JUDGMENT : B.P. Ray, J. - Death Reference No. 9/07 and Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 2007 arise out of the judgment and order passed by the Learned Adhoc Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T C., Athagarh in ST No. 228 of 2006 convicting the Appellant for commission of offence of murder of the deceased Sabita u/s 302 I.P.C. and for commission of offence of causing the disappearance of the deceased's dead body in order to save himself from legal punishment u/s 201 Indian Penal Code. The Appellant has been sentenced to death u/s 302 I.P.C. whereas no separate sentence has been awarded u/s 201 I.P.C. 2. P.W.1, the informant, is the deceased's father, P.W.2 is the deceased's mother and PW5 is P.W.1's brother. P.W.8 happens to be deceased's sister in-law. Prosecution case is that the Appellant and the deceased of village Sundara belonging to different castes were in love. Though the Appellant and the deceased wanted to marry, the deceased's parents and relations raised objection to their marriage. Out of their relationship, the deceased had conceived and was pregnant during the period of occurrence. It is alleged that a couple of days prior to the deceased's death, the Appellant during night time clandestinely took the deceased away from her house and P.W.6 as well as P.W.9 chanced upon the deceased and the applicant proceeding towards Dhobaninala. P.W.1 is stated to have lodged a written report regarding the missing of the deceased at Baramba P.S. on 13.01.2006. It is alleged that the Appellant killed the deceased by strangulation with a scarf when the deceased refused his proposal to get her pregnancy aborted and concealed the dead body in the nearby nala. Deceased's dead body was detected inside Baunsapal canal of Dhobaninala on 16.01.2006 in the night upon which P.W.1, the informant, lodged written F.I.R. Ext. 1 before P.W.1 0, a Junior S.I. of Police who was the Second Officer of Baramba PS.P.W.10 registered the case and took up investigation. In course of investigation P.W.10, inter alia, got the dead body of the deceased subjected to post mortem examination by P.W.3 Dr. Manas Ranjan Pani who found that the deceased had died due to asphyxia caused by strangulation with a scarf used as the ligature found to have been tied around her neck. The Appellant surrendered in the Court of J.M.F.C., Baramba upon which he was taken on police remand. Manas Ranjan Pani who found that the deceased had died due to asphyxia caused by strangulation with a scarf used as the ligature found to have been tied around her neck. The Appellant surrendered in the Court of J.M.F.C., Baramba upon which he was taken on police remand. While in custody, the Appellant disclosed to have concealed and led P.W.10 as well as P. Ws. 6 & 7 to the recovery of the deceased's chappals MOS XIX and XX as well as his own bloodstained banion MO-XXI near the place of occurrence which articles were seized under seizure lists Exts. 10/1 and 9/1 respectively. Seized articles, being forwarded by P.W.10, were subjected to chemical examination. On completion of investigation chargesheet under Sections 302/201 I.P. C. was submitted against the Appellant. 3. Facing the charges framed under Sections 302 and 201 I.P.C., the Appellant took the plea of denial. Also the further plea of the Appellant was that he was away from his village during the period of occurrence. The Appellant also appears to have taken a plea that as the deceased was pregnant and insisted upon getting married to the Appellant, her parents killed the deceased in order to save family honour. 4. In order to establish the charges, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses apart from relying upon documents marked Exts. 1 to 15 and material exhibits MOS- to XXI. Only one witness D.W.1 was examined on behalf of the defence. Apart from P. Ws. 1,2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, who have already been referred to above, prosecution examined P.W.4 a witness to seizure of the wearing apparels of the deceased received after post mortem examination and P.W.11, a police constable who accompanied the dead body for post mortem examination. However, P.W.6 turned hostile to the prosecution. D.W.1 deposed regarding love affair between the Appellant and the deceased, the deceased's pregnancy as well as the objection of the deceased's parents to the marriage between the deceased and the Appellant. 5. There is no direct evidence implicating the Appellant with the commission of murder or causing disappearance of the dead body of the deceased. D.W.1 deposed regarding love affair between the Appellant and the deceased, the deceased's pregnancy as well as the objection of the deceased's parents to the marriage between the deceased and the Appellant. 5. There is no direct evidence implicating the Appellant with the commission of murder or causing disappearance of the dead body of the deceased. The Learned Trial Court relying upon circumstances available mainly from the evidence of P.W.7 and P.W.9 coupled with the admitted circumstance of the deceased's love affair with the Appellant and pregnancy available from the evidence of prosecution witnesses as well as D.W.1 and the medical evidence available from the evidence of P.W.3 held the charges to have been established. 6. In assailing the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence, it is argued by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that in the absence of any eye-witness to the occurrence implicating the Appellant with the alleged offences, the so called circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to establish the charges remain far from being established. It is also argued that there are missing links in the so-called chain of circumstances, which the Learned Trial Court failed to take note of. It is strenuously contended that the prosecution has utterly failed to establish the motive for the commission of alleged murder inasmuch as though the prosecution asserts that the deceased's refusal to get her pregnancy terminated led the Appellant to do away with the deceased's life, P.W.3 in course of post mortem examination found the deceased to be not pregnant. It is argued that there being positive material in the prosecution evidence that the deceased was not pregnant, the very basis of prosecution case crumbles. It is further argued that the Learned Trial Court should not have relied upon the uncorroborated testimony of P.W.9 who stands in the footing of chance witness and it is also contended that the sole testimony of P.W.7 with regard to recovery of deceased's chappals and the Appellant's bloodstained banion at the Appellant's instance should not have been relied upon as the evidence of P.W.7 does not reveal that he accompanied P.W.10 and the Appellant to the places of recovery. It is further argued that in the absence of any evidence that the seized banion belongs to the Appellant or that the seized banion contained deceased's blood stains, especially when no injury appears to have been detected on the dead body of the deceased at the time of post mortem examination by P.W.3, circumstance of alleged seizure of banion and chappals does not constitute incriminating circumstance against the Appellant. 7. In reply, it is contended by the Learned Counsel appearing for the State that the Learned Trial Court has rightly held all the five circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to have been established in order to constitute a chain to unerringly indicate that it was the Appellant and none else who committed the murder of the deceased and concealed her dead body. It is strenuously argued that there is no infirmity in the evidence of P. Ws. 7 & 9. 8. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish each of the links in the chain of circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, and circumstances so established are required to unerringly point out at the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, held as follows: The following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused based on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established; (1) the Circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. (2) the facts' so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 9. In the present case, the prosecution relies upon and the Learned Trial Court concludes the following five circumstances to have been established against the Appellant. 9. In the present case, the prosecution relies upon and the Learned Trial Court concludes the following five circumstances to have been established against the Appellant. (i) The accused was in love with the deceased and she had conceived through him before her death. (ii) The accused found absent in his house in the very night in which the victim left her parental house and subsequently thereafter. (iii) The victim was last seen in the company of the accused and was never seen thereafter and the accused has failed to explain the circumstances in which the victim and he himself parted company. (iv) The chapals of the victim and Ganji of the accused recovered in consequence of the disclosure statement made by the accused and he has failed to explain how he got the chapels of the victim and why he had concealed his Ganji. (v) Extensive human blood is detected from the wearing apparels of the deceased also detected on the Ganji of the accused which he has given recovery and he has failed to explain how his Ganji stained with extensive human blood. 10. It is not disputed from any quarters that there was love affair between the Appellant and the deceased. Not only P. Ws. 1,2,5,8 & 9 testify that the deceased and the Appellant were in love but D.W.1 also deposes regarding the affair between them. It is also in the evidence of P. Ws. 1,2 & 5 D.W.1 that the deceased wanted to marry the Appellant but her family members objected to the marriage between the Appellant and the deceased. However, the circumstance that the Appellant was in love with the deceased or resistance to their intended marriage by the deceased's parents and relations by itself cannot be conceived to constitute the motive for commission of the murder of the deceased by the Appellant. Prosecution case appears to be that the Appellant killed the deceased as she objected to his proposition to do away with her pregnancy by abortion. Prosecution relied upon the evidence P. Ws. 1,2 & 8 as well as D.W.1 to establish that the deceased was pregnant prior to her death. However, not only P.W.3 does not depose regarding detection of the deceased pregnancy at the time of post mortem of the dead body but also it has been categorically indicated in the post mortem report Ext. 1,2 & 8 as well as D.W.1 to establish that the deceased was pregnant prior to her death. However, not only P.W.3 does not depose regarding detection of the deceased pregnancy at the time of post mortem of the dead body but also it has been categorically indicated in the post mortem report Ext. 4 that the deceased was not found to be pregnant. In Ext. 4 in the Column IV relating to examination of ABDOMEN in the Sub-column 11 in respect of deceased's organs of generation, it has been explicitly mentioned "uterus non-pregnant" and therefore, it is evident that the deceased was not pregnant prior to her death. Therefore, the prosecution case that the deceased's objection to terminate her pregnancy propelled the Appellant to commit the deceased's murder falls flat. 11. Therefore, the prosecution case that the deceased's objection to terminate her pregnancy was the motive of the Appellant propelling him to commit the murder is rendered doubtful. An attempt is made on behalf of the State to urge that as is evident from the evidence of the witnesses, it was the deceased's version that she had become pregnant. It has been elicited in P.W.2's cross-examination that she had stated before the police that the deceased had disclosed that her menstruation had stopped. So also in the cross-examination of P.W.8, it has been brought out that it was the deceased who disclosed that she had conceived through the Appellant and was pregnant for two months. Therefore, it is urged, the deceased, being under the impression that she was pregnant, had herself disclosed before others including the Appellant that she was pregnant. In the background of such contention, it is argued on behalf of the prosecution that the deceased herself having told that she was pregnant and refused to terminate the pregnancy the medical evidence negating the pregnancy must be ignored. However, criminal trial does not admit any room for surmises in the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstance of the deceased being pregnant prior to her death is being relied upon by the prosecution as the motive for commission of the murder of the deceased by the Appellant, in view of positive evidence regarding absence of the pregnancy, the alleged motive of the murder of the deceased has not been established by the prosecution. 12. The circumstance of the deceased being pregnant prior to her death is being relied upon by the prosecution as the motive for commission of the murder of the deceased by the Appellant, in view of positive evidence regarding absence of the pregnancy, the alleged motive of the murder of the deceased has not been established by the prosecution. 12. In such circumstances, one of the links in the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution appears to be missing. However, as has been held in Nachhittar Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, the failure of the prosecution to establish the motive for the crime committed by the accused does not mean that the entire prosecution case has to be thrown over-board. It only caste a duty to on the Court to scrutinize the other evidence with greater care. In Rajinder Kumar and Another Vs. The State of Punjab it has been held that the motive behind a crime is a relevant fact and the absence of a motive is also a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence. The circumstances proving the guilt of the accused are, however, not weakened at all by the fact that the motive has not been established. It often happens that only the culprit himself knows what moved him to a certain course of action. Failure to prove the motive does not signify that it is not in existence and not fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never indispensable for conviction when the facts are clear. It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence motive is one of the circumstances but it cannot be said that in the absence thereof other circumstances although completed the chain would be of no consequence. 13. In view of the above, it becomes imperative to scrutinize the evidence relating to other circumstances with greater care in order to come to the conclusion that in the absence of evidence relating to motive of commission of murder a so the other circumstances complete the chain of circumstances to conclude that it was the Appellant who was the author of the offences for which he stands convicted. 14. Among the other circumstances, the circumstance of the deceased to have been last seen in the company of the Appellant before her dead body was discovered is the most vital circumstance marshalled by the prosecution. 14. Among the other circumstances, the circumstance of the deceased to have been last seen in the company of the Appellant before her dead body was discovered is the most vital circumstance marshalled by the prosecution. Though in the F.I.R. itself it is alleged by P.W.1 the informant that he was being informed that the Appellant had taken the deceased, P.W.1 neither in his evidence nor in the F.I.R. names any particular person to have disclosed that the Appellant took away the deceased from her house. Though P.W.1 is stated to have lodged a missing report on 13.01.2006, the said missing report is not produced in Court. A cumulative reading of evidence of P. Ws. 1,2 & 5 goes to shows that at best they suspected the Appellant to have taken the deceased with him. Prosecution relies upon the evidence of P.W.9 to establish the vital circumstance of the deceased to have been last seen in the company of the Appellant. P.W.9 testifies that some days prior to the death of the deceased while he along with P.W.6 and Ors. was sleeping in their club house near P.W.6's and cowshed, he came out to urinate at about 1.00 A.M. and in the focus of torch light found that the Appellant and the deceased were proceeding on the village path towards Dhobaninala Seeing P.W.9, the Appellant requested him not to disclose about their leaving their houses for which P.W.9 did not disclose about the same to the family members of the Appellant and the deceased. P.W.9 further testifies that five days thereafter he came to know about the death of the deceased and went to Dhobaninala with others after knowing that the deceased's dead body was there and thereafter he disclosed before P.W.1 and also the police that prior to the occurrence he had seen the accused along with the deceased passing on the village path leading towards Dhobaninala. As has been stated earlier, P.W.6 does not support P.W.9's version and was declared to be hostile. P.W.6 was put leading questions by the prosecution and confronted with his earlier statement made before P.W.10 at the time of investigation. On a combined reading of evidence of P. Ws. As has been stated earlier, P.W.6 does not support P.W.9's version and was declared to be hostile. P.W.6 was put leading questions by the prosecution and confronted with his earlier statement made before P.W.10 at the time of investigation. On a combined reading of evidence of P. Ws. 6 & 10, it is apparent that P.W.6 had claimed before P.W.10 that he as well as P.W.9 upon hearing of sound of passing of human being in the night of 11/12.9.2006 at about 1.00 A.M., focused their torch light and found the Appellant and the deceased passing on the road and that as the Appellant and the deceased were in love since five years they did not make any inquiry and rather slept. As against such material on record, P.W.9 asserts in his cross-examination that except himself no other person had seen the Appellant and the deceased passing on the village path. P.W.9 also says that he had not disclosed either to P.W.6 or other persons who were sleeping in the club house to have seen that Appellant and the deceased were passing on the village path. Though P.W.9 says that after detection of the dead body of the deceased he disclosed to P.W.1 that he had seen the Appellant and the deceased passing through the village path, P.W.1 does not at all support the assertion. It also appears from the impugned judgment that P.W.9 was examined by police on 19.01.2006 though F.I.R. was lodged and police came to spot on 17.01.2006. In such circumstances, the evidence of P.W.9 falls far short of being termed as trustworthy enough so as to find him to be a wholly reliable witness. Unless a witness is found to be a wholly reliable witness, rule of prudence demands independent corroboration in order to act upon the sole testimony of such witness. In this connection, the decision in Vadivelu Thevar Vs. The State of Madras, is relied upon. 15. Also the time and place at, and the circumstance under which P.W.9 asserts to have been the deceased and the Appellant is far from usual. Therefore, P.W.9 undisputedly stands in the footing of a chance witness. P.W.9 deposes to have slept in a club house which was not a normal place of an abode. 15. Also the time and place at, and the circumstance under which P.W.9 asserts to have been the deceased and the Appellant is far from usual. Therefore, P.W.9 undisputedly stands in the footing of a chance witness. P.W.9 deposes to have slept in a club house which was not a normal place of an abode. His assertion to have chanced upon the Appellant and the deceased at the dead of the night when he went out to urinate leaves no scope of doubt that it is by coincidence only. P.W.9 asserts to have seen the deceased and the Appellant passing on the village path. Though the evidence of a chance witness is not necessarily incredible or unbelievable such evidence requires caution and close scrutiny. Upon close scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.9, a chance witness, it is found that in view of materials referred to above, it cannot be acted upon without corroboration. 16. In the present case, there being absolutely no corroboration to the evidence of P.W.9 who is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, it is not found safe to base any finding on the sole testimony of P.W.9 to the effect that the deceased was last seen in the company of the Appellant while eloping with the Appellant. 17. The next vital circumstance found against the Appellant is that while in police custody he made disclosure statement to P.W.10 in presence of P. Ws. 6 & 7 to have concealed the deceased's chapals and his bloodstained banion near the place of occurrence and thereafter led to the recovery of chapals MOS XIX and XX as well as the banion MO-XXI.P.W.6 does not support the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.7 on this score is that he along with P.W.6 had been to Baramba P.S. to invite police personnel for 'Austraprahari Nama Jangya' in their village. In their presence, the Appellant who was in custody confessed to have committed murder of the deceased and to have "concealed a Ganji in the 'KORAD' of a banyan tree and the chapals near the Guava tree of Pradeep Pradhan" and told that he would show the places if he would be accompanied. P.W.7 deposes to have signed on the disclosure statement Ext. 8/1. P.W.7 deposes to have signed on the disclosure statement Ext. 8/1. Though in his examination in chief P.W.7 deposes that after making the disclosure statement the Appellant led them and police and showed the places of concealment and gave recovery of Ganji MO XXI from the 'KORAD' of a banyan tree and a pair of chapals MO XIX and XX from near a Guava tree which articles were seized under seizure lists Ext. 9/1 and Ext. 10 respectively, it appears from the cross-examination of the P.W.7 that neither he nor P.W.6 accompanied P.W.10 and the Appellant to the places of recovery of the banion and the chapals. Rather he says that after the recording of the disclosure statement, he and P.W.6 came to their village and reached there about 1.00 P.M. while P.W.10 and other police personnel came in a jeep with the Appellant after sometime. The police party straightway went to Baunsapal canal and after arrival of the police party at Baunsapal canal, P.W.7 and Ors. went there voluntarily. It is stated by P.W.7 that after seeing the police jeep in his house, he went to the Baunsapal canal. Though he says that Appellant brought the banion from the banyan tree situated between the Jhinkal Mundia and land of Gobardhan Mantri, he expresses his inability to say in which directions from the banyan tree Jhinkal Mundia or land of Gobardhan Mantri are situated. Thus it is evident that the Appellant had not led P.W.7 to the recovery of the banion and the chapals inasmuch as P.W.7 never accompanied P.W.10 and the Appellant to the places of recovery. According to P.W.7 on his own volition he went to the places of recovery upon seeing the police jeep. The circumstance of alleged recovery of the banion and the chapals substantially looses significance in view of the fact that none of the witnesses including the deceased's parents P. Ws. 1 and 2 identifies the chapals MOS XIX and XX to be that of the deceased. The prosecution also has not adduced any evidence to the effect that the seized Ganji MO XXI belongs to the Appellant. No doubt the chemical examination report. Ext. 16 indicates that extensive human blood-stains were found on the banion MO XXI. 1 and 2 identifies the chapals MOS XIX and XX to be that of the deceased. The prosecution also has not adduced any evidence to the effect that the seized Ganji MO XXI belongs to the Appellant. No doubt the chemical examination report. Ext. 16 indicates that extensive human blood-stains were found on the banion MO XXI. However, in the absence of evidence connecting the Appellant with the banion and also in view of want of evidence to the effect that the Appellant led P.W. 7 to the recovery of the chapaIs and the banion, the prosecution is found to have failed to prove the circumstance of seizure of the chapals and the banion beyond reasonable doubt and to be incriminating against the Appellant. 18. The only other circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that the Appellant is stated to be found absent in his house in the night when the deceased left her home and subsequently thereafter. In other words, it is asserted that the Appellant absconded after commission of the alleged offences. It is well settled that absconding by itself is not a circumstance which conclusively proves the guilt of an accused. The Appellant does not claim to be present in his house or the village during the period of occurrence. Rather it is claimed in his statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that he was away from the village from the 8th day to 25th day of the month in which the occurrence took place. Prosecution has not led any evidence to show that the Appellant was present in the village till the evening proceeding the night in which the deceased left her home. There is also no evidence that the Appellant was absconding for which he could not be apprehended. P.W.2 vaguely states that during the period when they were searching for the deceased, the Appellant was absent from the village. P.W.5 in course of cross-examination states that in the very night in which the deceased left her house, the Appellant was found absent in his house. However, he adds, no inquiry was made from any person of his family regarding the whereabouts of the Appellant. Such admission on the part of P.W.5 goes to show that the absence of the Appellant was not very significant or consequential for P.W.5 and Ors. when they were in search of the deceased. However, he adds, no inquiry was made from any person of his family regarding the whereabouts of the Appellant. Such admission on the part of P.W.5 goes to show that the absence of the Appellant was not very significant or consequential for P.W.5 and Ors. when they were in search of the deceased. The absence of the Appellant since the deceased left her house, is not at all supported by P.W.1, the father of the deceased, who ought to have been the first person to look for the Appellant. Therefore, the evidence adduced of the prosecution to prove the circumstance of absconding is also not found to be unimpeachable. 19. Thus on an analysis of the evidence on record we find that in view of the infirmities discussed above, the prosecution has not been to establish any of the circumstances except the circumstance of the Appellant and the deceased being in love conclusively. Therefore, there is no scope to hold that the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution unerringly point out that the Appellant committed the murder of the deceased and concealed her dead body in the nala. In the absence of clinching evidence completing the chain circumstances, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is not sustainable. 20. We, accordingly, allow the Criminal Appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and Order Dated 17.07.2007 passed by the Learned Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Athagarh in Sessions Trial No. 228 of 2006 convicting the Appellant for commission of offences under Sections 302/201 I.P.C. and sentencing him to death u/s 302 I.P.C. The reference made u/s 366 Code of Criminal Procedure is answered. If the detention of the Appellant, Biranchi Gochhi is not required in any other case, he be set at liberty forthwith. 21. Death Reference answered. Final Result : Allowed