Shri Vikramjeet Marwaha v. First Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div. ), Dehradun
2008-09-16
V.K.GUPTA
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment In this petition filed under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, two orders, one dated 25-3-2006 and the second dated 9-5-2007 are under challenge. Both these orders have been passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Dehradun in the course of a suit pending in his court between the two parties. 2. Vide the first order dated 25-3-2006, the learned trial court granted an interim injunction in favour of the respondent no. 2 - plaintiff against the petitioner-defendant restraining the petitioner from interfering in any manner with respect to the property in question and also to maintain status quo thereupon. Also, a specific restraint order was passed against the petitioner with respect to the construction activity over the disputed piece of land. 3. On 29th August, 2006, the petitioner filed an application seeking leave, of the trial court for starting construction over the property in question and vide the impugned order dated 9-5-2007, this application was rejected. 4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at great length, I find that on both the occasions the learned court below went wrong. It wrongly passed the impugned order dated 25-3-2006 restraining the petitioner from interfering in any manner or from raising construction by ordering the maintenance of status quo. I am saying so primarily on the ground that there is a clear distinction and d6marcation between the property claimed by the respondent no. 2 and the property claimed by the petitioner. Whereas the respondent no. 2 claimed his possession and ownership with respect to a piece of land comprised in Khasra no. 13, the petitioner claims his possession and ownership with respect to a distinct piece of land comprised in khasra no. 34 (old khasra no. 20 M). The petitioner-defendant claims to have purchased this property vide a registered sale deed dated 7-10-1978 which fact is not in dispute. The petitioner is also in possession of the said piece of land. It is not the contention of respondent No.2 that he is in possession of this particular piece of land. 5.
34 (old khasra no. 20 M). The petitioner-defendant claims to have purchased this property vide a registered sale deed dated 7-10-1978 which fact is not in dispute. The petitioner is also in possession of the said piece of land. It is not the contention of respondent No.2 that he is in possession of this particular piece of land. 5. Actually while going through the impugned order dated 25-3-2006, I find that even though the learned court below did discuss about the prima facie nature and aspect of the case, yet, even upon and after coming to a conclusion that there was a serious doubt as well as a serious dispute about the identification and the demarcation of two properties; without returning any finding at all about there being a prima facie case in favour of the respondent no. . 2, it, nonetheless, went on to discuss the question of balance of convenience of the parties and passed an injunction order in favour of respondent no. 2. The approach adopted by the learned court below was wholly illegal as well as impermissible. Apparently the learned court below acted in doing so without a proper application of mind. 6. The existence of a prima facie case in favour of the party claiming injunction is a sine qua non to the grant of injunction. The trial court in the course of the impugned order dated 25-3-2006 actually did no return any finding that there was a existence any prima facie case in favour of the respondent no.2-plaintiff. On the other hand, the trial court in the course of the order dated 25-3-2006 itself found and came to a conclusion that there was a serious doubt and a serious dispute about the identification and demarcation with respect to the two properties, the plaintiff claiming ownership and possession over one and the defendant claiming ownership and possession over the other and yet, it went on to pass the injunction order. 7. Subsequently, the petitioner got the demarcation and identification done through the revenue authorities which also was a step in the direction of the petitioner's claim to his being owner in possession as far as his own property was concerned, with the property claimed by the respondent no. 2 - plaintiff.
7. Subsequently, the petitioner got the demarcation and identification done through the revenue authorities which also was a step in the direction of the petitioner's claim to his being owner in possession as far as his own property was concerned, with the property claimed by the respondent no. 2 - plaintiff. Based on this demarcation and identification, the petitioner-defendant approached the learned court below for permission to raise construction and vide the second impugned order that permission was declined. In my considered opinion this permission ought to have been granted. 8. Based on the aforesaid reasons, lam of the firm opinion that the learned court below erred grossly in law in passing the impugned orders. 9. Whatever observations have been made above by me are for the limited purpose of the disposal of the present writ petition arising out of the aforesaid two impugned interlocutory orders. I do not wish to make any further observation lest it may prejudice the outcome of the pending suit. 10. Both the impugned orders are set aside. 11. The petitioner-defendant is permitted to raise construction over the property which is in his possession and which belongs to him. This permission, however, is at the risk and responsibility of the petitioner-defendant and shall ultimately abide by the result of the suit. 12. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.