ORDER Subhash B. Adi, J.—This Revision is directed against the order passed in L.R.-A. No. 120/1987 dated 22.3.1990 reversing the order passed by the Land Tribunal dated 9.4.1987 in LRF/INA/222/1979-80 and LRA/INA/29/79-80. 2. Petitioner claiming to be an Archaka of Sri Channarayaswamy temple (Muzrai) situated at Chikkabanavara village, Bangalore North Taluk, filed an application under Section 6-A of the Karnataka (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act'). Respondent No. 4 also filed an application under Section 10 of the Act interalia, claiming to be a protected tenant The Land Tribunal considering the application of the petitioner granted occupancy rights by its order dated 9.4.1987, holding that, he is an Archaka and performing pooja and also cultivating the land previously and was dispossessed from the land when the land was put to panchasala auction. The said order was called in question by the respondent No. 4 in appeal before the District Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Bangalore. The District Land Reforms Appellate Authority allowed the appeal by holding that the petitioner herein is not entitled for grant of occupancy rights and further held that, the respondent No. 4 being the tenant in occupation is entitled for grant of occupancy rights in respect the land in question. 3. The case of the petitioner is that, he being the Archaka of the temple, by virtue of the Act 27/1973, right is conferred in him to claim the registration of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question. The Land Tribunal has rightly granted the occupancy rights considering the provisions of Section 6-A of the Act. The Land Reforms Appellate Authority without regard to the provisions of Section 6-A and without even considering as to whether, the 4th respondent is entitled for grant of occupancy rights or not has erroneously rejected the application of the petitioner and granted occupancy rights in favour of 4th respondent. 4. Sri. Aravinda Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, respondent No. 4 was cultivating the land under the panchasala gutta i.e., lease for 5 years from 1956 to 1962 and thereafter, he was not granted lease. The land belongs to religious institution is not in dispute. His possession thereafter cannot be termed as the possession of tenant.
4. Sri. Aravinda Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, respondent No. 4 was cultivating the land under the panchasala gutta i.e., lease for 5 years from 1956 to 1962 and thereafter, he was not granted lease. The land belongs to religious institution is not in dispute. His possession thereafter cannot be termed as the possession of tenant. He further submitted that, from 1961-62 to 1965-66, respondent No. 4 was not in possession and no occupancy rights could have been granted in his favour and only from 1965, the respondent No. 4 came in possession i.e., by virtue of an injunction order granted by the Civil Court In this regard, he relied on the provisions of Section 2 Sub-section 12(a) of the Act and submitted that, 'protected tenant' means, a tenant of any land comprised in a minor inam, if he has held it continuously and cultivated it personally for a period of not less than twelve years prior to the 1st day of July 1970 and submitted that, the tenant claiming under the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act as a protected tenant necessarily is required to prove that he has been in possession continuously for 12 years prior to 1.7.1970 and has been cultivating personally during the said period. Referring to the definition and also the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, he further submitted that, the respondent No. 4 was in possession from 1956 to 1961-62 is not in dispute and from 1961-62 to 1965-66, there is no material to show that, the respondent No. 4 was in possession and cultivating the land personally. If it is considered, then the respondent No. 4 has not proved that, he has been cultivating the land for 12 years prior to 1.7.1970 and in the absence of said material, the grant of occupancy rights is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act 5.
If it is considered, then the respondent No. 4 has not proved that, he has been cultivating the land for 12 years prior to 1.7.1970 and in the absence of said material, the grant of occupancy rights is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act 5. He also relied on Section 27-A of the Act and submitted that, respondent No. 4 cannot hold the land beyond the ceiling prescribed under Section 27-A of the Act He also relied on Section 6 of the Act and submitted that, the tenants other than the kadim tenants and permanent tenants are not entitled to hold any land beyond the extent prescribed under Section 27-A of the Act in this case, the Appellate Authority without considering the provisions of Section 27-A of the Act has passed the order in favour of respondent No. 4. He also submitted that, the grant of occupancy rights has to be in consonance with the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act as amended on 1.3.1974, as the application filed under Section 10 for grant of occupancy rights is required to be considered in terms of the provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 1961. He relied on Section 9 of the Act and submitted that, determination of claims for registration of occupancy rights and continuation of tenancy has to be in reference to the provisions of Land Reforms Act and submitted that, if the procedure contemplated under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act is applicable, then necessarily the provisions of Sections 44, 45, 63 and 66 of the Land Reforms Act are also applicable. The Tribunal before granting occupancy rights ought to have considered whether the respondent No. 4 is holding the land in excess to the ceiling limit and whether he is entitled for grant of occupancy rights. He submitted that the respondent No. 4 is holding the land beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 27-A of the Act and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Appellate Authority. 6.
He submitted that the respondent No. 4 is holding the land beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 27-A of the Act and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Appellate Authority. 6. He also submitted that, Section 6-A of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that, insofar as Archak and Pujari are concerned, they are only required to prove that, they are rendering services as Archak and Pujari in the religious institution and if that is proved, they are entitled for grant of occupancy rights. Only if the person is rendering any other service other than the Archak, he is required to be prove that, he has been cultivating the land personally continuously for not less than three years prior to vesting. In this regard, he referred to Section 6-A Clauses (i) and (ii) and submitted that, Clause (i) is independent by itself as Clause (i) does not refer to personal cultivation, only Clause (a) requires the personal cultivation. He also submitted that, respondent No. 4 had only cultivated the land as a tenant for a period of five years and thereafter, has not cultivated the land as a tenant On mere occupation of the land or cultivation without any right as a tenant, the respondent No. 4 will not come within the purview of Section 5-A of the Act. Relying on the provisions of Section 5-A and also Sections 6 and 6-A of the Act, he submitted that, the Appellate Authority wrongly interpreting these provisions has erroneously granted the occupancy rights in favour of the fourth respondent 7. In support of his contention, he relied on Ex.D3, an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 7th December 1962 and submitted that, the tenancy of the petitioner was terminated by the Assistant Commissioner and in pursuance of the same, as per Exs.D4 and D5, the Tahsildar has taken action to take possession from the respondent No. 4. Relying on these documents, he submitted that, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner as per Ex.D3 has been given effect to, as per Exs.D2 and D6. Relying on these documents, he submitted that, by virtue of these orders, it is clear that the respondent No. 4 had lost his right to continue in possession from 1962 onwards.
Relying on these documents, he submitted that, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner as per Ex.D3 has been given effect to, as per Exs.D2 and D6. Relying on these documents, he submitted that, by virtue of these orders, it is clear that the respondent No. 4 had lost his right to continue in possession from 1962 onwards. If that is so, the application of the respondent No. 4 for grant of occupancy rights in terms of Section 5-A is not maintainable, as he does not fulfill the minimum requirement of continuous cultivation for a period of twelve years next before vesting on 1.7.1970. 8. Smt. Suguna Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 submitted that, the land bearing Sy. No. 102 measuring 8 acres 27 guntas of Chikkabanavara village in Bangalore North Taluk has been in possession of the fourth respondent cannot be disputed. In this regard, she relied on Exs.A1 to A12 and submitted that, undisputedly, the respondent No. 4 was put in possession on 11.10.1956 under panchasala lavani (lease). The Assistant Commissioner as per Ex.D3 passed an order for non-payment of rent, directing the Tahsildar to take action to terminate the tenancy of the fourth respondent and submitted that, no proceedings were initiated by the Tahsildar in pursuance of Ex.D3. The order of the Assistant Commissioner was challenged by the fourth respondent in appeal No. DVS:2/64-65 and the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 30th November 1964 set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Further, an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Muzrai Commissioner and the Muzrai Commissioner also dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, confirming the order of the Deputy Commissioner. On 12th January 1965. the fourth respondent filed a suit in O.S. No. 25/1965 against the petitioner and one Cheluvaiah. The Civil Court granted temporary injunction in favour of the respondent No. 4 and thereafter, on 17.4.1967 the suit was decreed. Against the said decree, the petitioner had filed an appeal in R.A. No. 123/1967. By judgment dated 24.6.1968, the said R.A. was also dismissed. Against the said judgment the petitioner filed R.S.A. No. 523/1968. This Court by judgment dated 3.1.1972 dismissed the said R.S.A. also by confirming the decree of permanent injunction.
Against the said decree, the petitioner had filed an appeal in R.A. No. 123/1967. By judgment dated 24.6.1968, the said R.A. was also dismissed. Against the said judgment the petitioner filed R.S.A. No. 523/1968. This Court by judgment dated 3.1.1972 dismissed the said R.S.A. also by confirming the decree of permanent injunction. She also relied on the record of rights Exs.A3 to A5 pertaining to the years 1965 and 1981-82 and submitted that, in the light of the entries in the revenue records, under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, a presumption in law arises in favour of respondent No. 4. She also relied on the tax receipts upto 1977-78. 9. As regards to the possession between 1961-62 to 1964-65, it is submitted that, the Tahsildar had not initiated any proceedings against the fourth respondent to terminate the tenancy. Further, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner permitting the Tahsildar to initiate proceedings was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner and confirmed in appeal before the Commissioner of Muzrai. The fact that the name of respondent No. 4 continued in the record of rights has been recorded in O.S. No. 25/1965 wherein the Civil Court referring to the revenue entries for 1961-62 to 1963-64 has granted the decree of permanent injunction. Referring to the cultivation from 1956 to 1961-62 and revenue entries from 1961-62 to 1963-64 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner, setting aside the Assistant Commissioner's order and also the grant of injunction thereafter till coming into force of the Act and subsequent entries, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 4 submitted that, these documentary evidence clearly establish the continuous possession of respondent No. 4 for more than 12 years next before the date of vesting i.e.. 1.7.1970 and it cannot be disputed that, the cultivation was as a tenant, as the respondent No. 4 was inducted in possession as tenant on panchasala gutta. His tenancy is continued is also evident from Ex.D3 wherein, even the Assistant Commissioner had directed the Tahsildar to initiate proceedings to terminate the tenancy and if the tenancy is not terminated and if there is no change in the status and possession of the respondent No. 4 in the matter of cultivation, it can be presumed that, he had been continued in possession as a tenant and cultivating the same in the said capacity. 10.
10. As regards to the definition of 'protected tenant', learned Counsel submitted that, a tenant of any land comprised in a minor inam has been continuously cultivating personalty for more than 12 years prior to 1.7.1970 is entitled to make an application in terms of Section 5-A of the Act Section 5-A confers right on such tenant The provisions of Section 5-A being specialty inserted by virtue of Act 27/1973 and the said provision is not referred under the provisions of Section 27-A of the Act Under Section 27-A, the ceiling limit is prescribed only in case of grant of occupancy rights, in case of continuation of tenancy under Section 6 or grant of occupancy rights under Section 6-A and not in respect of grant of occupancy rights to kadim tenant or permanent tenant or protected tenant Section 6 though does not refer to the protected tenant, the intention of the legislature is to be found from the Amendment Act 27/1973. By the said amendment, the definition of 'protected tenant' is inserted under Section 2 Clause (12.a). At the same time, Section 5-A is also inserted. These are the beneficial legislation, they have to be interpreted liberally, no restrictive meaning could be given to the said provisions. It is also submitted that, what is not referred to under Section 27-A, by implication it cannot be referred to restrict the rights accrued under the beneficial legislation to the tenants. Further submitted that interpretation of law requires that, liberal interpretation should be given if the legislation is beneficial legislation for the benefit of class of people; where restriction is imposed, restrictive meaning is to be given; restrictive meaning has to be attached only in respect of grant of occupancy rights under Section 6-A of the Act or continuation of tenancy under Section 6 and not in respect of the protected tenant In this regard, she also referred to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. which are two other classes of tenants namely, kadim and permanent tenants. The object of the Act is to confer right on the tenants necessarily requires the interpretation in favour of the tenants and in this regard, learned Counsel relied on the judgments reported in The Associated Cement Companies Limited, Chaibassa Cement Works, Jhinkpani Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 56 : The Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi Vs.
The object of the Act is to confer right on the tenants necessarily requires the interpretation in favour of the tenants and in this regard, learned Counsel relied on the judgments reported in The Associated Cement Companies Limited, Chaibassa Cement Works, Jhinkpani Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 56 : The Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi Vs. Vishwanath and Others, AIR 1970 SC 488 : B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1010 : Jivabhai Purshottam Vs. Chhagan Karson and Others, AIR 1961 SC 1491 and Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta and Others Vs. Arun Kumar Bose, AIR 1975 SC 1994 By referring to these decisions, learned Counsel submitted that, the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above has held that, the beneficial provisions have to be construed liberally as they are all remedial measures, given right to the tenants of the lands and in this regard, purposive interpretation has to be adopted, if the purpose of the legislation is to grant occupancy rights, necessarily Section 5A has to be interpreted to mean that, the tenants, who have been granted occupancy rights, are not covered under the provisions of Section 27-A of the Act Though Section 6 docs not refer to Section 5-A, however, said omission does not take away the effect of said provision inserted with special purposes, the purpose of the legislation is to grant occupancy rights. 11. As regards to the interpretation of Section 6-A of the Act, learned Counsel further submitted that, this Court has already taken a view that, for grant of occupancy rights, under Section 6-A of the Act, the occupant must be in possession and personally cultivating the land as an Archak at least for three years next before the vesting of the land or the word used between Clause (i) and Clause (ii) of Section 6-A has to be understood as and when it is applicable and submitted that, this interpretation has already been considered by this Court in a decision reported in M.N. Shivappa Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR (1986) KAR 2472 . Referring to the said decision, she also submitted that, from the records it is clear that, the petitioner is not cultivating the land.
State of Karnataka, ILR (1986) KAR 2472 . Referring to the said decision, she also submitted that, from the records it is clear that, the petitioner is not cultivating the land. Even the Land Tribunal has not held that the petitioner has been cultivating the land for three years next before the vesting of the land, it has only relied on possession prior to 1956 and based on his possession in 1956 has granted occupancy rights in favour of the petitioner. 12. Referring to these documents and the provisions of the Act, she also submitted that, for grant of occupancy rights, the procedure contemplated under Section 48-A is required to be complied in view of the provisions of Section 9(2)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal cannot go into other questions in respect of grant of occupancy rights under the provisions of the Act, as the claim of the petitioner being under the special enactment and the Tribunal is required to apply the procedure contemplated under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and not for any other purpose. Even otherwise, she submitted that, no person is entitled to hold any land beyond ceiling limit prescribed under Section 63 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and fairly conceded that the land held by the respondent No. 4 does not go beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 63 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. She also submitted that, even if the declaration is not filed under Section 66 of the Land Reforms Act, the power is conferred on the Tahsildar to investigate the matter and to take action against the person, who has not filed the declaration, if it is found that, he is holding the land beyond ceiling limit, the Tahsildar can forfeit the land into State and submitted that, there is no reason to consider the said argument. 13. In the light of the rival contentions, the questions that arise for consideration in this Revision Petition are: 1) Whether an Archak under Section 6-A of the Act is entitled for grant of occupancy rights by virtue of his office irrespective of the fact as to whether he has been cultivating the land or not? 2) Whether under the provisions of Section 27-A of the Act, the 'protected tenant' under Section 5-A is required to hold the land to the extent of ceiling limit prescribed therein?
2) Whether under the provisions of Section 27-A of the Act, the 'protected tenant' under Section 5-A is required to hold the land to the extent of ceiling limit prescribed therein? 3) Whether the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Authority calls for interference? 14. Section 6-A of the Act has been introduced by Act 27/1973, which confers right on the Pujari, Archak or persons rendering any service in such institution to get occupancy rights registered in their favour. Section 6-A reads as under: 6-A PUJARI, ARCHAK, ETC., TO BE REGISTERED AS OCCUPANT ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS- (1) Where the inamdar is an institution of religious worship, a person- (i) rendering religious service in or maintaining the institution as a pujari, archak or the holder of a similar office by whatever name called) or (ii) rendering any service in such institution, and personally cultivating for a continuous period of not less than three years prior to the date of vesting by contributing his own physical labour or that of the members of his family and enjoying the benefits of any land comprised in the inam of such institution without paying rent as such in money or kind to that institution in respect of such land, shall with effect from and on the date of vesting and subject to the provisions of Section 27A be entitled to be registered as an occupant of such land. (2) In addition to the annual land payable in respect of the land, a person entitled to be registered as an occupant of any land under Sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay to State Government as premium for ownership of that land an amount equal to one hundred turves the land revenue of such facilities for irrigation from any source of water which is the property of the Government. (i) Where two crops of paddy can be raised in a year or where sugarcane can be raised. Rupees six hundred and sixty per acre (ii) Where one crop of paddy can be raised in a year. Rupees four hundred and forty per acre.
(i) Where two crops of paddy can be raised in a year or where sugarcane can be raised. Rupees six hundred and sixty per acre (ii) Where one crop of paddy can be raised in a year. Rupees four hundred and forty per acre. (iii) Where semi-dry crops can be grown Rupees two hundred and twenty per acre The amount of premium shall be payable in not more than ten annual installments along with the annual land revenue and in default of such payments the amount due shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is payable. The persons rendering services in religious institution as Pujari, Archak or holder of similar office in whatever name called are entitled for grant of occupancy rights. Clause (ii) refers personal cultivation for at least 3 years next before the vesting of the land into the State. A Division Bench of this Court in a decision reported in M.N. Shivappa Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR (1986) KAR 2472 (supra) has observed as under. 4. ...A careful reading of the Section would make it clear that the Clause 'personally cultivating for a continuous period of not less than three years prior to the date of vasting' in Clause (ii) of Section 6A applies not only to the categories of persons referred to in Clause (i) but also in Clause (ii). Any other construction would lead to incongruous results. To illustrate: If an Archak/Poojari referred to in Clause (i) is entitled to occupancy rights in respect of erstwhile inam land belonging to a temple even though he was not cultivating the lands, the following questions would arise. If any other person was actually cultivating the land and further he happens to be either the Kadim tenant or Protected tenant or Permanent tenant what should happen to him? Should he be evicted and occupancy right should be given to the Archak and then what is the extent of land in respect of which he can claim occupancy rights? Can he claim occupancy rights in respect of all the extents of Inam lands belonging to the religious institution concerned? The other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 4, 5 and 5A expressly provide that the persons cultivating the erstwhile religious Inam lands in those capacities are entitled to secure occupancy rights.
Can he claim occupancy rights in respect of all the extents of Inam lands belonging to the religious institution concerned? The other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 4, 5 and 5A expressly provide that the persons cultivating the erstwhile religious Inam lands in those capacities are entitled to secure occupancy rights. Certainly Section 6A is not intended to deprive the occupancy rights in respect of the persons who have been actually cultivating the lands as protected tenant or permanent tenant or kadim tenant and. confer the occupancy rights on the Archak/Poojari, who had never cultivated the lands. This decision of the Division Bench answers the first issue and it cannot be held that, Archak without cultivating the land can get the occupancy rights conferred in his favour. Sections 4, 5-A and also Section 6 specially confer rights on the kadim tenants, permanent tenants, protected tenants and other tenants to seek for continuation of tenancy. If these provisions are harmoniously construed, the only meaning that can be attached to Section 6-A is, an Archak, who is in possession and personally cultivating the land for three years next before the vesting can alone seek for grant of occupancy rights to protect his possession and not in respect of Archak, who is not cultivating the land. The grant of occupancy rights in favour of Archak, who is not cultivating the land, would defeat the object of the Act and also to defect the rights already accrued to other tenants under Sections 4, 5, 5-A and 6 of the Act. In my opinion, the provisions of Section 6-A(1) of the Act cannot be understood to mean that, no personal cultivation is required for Archak, Clause (i) and Clause (ii) of Section 6-A have to be considered together and if the Archak fulfils the requirement of cultivation for continuous period of three years, then only he is entitled for grant of occupancy rights, giving any other meaning would defeat not only the provisions of the Act and also the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. 15. In this case, the Tribunal has not held that, the petitioner is in possession and cultivating the land continuously for a period of three years before vesting.
15. In this case, the Tribunal has not held that, the petitioner is in possession and cultivating the land continuously for a period of three years before vesting. If that is so, then the initial qualification to seek grant of occupancy rights is not fulfilled by the Archak and if he is not found in possession, his application for grant of occupancy rights is not maintainable. 16. As regards to the ceiling limit prescribed under the provisions of Section 27-A is concerned, the ceiling limit is prescribed only in respect of two category of persons i.e., one falling under Section 6 and another falling under Section 6-A of the Act. The intention of the legislation in bringing the amendment to the provisions of the Act is to protect the rights of kadim tenant, permanent tenant and protected tenant. The omission of protected tenant in Section 6 of the Act does not restrict the right of the protected tenant, the Act 27/1973 clearly gives protection to the protected tenants by inserting Section 5-A to the Act If Sections 2(12.a), 5-A, 6-A and 27-A are read together, it only shows that the protected tenants are not required to restrict their holding, as Section 27-A of the Act does not include Section 5-A. These provisions have to be interpreted by keeping into account the purpose and intention. If the intention is to protect the tenant, then the liberal meaning has to be adopted. In my opinion, the applicants, who fall under Sections 4, 5 and 5-A of the Act, they are not required to declare their holding under Section 27-A of the Act However, in respect of tenants under Section 6 and applicants under Section 6-A of the Act, they are required to declare their holding under Section 27-A of the Act Only in respect of these categories, the ceiling is prescribed under Section 27-A of the Act and not in respect of others. 17. As regards to the application of provisions of the Land Reforms Act is concerned. Section 9 Sub-section (2) Clause (c) of the Act specifically refers to the provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. These are the only provisions, which are applicable for the purpose of considering the grant of occupancy rights under the Act.
Section 9 Sub-section (2) Clause (c) of the Act specifically refers to the provisions of Sections 48-A, 48-C and 112 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. These are the only provisions, which are applicable for the purpose of considering the grant of occupancy rights under the Act. These are procedural matters for which the provisions are made, and it cannot be enlarged to mean that, all the provisions of the Land Reforms Act are mutatis mutandis applicable to the applications filed under Section 10 of the Act. 18. Insofar as ceiling limit is concerned, irrespective of the provisions of the Act, every person, who is holding the land or lands more than the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 63 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is required to declare his holding. Under Section 63 of the Land Reforms Act, no person can hold land beyond the ceiling limit prescribed. Even if the person fails to declare, the Tahsildar has been conferred with power to initiate proceedings and forfeit the land in excess to ceiling limit If that is so, even if the respondent No. 4 fails to file declaration, declaring his holdings, it does not confer any right on the respondent No. 4 to hold any land beyond the ceiling limit and it is for the Tahsildar to find out whether the land held by the fourth respondent is excess to the ceiling limit or not. 19. As regards to the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, while considering the grant of occupancy rights under Section 10, the question of ceiling limit is also required to be considered, in my opinion, it is unnecessary to consider that question when there is a separate procedure contemplated and separate power is conferred on different authorities. The authorities, who have been conferred with the specific power for specific purpose, they would exercise their power in accordance with law. 20. On the question of interpretation of statute, it is well settled law that, if a plain meaning cannot be given, then the intention of the legislation to be gathered from the provisions of the Act if the legislation is a beneficial legislation for class of people, then such legislation should be considered in consonance with the intention of legislation. Admittedly, the Abolition Act is intended to confer occupancy rights mainly on the tenants.
Admittedly, the Abolition Act is intended to confer occupancy rights mainly on the tenants. If that is so, the tenants are classified as kadim tenants, permanent tenants and protected tenants and if that is so, no restriction could be given to restrict their rights. If there is any ambiguity in Section 6 or Section 27-A of the Act, the intention and purpose for which the legislation is brought is required to be given effect to, in such circumstances, if there is any ambiguity, the provision should be given liberal construction to sub-serve the purpose for which the legislation is made. In this case, provisions of Sections 2(12.a), 5-A and 27-A of the Act do make it clear that, the rights of protected tenants are not restricted. Provisions of Section 6 of the Act cannot be read in isolation to defeat the object and intention of the Act 21. On facts, it is clear that, respondent No. 4 has been in possession from 1956, though an order is passed in 1962 as per Ex.D3 to initiate proceedings against respondent No. 4 to terminate his tenancy, admittedly, no proceedings are initiated, in turn, the order of the Assistant Commissioner has been set aside and further, the revenue records also show the name of the respondent No. 4 till 1963-64 and from 1965 onwards, there is a decree of injunction in favour of the respondent No. 4. There is no document to show that, at any point of time, the respondent No. 4 has been dispossessed from the land, it is also not in dispute that, the respondent No. 4 was put in possession as tenant and his status as a tenant has also not been terminated. If that is so, once he has been inducted as a tenant, unless an action is taken in accordance with law and he being in possession for more than 12 years continuously next before the vesting, it is clear that, the respondent No. 4 has proved that he is a protected tenant within the meaning of Section 2(12-a) and under Section 5-A, he is entitled to make an application. 22.
22. The Appellate Authority considering the documents and considering the provisions of the Act has found that, the respondent No. 4 has proved that, he is entitled for grant of occupancy rights in terms of Section 5-A of the Act The Land Tribunal while granting occupancy rights in favour of the petitioner has only observed that, the respondent No. 4 came in possession in 1956 only and before that, the petitioner was in possession. In my opinion, the possession prior to 1956 cannot confer right in favour of the petitioner to seek grant of occupancy rights. 23. In the light of the above findings, I do not find any merit in this Revision. 24. Accordingly, the Revision fails and same is dismissed. No cost.