Papanna since deceased by his LRs. v. Chitra Annaswamy
2008-08-13
SUBHASH B.ADI
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Subhash B. Adi, J. This Revision is directed against the order dated 18.2.1989 in L.R.A. No. 1255/1986 passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority confirming the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore in LRF.INA. 1185/79-80 dated 13.11.1986 and for direction to the Land Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore for confirmation of the occupancy rights in respect of 1 acre 6 guntas of land in Sy.No. 47/1 of Kodihalli village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. 2. On 24.12.1974, the deceased petitioner made an application under Section 10 of the Mysore (Personnel and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) seeking for transfer of khata of Sy.No. 47/1 of Kodihalli village from his deceased father’s name to his name. In the said proceedings deceased petitioner made an application for impleading one Smt. Chitra Annaswamy, daughter of A.M. Ramamurthy, Jodidar of Kodihalli village. 3. The case of the deceased petitioner was that, the land measuring 2 acres 2 guntas is in his possession and enjoyment since decades and out of the said area, 37 guntas has been acquired and compensation has been paid to the father of the deceased petitioner namely, Muniswamappa vide order No. LAC. 80/43-44 on 18.10.1946 and the remaining area is in his possession. It is also stated that, he could not prefer an application earlier for change of khata since he was not aware of the details of the assets and liabilities of his father. When he came to know, he has filed the said application. 4. In support of his case, he had produced RTC for the year 1959-60, 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64 before the Special Deputy Commissioner. Smt. Chitra Annaswamy, who was impleaded, did not appear. In view of the amendment to the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act in 1979, all the applications, which were pending before the Special Deputy Commissioner under Inams Abolition Act, stood transferred to the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 30th March 1982 rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the application of the deceased petitioner has already been adjudicated and in view of the acquisition, the Khata is transferred in favour of H.A.L. As against the said rejection, the deceased petitioner had filed a writ petition before this Court.
The Land Tribunal by its order dated 30th March 1982 rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the application of the deceased petitioner has already been adjudicated and in view of the acquisition, the Khata is transferred in favour of H.A.L. As against the said rejection, the deceased petitioner had filed a writ petition before this Court. This Court by order dated 12.9.1982 allowed W.P. No. 17190/1982 and remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal. After remand, the Land Tribunal by its order dated 28.4.1984 granted occupancy rights to the deceased petitioner to an extent of 1 acre 3 guntas, which was revised to 1 acre 6 guntas later on by order dated 28.7.1984. As against the said order, H.A.L. had filed W.P. No. 18296/1984. The said writ petition was also allowed and the matter was again remanded to the Land Tribunal. On remand, the Land Tribunal by its order dated 13.11.1986 rejected the application of the deceased petitioner. As against the rejection, the deceased petitioner filed an appleal in L.R.A. No. 1255/1986 before the Land Reforms Appellate Authority, before the Appellate Authority, both the parties led additional evidence oral as well as documentary. Both of the members of the Appellate Authority differed in their opinion interalia, the Revenue Member agreed to concur with the findings of the Land Tribunal whereas the Judicial Member differed with the findings of the Land Tribunal. In view of the conflicting opinion between both the members, matter was referred to the Principal City Civil Judge, Metropolitan Area, Bangalore under Section 116-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. The learned Principal City Civil Judge by his Reference Order dated 27th January 1989 in Ref. Case No. 1/1987 agreed with the view taken by the Revenue Member, holding that the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner dated 13.11.1958 has become final. In view of the order of the Reference Court, the appeal filed by the deceased petitioner was rejected. It is this order and the order of the Land Tribunal have been called in question in this revision. 5. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the petitioner died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. 6.
In view of the order of the Reference Court, the appeal filed by the deceased petitioner was rejected. It is this order and the order of the Land Tribunal have been called in question in this revision. 5. During the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the petitioner died and his legal representatives have been brought on record. 6. Sri Shaker Shetty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that, the acquisition proceedings were initiated by the State during 1943-44 and an area of 39 guntas (37 guntas + 2 guntas kharab land) was acquired for the benefit of the respondent - H.A.L. the possession of the remaining land, remained with the deceased petitioner’s family. Father of the deceased petitioner had filed an application in 1958 and the said application was rejected without hearing the father of the deceased petitioner and in turn, an order was passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner on 13.11.1958 inter alia, holding that the entire land of Sy.No. 47 has been acquired for the benefit of H.A.L. He submitted that, as regards to the acquisition of land is concerned, the witness namely, B.K. Manikya Murthy was examined on behalf of the H.A.L., he in his evidence, has stated that, an extent of 31 guntas in Sy.No. 47/1 only has been acquired, and has also admitted that, the H.A.L. is not a tenant as defined under the provisions of Karnataka Inams Abolition Act. He also relied on the RTC entries pertaining to 1959 to 1964 to show that the name of the father of the deceased petitioner was entered in the revenue records. 7. He further submitted that, if an order is passed without hearing the person, such orders are void ab initio in law. Further submitted that, if an order is passed without jurisdiction, such orders are also void ab initio in law. In this regard, he relied on the statement of the witnesses examined by the respondent-H.A.L. and pointed out that, acquisition is only to the extent of 39 guntas and he also relied on the notification of acquisition of land and submitted that, to the extent of 39 guntas, the land was acquired and this fact is not disputed by the Government also, beyond this, H.A.L. has no right.
He referred to the provisions of the Act and submitted that, for grant of occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act, it is only Kadim tenants, permanent tenants, quasi-permanent tenants, holders of minor inma and inamdars alone can make an application for determination of their claim under the provisions of Section 10 of the Act. Referring to these provisions, he submitted that, HAL neither can be called as kadim tenant nor protected tenant nor quasi-permanent tenant nor it is an inamdar or the minor inamdar to claim grant of occupancy rights. If the HAL has no jurisdiction to make an application, any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in this regard is void in the eye of law and it becomes uneforceable. He further submitted that, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner in 1958, one rejecting the claim of the deceased father of the deceased petitioner and also another holding that the HAL has acquired entire land, both are violative of principles of natural justice and are one passed without jurisdiction. 8. In this regard, he relied on several decisions to contend that, if the order is one without jurisdiction or an order is passed without complying with the principles of Audi Alteram Partem, such orders would become void in law and they need not be considered and further submitted that, the Appellate Authority as well as the Land Tribunal have rejected the application of the deceased petitioner on the sole ground that, earlier the Deputy Commissioner in the year 1958 has rejected the application filed by the deceased father of the deceased petitioner. He submitted that, if the orders are void orders and such orders are not binding on the Tribunal and it is not precluded from considering the application of the deceased petitioner. He also submitted that, when an application is made for grant of occupancy rights well within the time stipulated under the provisions of the Act and if any other order is passed earlier, a duty is cast on the Tribunal to club the applications and pass appropriate order. Without doind so, the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. 9. In support if his contentions, he relied on a judgment reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 in the matter of Kiran Singh and Others Vs.
Without doind so, the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. 9. In support if his contentions, he relied on a judgment reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 in the matter of Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others and submitted that, it is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without having jurisdiction is a nullify and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. He also relied on another decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 344 in the matter of Union of India and Another Vs. Sri Babu Ram Lalla and submitted that, an order found to be null and void is deemed to have never been existed. He also relied on a judgment reported in ILR 2000 Kar 1929 in the matter of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh and Others and submitted that, the Courts and the Tribunals have power to recall its orders, if they are found to be wangled with fraud. He relied on another decision reported in ILR 1977 Kar 700 in the matter of Muniyellappa Vs. B.M. Krishnamurthy and Others and submitted that, any order passed in violation of principles of Audi Alteram Partem is nullify and it is unenforceable. Relying on these decisions, he further submitted that, the order passed in 1958 being one without jurisdiction being nullify in law, it cannot be looked into or it cannot be enforced against the petitioner. He also submitted that, the deceased petitioner is a tenant and this is clear from the material produced by him before the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority.
He also submitted that, the deceased petitioner is a tenant and this is clear from the material produced by him before the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. He referred to the order passed by the Land Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority and submitted that, both Appellate Authority and the Land Tribunal have noticed that, the entries are made in favour of the deceased petitioner and have also found that, the land acquired by the Government for the benefit of HAL is only 39 guntas, despite the admission and findings, the Land Tribunal has erroneously rejected the application of the deceased petitioner. He further submitted that, the Appellate Authority, before which the additional evidence was led, has not considered the material only on the ground that the application filed by the deceased father of the deceased petitioner is rejected in the earlier proceedings. 10. Sri S.V. Shastry, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2-HAL submitted that, the deceased petitioner has not filed application for grant of occupancy rights under Section 10 of the Act, the application is one for transfer of khata and such an application is not maintainable under the provisions of Section 10 of the Act. He submitted that, as against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 13.11.1958, an appeal was filed before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in Appeal Nos. 161/1989 and 84/1990, both the appeals were dismissed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by order dated 11th December 1990, against which two writ petitions were filed in W.P. Nos. 8416 and 8417/1991 and both the writ petitions hav ebeen dismissed on 6.1.1997. He submitted that in 1958 itself, the Deputy Commissioner had considered the application filed under Section 10 of the Act by the deceased father of the deceased petitioner and the said application was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. If an application filed under Section 10 is one rejected, there is no power for the Deputy Commissioner to consider one more application under the same provision filed by the successor in interest. The present application filed by the deceased petitioner is also under Section 10 of the Act. He submitted that, it is not that the deceased petitioner is claiming independent right other than the claim made by his deceased father. If the father had lost the application, it is not open to the petitioner to make another application for the same relief.
He submitted that, it is not that the deceased petitioner is claiming independent right other than the claim made by his deceased father. If the father had lost the application, it is not open to the petitioner to make another application for the same relief. He futher submitted that, in 1958 itself, the possession of the land was handed over to the HAL and HAL has been in possession of the said land since then. He further submitted that, the HAL had made an application under Section 13 of the Act for grant of the occupancy right and accordingly, the Deputy Commissioner had passed an order on 13.11.1958 in favour of the HAL and the said order has also reached finality in view of the dismissal of the appeal filed at a belated stage by the deceased petitioner herein. As regards to the cultivation by the petitioner is concerned, he submitted that the relevant records show the entry of the name of the HAL., and further submitted that the application of the petitioner is not maintainable. He submitted that the HAL is in possession of the land in question. 11. In the light of the rival contentions, the point that arises for consideration in this Revision Petition is: 1) Whether the order passed on 13.11.1958 could be ignored at this length of time, on the ground of want of jurisdiction? 12. Facts, which are not in dispute are, the deceased petitioner’s father had made an application under Section 10 of the Act interalia, claiming the grant of occupnacy rights. It is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, which reads as under: “10. Determination of claims under Sections 4,5,6,7,8 and 9.- (1) The Tribunal shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a kadim tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasi-permanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam or a inamdar claims to be registered as occupant under Sections 4,5,6,7 and 9 or the holder of a minor inma claims to be registered as holder under Section 8, as the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands and claims should be allowed.
(2) A tenant found to be in possession of any land on the first day of july, 1948, shall be presumed to be a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 unless the inamdar proves that such tenant is not a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in clause (14) of sub-section (1) of Section 2. Provided that in the case of a tenant in minor inam such presumption shall be raised if such tenant is found to be in possession of any land on the 1st day of July 1970. (3)(a) No person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4,5,6,7 and 9 unless the claimant makes an application to the Tribunal. Every such application shall be made,- (i) in respect of lands in inams which have vested in the State before the date of commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1973 within six years from the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act and (ii) in respect of lands in inams which vest in the State on or after the commencement of the Karnataka Inams Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 within three years from the date of vesting of the inam concerned or 31st December 1979 whichever is later. (b) where no application is made within the period specified in clause (a), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall stand extinguished and the land shall vest in the State absolutely; such land shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules relating to grant of lands. (c) The provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and the relevant rules framed thereunder shall mutatis mutandis apply to an enquiry for determination of a claim under this Section 5 and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.” Section 10 confers right on the kadim tenant, permanent tenant, quasi-permanent tenant, holder of minor inam or inamdar to make an application for grant of occupancy rights to register them as an occupant of the lands. In this case, the application filed by the father of the deceased petitioner is rejected on 13.11.1958 is not in dispute and it is also not in dispite that, the said order was not challenged till 1989. It is only in 1989, appeals were filed in Appeal Nos.
In this case, the application filed by the father of the deceased petitioner is rejected on 13.11.1958 is not in dispute and it is also not in dispite that, the said order was not challenged till 1989. It is only in 1989, appeals were filed in Appeal Nos. 161/1989 and 84/1990 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The Karnataka Appellante Tribunal by its order dated 11th August 1990 has dimissed both the appeals and against which writ petitions were also filed by the deceased petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8416 and 8417/1991 and both the writ petitions were dismissed for default on 6.1.1997. The facts remain that, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner in 1958 have reached the finality, if on one hand, the order passed under Section 10 has reached finality, the petitioner being the successor-in-interest of the estate of the deceased father, if he is not making any independent claim and claiming only as a successor, he cannot maintain application for the same relief. Assuming for a moment that the order was passed without hearing the petitioner’s father, that would have been a ground available for the petitioner for challenging the said order and in this case, it is found that the said order was challenged and has been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal as well as by this Court in writ petition. In view of the same, in my opinion, it would not be proper to go into the question, whether the order passed on 13.11.1958 was with jurisdiction or without jurisdiction. 13. After 50 years, it would not be proper to set the clock back to consider as to whether the order of 1958 was one with jurisdiction or without jurisdiction, which has survived and is confirmed by the judicial orders. In the light of the earlier order dated 13.11.1958, now it is not open to hold that the said order is not operative or void order. On consideration of evidence, both Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority have found that, the application of the petitioner is not maintainable. It is also found that, the name of HAL is entered in column No. 9 of record of rights. These findings show that, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 13.11.1958 has been given effect to, and if that is given effect to, same cannot be unsettled at this stage.
It is also found that, the name of HAL is entered in column No. 9 of record of rights. These findings show that, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner dated 13.11.1958 has been given effect to, and if that is given effect to, same cannot be unsettled at this stage. No doubt, the order without jurisdiction is a nullity and it can be questioned even in a collateral proceedings, but at the same time, lapse of time is also one of the factors, which is required to be considered. The gap between the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the order challenged clearly indicates that the said order was in force for nearly 40 years, neither petitioner nor his father challenged the said order, it is only in 1989, it was sought to be challenged, however, the appeal and writ petitions filed by the petitioner have been dismissed and the order dated 13.11.1958 has been confirmed. 14. If an issue as regard to the grant of occupancy rights has been decided earlier between the parties, same is binding on the parties and successor in interest. In this case, the father of the deceased petitioner herein having suffered the said order, petitioner as a son being the successor in interest, he is bound by the said order. In my view, the second application was rightly rejected by the Tribunal as not maintainable. 15. The question, as to whether the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is one without hearing the deceased petitioner’s father or not, is not the question, which could be gone into at this stage in these proceedings. Admittedly, these are the proceedings initiated on the basis of the application filed by the deceased petitioner herein and if the material produced by the petitioner shows that, such an application has already been rejected, the Tribunal is not required to go into the question as to whether the rejection was right or wrong; the Tribunal was only to consider, whether the second application is maintainable or not.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, if an application is made by the petitioner, if there is already an earlier order, then the said order is required to be recalled and both the applications are required to be considered together, that applies in a case of the order is passed based on the third party application and subsequently, the petitioner has made an application, he should not be denied of his right and in this regard, the Court has held that such application be clubbed. But in case of rejection of application filed by the father, son can get right to file another application. 16. Even assuming that, the Special Deputy Commissioner has granted the land to the HAL, without there being right, however, the said order also stood the test of the scrutiny of the judicial proceedings by way of appeal and writ petition and has been upheld in the said proceedings. If that is so, it would not be correct for this Court to go into the validity of the same order once again. These proceedings cannot be considered as appeal against the earlier orders. 17. Since I have taken a view that the application by the petitioner itself is not maintainable in law, it is not necessary to go into other questions raised by the petitioner. As regard to the principle that, an order passed without notice or in violation of principles of Audi Alteram Partem or principles of natural justice is void order, is not required to be considered as the said arguments was available to the petitioner in the earlier proceedings and the petitioner having lost the same, he is estopped from raising the question of validity of the order dated 13.11.1958 once again. 18. Apart from the above, the father of the petitioner during his life time had not even questioned the said order. I do not think there is any justification to reconsider the said contention. If that is so, the present application filed by the petitioner for the same relief, in my opinion, is not maintainable and both the Land Tribunal as well as the Land Reforms Appellate Authority have rightly held that the application is not maintainable and have rejected the same. I concur with the findings of the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority.
I concur with the findings of the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority. For the reasons stated above, the Revision Petition fails and same is dismissed.