Judgment : TAPEN SEN, J. (1) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 3. 9. 2007 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W. P. No. 8664 (W) of 2006 with CAN 68 I6 of 2006 whereby and whereunder he was pleased to dismiss the writ petition by holding that the respondent No. 7 (daughter-in-law of the writ petitioner) was lawfully entitled to request the municipal Corporation to mutate the records by incorporating her name as a permit holder of the stall in question (hereinafter referred to as the shop). (2) THE writ petition was filed by the appellant (Rajendra Kumar Majumdar)being the father-in-law of the respondent No. 7 (Smt. Krishna Majumdar)praying, inter alia, for an order commanding upon the Kolkata Municipal corporation, and its officers including its Mayor, to register/restore his name in the records maintained by the said Corporation as the original tenant in respect of shop No. E-5 situated in the Gariahat Market Complex AND not to register/mutate the name of his daughter-in-law (respondent No. 7) as a tenant with regard thereto. (3) THE facts, as stated in the writ petition, are that the appellant /writ petitioner was the original tenant since 1955 in respect of the aforementioned shop and was running a business therein in the name and style of "sri Sri saradeshwari Dashakarma Bhandar" in the capacity of its lawful occupier and on the basis of a licence issued to him by the Corporation and for which, he was a regular tenderer of rent. He had three sons and two daughters out of which, his second son (Sajal Majumdar) had expired on 7. 12. 2005. This deceased son namely Sajal, and who was the husband of the respondent no. 7 (Krishna Majumdar), used to help him in managing the day-to-day affairs of the shop in question because his other children were totally independent, being well established. It was only Sajal who was unemployed and had an uncertain future. (4) CONSIDERING his old age as well as the uncertain future of Sajal, he executed a Deed of Family Settlement and Trust on 26. 7. 1977 (Annexure-P3 to the writ petition) and by virtue thereof, he himself became the sole beneficiary and continued to be the rightful occupant/owner of the shop during his life-time. (4) CONSIDERING his old age as well as the uncertain future of Sajal, he executed a Deed of Family Settlement and Trust on 26. 7. 1977 (Annexure-P3 to the writ petition) and by virtue thereof, he himself became the sole beneficiary and continued to be the rightful occupant/owner of the shop during his life-time. However, a clause was inserted in the said Deed of trust by reason whereof, it was provided, that in case he died before Sajal, then and only then, the ownership of the shop, together with all rights, title and interest appertaining thereto would vest and devolve upon him. There was a further clause that the Deed of Trust could be revoked only by a registered Deed of Revocation. (5) THE petitioner further stated that on account of his old and frail health, he entrusted the administration and/or the business of the said shop upon Sajal and after early 1980, he (Sajal) began acting as the "de facto manager" of the shop but nevertheless, he (the petitioner) remained and continued to remain the original tenant and went on paying taxes regularly. (6) THE petitioner further stated that Sajal, who was then unmarried, used to submit the accounts to him regularly but would take a nominal amount for his own expenditure. The petitioner stated that as time went by, he continued to grow older and gradually, more and more feeble. He started losing his grip over the business and had to rely totally upon Sajal upon whom he reposed full confidence. Sajal continued looking after his business and property and he also started to look after and maintain the petitioners family from the income coming from the business of the said shop. (7) ON 19. 11. 2003, Sajal got married to Krishna (respondent No. 7) according to the Hindu Rites and Customs whereafter they started living as husband and wife in his house but soon thereafter, there was marital discord between themselves and Krishna started pressurizing him (her husband) to transfer the property in her name. She often quarrelled with Sajal as well as with the other family members and would also humiliate him but he continued to tolerate all this in the hope that peace would ultimately prevail. (8) ON 31. 3. She often quarrelled with Sajal as well as with the other family members and would also humiliate him but he continued to tolerate all this in the hope that peace would ultimately prevail. (8) ON 31. 3. 2004, Krishna went to her paternal house on her own volition without informing anyone and it was then that his son came to learn that she had left with valuable articles. Sajal then went to her house and requested her to return but instead of doing so, she threatened that she would lodge false complaints against him and his family members. Apprehending trouble, sajal then lodged a general diary with the Kasba Police Station. (9) ON 9. 6. 2004, Krishna (respondent No. 7) filed a complaint before the kasba Police Station under section 498a/406/307 IPC against Sajal and other members of his family which was initially registered as Kasba PS Case no. 96 dated 9. 6. 2004 but subsequently, renumbered as B. G. R. No. 3083 of 2004. Sajal was then put behind bars for a considerable period but subsequently, the police, after investigation, did not find any ingredients pertaining to the commission of any offence under section 307 IPC and therefore, submitted a chargesheet against him and the other in-laws under section 498a/406/506b IPC. The said case, according to the petitioner, and as stated in Paragraph-10 of the writ petition, is still pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, at Alipore. (10) SAJAL also filed a matrimonial suit but during the pendency thereof, he died on 07. 12. 2005. It was stated that Krishna did not attend his funeral and after the last rites, the petitioner himself went to the shop on 18. 12. 2005 and opened the same for collecting materials for performing the "shradh" ceremony and also to clean the shop, but it was then that Krishna, along with anti-social elements, appeared and forcibly attempted to take possession and snatch the keys of the shop but, due to the intervention of other shopkeepers, she failed in her attempts. A similar incident was repeated on 27. 1. 2006 and therefore (as stated in para-12 of the writ petition), the petitioner lodged a general diary before the local Gariahat Police Station vide Annexure-P4 informing them about the incident that had taken place on that day, i. e. on 27. 01. 2006. A similar incident was repeated on 27. 1. 2006 and therefore (as stated in para-12 of the writ petition), the petitioner lodged a general diary before the local Gariahat Police Station vide Annexure-P4 informing them about the incident that had taken place on that day, i. e. on 27. 01. 2006. (11) THE petitioners further case was that he also filed a title suit before the 2nd Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Alipore in which an application under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 was filed praying for an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from taking forcible possession of the shop and also for restraining them from creating any disturbance in the peaceful running of the shop. On 22. 12. 2005, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) passed an order of status quo to be maintained by both the parties as on that day and the said order was extended from time to time but finally vacated on 21. 2. 2006 due to the non-appearance of the Counsel of the petitioner. (12) EVEN thereafter, matters did not end as applications under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were filed before the learned Executive magistrate (1st Court) at Alipore both by the respondent No. 7 as well as by the petitioner qua maintenance of peace and tranquillity at the shop but all proceedings were dropped by the Magistrate with an observation that the dispute was purely civil in nature. (13) BY Memo No. G. M. 556 dated 22. 2. 2006 (Annexure-P6 to the writ petition), the Market Superintendent, Gariahat Market Complex (Market division) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (respondent No. 5), stated that an application dated 17. 2. 2006 had been received in his office, being an application of the respondent No. 7 (Krishna Mazumdar) for the registration of her name in place of the name of her deceased husband in respect of the shop in question. In the said memo, it was mentioned that if there was any objection, the same may be submitted within 15 days. Being shocked, the petitioner enquired and was told that in the year 1987 itself, the authorities had already mutated the name of his son in place of the petitioner in respect of the shop. In the said memo, it was mentioned that if there was any objection, the same may be submitted within 15 days. Being shocked, the petitioner enquired and was told that in the year 1987 itself, the authorities had already mutated the name of his son in place of the petitioner in respect of the shop. He further came to learn that the said mutation was effected by the Municipal authorities on the basis of an unregistered Deed of Gift purportedly signed by him as a donor gifting the property to his deceased son as a donee. The petitioner demanded for the original Deed of Gift as well as a copy thereof but till date, neither such copy was shown nor given. According to the petitioner, he apprehends that there is no such Deed of Gift at all and that the mutation is a result of fraud and collusion. (14) ON 06. 3. 2006, the petitioner filed his objection giving all facts in support of his contention that the shop should not be mutated in the name of the respondent No. 7 (Krishna Mazumdar). (15) IN paragraph 19 of the writ petition, the petitioner stated that after filing the objection, he made enquiries with regard to its status before the respondent No. 5 on a number of occasions but the said officer maintained a stoic silence but even then, the petitioner did not lose hope and continued to pursue the matter before the authorities. However, all of a sudden, he received news that in spite of his objection, the authorities were proceeding at a tremendous pace to illegally register/mutate the name of the respondent no. 7 in respect of the shop without any basis whatsoever. Apprehending trouble, he immediately sent a legal notice to the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 demanding justice and requested them not to take any decision regarding mutation of the shop in the name of the respondent No. 7. In one of the letters, he stated that the right to tenancy with regard to the shop in question vested entirely upon him and therefore, the same was required to be restored in his name at the earliest. (16) NOTWITHSTANDING these facts, a letter was issued by the respondent no. 5 (Market Superintendent) on 29. 3. 2006 vide Annexure-P-10 appended to the writ petition, informing the petitioner that the Mayor had not considered his prayer "at this stage". (16) NOTWITHSTANDING these facts, a letter was issued by the respondent no. 5 (Market Superintendent) on 29. 3. 2006 vide Annexure-P-10 appended to the writ petition, informing the petitioner that the Mayor had not considered his prayer "at this stage". The said letter reads as follows : "the KOLKATA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION no. GM-599 of 2005-06 gh Department in replying please quote the number and date of this letter 29. 3. 2006 from : superintendant, gariahat Market, kolkata. To, sri Rajendra Kumar Majumder, 22/a/22, B. Bosepukur Road, Kasba, Kolkata - 700 042. Re : Stall No. E-5. Gariahat Mkt. This is to inform you that the Honble Mayor have not considered your prayer as this stage. Thanking you, yours faithfully, sd/-29. 3. 2006 superintendent GARIAHAT MARKET, KM. C. (Quoted as it appears in the paper-book) (17) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the language used in the aforesaid letter clearly indicates malice on the part of the authorities in not restoring the name of the writ petitioner as the original tenant. The further grievance of the petitioner before the Writ Court was that even the alleged mutation effected in the name of his deceased son was also illegal and it was a result of collusion and fraud and that on the basis of an unregistered Deed of Gift, such a mutation could not have been given effect to. His further grievance was that such a mutation without so much as even serving a notice upon him, was totally in violation of the principles of natural justice and was in effect, a collusive mutation. (18) THE petitioners further case before the Writ Court was that the Deed of trust dated 26. 7. 1977 could never enable the respondent No. 7 to get her name mutated because of the clause created in that trust itself laying down that her husband (Sajal) could succeed to the shop only if the petitioner (his father)pre-deceased him. Since, in this case, the son pre-deceased the father, the property continued to vest in the petitioner (the father) and not in his son. (19) MR. Ashok Das Adhikari, appearing for the appellant has raised a number of points in support of his contention that the respondent-authorities have acted illegally and with malice. Since, in this case, the son pre-deceased the father, the property continued to vest in the petitioner (the father) and not in his son. (19) MR. Ashok Das Adhikari, appearing for the appellant has raised a number of points in support of his contention that the respondent-authorities have acted illegally and with malice. His first contention is that Annexure-P-10 itself is totally illegal inasmuch as it not only refuses to give reasons as to why the petitioners objection was not considered but it also conveys an information to the effect that the Mayor did not consider his prayer at all. He submits, that being a statutory authority, it was the bounden duty of the mayor as well as of the other authorities of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation to deal with the objection of the petitioner from every angle and then to pass an order giving reasons as to why the Mayor did not think it fit even to consider the prayer/objection of the petitioner. (20) HE next contended that upon a plain reading of the Deed of Trust itself, it would be evident that so long as the petitioner was alive, he (the petitioner) and the petitioner alone, would be the sole trustee and it would be only after his death that the trust would come to an end and the rights appurtenant to the shop would stand transferred to his son. (21) ACCORDING to Mr. Das Adhikari, since the petitioner is still alive, his rights over the shop in question cannot, under any circumstances, be said to have been obliterated or transferred to his son on the basis of an affidavit and similarly, any mutation alleged to have taken place on 31. 3. 1986 was without notice to him and therefore the same was per se illegal and void ab initio and would continue to be so as it was made behind the back of the petitioner without valid documents and therefore, his objection could not have been rejected summarily. (22) FOR the same reason, Mr. Das Adhikari submits that even the learned single Judge could not have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay ("distance-of-time") as the offence being a continuing offence, the question of delay did not arise at all. (22) FOR the same reason, Mr. Das Adhikari submits that even the learned single Judge could not have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay ("distance-of-time") as the offence being a continuing offence, the question of delay did not arise at all. Learned Counsel submits that apart from the aforesaid, the learned single Judge did not consider any of these issues and straightaway came to a conclusion that the respondent No. 7 was entitled to request the corporation for mutation of her name without considering, amongst others, the specific statements made in para-6 of his reply to the affidavit-in-opposition wherein he stated that " Nowhere from the said Deed of Trust it was stated that the shop No. E-5 at Gariahut Market Complex has been given to Sajal majumdar, since deceased. Furthermore, from the said Deed of Trust it is very clear that the petitioner is the only trustee till his death, and after his death said predeceased son should have the right of the property as a trustee. Not only that there was also a provision in the said Trust Deed by which the said deed should be revoked, by any other valid documents and the said trust Deed has already been cancelled by another Deed of cancellation. " (quoted) (23) LEARNED Counsel then attacked the stand of the Kolkata Municipal corporation (made in para-5 of their affidavit-in-opposition) and which was to the effect that in the month December, 1985, the petitioner had made an "application" before the Municipal authorities along with an affidavit showing his willingness to convey his right, title and interest in respect of the shop to his son, Sajal and that the said deceased son had also given an Indemnity Bond on 23. 12. 1985. The matter was then considered by the Municipal authorities and by virtue of decision taken by the Mayor-in-Council on 31. 3. 1986, steps were taken to mutate the name of Sajal in place of the petitioner. (24) MR. Adhikari then submitted that apart from the fact that such documents are collusive in nature, it cannot be believed that a transfer of right over property can be transferred on an alleged affidavit executed on a non-judicial stamped paper which is valued at only Rs. 5/- (Rupees five) as is evident from page-126 of the paper-book and which was sworn before a mere Notary public. 5/- (Rupees five) as is evident from page-126 of the paper-book and which was sworn before a mere Notary public. Learned Counsel then submitted that none of the statements made by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation in their affidavit-in-opposition should be accepted nor should they have been accepted by the learned Trial Judge after they came out with the order dated 29. 3. 2006 quoted in para 16 above and in which they did not give any reasons which they are attempting to give in the affidavit-in-opposition. He submitted that both the Superintendent as well as the Mayor are statutory functionaries and the validity of their orders have to be judged from the orders themselves and they cannot be allowed to be supplemented or complemented by the addition of fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise so as to validate the original orders because if such a course is allowed, an order which is bad in the beginning, may get validated by the addition of subsequent facts brought on record through an affidavit. Learned Counsel relies upon the well-known judgment of the supreme Court passed in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. vs Chief election Commissioner, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 . (25) LEARNED Counsel then submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is erroneous inasmuch as it proceeds on assumptions by taking into consideration non-existent documents. He submits that in the very opening sentence of the impugned order, the learned Trial Judge, refers to a "decision" of the Corporation dated 29. 3. 2006 but the said so-called "decision" is the letter dated 29. 3. 2006 (Annexure P-10 to the writ petition quoted in para-16 above) and it is a mere communication informing the petitioner that the Mayor has not considered the prayer of the petitioner. According to the learned Counsel, such a "one-lined" letter could not have been referred to as a "decision" of the Corporation by the learned Trial Judge. Similarly, in the body of the order of the learned Trial Judge, the alleged "decision" of the Corporation has been referred to at a number of places. According to the learned Counsel, such a "one-lined" letter could not have been referred to as a "decision" of the Corporation by the learned Trial Judge. Similarly, in the body of the order of the learned Trial Judge, the alleged "decision" of the Corporation has been referred to at a number of places. He refers to the relevant portion of the order at page-160 of the paper-book and which reads as follows: "counsel for the parties inform me that the petitioner has already instituted a suit before the Civil Court, and that in that suit Krishna is a party, though Corporation is not a party. Be that as it may, on the facts, i do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the Corporation. From the documents produced with the opposition of the Corporation it is apparent that Sajals name was recorded as the permit holder in terms of decision of the Mavor-in-Council dated March 31". 1986 and that the decision was taken on the basis of the petitioners application dated december 7th 1985. genuineness whereof has been sought to be questioned by Counsel for the petitioner today. What Counsel has suggested is that the Corporation perhaps fabricated the documents stated to be application submitted by the petitioner on December 7th, 1985 and the indemnity bond dated December 23rd, 1985 submitted by Sajal. There is absolutely no reason to entertain such a plea at this distance of time, when there is nothing to show that Sajal, during his life-time, was not operating his business from the shop. He died only on December 7th, 2005. As his wife krishna was lawfully entitled to request the Corporation to mutate the records incorporating her name as the permit holder of the shop. " Quoted as it appears from the paper book but emphasis by bold fonts is by this Court) (26) MR. Das Adhikari submits that it is not at all understandable as to how the learned Trial Judge proceeded to say that he did not find reason to interfere with the "decision of the Corporation" when there is no decision which has been brought on record in the entire records of this case save and except the one-lined communication dated 29. 3. 2006 referred to and quoted above. 3. 2006 referred to and quoted above. (27) LEARNED Counsel submitted that similarly, the finding and/or the observations of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that it was apparent that Sajals name was recorded in terms of the "decision of the Mayor-in-Council dated 31. 3. 1986" and that the said "decision" was taken on the basis of the "petitioners application dated. 7. 12. 1985" are totally erroneous observations which are contrary to the records inasmuch as neither the affidavit-in-opposition discloses any "decision dated 31. 3. 1986" nor do the records show that there was, in fact, any "application" filed by the petitioner on 7. 12. 1985 because the only document dated 7. 12. 1985 which has been brought on record is not an "application" but it is a mere "affidavit" alleged to have been executed by the petitioner on a Non-judicial Stamped Paper worth Rs. 5/- only at running page-126 of the paper-book. (28) LEARNED Counsel submitted that in the face of these facts and circumstances and in the absence of these documents, the learned Trial Judge acted mechanically, without application of mind and totally misdirected himself when he made the aforesaid observations quote in para-26 above. (29) HE then submitted that apart from the aforesaid, the learned Trial Judge proceeded mechanically in coming to a conclusion that there was no reason to entertain the plea that the documents were fabricated at "at this distance of time" without considering the effect of the letter dated 22. 2. 2006 (Annexure-P6) by which the Market Superintendent had himself stated the fact that the respondent No. 7 had filed her application only on 17. 2. 2006 for mutation of her name and therefore, his cause of action was not at a "distance of time" as recorded by the learned Trial Judge but in "fact, was of recent origin. (30) THE learned Counsel then submitted that the learned Trial Judge could not have refused to disbelieve the submissions relating to fabrication of documents without giving any reasons and by mechanically using the words "distance-of-time" without examining the effect, interpretation and tenor of the Deed of trust which was brought on record by the petitioner vide Annexure-P3. (30) THE learned Counsel then submitted that the learned Trial Judge could not have refused to disbelieve the submissions relating to fabrication of documents without giving any reasons and by mechanically using the words "distance-of-time" without examining the effect, interpretation and tenor of the Deed of trust which was brought on record by the petitioner vide Annexure-P3. He submitted that having not gone through these aspects, the learned Trial Judge should not have, on the one hand, proceeded to dismiss the writ petition and on the other, proceeded to virtually conter a right upon the respondent No. 7 by straightaway saying that "krishna was lawfully entitled to request the Corporation to mutate the records" in her name. Such an observation, according to learned Counsel, has the effect of totally obliterating a valid right of the petitioner flowing not only from the licence on the basis whereof he claims to have been a lawful occupier as a tenant since 1955 but also in the capacity of the head of the family. (31) LEARNED Counsel submitted that by reason of the impugned order, the appellant has suffered immensely because there was no material before the learned Trial Judge on the basis whereof he could have arrived at a conclusion that the writ petitioner was guilty of laches or delay. In the absence of materials, the learned Trial Judge should not have come to a conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of delay because there was no proof before him to establish that the petitioner had knowledge or notice with regard to the alleged mutation of the name of his son. Consequently, the point of delay should not have been slapped against him. (32) LEARNED Counsel then submitted that none of these aspects were considered by the learned Trial Judge and without considering these aspects, he could not have conferred a status and/or right upon the respondent No. 7 entailing civil consequences as against the appellant without appreciating that the petitioner had no notice at all of what was happening in the year 1985/1986 behind his back and without considering the reasons which had prompted the authorities to issue the communication dated 29. 3. 2006 without giving any reasons as to why the Mayor had refused to consider the objection of the petitioner. 3. 2006 without giving any reasons as to why the Mayor had refused to consider the objection of the petitioner. (33) HE submitted that whenever civil consequences ensue, reasons must not only be given but an opportunity of hearing should also be afforded so as to give effect to the principles of natural justice. Learned Counsel, amongst others, relies upon the judgments of the Supreme Court passed in the cases of (i) State of Orissa vs. Binapani Dei and Ors. , reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 (Para-12); (ii) Daya Ram vs. Raghunath and Ors. , reported in 2007 (5) Supreme 188 (Para-9); (in) Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors. vs. Paresh R. Kampani and Ors. , reported in 1998 (2) CLJ 87 (para 4). (34) MR. Alok Kr. Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the Kolkata municipal Corporation, has submitted that the petitioner/appellant is a very clever person and a very clever litigant. He submitted that what the petitioner actually wants through the processes of this Court is the restoration of a shop which stood in the name of his son and which had been voluntarily given up by him on 7. 12. 1985 by an application. 20 (twenty) years thereafter, by filing a writ petition in 2006, he wants a virtual restoration of that shop in his name when, after the death of his son on 07. 12. 2005, his wife became a natural descendant and had the right to claim mutation of the shop in question. He then submitted that in fact, the petitioner/appellant is aware of everything and that there is no collusion at all because along with the application, the petitioner had also sworn an affidavit expressing his willingness to convey his right, title and interest in respect of the shop in question and the deceased Sajal had also given an indemnity bond on 23. 12. 1985 and thereafter, the matter was considered by the Municipal authorities and a decision taken on 31. 3. 1986. (35) LET it be recorded that the aforementioned submission of Mr. Alok ghosh is based on paragraph-5 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and sworn by one Partha Das, A. S. O. (Market) the kolkata Municipal Corporation. 3. 1986. (35) LET it be recorded that the aforementioned submission of Mr. Alok ghosh is based on paragraph-5 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and sworn by one Partha Das, A. S. O. (Market) the kolkata Municipal Corporation. The said paragraph-5 has been sworn as being true to his information derived from the records of the case but amazingly, curiously and surprisingly, neither the "application" referred to therein nor the so called "decision" of the Mayor-in-Council said to have been taken on 31.3.1986 have been brought on record in the said affidavit-in-opposition. Therefore, in the absence of the "application" as well as the so-called "decision dated 31. 03. 2006" which have been emphatically referred to in para-5 of the affidavit-in-opposition, this Court is entitled NOT to give any credence to such statements/submissions which have been made without supporting evidence. (36) MOREOVER, in sharp retaliation to these statements, Mr. Adhikari has referred to Paras 6 and 8 of the reply filed by the petitioner to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Nos. l to 5 in which it was emphatically stated that the petitioner had never filed any application along with an affidavit showing his willingness to convey his right, title and interest in the shop in question and that on the basis of such documents there cannot be a valid transfer of property or right at all. In the said paragraph 6, the petitioner also "called upon" the respondent authority to produce the alleged decision dated 31. 3. 1986. Mr. Das Adhikari contended that the learned Trial judge did not at all apply his mind to these aspects and did not consider their effect at the time of passing the impugned order. The said paras 6 and 8 of the reply of the petitioner to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent nos. 1 to 5 read as follows: "6. With reference to the statements and/or averments made in paragraph No. 5 of the said opposition, I deny and dispute the allegations made therein and I do not admit anything which is contrary to the record and/or inconsistent therewith and I repeat and reiterate the statements made in paragraph Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the writ petition. It is denied that the petitioner had not acted with the terms and conditions of the Trust deed dated 26th July, 1997. 4, 5 and 6 of the writ petition. It is denied that the petitioner had not acted with the terms and conditions of the Trust deed dated 26th July, 1997. I reluctant to say that the deponent of the said opposition has not understood the meaning and purports of the said deed dated 26th July, 1977. No where from the said Deed of Trust it was stated that the stall No. E-5 at Gariahat Market Complex has been given to Sajal Majumdar, since deceased. Furthermore, from the said Deed of trust it is very clear that the petitioner is the only trustee till his death, and after his death said predeceased son should have the right of the property as a trustee. Not only that there was also a provision in the said Trust Deed by which the said deed should be revoked, by any other valid documents and the said Trust Deed has already been cancelled by another Deed of Cancellation. Further it is denied that sometime in the month of December 1985, the petitioner made an application before the Municipal authority along with an affidavit showing his willingness to convey all his right, title and interest in respect of the stall in question to his said deceased son. Here it is stated that the petitioner never made any application before the said Corporation to convey his right, title and interest as alleged. It is also specifically stated that the petitioner never swear any affidavit to that effect also. I call upon the respondent authority to produce the alleged application before this Honble Court for the purpose of genuineness of the same. I further say that I have never affirmed any affidavit to that effect. The document which is annexed at page 17 of the said opposition is not my document. I also disputed and denied the signature of the same. It is stated that the same is a manufactured one. It is specifically stated that I have never went to any of the Notary Public as has been found from the said documents. Furthermore, the said document itself is not a valid one, as the same was not prepared in accordance with the prescribed rulers. I cannot say whether any bond was even given by the said Sajal Majumdar, since deceased or not. Here it is stated that Sajal Majumdar. Furthermore, the said document itself is not a valid one, as the same was not prepared in accordance with the prescribed rulers. I cannot say whether any bond was even given by the said Sajal Majumdar, since deceased or not. Here it is stated that Sajal Majumdar. since deceased had got no authority or he had got no right to give an indemnity bond in respect of the property of another, therefore, the said bond is also an unlawful document. I call upon the respondent authority to produce the said alleged decision dated 31st March. 1986 as alleged before This Honble Court for its true scope and meaning thereof. Hence it is stated That I have never called upon by any of the authorities for such purpose. If the Corporation had taken any decision behind the back of the petitioner, that should be set aside immediately. The recording of name of said Sajal Majumdar, since deceased, in the records of the Corporation in place of the petitioner is totally illegal, arbitrary, unlawful and against the spirit of the law of our country. I call upon the answering respondents to produce any of the documents before This Honble court to prove the alleged change of name in the records, which is within the knowledge of the petitioner. It is further stated that the decision which has no leg to stand, the same should be quashed and/or set aside, at any point of time. I once again repeat and reiterated that the alleged decision of the concerned authority is illegal, motivated and the same has been done purposefully. 8. With reference to the statements and/or averments made in paragraph no. 8 of the said opposition, I deny and dispute the allegations made therein and I do not admit anything save and except those appear from records. It is also stated that all the statements are false and concocted and those have been made to create a cloud in the mind of the Honble court for the purpose of their evil gain. In this context I repeat and reiterate the statements and/or averments made in paragraph Nos. 16,17,18,19, 20 and 21 of the writ application. Once again it is stated that the petitioner never executed any affidavit on 7th December. 1985 as has been alleged in the said paragraph. The said document is also an invalid document. In this context I repeat and reiterate the statements and/or averments made in paragraph Nos. 16,17,18,19, 20 and 21 of the writ application. Once again it is stated that the petitioner never executed any affidavit on 7th December. 1985 as has been alleged in the said paragraph. The said document is also an invalid document. It is stated that the respondent corporation also produced another affidavit before this Honble Court on 17th May, 2006, when the matter was taken up for hearing by His Lordship the Honble Justice Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, the said document is not tally with the present one. The petitioner able to see the said manufactured document dated 18th August, 1987, which has been used by the said respondent No. 7 before the learned Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate at Alipore, in M. P. Case No. 2409 of 2006, but failed to obtain any copy of the same, as the respondent has filed a xerox copy. I call upon the respondent to produce the original for its true meaning. The said document is also an invalid one. It is also stated that the signature of the petitioner is also not a genuine one and the petitioner never signed in such manner and in such language. The signature and/ or contents of the said affidavit are totally false, necessary steps may be taken against those person, who has manufactured the same. In this context the petitioner reluctant to say that the deponent of the said opposition perhaps understood the fact that the petitioner never signed in English and as such they have purposefully annexed another manufactured document/ affidavit dated 7th December, 1985. It is further denied that the prayer was made by the petitioner before the municipal authority for transferring the petitioners right, title and interest in respect of the said stall in question to his son Sajal Majumdar. since deceased. Here the petitioner asked the answering respondents to produce the said alleged application of the petitioner before this Honble Court for the purpose of authentication of the same. It is also denied that the petitioner had even shows his willingness to convey all right, title and interest in respect of the said shop room to his third son. Since deceased. Here the petitioner asked the answering respondents to produce the said alleged application of the petitioner before this Honble Court for the purpose of authentication of the same. It is also denied that the petitioner had even shows his willingness to convey all right, title and interest in respect of the said shop room to his third son. Since deceased. The petitioner states that there cannot be any transfer taken place with such type of documents as has been allegedly stated by the answering respondents by supporting the claim of the private respondent No. 7. The petitioner cannot say whether any document has ever been produced by the said Sajal Majumdar, since deceased. The petitioner states that nobody cannot convey his imaginary right by way of creating indemnity bond, which is against the law of the land. It is specifically denied that the petitioner made any prayer to the municipal authority for transferring his right, title and interest in respect of the said stall in question to his said deceased son. I again and again asked the answering respondents to produce those alleged documents before this Honble Court with their M. M. I. Cs order dated 31st March. 1986 for its true scope and meaning thereof. It is strongly objected to the statements to the effect that the petitioner had made prayer before the concerned authority for transferring his right, title and interest to his said deceased son. It is also denied that the petitioner gave his prayer and/or consent to that effect. Furthermore, nobody should not and/or cannot have any right to grab the property of the petitioner by way of such alleged process and/or proceeding. It is specifically stated that the respondent No. 7 has got no right in respect of the said stall in question, as till now the said stall is in possession of the petitioner and he had executed a family settlement deed in which the petitioner was the sole and absolute trustee and as such the said Stall in question cannot have been the property of any other and till now the petitioner is the sole tenant in respect of the same. It is specifically stated that the petitioner has not suppressed any fact before this Honble Court and furthermore, the petitioner should not understood the meaning of real fact. It is specifically stated that the petitioner has not suppressed any fact before this Honble Court and furthermore, the petitioner should not understood the meaning of real fact. Therefore, it is not possible for the petitioner to ascertain which is the real fact. The petitioner can say that he has stated each and every fact before this Honble Court for proper adjudication of the matter and the petitioner never conveyed his tenancy right to anybody. It is the Corporation who had done the mischief behind the back of the petitioner. It is also stated that the answering respondents never enquired and/or intimated the petitioner regarding the alleged transfer. In the statement made in the paragraph under reply that there was no scope to face consideration of the matter as such the honble Mayor was not inclined to consider the matter afresh and rightly rejected the prayer of the petitioner as per provisions of law. It is stated that the Honble Mayor never indicated such type of statements/facts in his decision, and this is the deponent who has himself made out a case and stated all the things on behalf of the respondents and particularly supporting the illegal claim of the private respondent No. 7. The petitioner has opened the shop on number of occasions but the Kolkata Municipal authority resists the petitioner to open the said stall with the help of the private respondent No. 7 accompanied lots of antisocials. " (Quoted as it appears in the paper book but emphasis by bold fonts is by this Court) (37) MR. Alok Ghosh then submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable because the petitioner has referred to a large number of disputed questions of facts as well as disputed questions of title and therefore, unless conclusive rights are established by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction, the petitioner would not have any right to maintain a writ petition. 39. Let it be recorded that the writ petition was filed not for any declaration of any right, title or interest but was filed for an order directing the respondents to restore his name as a tenant because according to him, the mayor of Kolkata Municipal Corporation had refused to even consider his prayer without assigning any reasons and had informed the petitioner as such by the communication dated 29th March, 2006 quoted above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petition is not maintainable. (38) THE next submission of Mr. Alok Ghosh was with regard to delay and the "distance-of-time" yardstick used by the learned Trial Judge. According to him, this was correct because filing of the writ petition in the year 2006 was an indirect attempt inviting the Court to go back to the year 1985. He submitted that an equitable remedy cannot be granted when there is a long delay and therefore there was nothing wrong when the Mayor at this "distance-of-time" did not give reasons as to why he did not consider the prayer of the petitioner. He relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court passed in the cases of (i) Union of India and Ors. vs. E. G. Nambudiri, reported in 1991 (3) SCC 38 (paras 9 and 10); (ii) Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and anr. vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. , reported in 2000 (2) SCC 48 (para 8, 14,17); (iii) Karnataka Power Corpn. Limited, etc vs. K. Thangappan and Anr. , reported in 2006 (4) SCC 322 (paras 5 and 10); (iv) New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and Ors. , reported in AIR 2007 SC 1365 (Para 16). (39) I am afraid, none of the aforementioned judgments can be applied because, according to this Court and as has been rightly argued by Mr. Das Adhikari, the cause of action of the appellant began, in the year 2006 when he came to learn that the Kolkata Municipal Corporation were inviting objections against an application which was filed for the first time by the respondent No. 7 on 17. 2. 2006 for mutation of her name in place of the name of Sajal who had died in the year 2005. In the absence of any document brought on record by the kolkata Municipal Corporation showing that the petitioner/appellant was given notice or an opportunity of hearing in the year 1985 when the shop was allegedly mutated in the name of his son and in the absence of such an order on record, it cannot be said that the petitioner/appellant was sleeping because he came to know of the alleged transposition of the name of his son only in the year 2006 when, the Corporation, by their Notice dated 22. 2. 2. 2006, invited objections to the proposal of mutating the name of the respondent No. 7 in terms of her application dated 17. 2. 2006. So far as the statements/allegations that the appellant had applied along with an affidavit, we notice that the appellant had repeatedly called upon the respondents to produce the so called application and the so called decision of the Mayor-in-Council. The respondents never produced them and therefore in paragraph-36 above, we have not given any credence to such statements/allegations. Consequently, it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Alok Ghosh that the "distance-of-time" yardstick used by the learned trial Judge was correct. We accordingly reject his contention. (40) LEARNED Counsel then relied upon a letter of the petitioner, brought on record by the petitioner himself as a part of Annexure-P8 appended to the writ petition (at running page 69 of the writ petition and at running page 91 of the paper book) in which the petitioner stated that for the convenience of business, his deceased son Sajal was running the shop in his own name. He submitted that thus, the fact relating to change of ownership of the shop in the name of his son was very much within the knowledge of the petitioner and it was only after his death on 07. 12. 2005, that he wanted the restoration of his name. (41) WE are of the view that in the absence of any such order brought on record showing the actual transposition of the name in substitution of the name of the appellant in accordance with law, no inferences should be allowed to be drawn on the basis of a solitary letter without looking into all the other factors. We therefore do not accept this contention of Mr. Ghosh. (42) MOREOVER, let it be recorded that this letter of the appellant is dated 09. 01. 2006 (i. e. immediately after the death of his son on 07. 12. 2005 but before the respondent No. 7 filed her application for mutation on 17. 2. 2006. The respondents were bound to have dealt with the letter of the petitioner but they remained inert and by efflux of time and within 39 (thirty-nine)days from the date of this letter (09. 1. 2006), the respondent No. 7 filed her application on 17. 2. 2006. Within 5 (five) days from the date she filed the application on 17. 2006. The respondents were bound to have dealt with the letter of the petitioner but they remained inert and by efflux of time and within 39 (thirty-nine)days from the date of this letter (09. 1. 2006), the respondent No. 7 filed her application on 17. 2. 2006. Within 5 (five) days from the date she filed the application on 17. 2. 2006, the Corporation issued the notice dated 22. 02. 2006 (Annexure P-6) calling for objections thereto. There was no inertia on the part of the Corporation then because on the 5th (fifth) day thereafter, they issued the notice on 22. 2. 2006. The petitioner then duly filed his objection but instead of dealing with the same, the Mayor refused to consider the case of the appellant without even giving reasons as to why he refused to do so and without informing and disclosing to the appellant the materials that were against him and the factors that compelled him to refuse to even consider the case of the appellant. We are not at all impressed by the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Corporation that in view of the "distance of-time" yardstick, the mayor was not, obliged to either consider the case of the appellant or to give reasons. We have already held in the foregoing paragraphs that the petitioners knowledge, in the absence of materials indicating a contrary view, cannot be deemed, by circumstances, to be 1986 or 1987. Having perused the notice dated 22. 2. 2006 issued by the Corporation in which they invited objections to the application of the respondent No. 7 filed on 17. 2. 2006, we have therefore been inclined to take the view that the petitioners knowledge will be deemed to commence from 22. 2. 2006 and not prior thereto. (43) MOREOVER, the Corporation itself is an organization that functions under a statute, namely the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act. The Mayor of the Corporation is a mere functionary under the said statute which does not confer omnipotence upon him. Being a statutory functionary, his actions, qua citizens, must be based on the anvil and parameters of reasonableness, fair play and also, within the framework of law. The Mayor of the Corporation is a mere functionary under the said statute which does not confer omnipotence upon him. Being a statutory functionary, his actions, qua citizens, must be based on the anvil and parameters of reasonableness, fair play and also, within the framework of law. When a citizen approaches the Corporation for redressal of his grievances in a case where there are so many facets to the issue and factors to be considered as noticed above, the same cannot be ignored just like that. We are therefore of the view that the corporations Superintendent, could not have, by his letter dated 29. 03. 2006 (Annexure P-10) stated that "this is to inform you That the Honble Mayor have not considered your prayer at this stage". At the same time, having noticed that the Corporation and/or its Mayor refused to give reasons in the manner stated above, they cannot be allowed to add reasons in the shape of their affidavit-in-opposition in terms of mohinder Singh Gills case (supra). (44) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 7 adopted the submissions of Mr. Ghosh and added that when the respondent No. 7 came to the family by marriage in 2003, the name of the deceased son of the petitioner had, by then, already been mutated in the records of the Kolkata Municipal corporation. He submitted that under these circumstances, all that the respondent No. 7 now wants is that the Kolkata Municipal Corporation should confirm her rights through the deceased son of the petitioner. (45) THE matter cannot be so simple. When parties claim equity on the basis of some rights which they say, they are entitled to, such rights must first be established before the proper forum. (46) AFTER we had held the order of the Corporation to be illegal, we were contemplating of sending the matter on remand to the Corporation and/or its mayor to decide the matter afresh by passing a reasoned order but we realised that neither the Corporation nor its Mayor can be said to be the appropriate forum to make an adjudication on the rights of the parties. The only proper forum is a Court of competent civil jurisdiction because we feel that these rights will have to be weighed in the context of the law relating to succession under the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law also since the appellant is still alive. The only proper forum is a Court of competent civil jurisdiction because we feel that these rights will have to be weighed in the context of the law relating to succession under the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law also since the appellant is still alive. In the instant case, while the appellant claims his own rights on the basis of the original licence and the execution of the Deed of Trust, the respondent No. 7, on the other hand, claims her right on the basis of her marriage to the deceased son of the appellant. The deceased son of the appellant was running the shop at the time of his death on 7. 12. 2005. It is evident that after her marriage on 19.11. 2003, a matrimonial suit for divorce was filed by the deceased son of the appellant in the year 2004 itself alleging therein that the respondent No. 7 left the matrimonial home on 31. 3. 2004 (i. e. within approximately 4 months after marriage). A photocopy of order No. 1 dated 31. 5. 2004 passed by the learned District Judge, alipore was produced for our perusal and we noticed that the said suit was dismissed for default on 30.7.2005 as nobody appeared for the son of the appellant. However, the fact remains that at the time of death it was not the respondent No. 7 who was running the shop but it was her husband who was doing so and the respondent No. 7 had lodged a criminal case against her husband and her other in-laws on 9. 6. 2004 being Kasba P. S. case No. 96 dated 9. 6. 2004 (later renumbered as BGR No. 3083 of 2004) in which her husband was put behind bars for a considerable period and in which, the kasba Police Station, after investigation did not find any ingredient of the commission of any offence under section 307 and therefore, submitted a chargesheet under section 498a/406/506b of the Indian Penal Code. (47) THE aforementioned facts were stated by the appellant in para-10 of the writ petition which read as follows:- "10. That thereafter, 9th June, 2004 the respondent No. 7 lodged a complaint before the Kasba Police Station alleging, inter alia, about the commission of an offence punishable under section 498a/406/307 IPC against her husband and other in-laws vide Kasba PS Case No. 96 dated 09. 06. That thereafter, 9th June, 2004 the respondent No. 7 lodged a complaint before the Kasba Police Station alleging, inter alia, about the commission of an offence punishable under section 498a/406/307 IPC against her husband and other in-laws vide Kasba PS Case No. 96 dated 09. 06. 2004 and which was later renumbered as B. G. R. No. 3083 of 2004 and put her husband behind the bars for a considerable period. The Kasba PS after investigation did not find any ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under section 307 of IPC. i. e. attempting to murder and submitted chargesheet under section 498a/406/505 (B) of IPC against her husband and two other in-laws which is still pending before the learned 1st Court of Judicial Magistrate at Alipore. " (Quoted as it appears in the Paper book)In reply, the respondent No. 7, in Para-8 other affidavit-in-opposition, merely stated as follows:"8. With regard to the statements made in paragraphs 7,7a, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the writ application, I do not admit any statement and/or averment contrary to and/or inconsistent with the records. I admit that I was married to the said Sajal Kumar Majumdar on November 19, 2003 according to the hindu rites and customs and since then we have lived as husband and wile. However, with regard to the marital discord with my late husband, I say that the same is not at all relevant for disposal of the instant writ application and I offer no comment. However, I deny and dispute that I ever humiliated and tortured the said Sajal Kumar Majumdar. " (Quoted as it appears in the paper book) (48) THUS, upon a perusal of her statements made in Para-8 quoted above, it is evident that the respondent No. 7 did not deny the fact relating to her having lodged the criminal case on the basis whereof the son of the Appellant was put behind bars for a considerable length of time. Yet, before this Court, her Counsel has submitted that ail that the respondent No. 7 wants is her "rights" through the son of the appellant (meaning thereby the son of the appellant who was put behind bars for a considerable period of time on the basis of the criminal case lodged by the respondent No. 7). Yet, before this Court, her Counsel has submitted that ail that the respondent No. 7 wants is her "rights" through the son of the appellant (meaning thereby the son of the appellant who was put behind bars for a considerable period of time on the basis of the criminal case lodged by the respondent No. 7). (49) THIS Court is of the view that unless the right of the respondent No. 7 is established in accordance with law and before the appropriate forum, such a wish/desire of the respondent No. 7 cannot be allowed to materialize unless the rights of the appellant are also taken into consideration. Since such consideration has already been "refused" to be given by the Mayor, we therefore consider it appropriate to hold that the learned Trial Judge could not have termed the said "refusal" dated 29. 03. 2006 as a "decision of the corporation". We are also of the view that since the rights of the respondent no. 7 have not yet been decided by an appropriate Court of Civil jurisdiction in accordance with law and on the basis of materials on record lying with the Corporation, the learned Trial Judge tell in error when he virtually extinguished the rights of the appellant by saying that". . . . . . his wife Krishna was lawfully entitled to request the Corporation to mutate the records incorporating her name as the permit holder of the stall". (50) WE are further of the view that having regard to our observations and findings relating to the Notice dated 22. 2. 2006 made in the foregoing paragraphs, the learned Trial Judge also fell in error when he dismissed the writ petition by applying the "distance-of-time" yardstick against the appellant. (51) FOR the foregoing reasons we are of the view that the Order of the learned Trial Judge cannot be sustained. As a result, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 03/09/2007 and as a result, we also set aside the Letter/communication dated 29.03. 2006 issued by the respondent No. 5 informing that "the Honble Mayor have not considered" (quoted) the prayer of the appellant. (52) THE appeal is therefore allowed but in view of our reasoning given above, we desist from remanding the matter to the Corporation. 2006 issued by the respondent No. 5 informing that "the Honble Mayor have not considered" (quoted) the prayer of the appellant. (52) THE appeal is therefore allowed but in view of our reasoning given above, we desist from remanding the matter to the Corporation. We therefore give liberty to the respondent No. 7 to get her rights established before the Civil Court in accordance with law. We take notice of the fact that the Title Suit filed by the appellant being T. S. No. 315 of 2005 was dismissed on 19. 7. 2006 as was also evident from the photocopy of the Order produced for our perusal in Court but we also notice that the said dismissal was a dismissal for default because the plaintiff (appellant) had not taken steps for service of a copy of the plaint. (53) LET it be recorded that the writ petition was filed on 7. 4. 2006 and the order of dismissal for default was passed on 19. 7. 2006. We do not wish to make any comments on this except to observe that dismissal of the Title Suit for default, will not stand in the way of the appellant in the event he also desires to move the Court of a competent Civil Jurisdiction. However, in the meantime and taking into consideration that on the date of death, it was the son of the appellant who was running the shop in question and who was facing severe litigations with the wife who was not living in matrimony at that time and, who was not running the shop and who had lodged a criminal case against the deceased son of the appellant and other in-laws as a result of which the son of the appellant, who ultimately died, had to go behind bars we direct that till the matter is finally adjudicated by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction, the Municipal Corporation will render all assistance to the appellant so that he is able to run the shop in question without any hindrance or disturbance from the respondent No. 7 or from the Corporation itself. The appeal is accordingly allowed but the parties will bear their own costs. (54) UPON appropriate application (s) being made, urgent photostat certified copy of this Order, may be given/issued expeditiously subject to usual terms and conditions. S.K. Gupta, J. : I agree. The appeal is accordingly allowed but the parties will bear their own costs. (54) UPON appropriate application (s) being made, urgent photostat certified copy of this Order, may be given/issued expeditiously subject to usual terms and conditions. S.K. Gupta, J. : I agree. Later: (55) AFTER delivery of the aforementioned judgment, prayer was made by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents for stay of the same. We have considered such prayer and in view of our reasoning given in this judgment, we refuse to stay the same. Appeal allowed. Stay refused.