. In the decision in Nandamani Anangabhima and Another v. Modono Mohono Deo (AIR 1937 Madras 239), an execution petition was filed by a pleader without any documentary authority in his favour from the decree holder. In the penultimate paragraph of the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court pointed out that there was no indication from the document to show that the pleader who presented the execution petition had any authority at any point of time at all. The Division Bench remarked that the pleader who presented the execution petition had not been appointed by a document in writing and hence he was actually wanting in capacity or competence to act. But it is not the case here. The respondent had in fact engaged a counsel, but the vakalat given by the respondent was not filed along with the plaint. Therefore, the case on hand is one where the counsel had the authority in terms of Order III Rule 4 C.P.C. but omitted to present it along with the plaint on 29.03.2005. 14. The decision of the Patna High Court in Sheikh Palat v. Sarwan Sahu and Others (AIR 1920 Patna 581) is also of no assistance to the petitioner, since in the penultimate paragraph of the decision, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court observed that it may not be necessary to file a vakalatnama with the petition or appeal, but it is certainly necessary that there should be at the time of presentation of the appeal, a vakalatnama in existence bearing the signature of the applicant or his attorney. In other words, the decision of the Patna High Court is actually in support of the respondent. 15. The decision of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Official Receiver, Aligarh v. Hira Lal and Another (AIR 1935 Allahabad 727), arose out of a case, where the name of the pleader was left blank and the vakalatnama did not bear any signature of the pleader showing that he had accepted vakalatnama. Therefore, it was held that such a presentation was not by a person who was duly authorised. Therefore, it was held that such a presentation was not by a person who was duly authorised. 16. The decision in Ramkaran v. Shrikishan and Others (AIR 1976 Rajasthan 130), is a case where a consent decree was passed. But the pleader acted without filing a memo of appearance. Therefore, the said decision is also of no assistance to the petitioner. 17. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tentu Lakshmu Naidu v. Vaisreddi Verda Rama Rao and Another (AIR 1980 Andhra Pradesh 62), arose out of an election petition. There, the question of abatement arose and the legal heir did not come on record through a counsel. Therefore, the rigidity in the application of Rules to the election proceedings, forced the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to come to the conclusion that it did in that case. 18. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Parvati and Others v. Anand Parkash (AIR 1987 Delhi 90), arose out of an appeal filed by several persons, only two of whom had given a power of attorney. In other words, others were not represented properly. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the decision is also not directly on the point. 19. That an error of procedure is merely an irregularity, which can be cured, is well settled by the decisions of various High Courts. One of the earliest cases on the issue is that of the Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Wali Mohammed Khan v. Ishak Ali Khan and Others {AIR 1931 All. 307}, where it was held as follows:— “If the legislature had intended that the absence of the presentation of the plaint by the plaintiff or by some person duly authorised by him would altogether oust the jurisdiction of the Court the language used would have been definite and specific. Instead of that, Section 26 merely provides that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed, without saying in express terms that the presentation should be by the plaintiff or his duly author ised agent. As there is no specific rule either requiring or expressly authorising the plaintiff to present the plaintiff it is doubtful whether Order III, Rule 1, of the Code would apply to such a case. As there is no specific rule either requiring or expressly authorising the plaintiff to present the plaintiff it is doubtful whether Order III, Rule 1, of the Code would apply to such a case. If it does not apply, the presentation by a person orally authorised to do so would be valid. But even if it does we are clearly of opinion that the omission to comply with this provision would be a mere irregularity and not an absence of jurisdiction. The Court receiving a plaint which has not been properly presented would have jurisdiction to dismiss it and pass orders on it. It would not be acting without jurisdiction if it did so. We do not mean to imply that that a plaintiff has the right to get his plaint presented by a man in the street. If the person presenting it was not properly authorised, the presentation would be irregular. The Court would then have the discretion to allow the irregularity to be cured or not. If the plaintiff has acted in good faith and without gross negligence, and it is fair and just to allow the defect to be cured, the Court would undoubtedly do so. It is not absolutely helpless in the matter.” 20. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider a similar issue, with particular reference to a suit instituted by a Company incorporated under the Companies Act. Though it did not relate to the presentation of a plaint, by a pleader without vakalat, the said case related to signing and verification of pleadings. In paragraph-13 of its judgment in All India Reporter Ltd. v. Ramchandra {AIR 1961 Bombay 292}, the Bombay High Court held as follows:— “13. The question is whether the provisions contained in Order 6 relating to signing, verification and presentation of the plaint relate merely to procedure or whether a plaint which does not strictly comply with the requirements of Order 6 would cease to be a valid plaint and would be a nullity because of such defects or irregularities. It is true that when a plaint is presented to the Court or to such Officer as the Court appoints, it is open to the Court or to the Officer to point out the defects or irregularities to the person presenting the suit and to require him to rectify the defects or irregularities. It is true that when a plaint is presented to the Court or to such Officer as the Court appoints, it is open to the Court or to the Officer to point out the defects or irregularities to the person presenting the suit and to require him to rectify the defects or irregularities. But can it be said that the defects or irregularities would make the presentation of the suit itself invalid although die plaint is admitted and particulars of the plaint are entered in a register of suits as provided by Order 4, Rule 2? In this connection, it is necessary to note that Order 7, Rule 11, which refers to the rejection of a plaint, enumerates only four cases in which a plaint has to be rejected, but it does not enumerate any of the defects or irregularities referred to in Order 6, Rule 14, Order 6, Rule 15, or Order 6, Rule 2. It is clear from the provision contained in Order 6 that these rules relate only to procedure, and the better view would be to regard them as mere matters of procedure and to hold that if a plaint is not properly signed or verified but is admitted and entered in the register of suits it does not cease to be a plaint and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted merely because of the existence of some defects or irregularities in the matter of signing and verification of the plaint.” In paragraph-20 of the same judgment, the Bombay High Court held as follows:— “20. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. In the case of companies the plaint can be signed by either a Secretary or a Director or other Principal Officer under Order 29, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, or any person duly authorised by the Company under Order 6, Rule 14. The words “duly authorised” in Order 6, Rule 14, need not be restricted to mean authorised by proper written authority or by power of attorney. There is authority for this view in Bengal Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal , AIR 1943 Cal 13, AIR 1948 Mad 369, ILR 1939 Nag 515: (AIR 1939 Nag 242) and AIR 1941 Nag 159. In these cases it was held that a plaintiff can orally authorise another person to sign a plaint for him. There is authority for this view in Bengal Jute Mills v. Jewraj Heeralal , AIR 1943 Cal 13, AIR 1948 Mad 369, ILR 1939 Nag 515: (AIR 1939 Nag 242) and AIR 1941 Nag 159. In these cases it was held that a plaintiff can orally authorise another person to sign a plaint for him. The Managing Director of the plaintiff Company in the instant case, who has authority to file suits on behalf of the Company (vide Article 156 of the Companys Articles of Association), can orally authorise another person to sign the plaint for him on behalf of the Company. Plaintiff No. 2, who is the Man aging Director of the Company (Plaintiff No. 1) has in his deposition deposed that Ghushey signed the plaint under his instructions. The evidence of Ghushey is to the same effect.” What was laid down by the Bombay High Court with regard to signing and verification of pleadings may equally apply to the presentation of the plaint. 21. The Supreme Court in Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh ( (2006) 1 SCC 75 = 2006-1-L.W. 769), held that any defect in signing a memo of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memo of appeal or the omission to file vakalatnama in that appeal will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal. The relevant portion of the said judgment found in para 15, reads as follows: “15. It is, thus, now well settled that any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant, along with the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the memorandum of appeal or the presentation thereof before the appellate Court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected.” 22. The decision of the Supreme Court cited above squarely applies to the case on hand. As stated above, there is no dispute about the fact that the plaint was in fact presented with necessary court fee and the documents, on 29.03.2005. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected.” 22. The decision of the Supreme Court cited above squarely applies to the case on hand. As stated above, there is no dispute about the fact that the plaint was in fact presented with necessary court fee and the documents, on 29.03.2005. The only defect in the presentation was that the plaint was not accompanied by a vakalat in favour of the pleader. It is not the case of the petitioner that the counsel who presented the plaint on 29.03.2005 did not even hold a vakalat on that date. The vakalat just did not accompany the plaint. The result of such a presentation would be that the authority of the person who presented the plaint was just not known on that date. It cannot result in the very presentation becoming invalid. 23. In such circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the order of the Court below. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. However, any observation made herein shall not have any bearing upon the merits of the dispute, if the petitioner takes up the judgment and decree passed in the first appeal by way of second appeal.