Judgement I. MAHANTY, J. :- The petitioner, M/s. Variety Entertaiment (Pvt.) Ltd. is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and claims to be a "Cable Operator" Within the meaning of the provisions of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995. 2. The petitioner asserts that it is running a system of Cable Television Network and has the necessary license to distribute the television signals received from various broad-casters of Satellite Television channels to different households in the towns/ cities of Orissa. The distribution of Cable Television signals is done through various technical means and the said signals reach the viewers at their individual households through a distributing, system by way of cable networking carried in electrical poles. The petitioner vide its letter dated 12-4-2002 (Annexure-1) to the CESCO (O. P. No. 2) sought for its permission to use its electric poles laid in its operational area in different towns and cities of Orissa for carrying out its cable television business. It is submitted that the CESCO (O. P. No. 2) accorded the requisite permission as sought for by the petitioner, subject to the execution of a 'formal agreement' and fulfilment of other terms and conditions concerning fees etc. under its letter dated 7-5-2002 (Annexure-2). 3. It appears that the petitioner thereafter, by letter dated 21-6-2006 (Annexure-3) wrote to CESCO and sought for execution of an agreement in conformity with CESCO's earlier letter of approval dated 7-5-2002. The CESCO authorities directed the petitioner under cover of their letter dated 24-7-2006 (Annexure-4) to contact the concerned Executive Engineers in charge of the respective distribution divisions, for execution of the said agreement, but, with a rider not to allow more than one Cable Television Operator use of the same electric pole, in difference to a Energy Department Notification No. 18271 dated 11-10-2001 (Annexure-5) and Notification No. 148 dated 4-1-2002 (Annexure-6). 4. The petitioner's further claim is that it contacted CESCO authority to clarify the aforesaid letters and came to learn of the issue of the Govt. Notification referred above and the petitioner came to understand that since there is already a cable operator permitted to use CESCO Electric poles for its cable television business, it cannot be permitted to do so, since that would go against the Energy Department/Govt. Notification referred hereinabove. 5. Notification referred above and the petitioner came to understand that since there is already a cable operator permitted to use CESCO Electric poles for its cable television business, it cannot be permitted to do so, since that would go against the Energy Department/Govt. Notification referred hereinabove. 5. The relevant Clause-16 of the notification dated 11-10-2001 which was cited as the reason for not permitting the petitioner and for not executing a formal agreement as sought for, by the petitioner is quoted hereinbelow : "NOS. OF CABLES and SPACING :- Only the number of Cable shall be in one Pole taking into consideration of the height of the Pole and leading of conductors. The cables is to be identified at every alternate Poles." The Energy Department, it appears, vide its further notification No. 148 dated 4-1-2002 has modified the aforenoted Clause in the following manner : "XX XX XX (4) The 2nd word "the" may be replaced by ''one" under Sl. No. 16 - Nos. of Cables and spacing." 6. The petitioner submits that the State (O. P. No. 1) by issuing the aforesaid notification and the modification thereto, has in effect, sought to restrict use of electric poles, so that, the same may be used only by "one cable operator" alone, to the exclusion of others. In the circumstances, as noted hereinabove, the petitioner in the present writ application urged the following questions for adjudication : "(a) Whether the Guideline No. Sixteen (16) as contained in Energy Department Notification No. 18271 dated 11-10-2001 and as modified in Notification No. 148 dated 4-1-2002 are aimed at creating absolute monopoly and thereby throttle fair competition in general public interest and whether the said guideline is fair and non-discriminatory? (b) Whether the Opposite Party No. 2 is competent to alter the original terms and conditions in granting permission to the petitioner for use of electric poles for Cable TV business to the petitioner's disadvantage in an unfair and discriminatory manner?" 7. Mr. Sanjit Mohanty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned notification issued by the State Govt. under Annexures-5 and 6 are highly objectionable and were aimed at creating an absolute monopoly in favour of a single Cable Operator to the detriment of general public at large and Cable TV viewers in particular. Mr. Sanjit Mohanty, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned notification issued by the State Govt. under Annexures-5 and 6 are highly objectionable and were aimed at creating an absolute monopoly in favour of a single Cable Operator to the detriment of general public at large and Cable TV viewers in particular. He further asserts that soon after the guidelines under Annexures 5 and 6 came into force, it was only certain specific cable operators who were given permission and agreements were entered into by CESCO and WESCO for use of their electric poles, effectively thereby denying any opportunity either to the petitioner or any other similar person to carry out its business of Cable TV Network. Therefore, he submits that Clause 16 and its amendment and the object behind it, was only to ensure that no other party, other than O. P. No. 5 could carry on its business of Cable TV Network. It was, therefore, asserted that the said Clause, being per se discriminatory and resulting in the creation of a monopoly in favour of O. P. No. 5, ought to be held to be discriminatory and unreasonable. 8. The petitioner seeks to challenge Clause 16 of the impugned notification essentially on three grounds : (i) Restricting operation to only one cable operator and selecting a cable operator without public notice, is unreasonable. (ii) Clause 16 creates a monopoly in favour of one cable operator and is, therefore, is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India since, no guideline for selection of the recipient has been statutorily laid down, and (iii) The recommendation of the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission, in favour of "one cable operator" either "co-axial" or "optic-fibre" is erroneous and misconceived, being opposed to the submissions made by Electric Distribution Companies before the Commission and, therefore, such opinion may not be accepted since the same has not been based on logical analysis in order to describe as reasonable and, therefore, such Report ought not to be accepted as binding on the parties. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal and others, AIR 1995 SC 1236 , wherein, the observations of Hon'ble Apex Court is as follows : "x x x x The freedom of speech and expression includes right to acquire information and to disseminate it. (Para-11 at page 1259) X X X X However the right to freedom of speech and expression also includes the right to educate, to inform and to entertain and also the right to be educated, informed and entertained. The former is the right of to telecaster and the latter that of the viewers." (Para-17 at Page-1266) x x x x There is no doubt that since the air waves/frequencies are a public property and are also limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licenses to other agencies, including the private agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the most powerful media both because of its audiovisual impact, and its widest reach covering the section of the society where the print media does not reach. The right to use the air waives and the content of the programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as well as to prevent monopoly of information and views relayed, which is a potential danger flowing from the concentration of the right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency or of few private affluent broadcasters. x x x x If the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the said right. x x x x If the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the said right. (Para-17 at page 1267)" Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Motion Pictures Assn., (1999) 6 SCC 150 : ( AIR 1999 SC 2334 ) and in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442 as well as in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 988 . 10. Apart from the aforesaid position, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Star India Pvt. Ltd. v. Sea TV Network Ltd. and another, AIR 2007 SC 1538 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with a case under the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable Services) Interconnection Regulations, 2004, framed by TRAI, has observed "the object of the said Regulations is to eliminate monopoly in the cable network business." Learned Counsel also placed reliance on the aims and objectives of the Competition Act, 2002 and in particular, placed stress on the object of the aforesaid Act which is to provide keeping in view the economic development of the country for establishment of a Commission to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in markets to protect the interests of the consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the markets in India and etc. Learned counsel submits that the impugned Circular of the State Government violates the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 and also frustrates the objective of encouraging fair competition and therefore, acts against the interest of the consumers and such restriction amounts to the restriction on carrying out freedom of trade. 11. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since no standard nor norms have been specified for the purpose of selection of recipient/beneficiary, thereby effectively limiting the scope of operating cable network by single operator is clearly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since no standard nor norms have been specified for the purpose of selection of recipient/beneficiary, thereby effectively limiting the scope of operating cable network by single operator is clearly violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the impugned guideline suffers from arbitrariness and thereby infringes Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since no standard or norm has been fixed relating to eligibility criteria for selecting a recipient/beneficiary and therefore, since the impugned Notification comes in the way of petitioner's fundamental right to carry out his business as a cable TV operator by being permitted to use the electric poles of various companies and the Guideline of the Government in Energy Department, more particularly, Clause 16 thereof having neither fixed the criteria for selecting only single operator nor the process for selection of such a beneficiary, is clearly unconstitutional. In this respect, it is asserted that the State cannot escape the rigours of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and placed reliance on the following decisions : AIR 1969 SC 1081 (Rasbihari Panda v. State of Orissa). AIR 1974 SC 555 (E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu). AIR 1990 SC 1031 (Mahabir Auto Shop v. Indian Oil Corpn.). AIR 1991 SC 537 (Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P.). AIR 1992 SC 443 (Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India). 12. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that use of electric poles itself being covered by the impugned Notification issued by the Energy Department of the State Government, permission for use of such poles has to be treated as "State largesse" and therefore, is required to be leased out by way of public auction and it is obligatory on the part of the State for such purpose, to be transparent, just, fair and non-arbitrary. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been no transparency or fairness involved in the method of selecting Opp. Party No. 5 for the purpose of being granted the right to use the electric poles for their cable network business thereby depriving the petitioner and others from the scope of consideration. 12A. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been no transparency or fairness involved in the method of selecting Opp. Party No. 5 for the purpose of being granted the right to use the electric poles for their cable network business thereby depriving the petitioner and others from the scope of consideration. 12A. In course of hearing of this case, this Court vide its order dated 6-11-2006 called upon the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) to file a report on the following three issues : 1) Whether Government Notification dated 11-10-2001 and 4-1-2002 require modification in view of latest scientific and technological development? 2) Whether one electric pole can be utilized by more than one cable operator and if so, whether installation of 'fibre optic cables' by an operator would in any manner interfere with the operation who uses co-axial cables? 3) What is the maximum number of cables (Whether co-axial or fibre optic) that can be permitted to be installed on a single pole without endangering the safety and security of the electrical transmission? 13. The issues framed by this Court were answered by the OERC by its report dated 8-1-2007 in the following manner : "a) .........no interference between Optical fiber cables and co-axial cables. Hence, installation of Fiber Optic cable would not in any manner interfere with the operator who uses co-axial cables. b)..............no interference between the power line and optical fiber cable or the coaxial cable. c) Prudent to allow one cable either coaxial or fiber optics." Further, the O. E. R. C. at paragraph 17 of its report held as follows : "As by the Telecom experts an OF can handle upto any number of 1000 channels depending upon the modem and interface ability. Since a single OF Cable has approximately 10 fibres, an single cable can be used by multiple operators. Even a single fiber can be utilized by different cable operators by allotting different bandwidths. Similarly, a co-axial cable operator can allow the use of multiple channels but not multiple operators. Both these arrangements will have the benefit of economic use of national asset and ultimate benefit to the consumers as many cable operators will not be required to invest for delivery of cable services. In other words, a single cable can serve as an open access for many users. Both these arrangements will have the benefit of economic use of national asset and ultimate benefit to the consumers as many cable operators will not be required to invest for delivery of cable services. In other words, a single cable can serve as an open access for many users. xx xx 'In view of this, we recommend that a single optic fibre cable may be used for use by multiple TV/Communication Service Providers. For this, appropriate permission may be obtained from Telecom Regulatory Authority of India or any other appropriate authority. Likewise a co-axial cable operator may allow the use of multiple channels." It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid observations and the conclusion of the O. E. R. C. is thoroughly erroneous and misconceived and their recommendations being arbitrary/perverse and contrary to law, are not binding on this Court. In this respect, it is further contended that it is only such expert's opinion which is capable of withstanding of logical analysis in order to describe the reasoning and responsibility, is binding on a Court of law. On the contrary, it is asserted that if it can be considered that the experts' opinion is not capable of understanding, the Court would be entitled to hold that the impugned opinion is not reasonable or responsible. In this respect, reliance was placed by the learned counsel upon the case of West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd. etc., AIR 2002 SC 3588 and on the case of Cellular Operators Association of India v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 899 as well as on a case of Vinitha Ashok v. Laxmi Hospital and others, 2001 (8) SCC 731 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3914 ). 14. It is next contended that the O. E. R. C.'s conclusion in paragraph-15(j) to the extent that only one cable operator is to be allowed to use the electric poles and that too using either co-axial or fiber optic is erroneous and contrary to the views of experts as well as the Electricity Distribution Companies i.e. CESU, WESCO, NESCO and SOUTHCO. It is asserted that two experts, namely, Dr. Ganapati Panda and Mr. S. D. Bhatta Mishra have given their views with regard to peaceful co-existence between a co-axial and Optic fiber communication cable. It is asserted that two experts, namely, Dr. Ganapati Panda and Mr. S. D. Bhatta Mishra have given their views with regard to peaceful co-existence between a co-axial and Optic fiber communication cable. In this respect, reliance is placed on Annexures-III and IV to the report of the O.E.R.C. Insofar as the aforesaid distributors are concerned, it is submitted that they have filed their report before the O. E. R. C. clearly opining to permit three numbers of cable operators to use the electric poles whereas the NESCO in its report submitted before the O. E. R. C. opined ".....factor of safety is considered for PSC poles in 2.5 as per REC specification." It is further opined by the NESCO that maximum three cables can be born by their respective electric poles. A similar stand has been taken by the WESCO and CESU. 15. Placing reliance on the aforesaid reports of the distributing companies before the O. E. R. C., learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the report of the O. E. R. C. providing limited use of the electric poles to one cable operator is erroneous since there is no reason as to why three numbers of cable operators cannot be permitted to use the poles. It is further contended that there is no justification on the part of the State Government to issue the Notification limiting such use of electric poles by the cable operators. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the cable operators can fix their cable in the alternative pole. It is submitted that if one cable operators uses pole numbers 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and likewise, the other cable operator may be permitted to use pole numbers 2nd, 4th, 6th and likewise. In this respect it is submitted that even if the recommendation made by the OERC for use of single pole by a single cable operator is accepted, then the alternative pole can be used by another cable operator. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in terms of Rules 86 and 87 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, it is the distribution companies which are in charge of electrical supports/assets in their control and further that, in terms of Section 51 of the Electricity Act, 2003 the distribution companies have the mandate to optimally utilize their assets in order to reduce the wheeling charges. Therefore, it is argued that the distribution companies are analyzed in law to optimally utilize their assets and when they have filed their report before the OERC opining that technically it would be possible to place three number of communication cables on their electric poles, the OERC in its report filed before the Court has categorically negatived the same without any basis. In conclusion, it is submitted that whereas the impugned Notification of the State Government is violative of the aforesaid mandate, it also creates a monopoly and since the procedure adopted is not prescribed by law, the said Notification be declared as ultra vires Constitution of India and a direction may be issued to the distribution companies to consider allowing up to three cable operators to use their electric poles through transparent, just, fair and non-arbitrary process of selecting such operators. 16. Learned Advocate General on behalf of the State of Orissa has opposed the present writ application defending the impugned Notification issued by the Energy Department, inter alia, by relying upon the report of the O. E. R. C. placed before this Court on 2-7-2007. The learned Advocate General further asserted that the State have taken into consideration the suggestions and recommendation made by the O. E. R. C. in its report and have accepted the modifications suggested by the O. E. R. C. and have also issued the Notification No. 5131 dated 18-6-2007. The relevant portion of the said Notification is quoted hereinbelow : "3. The State Government, Deptt. of Energy after receipt of the recommendation of the OERC has been pleased to accept the report of the OERC dated 8-1-2007 and accordingly the State Government has decided to modify the Government Notification No. 18271 dated 11-10-2001 and No. 148 dated 4-1-2002 in respect of co-axial or fibre optic cable as indicated in paragraphs 15(j) and 16 of the said recommendation of the OERC. In paragraph 16, the OERC recommends that the Government notification be modified to the extent to allow the use of cable network limited to one operator and that too one cable either co-axial or fibre optics. In paragraph 16, the OERC recommends that the Government notification be modified to the extent to allow the use of cable network limited to one operator and that too one cable either co-axial or fibre optics. Similarly, at paragraph 16 it is recommended by the OERC at paragraph 16 : (a) that bearer wire carrying the cable should be sectionalized after each 2nd pole to avoid any rise in voltage during fault condition, (b) it has to be adequately grounded as per, i.e., I. E. Rules, 1956. (c) if fibre optic cables are used adequate system software support shall be provided by this service provider to disable laser beam transmission during puncture of the cable." It is stated on behalf of the State that on acceptance of the report submitted by the O. E. R. C., the writ application does not justify any further consideration nor any legal issue raised by the petitioner subsists for adjudication. Insofar as legal questions raised by the petitioner regarding unconstitutionality of the impugned Notification as well as the alleged process of selection and lack of any specific procedure are concerned, it is submitted on behalf of the State that since the petitioner has never challenged the decisionmaking process of the experts for which the expert opinion ought not to be touched by this Court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Unless the report is apparently perverse. A further plea has been raised by the learned Advocate General that a writ of mandamus is only available against any public authority or if any statutory authority fails to act in accordance with a duty imposed on it by a statute, a writ of mandamus would lie against that authority to do an act imposed by the statute. In the present case, he submits that the distribution companies are statutorily and otherwise bound to act within the parameters of the Indian Electricity Act and the Rules framed thereunder and they have statutory obligation to provide electricity energy to citizens on compliance of certain terms and conditions under the Act and the Rules, but the said companies have no obligation under the Statute to regulate the drawing of cable lines through their poles and, therefore, a writ of mandamus would not lie as prayed for by the petitioner. So far as allegation of monopoly is concerned, it is submitted that no monopoly has been created since the Notification is uniformly applicable to every operator and the same has been modified accepting the recommendation and suggestions made by the O.E.R.C. which requires no further consideration in the present application. 17. At this point, it is necessary to take note of the affidavit filed by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India-Opp. Party No. 7. In their counter-affidavit, the Regulatory Authority took a stand that essentially the challenge in the present writ application being to a Notification issued by the State of Orissa, while it does not concerning the said Opp. Party No. 7, yet highlighted that the TRAI has always been considering the question of promotion of fair competition in the Cable TV services with a view to make appropriate recommendation to the Government of India. It is further stated that most of network of cable operators is overhead and right of way is a major concern for these service providers for providing their services to the subscribers. The State Government also have a role in enhancing the competition for the benefit of the subscribers. In this respect, in the counter-affidavit, the TRAI has referred to their earlier recommendation to the Government of India on 14-92005 on "Digitalisation of Cable Television" in which following recommendations were made by them : "(xii) The right of way is not available to MSOs/Cable Operators as they are not licensed under Section 4 of the ITA. In the absence of this right it may not be always possible for a MSO/Cable Operator to lay their own optical fibre network and may have to depend on telecom operators for lease of their optic fibre network. It is, therefore. Imperative that such rights are available to licensees of digital cable systems. It is proposed to provide for Right of Way on the lines of provisions contained in The Communication Convergence Bill, 2001 through appropriate amendments in the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995." 18. M/s. ORTEL Communication Limited-O. P. 4, against whom the petitioner has levelled-allegation of monopoly, has filed a counter affidavit basing on the prayer of the petitioner, inter alia, raising the following objections :- a) The writ petitioner does "not have any locus standi" and is estopped from making the grievances contained in the writ petition. M/s. ORTEL Communication Limited-O. P. 4, against whom the petitioner has levelled-allegation of monopoly, has filed a counter affidavit basing on the prayer of the petitioner, inter alia, raising the following objections :- a) The writ petitioner does "not have any locus standi" and is estopped from making the grievances contained in the writ petition. b) The instant litigation by the writ petitioner is "mala fide" and as such the writ petitioner is not entitled to exercise of any discretion in its favour. c) The writ petitioner has not been prevented from carrying on his business by reason of the acts impugned in the writ petition. d) The act complained of in the writ petition do not create a monopoly in favour of any one particular Cable Operator. e) The impugned Notification and the amendment thereof have been passed on the recommendation of an Expert Body and as such cannot be impugned in a writ proceeding. f) No relief can be granted against opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 of the nature claimed in the writ petition. Mr. Mukharji, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party No. 4 submitted that the petitioner had originally wanted to use the fibre optic cable for the purpose of Cable TV Network and such cable was to be laid by the writ petitioner "underground", as represented to CESCO in the letter of the writ petitioner dated 12th April, 2002 and, therefore, since the writ petitioner wanted to lay the fibre-optic cable underground, the petitioner has no locus standi to raise the issue relating Clause-16 of the impugned Notification. It is submitted that Clause-16 of the Notification only relates to a situation where cables for cable network are to be drawn on electric poles owned by opposite parties 2 and 3 and does not in any manner cover a situation which relates to cables being laid underground for the Cable Network business. It is further submitted that the petitioner-company belongs to the ETV Telugu group broadcaster and that the present writ petition has been filed by them in order to put pressure on opposite party No. 4 (ORTEL Communication Ltd.) to broadcast its other Pay Channel i.e., ETV Oriya, which is the subject-matter of litigation that is already pending before the Telecom Disputes Settlement Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT). In this background opposite party No. 4 asserted that the writ petition having been filed for mala fide purposes ought not to be entertained and that the petitioner is not entitled to the exercise of any discretionary relief in its favour. Learned counsel further submits that the writ petitioner has not been prevented in any way from carrying on business, by reason of the impugned notification. It is further contended that the acts complained of in the writ petition do not create a monopoly in favour of any one particular cable operator. It is submitted that in order to succeed on the ground of creation of monopoly, the writ petitioner is required to show that the impugned Notificaiton was "solely and wholly" intended to create a monopoly in the cable network business and which has prevented the writ petitioner from carrying on such business. It is alleged that while no specific allegation has been made in the writ petition, it is well settled that in absence of specific allegation giving fullest particular such charges cannot be entertained. In this respect reliance was placed in the case of Federation of Railway Officers' Association v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 1344 . It is submitted that the impugned notification applies equally to all the Cable Operators and this fact has not been specifically denied by the writ petitioner and in the absence of such denial the case of the writ petitioner cannot be sustained. It is further submitted that it is not opposite party No. 4 alone who has entered into such contract with the distributors. It is asserted that opposite party No. 5 has also entered into the contract for using of electric poles and is also enjoying the benefits by such impugned Notification. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that a monopoly in favour of opposite party No. 4 has come to existence. The next contention on behalf of opposite party No. 4 is that the use of electric poles for Cable TV Network erected by opposite parties 2 and 3 for transmission of electricity is not the only manner in which Cable TV business is being carried out. The next contention on behalf of opposite party No. 4 is that the use of electric poles for Cable TV Network erected by opposite parties 2 and 3 for transmission of electricity is not the only manner in which Cable TV business is being carried out. It is possible by putting fibre optic cable underground as well as carrying cable TV programme through Satellite i.e., through DTH and in such circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner has been prevented from carrying on business nor that the impugned Notification creates any monopoly. It is further asserted that the "electric poles" are not public property or State largesse, but are the property of opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 erected for transmission and distribution of electricity. Use of such electric pole in particular manner by opposite parties 2 and 3 for augmenting its revenue. Since permitting such use by cable operator is not for the purpose of discharging their functioning under the Electricity Act, 2003, this act cannot be questioned in any writ proceeding particularly, where majority of the shareholding of opposite parties 2 and 3 are not controlled by the State. In such circumstances it was submitted that the impugned notification does not create any monopoly and opposites parties 2 and 3 having already taken a stand that it will not permit more than one cable to be drawn on poles erected by them, no such direction as prayed for by the petitioner is permissible to him under law. It is next contended that the impugned Notification have been issued on the basis of "recommendation of an Expert Body" and as such cannot be the subject-matter of challenge in present writ petition. It is stated an Expert Body was engaged to make recommendation which lead to promulgation of guidelines has also evidenced by the communication dated 24th March, 2001 of the Chief Electrical Inspector addressed to the Principal Secretary, Department of Energy of the Government of Orissa. Pursuant to which by a notification dated 1st May, 2001 of the Government of Orissa a Technical Committee was created to formulate guidelines and the report of such an Expert on the use of electric poles for supporting of cable for Cable T. V. Network was duly issued. Pursuant to which by a notification dated 1st May, 2001 of the Government of Orissa a Technical Committee was created to formulate guidelines and the report of such an Expert on the use of electric poles for supporting of cable for Cable T. V. Network was duly issued. Thereafter on the basis of the report of OERC submitted before this Court on 9th January, 2007 and in terms of said recommendation necessary amendments to the notification have already been carried out on the basis of the report of the said Expert Committee and therefore challenge to the report of the Expert Committee by a person having no technical qualifications ought not to be entertained. In this respect the learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 placed reliance in the case of West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission v. C. E. S. C. Ltd., etc. reported in AIR 2002 SC 3588 , where Hon'ble Supreme Court also recognizes that where the decision of an Expert Body is under challenge, it is not sufficient to upset the review of the Expert Body on the basis that an other view is possible. It is submitted by the learned counsel on behalf of opposite parties 2 and 3 that they are bound by the Notification issued by the State of Orissa and therefore they have no stay in the matter. 19. On consideration of submissions noted hereinabove by the learned counsel for various parties, the following questions arise for consideration : i) Whether the writ application is maintainable? ii) Whether the opinion of an expert body is subject to scrutiny/challenge in the present writ application? iii) Whether the issue notifications are unconstitutional on the ground of creating a monopoly and/or for not having prescribed any procedure for selection/not having provided a level playing field. 20. In the light of the aforesaid issue that have arisen for consideration in the present writ application whereas, it is a fact that the petitioner had originally applied for being granted permission to lay underground fibre-optic cables, yet, it is also a fact that the petitioner had applied to opposite party No. 2 vide its letter dated 12-42002 under Annexure-1 for being granted permission for using its "electrical poles" within its territory for the purpose of carrying on its cable network business. Pursuant thereof, "sanction" had already been granted to the petitioner by opposite party No. 2 under cover of its letter dated 7-52002. Therefore, the present dispute raised by the petitioner herein, does not relate to the petitioner's application for lying underground fibre-optic cables but clearly relates to the refusal on the part of opposite parties 2 and 3 from entering into a formal agreement with the petitioner for use of their electrical poles, in spite of their unprincipled approval granted to the petitioner on 7-52002 the further issue arises on account of the reason cited by opposite parties 2 and 3 for not signing the agreement and citing the impugned notifications as a limitation case by the said notifications as the basis for not signing the formal agreement with the petitioner - company. 21. While the subject-matter of "use of the poles" cannot be directly relatable to carrying on business of distributor of electricity, the opposite parties 2 and 3 as distributing licensees under the Electricity Act, 2002. Yet, Clearly under Section 51 of the Electricity Act, opposite parties 2 and 3 are statutorily required to make best use of their resources in order to reduce the "wheeling charges" of electricity. Therefore, the grant of permission to cable operators on receipt of payment or use of poles is directly relatable to such statutory obligation which would consequently reduce the wheeling charges of electricity. Therefore, it cannot be said that the subject-matter for grant of right to use electric poles for payment is totally outside the scope of the Electricity Act, 2003. 22. We are of the view that the obligation cast to opposite parties 2 and 3 under Section 51 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is a statutory obligation. Even otherwise, it is well settled that whereas the Constitution of India guarantees the freedom of speech and expression, it includes thereof the right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Therefore, it is obligatory on every citizen as well as State authorities and/or statutory bodies to ensure that no impediment is caused both to the freedom of speech and expression as well as right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Therefore, any act of any statutory body authority and/or statutory licensee which acts as an impediment, falls within the scope for challenge/ consideration in writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, any act of any statutory body authority and/or statutory licensee which acts as an impediment, falls within the scope for challenge/ consideration in writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we overrule the objection of maintainability raised by the opposite parties and hold that the present writ application is maintainable. 23. On a perusal of the impugned notification dated 11-10-2001 under Annexure5 and amendment thereto vide notification dated 4-1-2002 under Annexure-6 and in particular Clause-16 thereof, it is clear that the Department of Energy has directed that only one number of cable can be placed in one pole and each cable is to be identified by any other alternate pole. 24. This impugned notification has been framed by the Department of Energy, inter alia, with the object of "framing of guidelines for laying cable network for cable television communication purposes." Under its authority to prescribe through guidelines standard practices and procedures for ensuring safety of the transmission lines. Under these guidelines, the opposite parties take a defence that this notification having been passed pursuant to a report of the committee of experts and forms the basis for the reason why more than one cable operator is not being permitted to use the electrical poles of the distribution company. Whereas the term 'monopoly' may not be strictly applicable to the situation that arises in the present case due to the fact that other forms of transmission/broadcast by cable operator, in fact, exists yet, the term 'monopoly' can be applied to one form of distribution of television signals and, i.e., distribution of television signals through the mode of cables attached to electrical poles. This mode of transmission while being economically least expensive, the chief mode of transmission of signals to the vast majority of cable viewers in the State. Therefore, once this mode of transmission itself is confined to one operator, thus, on account of statutory intervention i.e. issue of notification under Annexures-4 and 5, the implications are crystal clear, that not more than one cable operator can be permitted to use one pole. Therefore, it is clear from the working of the notification that the notification in effect creates a monopoly by limiting the use of the electrical poles by one cable operator. Therefore, it is clear from the working of the notification that the notification in effect creates a monopoly by limiting the use of the electrical poles by one cable operator. In course of hearing, the present writ application by order dated 611-2006, this Court had directed the Orissa Electric Regulatory Commission to give its report on specific questions formulated by the Court and in respect thereof, a report dated 8-1-2007 was submitted before this Court. 25. To query by the Court, as to whether allowing more than one cable can be hazardous from the point of view of safety of public, cable operator so also electric lines and as to whether there would be any interference when fibre-optic cables and co-axial are carried in the same distribution network - the Commission has answered the question in the negative by stating that there would be no interference between the optic-fibre cable and co-axial cable and the power lines in any manner. To the further question as to what is the maximum numbers of cables whether "co-axial or optic-fibre" can be permitted to be installed on a single pole without endangering safety and security on the electrical transmission. The Commissioner had responded by stating that it would be prudent to allow the use of cable network limited to one operator and that too one cable either co-axial or fibre-optic. 26. The State of Orissa has acted in terms of the recommendation of the O. E. R. C. and has also amended the impugned notification under Annexure-4 by incorporating the said suggestion of the Commission, but, even after the report of the O. E. R. C. and the necessary amendment to the notification under Annexure-4, the situation that still exists is that, only one cable operator can be permitted to use the electric poles and in major of areas opposite party No. 4 already has subsisting agreements and, therefore, there is no possibility of a second operator using the poles for the purpose of cable network business. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ application has seriously questioned the recommendation of the O. E. R. C. regarding limiting the cable network to one operator alone. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ application has seriously questioned the recommendation of the O. E. R. C. regarding limiting the cable network to one operator alone. In this respect, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that whereas the experts whose evidence was collected by the O. E. R. C. have specifically opined that the poles are capable of handling multiple cables and this would also provide the distributing companies with an additional source of revenue, the opinion of the OERC, i.e., expert committee ought to be looked into and since the conclusion of the OERC is not founded on the opinion/views collected by it, such report ought to be rejected. 28. On the other hand, learned counsel for opposite parties have taken a stand that the report of an expert body, whose report has not been challenged, ought not to be interfered with. Further, since the petitioner has not impleaded the OERC as a party to the present proceeding, it is further contended that due deference is required to be shown to an opinion of an expert body and the challenge to the expert body's report, being by a person who has no technical qualification ought not to be entertained. In this respect, we are in respectful agreement with the learned counsel for the opposite parties, since the report of the OERC emanated pursuant to the direction of this Court and due deference has to be shown to such report of an expert body. Apart from this, it is also a fact that in the present proceeding, the OERC has not been impleaded as a party and, therefore, we are of the view that it would not be permissible to permit the petitioner to challenge the report of the OERC. But it needs to stated that it always remains open to the State and its agencies to make periodical review of its policy and bring in changes in any manner it may think appropriate. 29. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the further question to be dealt with is, as to whether the impugned notification can be declared as unconstitutional for not having prescribed any procedure for selection and for not having provided a "level playing field". 29. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, the further question to be dealt with is, as to whether the impugned notification can be declared as unconstitutional for not having prescribed any procedure for selection and for not having provided a "level playing field". It is a well settled principle of law that the State while prescribing any procedure, it is obligatory to ensure that the procedure prescribed, is transparent, just and fair for the purpose of selecting a party for entering into a contract. The right to use electric poles may not be strictly construed as "State largesse" in the classical sense, but awarding such a right by a contract is an extremely important right, since this right will allow the selected cable operator to provide the "last mile connection" between the cable operator and the consumer. In fact, it is this right of the selected cable operator which provides a selected party with the last link "in a economic manner" in transferring television signals to its consumers/citizens. 30. The Telecom Regulatory Authorities in India has highlighted in its report the importance and the requirements of the State Government to play an effective role in enhancing competition amongst the cable operators for the benefit of the subscribers. Therefore, it is trite in law to state that such "last link" which is provided from the electrical pole to the consumer must be settled in a non-discriminatory manner which is transparent, just and fair. In this respect, it would be extremely important to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 1 : (2007 AIR SCW 6416) and it would be most relevant to quote paragraphs-36 as well as paragraph-39 thereof (Paras 22 and 25 of AIR) : "36. We find merit in this civil appeal. Standards applied by courts in judicial review must be justified by constitutional principles which govern the proper exercise of public power in a democracy. Article 14 of the Constitution embodies the principles of "non-discrimination". However, it is not a freestanding provision. It has to be read in conjunction with rights conferred by other articles like Article 21 of the Constitution. The said Article 21 refers to "right to life". It includes "opportunity". Article 14 of the Constitution embodies the principles of "non-discrimination". However, it is not a freestanding provision. It has to be read in conjunction with rights conferred by other articles like Article 21 of the Constitution. The said Article 21 refers to "right to life". It includes "opportunity". In our view, as held in the latest judgment of the Constitution Bench of nine Judges in I. R. Coelho v. State of T. N. ( AIR 2007 SC 861 ), Articles 21/14 are the heart of the chapter on fundamental rights. They cover various aspects of life. "Level playing field" is an important concept while construing Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is this doctrine, which is invoked by REL/HDEC in the present case. When Article 19(1)(g) confers fundamental right to carry on business to a company, it is entitled to invoke the said doctrine of "level playing field". We may clarify that this doctrine is, however, subject to public interest. In the world of globalization, competition is an important factor to be kept in mind. The doctrine of "level playing field" is an important doctrine, which is embodied in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This is because the said doctrine provides space within which equally placed competitors are allowed to bid so as to subserve the larger public interest. "Globalisation", in essence, is liberalization of trade. Today India has dismantled licence raj. The economic reforms introduced after 1992 have brought in the concept of "globalisation". Decisions of acts which result in unequal and discriminatory treatment, would violate the doctrine of "level playing field" embodied in Article 19(1)(g). Time has come, therefore, to say that Article 14, which refers to the principle of "equality", should not be read as a stand alone item but it should be read in conjunction with Article 21 which embodies several aspect of life. There is one more aspect which needs to be mentioned in the matter of implementation of the aforestated doctrine of "level playing field". Accordingly to Lord Goldsmith, commitment to the "rule of law" is the heart of parliamentary democracy. One of the important elements of the "rule of law" is legal certainty. Article 14 applies to Government policies and if the policy or act of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of "reasonableness", then such an act or decision would be unconstitutional. 39. One of the important elements of the "rule of law" is legal certainty. Article 14 applies to Government policies and if the policy or act of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of "reasonableness", then such an act or decision would be unconstitutional. 39. In Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, the Division Bench of this Court has held that in matters of judicial review the basic test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision-making process and not in the decision itself. This means that the decisionmaker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and he must give effect to it otherwise it may result in illegality. The principle of "judicial review" cannot be denied even in contractual matters or matters in which the Government exercises its contractual powers, but judicial review is intended to prevent arbitrariness and it must be exercised in larger public interest. Expression of different views and opinions in exercise of contractual powers may be there, however, such difference of opinion must be based on specified norms. Those norms may be legal norms or accounting norms. As long as the norms are clear and properly understood by the decisionmaker and the bidders and other stakeholders, uncertainty and thereby breach of the rule of law will not arise. The grounds upon which administrative action is subjected to control by judicial review are classifiable broadly under three heads, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In the said judgment it has been held that all errors of law are jurisdictional errors. One of the important principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that whenever a norm/benchmark is prescribed in the tender process in order to provide certainty that norm/standard should be clear. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. In Reliance Airport Developers the scoring system formed part of the evaluation process. The object of that system was to provide identification of factors, allocation of marks of each of the said factors and giving of marks at different stages. Objectivity was thus provided." 31. As stated above "certainty" is an important aspect of the rule of law. In Reliance Airport Developers the scoring system formed part of the evaluation process. The object of that system was to provide identification of factors, allocation of marks of each of the said factors and giving of marks at different stages. Objectivity was thus provided." 31. Taking guidance from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred hereinabove, it is clear that on a reading of the impugned notifications under Annexures 5 and 6 as well as its amendment thereafter by the State, it is clear that, no standard or norm for deciding the manner/process to award the right to use such electrical poles has been prescribed. This is a clear case where the State has failed to provide the requisite standard or norm for selecting the beneficiaries. Therefore, since it is an obligation of the State to provide a "level playing field" and such "level playing field" can only be provided by embodying the principles of non-discrimination in the process of selection. The manner in which the State Government and opposite parties 2 and 3 have acted in entering into the contract with opposite party No. 4 clearly reveal that all such contracts entered into after the impugned notification were promulgated, do not meet these standard requirements of law. Even otherwise, all such contracts that have been entered into after the impugned notification were issued ought to have been made first by laying down the specific standards and norms and, thereafter, by bringing to the notice of the public at large by inviting applications and thereafter, by taking on its decision in a fair, just and transparent manner. 32. In the present case, it is seen that the agreement that have entered into by opposite parties 4 and 5, after the date of promulgation of the impugned notification, do not satisfy the requirements of law. Accordingly, while upholding the notifications impugned herein as valid in law, we declare that the process adopted by the State/ O. Ps. 2 and 3 in granting such benefits to opposite parties 4 and 5, are not consistent with the requirements of law. Accordingly, all agreements entered into by opposite par ties 2 and 3 notifications issued, are held to be invalid and inoperative in law. 2 and 3 in granting such benefits to opposite parties 4 and 5, are not consistent with the requirements of law. Accordingly, all agreements entered into by opposite par ties 2 and 3 notifications issued, are held to be invalid and inoperative in law. Further directions are also issued to the State to issue necessary guidelines setting the norms and standards for selecting a cable operator who will be awarded the contract to operate their cable networks through the electrical poles of opposite parties 2 and 3. Therefore, the opposite parties 2 and 3 are required to make a public advertisement inviting applications from intending cable operators and as a consequence thereof, it may award such contract on such terms and conditions as the State and the opposite parties 2 and 3 may deem just and proper. It is only in this manner that the doctrine of "level playing field" which is embodied in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India can be ensured. It must never be forgotten that the basic important element of the "rule of law", is "legal certainty" and it is well settled that Article-14 of the Constitution of India not only applies to Government policies but also extends to the contractual matters, which must also satisfy the test of "reasonableness". We further direct that the implementation of the aforesaid directions must be done within a period of six months from today. The entire procedure of fixation of norms and standards of public advertisement and settlement of rights should be completed within a period of six months. In order to provide continuity in service to the citizens/ consumers the present arrangements as it exists today may continue till then. With the aforesaid observations, the writ application is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 33. A. K. GANGULY, C.J. :- I agree. Application allowed.