Judgment : V. Dhanapalan, J. While W.A.Nos.36 to 64 of 2007 have been filed by the management, challenging the order of a learned single Judge questioning the reinstatement of the workmen with continuity of service, W.A.Nos.111 to 126 of 2007 are preferred by the workmen, discontent with a portion of the order in not awarding back wages. 2. The management is an engineering establishment in the manufacture of boilers, boiler components, valves, suit blowers etc., necessary for generation of electricity and the workmen were engaged temporarily on daily wage basis and subsequently terminated from service. The workmen raised a demand at the first instance against the management seeking permanent status under Section 2 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (in short, "the Act"), which resulted in a reference to the Labour Court, Tiruchirapalli, whereupon the Labour Court passed an award, ordering reinstatement without back wages as well as continuity of service. Aggrieved over the order of reinstatement, the management filed Writ Petitions. Also, the workmen challenged the denial of back wages and continuity of service by way of separate Writ Petitions. The learned single Judge dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by the management and partly allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the workmen, Hence, these Writ Appeals, at the instance of both the parties. 3. Learned counsel for the management would contend that the workmen were engaged as apprentices for training under the Apprentices Act,1961; except the respondents in W.A.Nos.53 and 57 of 2007, no other persons have put in more than 240 days of service in 12 calendar months immediately preceding the date of alleged termination; the Labour Court, in spite of holding that the workmen are not permanent employees, directed reinstatement without back wages and continuity of service and the same was challenged in the Writ Petitions filed by the management. It is also the contention of the learned counsel that inasmuch as the management is an authority or State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the employment thereunder is public in nature, as contemplated under Article 16, any appointment made violating the constitutional mandatory requirement would be illegal and void ab initio and unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among the qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. He also argues that if the appointment is on daily wage or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued and a temporary employee cannot claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. 4. The quintessence of the learned counsel for the management is that it is not the case of the workmen that they have been appointed against sanctioned posts as also they applied for the posts in furtherance of any advertisement issued in any newspaper and, as they accepted appointment on temporary basis on daily wage for a specific period, such employment cannot provide any right or lien to claim employment from a public sector undertaking and that in the absence of any right to claim employment subsisting in favour of the workmen, the question of termination or retrenchment does not arise at all. In support of his case, the learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions : (i) Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi & Ors., 2006 (4) SCC 1 = 2006 AIR SCW 1991 : "47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a onetime measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. (ii) Kishore Chandra Samal v. Orissa State Cashew Development Corporation Limited, Dhenkanai, 2006 (1) SCC 253 : "4. The Labour Court on perusal of the evidence on record held that the appellant served continuously for many years covering the requisite period of continuous service in a calendar year. Although there is no evidence that the post of Typist was a permanent one, he was engaged from time to time and at the time of termination as the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the Act") had not been complied with, termination of his service is illegal and unjustified. Although there is no evidence that the post of Typist was a permanent one, he was engaged from time to time and at the time of termination as the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short "the Act") had not been complied with, termination of his service is illegal and unjustified. On the basis of the said finding, the Labour Court directed the appellant to be reinstated in his former post." (iii) Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi v. State of Bihar, 90 FJR 465 : "The main grievance of the petitioners before us is that termination of their services is in violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the petitioners can be said to have been "retrenched" within the meaning of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Every department of the Government cannot be treated to be "industry". When the appointments are regulated by the statutory rules, the concept of "industry" to that extent stands excluded. ..." (iv) Management of K.V. Samasthe v. S.B. Gupta, 2005 (4) LLN 388 : "8. In the instant case, as noticed above, the respondent has accepted the appointment including the terms and conditions stipulated in Clause (11) of the appointment order and rejoined the post from 4 September 1995 and continued in the post up to 29 February 1996 on which date the period of six months came to an end. He raised grievances before the Tribunal after the probationary period came to an end by afflux of time. Having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment order and allowed the period for which he was appointed to have been lapsed by afflux of time, he is not permitted to turn back and say that the appointment de hors the Rules or the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment, were not legally valid." .(v) Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyaghai Amarsingh, 2005 (8) SCC 750 : "8. To attract the provisions of Section 25-F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be less than one year. Section 25-B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". To attract the provisions of Section 25-F, one of the conditions required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be less than one year. Section 25-B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this section is that if a workman has put in uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lockout or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be continuous service for that period. Thus the workman shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e. 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25-B. However, the workman must have been in service during the period i.e. not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in sub-section (1). The workman must be in the employment of the employer concerned not only on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of subsection (1) of Section 25-B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (i) of Section 25-B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of sub-section (2)(a)(i), the workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the section postulate that if the workman has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25-F." (vi) Bhaskar, R, v. Presiding Officer, I Addl.Labour Court, Madras, 2007 (3) LLJ 907 : "6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, I find force in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent Management. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the second respondent-Management, there is a clear cut distinction as between the provisions contained in Section 2(g) read along with Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 25-B(2)(a)(iii) of the Central Act, namely the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said distinction has been clearly noted by the Supreme Court in the recent decision Sriram Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Mahak Singh (2007-II-LLJ 393) ..." (vii) Sivakumari, R, v. Ramanathapuram Mavatta Payirchipetra Edainilai Asiriyargal Sangam (FB), 2007 (5) CTC 561 : "24. Therefore, if the recruitment of about four thousand secondary grade teachers to the Government Schools, were to be made in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the respondents ought to have followed the following procedure namely - A. Notify the Employment Exchanges. B. Issue publications in newspapers having wide circulation, inviting Applications. C. Display the notification in the notice boards of the respective offices or make announcements in the media." (viii) Unreported judgment in W.A.Nos.265 and 267 of 2007, dated 08.08.2007 : "The question of regularization, absorption or permanency of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or adhoc employees fell for consideration before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court recently in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (3) reported in 2006 (4) SCC 1 :: 2006 (4) SCALE 197 :: AIR 2006 SC 1806 . In the said case, the Supreme Court has held that temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or adhoc employees appointed/recruited de hors the rule, even if continued for long, are not entitled for regularization. What the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court directed in the case of Uma Devi (3), is principle of regularization in relation to such appointments, which were irregular in nature, but not illegal. " (ix) Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India & Ors., 2006 (8) SCC 111 : "9. This court in Visweshwara Rao ( 1998 (2) SCC 332 ), therefore, held that intimation to the employment exchange about the vacancy and candidates sponsored from the employment exchange is mandatory. " (ix) Arun Kumar Nayak v. Union of India & Ors., 2006 (8) SCC 111 : "9. This court in Visweshwara Rao ( 1998 (2) SCC 332 ), therefore, held that intimation to the employment exchange about the vacancy and candidates sponsored from the employment exchange is mandatory. This court also held that in addition and consistent with the principle of fair play, justice and equal opportunity, the appropriate department or establishment should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation, announcement on radio, television and employment news bulletins and consider all the candidates who have applied. This view was taken to afford equal opportunity to all the eligible candidates in the matter of employment. The rationale behind such direction is also consistent with the sound public policy that wider the opportunity of the notice of vacancy by wider publication in the newspapers, radio, television and employment news bulletin, the better candidates with better qualifications are attracted, so that adequate choices are made available and the best candidates would be selected and appointed to subserve the public interest better. " (x) Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr., v. Ashok Kumar & Another, 2008 AIR SCW 1474 : "8. Section 6-N of the Act unlike Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not provide that working for a period of 240 days in the preceding year would sub-serve the purpose. What is necessary under the said provision is working for a period of 240 days in one year. Once, a workman, has been in continuous service for not less that one year before his retrenchment, one months notice in writing indicating the reason thereof or wages in lieu thereof, as also compensation equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of service or in part thereof in the Act provides that no notice would be necessary to be served, if the retrenchment has been in terms of an agreement which specified a date for the termination of service. The said proviso is not in pari materia with Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." .(xi) Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban, 2007 (3) LLN 597 : "6. The said proviso is not in pari materia with Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947." .(xi) Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban, 2007 (3) LLN 597 : "6. The question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether in a situation of this nature, the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court should have directed reinstatement of the respondent with full back-wages. Whereas at one point of time, such a relief used to be automatically granted, but keeping in view several other factors and in particular the doctrine of public employment and involvement of the public money, a change in the said trend is now found in the recent decisions of this Court. This court in a large number of decisions in the matter of grant of relief of the kind distinguished between a daily-wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. ..." (xii) Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Neelam, 2005 (5) SCC 91 : "12. The Industrial Courts like any other court must be held to have some discretion in the matter of grant of relief. There is no proposition of law that once an order of termination is held to be bad in law, irrespective of any other consideration the Labour Court would be bound to grant relief to the workman. The Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision which mandates the Industrial Court to grant relief in every case to the workman. The extent to which a relief can be moulded will inevitably depend upon the facts and circumstances obtaining in each case. In the absence of any express provision contained in the statute in this behalf, it is not for the court to lay down a law which will have a universal application. " (xiii) P.S.S. Bommanna Chettiar Sons v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, 1973 LIC 882 Madras : "4. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue whether the case posed a problem of retrenchment or abandonment of service, is well-founded. There is a marked distinction between the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and that of the Labour Court. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue whether the case posed a problem of retrenchment or abandonment of service, is well-founded. There is a marked distinction between the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and that of the Labour Court. Whilst the Labour Court functioning for all purposes enumerated under the Act has certain duties and responsibilities as prescribed therein, the matters to be dealt with and which are within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal as prescribed under Section 7-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are entirely different. Item (10) in the third Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is one of the matters within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. The item is retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment. ..." (xiv) H.P. State Electricity Board v. Ranjeet Singh, 2008 (2) LLJ 629 SC : "7. When a reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the question not only as to whether the termination of a workman is justified or not but to grant appropriate relief, it would consist of examination of the question whether the reinstatement should be with full or partial back wages or none. Such a question is one of fact depending upon the evidence to be produced before the Tribunal. If after the termination of the employment, the workman is gainfully employed elsewhere it is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether or not reinstatement should be with full back wages or with continuity of employment. Such questions can be appropriately examined only in a reference. When a reference is made under Section 10 of the Act, all incidental questions arising thereto can be determined by the Tribunal and in this particular case, a specific question has been referred to the Tribunal as to the nature of relief to be granted to the workmen. " (xv) P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, 97 FJR 62 SC : "In Thakur Jugal Kishore vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., ( AIR 1967 SC 1494 ), this court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar, under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was a court. " (xv) P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, 97 FJR 62 SC : "In Thakur Jugal Kishore vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., ( AIR 1967 SC 1494 ), this court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar, under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was a court. It was held that the Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same powers as was given to an ordinary civil court by the Code of Civil Procedure, including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. ..." (xvi) S. Ramachandran v. S. Ramachandran, The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, Chennai, 2006 (4) CTC 666 : "5. If the principles set out in the said paragraph are applied to the facts of this case, it can be safely held that the jurisdiction exercisable by the first respondent as a revisional authority would satisfy all the requirements that have been set out in the above referred to decision of the Supreme Court. Even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression used is only "court" and not a "civil court". Therefore, it can be safely held that there is every jurisdiction vested in the first respondent to condone the delay involved in preferring the Revision Petition by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act." 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the workmen would contend that the workmen are all ITI trained and they underwent apprenticeship in the management industry under the Apprentices Act, 1961, on being sponsored through Employment Exchange. Per contra, learned counsel for the workmen would contend that the workmen are all ITI trained and they underwent apprenticeship in the management industry under the Apprentices Act, 1961, on being sponsored through Employment Exchange. It is also his contention that the vacancies in the skilled artisan posts in the appellant industry are filled by batch wise absorption of artisan trainees who underwent apprenticeship and the said method of recruitment i.e., batch wise absorption of the apprentices is in accordance with Clause 4.4 of the management companys recruitment policy; further, the workmen were recruited against the vacancies, but, till-date, they are deliberately not given permanent posting as given in the previous batches and, instead, they are given appointment as temporaries for six years with artificial break ups; some of the workmen have also filed W.P.No.4601 of 1992 on the file of this Court praying for permanency and the moment they approached the Court, all the workmen were retrenched after six years of their continuous service and, in their place, contract labourers were employed, by introducing contract labour system and later workmen in the name of On the Job Trainees were employed by the management and that some of the co-workmen, namely, Mamundiraj and 18 others were reinstated by an order of this Court and absorbed as skilled artisans. 6. The mainstay of the learned counsel for the workmen is that the management, being a public sector undertaking, ought to have given the same treatment to the other similarly situated workmen as in this case, as a model employer, which is not done, as a result of which the workmen were forced to raise industrial disputes under Section 2-A of the Act. 7. In his last limb of submissions, the learned counsel would contend that though the Labour Court had passed an award, ordering reinstatement of the workmen, they were denied back wages and continuity of service and other attendant benefits, aggrieved over which the workmen filed writ petitions, wherein, though the learned single Judge confirmed the award passed by the Labour Court and ordered continuity of service, the workmen were denied back wages, which is illegal. To substantiate his contentions, the learned counsel cited the following decisions : (i) N. Mamundiraj and Ors. v. The Management of BHEL, 1999 FJR 215 : "22. To substantiate his contentions, the learned counsel cited the following decisions : (i) N. Mamundiraj and Ors. v. The Management of BHEL, 1999 FJR 215 : "22. The continuous service in the context of the scheme and the text of the Act does not postulate a continuous relationship of master and servant. Our considered view is what the statute accepts that the workmen should be in the employment of the employer for a period of 480 days in preceding 24 calender months. To hold otherwise would not only alter the provisions of the Act as well as the object but would result in draconian rule of law resulting in perpetuating injustice." .(ii) A.P.S.R.T.C., Cuddapah, v. K.Bajjanna, 2002 (9) SCC 739 : "4. On consideration of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties on the question of back wages to be paid to the respondent, we are of the view that it will be fair and reasonable to order payment of full back wages from 01-08-1990 till August 1997. When in August 1990 a similarly placed workman was given the relief of reinstatement with back wages by the appellant Corporation, there was no reason why the respondent should not have been granted similar relief. " (iii) Punjab LD & R Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1990 (II) LLJ 70 : "76. .... it is clear that the extended meaning given to the term retrenchment under clause (00) of Section 2 is also subject to the context and the subject matter. Section 25-F prescribes the conditions precedent to a valid retrenchment of workers as discussed earlier. Very briefly, the conditions prescribed are the giving of one months notice indicating the reasons for retrenchment and payment of wages for the period of the notice. ..." (iv) Management of Silver Sands Beach Resort & Ors. v. The Workmen Silver Sands Employees Union and Another, 1996 LIC 112 : "6. ... The weapon of strike being a legitimate weapon in the armoury of the workmen to vindicate their genuine and legitimate grievances the fact that the workmen indulged in sympathetic strike is no ground according to the learned counsel for the workers Union to terminate their services and the retrenchment of such workmen was patently illegal. ..." .(v) Management of Seeranaickenpalayam Weavers Co-operative Production and Sales Society Ltd., Coimbatore, v. N.Selvaraj and Another : "9. ..." .(v) Management of Seeranaickenpalayam Weavers Co-operative Production and Sales Society Ltd., Coimbatore, v. N.Selvaraj and Another : "9. We have already referred to the decision of the Board of Director to retrench the writ-petitioner after the service of charter of demands by the union and the factual finding rendered by the Labour Court, namely, that retrenchment is not bona fide. .... It is settled law that when retrenchment was effected not on bona fide grounds, but it was made under the guise of wrongful termination, the normal rule is to order reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and monetary benefits. When such is the position, the Labour Court having found that the retrenchment is not bona fide and the society has failed to comply with the provisions of S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, committed an error in ordering compensation of Rs.7,752 in lieu of reinstatement in service. The said order cannot be sustained. ..." (vi) M. Sekaran v. General Manager, TNSTC, Coimbatore Division-II, Erode, 2006 (1) LLN 257 Mad. : "18. It is pertinent to point out that even before S.25H was added to the Act industrial adjudication generally recognised the principle that if any employer retrenched the services of an employee on the ground that the employee in question had become surplus, it was necessary that whenever the employer had occasion to employ another hand, the retrenched workman should be given an opportunity to join service. ..." (vii) Management of Madurantakam Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S.Viswanathan, 2005 (2) LLN 38 : "12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final Court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Art.226 or under Art. 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ Court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ Court will not enter into. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ Court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ Court will not enter into. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a Court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court." (viii) Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam and Ors., 1996 (II) LLN 820 : "6. ... Section 25-F prescribes the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. It applies only to the retrenchment of a workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year and not to any workman who has been in continuous service for less than one year. ... The benefit of applicability of Section 25-F can, therefore be claimed by a workman only if he has been in continuous service for not less than one year as defined in Section 25 B. Any other retrenched workman who does not satisfy this requirement of continuous service for not less than one year cannot avail the benefit of Section 25-F which prescribes the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman of this category. Section 25-G prescribes the procedure for retrenchment and ordinarily applies the principle of last come first go. " (ix) Samistha Dube v. City Board Etawah and Another, 1999 (3) SCC 14 : "9. It is true that the rule of "first come, last go" in Section 6-P could be deviated from by an employer because the section uses the word "ordinarily". It is, therefore, permissible for the employer to deviate from the rule in cases of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence etc., as held in Swadesamitran Ltd. vs. Workmen. It is true that the rule of "first come, last go" in Section 6-P could be deviated from by an employer because the section uses the word "ordinarily". It is, therefore, permissible for the employer to deviate from the rule in cases of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence etc., as held in Swadesamitran Ltd. vs. Workmen. But the burden will then be on the employer to justify the deviation. No such attempt has been made in he present case. Hence, it is clear that there is clear violation of Section 6-P of the U.P. Act." .(x) Bank of Baroda v. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari, 2005 (2) LLN 671 SC : "8. ... In the instant case, the workman has established the fact which, of course, has not been denied by the bank, that he did work as a driver of the car belonging to the bank during the relevant period which come to more than 240 days of work. He has produced 3 vouchers which showed that he had been paid certain sums of money towards his wages and the said amount has been debited to the account of the bank. As against this, as found by the fora below, no evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the bank to rebut even this piece of evidence produced by the workman." (xi) Manager (P&A), ONGC Ltd., Chennai, v. G. Radhakrishnan, 2005 (2) LLN 881 Mad.: "25. ... As we have found from the factual matrix involved in the case on hand that the claim of the appellant as regards the employment of the respondent does not fall within S.2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it will have to be held that the services of the respondent could not have been terminated atleast without following the statutory requirements as stipulated under S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act as the termination resorted to by the appellant squarely falls within the definition of retrenchment as defined under S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ..." (xii) Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (3) SCC 588 : "13. The Tribunal as also the High Court, both appear to have been moved by the fact that the appellant had encashed the cheque through which retrenchment compensation was paid to him. ..." (xii) Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (3) SCC 588 : "13. The Tribunal as also the High Court, both appear to have been moved by the fact that the appellant had encashed the cheque through which retrenchment compensation was paid to him. They intended to say that once retrenchment compensation was accepted by the appellant, the chapter stands closed and it is no longer open to the appellant to challenge his retrenchment. This, we are constrained to observe, was wholly erroneous and was not the correct approach. The appellant was a casual labour who had attained the "temporary" status after having put in ten years of service. Like any other employee, he had to sustain himself, or, may be, his family members on the wages he got. On the termination of his services, there was no hope left for payment of salary in future. ..." (xiii) Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. Marketing – cum- Processing Service Society Ltd. and Others, 1999 (1) LLJ 1261 SC : "10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the Tribunal, Labour Court or Board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back-wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back-wages instead of full back-wages." (xiv) Mahavir Singh v. U.P.S.E.B. and Others, 1999 (II) LLJ 482 SC : "3. Once the termination is held to be illegal, we fail to appreciate how the entire reference could have been rejected. The dispute lingered on for number of years. That would not mean that the dispute had ceased to exist. Once the termination is held to be illegal, we fail to appreciate how the entire reference could have been rejected. The dispute lingered on for number of years. That would not mean that the dispute had ceased to exist. It is, of course, true that belatedly the dispute was raised but that has been taken care of by the Labour Court by not awarding full-back wages but only 50 per cent of the back-wages all throughout from the date of termination till reinstatement. Which order as passed by the Labour Court could not be said to be in anyway uncalled for an illegal. ..." (xv) UPSRTC and Another v. UP Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and Others, 1995 (2) SCC 1 : "11. ... What is indeed required is to see that the nation gets the benefit of time, money and energy spent on the trainees, which would be so when they are employed in preference to non-trained direct recruits. This would also meet the legitimate expectations of the trainees. 12. In the background of what has been noted above, we state that the following would be kept in mind while dealing with the claim of trainees to get employment after successful completion of their training: (1) Other things being equal, a training apprentice should be given preference over direct recruits. .(2) For this, a trainee would not be required to get his name sponsored by any employment exchange. The decision of this Court in Union of India v. N. Hargopal would permit this. .(3) If age bar would come in the way of the trainee, the same would be relaxed in accordance with what is stated in this regard, if any, in the service rule concerned. If the service rule be silent on this aspect, relaxation to the extent of the period for which the apprentice had undergone training would be given. .(4) The training institute concerned would maintain a list of the persons trained year-wise. The persons trained earlier would be treated as senior to the persons trained later. In between the trained apprentices, preference shall be given to those who are senior." 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records and the decisions coupled with the order impugned. 9. The persons trained earlier would be treated as senior to the persons trained later. In between the trained apprentices, preference shall be given to those who are senior." 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the records and the decisions coupled with the order impugned. 9. Conceding, the management had selected workmen as apprentices after their names were sponsored through Employment Exchange and appointed them subsequently after due selection on their completion of training in batches and, thereafter, they were absorbed as Artisans as per Rule 4.4 of the managements recruitment policy. In the said rule, it is not stated that after completion of the Apprenticeship training, the names of the workmen should once again be sponsored through the Employment Exchange for absorption. When that be so, the management cannot say that the names of the workmen are not sponsored through Employment Exchange at the time of their absorption/appointment and, therefore, they should be treated as back door entrants. .10. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the management in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Umadevi & Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , deals with the appointment of daily wagers/temporary employees, contrary to the recruitment rules, where the claim of the employees were to prevent the Government by making regular recruitment on the ground that they were entitled to get absorption and regularization and, in that case, appointment of the temporary employees was found contrary to the recruitment rules. 11. In the said case of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the question of regularization, absorption or permanency of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or adhoc employees fell for consideration, whereupon it was held that temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or adhoc employees appointed/recruited de hors the rule, even if continued for long, are not entitled for regularization. What the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court decided in the said case was the principle of regularization in relation to such appointments, which were irregular in nature, but not illegal. 12. In this case, the workmen were appointed as per the recruitment policy and rules followed by the management and the workmen were originally selected for apprenticeship training after their names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange and then they were selected by a Selection Committee after interview and thereafter absorbed. 12. In this case, the workmen were appointed as per the recruitment policy and rules followed by the management and the workmen were originally selected for apprenticeship training after their names were sponsored by the Employment Exchange and then they were selected by a Selection Committee after interview and thereafter absorbed. Hence, the entry of the workmen in the service of the management as Apprentices and their subsequent appointment cannot be treated as back door entry. Absorption of the Apprentice Trainees is also approved by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of U.P.S.R.T.C. and another v. U.P.Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and others, 1995 (2) SCC 1 , which was also followed in U.P.Rajya Vidyut Parishad Apprentice Welfare Association and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2000 5 SCC 438 . Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be stated that the selection of the workmen as Apprentices and also their subsequent appointments are contrary to the recruitment policy of the management, particularly in view of rule 4. At the same time, it cannot also be said that the names of the workmen were not sponsored through Employment Exchange, 13. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mamundiraj and 18 others, 1999 FJR 215, who were similarly placed like of that of the workmen, had directed the management to confer permanent status to them, as per the seniority. 14. An objection was raised by the learned counsel for the management that the workmen had not approached the authority or the Labour court at once; hence, they are guilty of laches and, as such, no relief could have been granted by the Labour court for reinstatement. 15. In this connection, it is to be stated the litigation between the Management and Mamundiraj and others was pending till 1999 and the writ petition W.P.No.4601 of 1991 filed by some of the workmen herein was also pending till 1999 before this Court and after the disposal of the same, the workmen were under the impression that they would be given similar treatment by the management. But, the same having been denied, the workmen were compelled to move the Labour Court. Therefore, the delay is properly explained. 16. But, the same having been denied, the workmen were compelled to move the Labour Court. Therefore, the delay is properly explained. 16. Since the workmen were appointed as apprentices, the management cannot say that the services of the workmen were disengaged and, on account of their nonemployment, they cannot not seek the status of permanency before the authority, constituted under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981. 17. Though it is contended by the management that there are no vacancies available to engage the workmen any further, it could be seen from the notification published in the Employment News, 24-30, June, 2006, that there were 90 vacancies in the post of Artisan-IV and 250 vacancies in various posts in the year 2005. Therefore the said contention that the workmen could not be permanently absorbed due to want of vacancies has no basis. 18. Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, gives preference to the workmen who are already employed and subsequently retrenched, for future vacancies. On the strength of the order passed by the authority under the Act giving permanent status to Mamundiraj and 18 othes, learned counsel for the workmen submitted that the workmen herein are also similarly placed and the action of the management is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which, in our view, is acceptable. .19. The disengagement of the workmen without giving any notice or without giving any compensation is also admitted by the management during the course of its evidence and it is also admitted that there is no difference amongst Mamundiraj and 18 others and the workmen, except they belonging to different batches. Hence, the Labour Court followed the Division Bench decision of this Court in Mamundirajs case, cited supra, and ordered reinstatement. 20. Cessation of work of the workmen is not due to the act of the workmen nor can it be termed due to any fault on the part of the workmen. It is also seen that Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act are violated by the management, as some of the juniors to the workmen were given re-employment and, subsequently, some fitters had been appointed, which was justified on the ground that they obtained gold medals. It is also seen that Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act are violated by the management, as some of the juniors to the workmen were given re-employment and, subsequently, some fitters had been appointed, which was justified on the ground that they obtained gold medals. Further, since the workmen were not given any notice prior to the retrenchment, there is a violation of Section 25-N of the Act. 21. All the apprentices, who completed their training batchwise, were given appointment as could be seen from the deposition given by the management before the Labour Court. In the absence of any claim of distinction among Mamundiraj and 18 others and the present workmen except that they were in the earlier batch of apprentices, all other respects including the selection method followed for apprenticeship training and appointment are one and the same. The management having accepted to implement the order of the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Trichy, granting permanent status to the said Mamundiraj and others, is bound to apply the same yardstick to the workmen in these cases and affording a different treatment to the workmen is certainly a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 122. Though the learned counsel for the management contended that the workmen have closed their PF accounts and received the same without any demur and therefore it is not open to them to claim reinstatement and other reliefs before the Labour Court, mere acceptance of the P.F. amount will not disentitle the workmen to maintain the claim petition before the Labour Court, as there is no estoppel or waiver of fundamental right. .23. It is seen from Page No.23 of the Additional Typed Set of Papers filed by the management that by an order dated 28.01.1992, the workman was appointed as a Fitter on purely temporary basis for a period of two months i.e., up to 28.03.1992. At the same time, it is also seen from Page No.24 of the same Typed Set that even before the expiry of the said period of two months, by another order dated 30.01.1992, the management reposted the said workman with Staff No.28406, along with several others, as casual employees, mentioning the staff numbers and the departments and also requesting the Controlling Officer to send the joining report of the individuals to the department concerned. What may, the appointment of the workmen with staff numbers in the Department would clearly indicate that the appointments have to be made as per the requirement, which fact was taken into account by the Labour Court and also the learned single Judge, while ordering reinstatement of the workmen. 124. Since the workmen were not in employment on the date when the claim petition was filed, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement, but without back wages and continuity of service. It is the specific case of the workmen that they were engaged from 1988 to 1993 and thereafter they were disengaged and there is a cessation of work. Till 2000, the workmen had not approached the Labour Court for one reason or the other. Under the circumstance, the workmen, having not worked in all these years, are not entitled to get back wages on the principle of No Work, No Pay. 125. The training imparted is rather exhaustive and elaborate. Sufficient amount of money is also spent on the trainees by way of payment of stipend to them. What more is, there is an obligation on the employer to provide an apprentice with training in his trade in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The legislature made adequate provisions to see that the competent persons receive due training to cater to the needs of increasing demand for skilled craftsmen on one hand and to improve the employment potential of the trainees on the other. Good amount of money, which would be public money in case of public bodies like the management, is also spent on training the apprentices. Further, during the period of training, the apprentices are put under a discipline akin to that of regular employees. Therefore, the training imparted is desired to be result-oriented and the trainees are treated similar to the regular employees. 126. The scheme of training had been introduced to promote chances of employment of educated unemployed persons. If employer would not provide employment to the qualified apprentices, the same would amount to destruction of developed human resources. What is indeed required is to see that the nation gets the benefit of time, money and energy spent on the trainees, which would be so when they are employed in preference to non-trained direct recruits. This would also meet the legitimate expectations of the trainees. 127. What is indeed required is to see that the nation gets the benefit of time, money and energy spent on the trainees, which would be so when they are employed in preference to non-trained direct recruits. This would also meet the legitimate expectations of the trainees. 127. The Supreme Court, in U.P.S.R.T.C. v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh, referred to above, framed certain guidelines to be kept in mind, while dealing with the claim of trainees to get employment after successful completion of their training. The said guidelines are reproduced as under : .(1) Other things being equal, a trained apprentice should be given preference over direct recruits. .(2) For this, a trainee would not be required to get his name sponsored by any employment exchange. .(3) If age bar would come in the way of the trainee, the same would be relaxed in accordance with what is stated in this regard, if any, in the service rule concerned. If the service rule be silent on this aspect, relaxation to the extent of the period for which the apprentice had undergone training would be given. .(4) The training institute concerned would maintain a list of the persons trained yearwise. The persons trained earlier would be treated as senior to the persons trained later. In between the trained apprentices, preference shall be given to those who are senior. 28. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, 2008 (9) Supreme Court Cases 24, the issue regarding the extension of benefit to similarly situated persons was dealt with and though the proposition of law was accepted that wrong decision in one case could not be extended to others, on facts, it was held that once a judgment had attained finality, it could not be termed as wrong and its benefit should be extended to other similarly situated persons. 29. The above decision of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, as, in this case, Mamundiraj and others, who were similarly placed like that of the workmen, were given permanent status by the management, but it was not done in the case of the workmen herein, thereby violating the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 30. 30. Following the above settled legal proposition and in view of our findings in the foregoing paragraphs and also the fact that the workmen were recruited through employment exchange as apprentices; they were appointed to the posts; their services were continued and without following the procedure contemplated, their services were terminated and also similarly placed persons were already reinstated, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, all these Writ Appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.Nos.2 of 2007 are also dismissed.