Judgment Rajesh Bindal, J. 1. The challenge in the present petition is to the order dated February 26, 2005 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala whereby the petitioner was directed to be summoned in an application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code"). The order dated February 20, 2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala in revision filed against the order dated February 26, 2005 is also under challenge. 2. The present proceedings arise out of FIR No. 533 dated November 25, 2001 under Sections 406, 498-A, 504, 506, 325, 34 IPC lodged by the complainant Smt. Madhu alias Pooja. The marriage between complainant and Virender Singh was solemnized on November 27, 1995 and the petitioner is husband of sister of the husband of the complainant (Nandoi). Though initially the name of the petitioner was also mentioned in the complaint, however, on investigation the petitioner was found to be innocent and the challan was presented only against the husband and mother-in-law of the complainant. Application under Section 319 of the Code for summoning the petitioner alongwith two other accused, who were left out in the investigation by the police was filed immediately after the examination-in-chief of the complainant was complete. Learned Magistrate relying upon her statement directed summoning of the petitioner vide order dated February, 26, 2005 which order was upheld by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in revision. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that statement made by the complainant before the Court was nothing else but reiteration of her statement made before the police leveling false and frivolous allegations against the petitioner as after detailed investigation the petitioner was found to be innocent and no challan was presented against him. He further submitted that unless there was other corroborating evidence to prove the guilt of the accused sought to be summoned against whom the challan was not presented, they could not be summoned by the Court as powers under Section 319 of the Code should not be exercised lightly. He has relied upon Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka 2004 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 678, Anju Bala and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 191, Smt. Harmohan Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 932, and Harjinder Kaur v. State of Punjab 2004 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 332. 4. He has relied upon Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka 2004 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 678, Anju Bala and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 191, Smt. Harmohan Kaur v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2006 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 932, and Harjinder Kaur v. State of Punjab 2004 (4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 332. 4. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the State submitted that statement of the complainant was sufficient to summon the accused at this stage. He will have due opportunity to contest the claim made by the prosecution at the stage of framing of charges. He further raised objection of maintainability of the revision as the petitioner has already availed of the remedy of revision before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 5. Before dealing with the matter in dispute on merits, I propose to deal with scope and ambit of powers under Section 319 of the Code. Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under: 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence: (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the court proceeds against any person under Sub-section (1) then (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of Clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 6. In Kailash Dwivedi v. State of M.P. and Anr. 6. In Kailash Dwivedi v. State of M.P. and Anr. (2005) 11 Supreme Court Cases 182, referring to Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka, while dealing with the jurisdiction of the Courts for exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 6. In the case of Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka this Court, considering the appeal on almost similar factual background, held that: (SCC pp. 794-95, paras 6-7 & 9-10). 6 [A]. It has been repeatedly held that the power to summon an accused is an extraordinary power conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. 7[B] In the present case, we need not go into the question whether prima facie the evidence implicates the appellant or not and whether the possibility of his conviction is remote, or his presence and instigation stood established, for in our view the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate, in any event of the matter, did not call for interference by the High Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. * ** 9[C] ...for exercise of discretion under Section 319 Cr.P.C., all relevant factors, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused. 10[D] Applying the test as aforesaid to the facts of the present case, in our view, the trial Magistrate is right in rejecting the application. The incident was of the year 1993. Seventeen witnesses had been examined. The statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had been recorded. The role attributed to the appellant, as per the impugned judgment of the High Court, was of instigation. Having regard to these facts coupled with the quashing of proceedings in the year 1995 against the appellant, it could not be held that the discretion was illegally exercised by the trial Magistrate so as to call for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. 7. In Palanisamy Gounder and Anr. v. State reprsented by Inspector of Police (2005) 12 Supreme Court Cases 327, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 3. 7. In Palanisamy Gounder and Anr. v. State reprsented by Inspector of Police (2005) 12 Supreme Court Cases 327, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 3. The power under Section 319 of the Code cannot be exercised so as to conduct a fishing inquiry. We have already noticed the observations of the learned trial Judge that though the case against the appellants was not on solid foundation but it was felt that to find out the real truth they deserved to be added as accused. The manner in which the power under Section 319 deserves to be exercised has been laid down in Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation holding that unless the Court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction for the offence concerned, the Court shall refrain from adding them as accused. In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka a Bench of which one of us (Honble Mr. Justice V.K. Sabharwal) was a member, following Michael Machado it was said that: (SCC p. 795 para 9). 9. In Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation construing the words the court may proceed against such person in Section 319 Cr.P.C., this Court held that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the Court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence.this Court further held that a judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has already proceeded and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. The court, while examining an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., has also to bear in mind that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. In a nutshell, it means that for exercise of discretion under Section 319 Cr.P.C., all relevant factors, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused. 8. In Kavuluri Vivekananda Reddy and Anr. v. State of A.P. And Anr. 8. In Kavuluri Vivekananda Reddy and Anr. v. State of A.P. And Anr. (2005) 12 Supreme Court Cases 432, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 6. We have perused the statements of these witnesses and find that in relation to the alleged instigation by the appellants, only general statements have been made. On the basis of the said general statements qua the appellants, it is evident that the courts below committed serious illegality in proceeding to add the appellants herein as accused in exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code. The manner of exercise of the power under the said provision has been explained by this Court in Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka wherein it has been held that it has to be kept in view that the power under Section 319 of the Code is discretionary and has to be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the court should not turn against another whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code are required to be used sparingly. The summoning of the appellants after the expiry of eight years, on the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the nature of the depositions of the witnesses which have been examined by us, is not called for. In this view, we set aside the impugned orders and allow the criminal appeal. 9. In Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh 2006 (2) RCR (Criminal) 707, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 10. On a careful reading of Section 319 of the Code as well as the aforesaid two decisions, it becomes clear that the trial court has undoubted jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it to face the trial along with other accused persons, if the Court is satisfied at any state of the proceeding on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial. It is further evident that such person even though had initially been named in the F.I.R. as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. It is further evident that such person even though had initially been named in the F.I.R. as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. The trial Court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet of the case diary, because such materials contained in the charge sheet or the case diary do not constitute evidence. Of course, as evident from the decision reported in Sohan Lal and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan the position of an accused who has been discharged stands on a different footing. 11. Power under Section 319 of the Code can be exercised by the Court suo motu or on an application by someone including accused already before it. If it is satisfied that any person other than accused has committed an offence he is to be tried together with the accused. The power is discretionary and such discretion must be exercised judicially having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word "evidence" in Section 319 contemplates that evidence of witnesses given in Court. Under Sub-section (4) (1) (b) of the aforesaid provision, it is specifically made clear that it will be presumed that newly added person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. That would show that by virtue of Sub-section (4) (1) (b) a legal fiction is created that cognizance would be presumed to have been taken so far as newly added accused is concerned. 10. In Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 52. That would show that by virtue of Sub-section (4) (1) (b) a legal fiction is created that cognizance would be presumed to have been taken so far as newly added accused is concerned. 10. In Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 52. We may, however, hasten to add that our direction is not intended to lay down the law that while the Magistrate directs a further investigation or while a Sessions Judge exercises his jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an accused is entitled to be heard; he is not as he has no right therefor and, thus, the question of hearing him at that stage would not arise. 11. In Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq and Anr. 2007 (2) RCR (Criminal) 762, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 12. The trial Judge, as noticed by us, in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required to arrive at his satisfaction. If he thought that the matter should receive his due consideration only after the cross-examination of the witnesses is over, no exception thereto could be taken far less at the instance of a witness and when the State was not aggrieved by the same. 13. From the decisions of this Court, as noticed above, it is evident that before a Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must arrive at the satisfaction that there exists a possibility that the accused so summoned is in all likelihood would be convicted. Such satisfaction can be arrived at inter alia upon completion of the cross- examination of the said witness. For the said purpose, the court concerned may also like to consider other evidence. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has committed an error in passing the impugned judgment. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. 12. In judgment consisting of two Honble Judges in Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. 2007 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1021, in his separate opinion P.K. Balasubramanyan J. opined that power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. should not be described as extraordinary power or to confine the exercise thereof only in compelling circumstances. Relevant passages from the separate opinion expressed by His Lordships are extracted below: 15. 2007 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 1021, in his separate opinion P.K. Balasubramanyan J. opined that power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. should not be described as extraordinary power or to confine the exercise thereof only in compelling circumstances. Relevant passages from the separate opinion expressed by His Lordships are extracted below: 15. Section 319(1), which is relevant for our purpose reads: 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. As I see it, the words are plain and the meaning clear. When in the course of the enquiry or trial, it appears to the court from the evidence that a person, not arrayed as an accused, appears to have committed any offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused, the court may proceed against that person. Surely, it must appear to the Court from the evidence that someone not arrayed as an accused, appears to have committed an offence. Be it noted, the Court need not be satisifed that he has committed an offence. It need only appear to it that he has committed an offence. In other words, from the evidence it need only appear to it that some else has committed an offence, to exercise jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code. Even then, it has a discretion not to proceed, since the expression used is may and not shall. The legislature apparently wanted to leave that discretion to the trial court so as to enable it to exercise its jurisdiction under this Section. The expression appears indicates an application of mind by the court to the evidence that has come before it and then taking a decision to proceed under Section 319 of the Code or not. With great respect, I see no reason to describe the power as an extraordinary power or to confine the exercise of it only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against any other person against whom action has not been taken. With great respect, I see no reason to describe the power as an extraordinary power or to confine the exercise of it only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against any other person against whom action has not been taken. After all, the section only gives power to the court to ensure that all those apparently involved in the commission of an offence are tried together and none left out. I see no reason to curtail this power of the court to do justice to the victim and to the society. It appears to me that it is left to the judicial discretion of the court, judicially trained, to decide to proceed or not to proceed against a person in terms of Section 319 of the Code. 19. The power under Section 319 of the Code is conferred on the court to ensure that justice is done to the society by bringing to book all those guilty of an offence. One of the aims and purposes of the Criminal Justice System is to maintain social order. It is necessary in that contest to ensure that no one who appears to be guilty escapes a proper trial in relation to that guilt. There is also a duty to render justice to the victim of the offence. It is in recognition of this that the Code has specifically conferred a power in the court to proceed against others not arrayed as accused in the circumstances set out by this Section. It is a salutary power enabling the discharge of a courts obligation to the society to bring to book all those guilty of a crime. 20. Exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code, in my view, is left to the court trying the offence based on the evidence that comes before it. The court must be satisfied of the condition precedent for the exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code. There is no reason to assume that a court trained in law would not exercise the power within the confines of the provision and decide whether it may proceed against such person or not. There is no rationale in fettering that power and the discretion, either by calling it extraordinary or by stating that it will be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. It is intended to be used when the occasion envisaged by the section arises. 13. There is no rationale in fettering that power and the discretion, either by calling it extraordinary or by stating that it will be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. It is intended to be used when the occasion envisaged by the section arises. 13. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi 1983 (1) RCR (Criminal) 73 Honble the Supreme Court observed as under: No doubt, it might have been a probable defence which the court could not consider at the time of proceeding under Section 319 Cr.P.C. but as the power has to be exercised sparingly, the Court should have examined all the aspects of the case XXX XXXX Section 319 is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. If the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence, the court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. The mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed under Section 482 against some of the accused persons (respondents 2 to 5) will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. 14. In Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, Honble the Supreme Court held as under: The summoning of additional persons by the Sessions Court under Section 319 of those who appear to be involved in the crime from the evidence led during the trial and directing them to stand their trial along with those who have been committed, must be regarded as incidental to the cognizance under Section 193 and part of the normal process that follows it. Section 319(4)(b) enacts a deeming provision in that behalf dispensing with the formal committal order against the newly added accused. 15. Section 319(4)(b) enacts a deeming provision in that behalf dispensing with the formal committal order against the newly added accused. 15. In Kishan Singh v. State of Bihar 1993 (1) RCR (Criminal) 647, Honble the Supreme Court observed as under: On a plain reading of Sub-section (1) of Section 319 there can be no doubt that it must appear from the evidence tendered in the course of any inquiry or trial that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which he could be tried together with the accused. This power, it seems clear to us, can be exercised only if it so appears from the evidence at the trial and not otherwise. Therefore, this sub-section contemplates existence of some evidence appearing in the course of trial wherefrom the Court can prima facie conclude that the person not arraigned before it is also involved in the commission of the crime for which he can be tried with those already named by the police. Even a person who has earlier been discharged would fall within the sweep of the power conferred by Section 319 of the Code.... 16. In Guriya @ Tabassum Tauquir and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. 2007 (4) Recent Criminal Cases 518, Honble the Supreme Court opined as under: 6. The parameters for dealing with an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have been laid down by this Court in several cases. 7. In Michael Machado and Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr., it was observed as follows: The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of Another. person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. But even then what is conferred on the court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the court may proceed against such person". The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the court should turn against Another. person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of Sub-section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly-added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be recommended from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross- examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action. 8. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action. 8. Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and Anr., it was, inter-alia, observed as follows: The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the courts may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatory to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross- examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words "could be tried together with the accused" in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. "Could be" cannot under these circumstances be held to be "must be." The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused, who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the Court. 13. 13. On a careful reading of Section 319 of the Code as well as the aforesaid two decisions, it becomes clear that the trial court has undoubted jurisdiction to add any person not being the accused before it to face the trial along with other accused persons. If the Court is satisfied at any stage of the proceeding on the evidence adduced that the persons who have not been arrayed as accused should face the trial. It is further evident that such person even though had initially been named in the FIR, as an accused, but not charge sheeted, can also be added to face the trial. The trial Court can take such a step to add such persons as accused only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case diary because such materials contained in the charge-sheet as the case diary do not constitute evidence. Of course, as evident from the decision reported in Sohan Lal and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, the position of an accused who has been discharged stands on a different footing. 14. Power under Sections 319 of the Code can be exercised by the Court suo motu or on an application by someone including accused already before it, if it is satisfied that any person other than accused has committed an offence and he is to be tried together with the accused. The power is discretionary and such discretion must be exercised judicially having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word "evidence" in Section 319 contemplates evidence of witnesses given in Court. Under Sub-section (4) (1) (b) of the aforesaid provision, it is specifically made clear that it will be presumed that newly added person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. That would show that by virtue of Sub-section (4) (1) (b) a legal fiction is created that cognizance would be presumed to have been taken so far as newly added accused is concerned. (See Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh and Anr.). 17. That would show that by virtue of Sub-section (4) (1) (b) a legal fiction is created that cognizance would be presumed to have been taken so far as newly added accused is concerned. (See Lok Ram v. Nihal Singh and Anr.). 17. In Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy and Anr. 8. The scope and ambit of Section 319 of the code have been elucidated in several decisions of this Court. In Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab it was observed: (SCC p. 349, para 6). 6. A plain reading of Section 319(1) which occurs in Chapter XXIV dealing with general provisions as to inquiries and trials, clearly shows that it applies to all the Courts including a Sessions Court and as such a Sessions Court will have the power to add any person, not being the accused before it, but against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused.... It was further observed in para 9 (SCC pp. 351-52) 9. As regards the contention that the phrase "any person not being the accused" occurring in Section 319 excludes from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in column 2 of the charge-sheet, the contention has merely to be stated to be rejected. The said expression clearly covers any person who is not being tried already by the court and the very purpose of enacting such a provision like Section 319(1) clearly shows that even persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the criminal court are included in the said expression. 9. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, after referring to the decision in Joginder Singh case, it was observed: (SCC p. 8, para 19) 19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. More than this we would not like to say anything further at this stage. We leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court concerned so that it may act according to law. We would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed against Respondents 2 to 5 will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. 18. In Smt. Rani v. State of Haryana 2006 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 985, this Court observed as under: 7. In the present case, undisputedly, the petitioners were found to be innocent during investigation by the police and they were placed in Column No. 2 in the challan submitted by the police. There is no fresh evidence against the petitioners except the statement of Meena, complainant wherein the allegations are similar to that the complaint filed by her. All the petitioners except Sham Lal were residing separately from the complainant and her husband. Even in her statement before the Court no specific allegations as to how the complainant was harassed by the present petitioners, have been made. The complainant herself stated that she has gone to her in-laws house only three times after the marriage. The powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be used sparingly and only if there is convincing evidence against the persons sought to be arraigned as accused. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Manoj Kumars case (supra) and in Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2001 (2) RCR (Crl.) 580. The powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be used sparingly and only if there is convincing evidence against the persons sought to be arraigned as accused. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Manoj Kumars case (supra) and in Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2001 (2) RCR (Crl.) 580. It is well establised that sweep of Section 319 is limited as it is an enabling provision which can be invoked only if evidence surfaces in the course of an inquiry or a trial disclosing the complicity of person (s) other than the person(s) already arraigned. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code do not apply to all situations and cannot be interpreted to repository of all powers for summoning such persons to stand trial along with others arraigned before the inquiry/investigation conducted by the investigating agency. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code confer an extra-ordinary power and should not be easily resorted to. During the investigations, all the petitioners were found innocent and accordingly, they were placed in Column No. 2. Complainant Meena in her statement could not substantiate, beyond reasonable doubt, involvement of the petitioners. 19. In Surinder Kumar Changli v. State of Punjab 2006 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 359, this Court opined as under: 12. A perusal of the statutory provisions of Section 319 of the Code as also the judgments referred to hereinabove, make it abundantly clear that while considering an application under Section 319 of the Code, a Court is required to record a "reasonable satisfaction" that the material on record whether in the shape of the statements under Section 161, which form a part of the report under Section 173 or other evidence produced before it, are sufficient to warrant a finding that the accused, sought to be summoned under Section 319 of the Code, must be arraigned along with the accused already facing trial. 13. The words "reasonable satisfaction" are not emply platitudes but are words that define the jurisdiction of a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code. These words inhere in them, a duty, to record judicial satisfaction. The order must disclose howsoever briefly, the reasons that led the Court to record a finding in terms of the powers confered upon it under Section 319 of the Code. These words inhere in them, a duty, to record judicial satisfaction. The order must disclose howsoever briefly, the reasons that led the Court to record a finding in terms of the powers confered upon it under Section 319 of the Code. A Court is also required to examine the material, as held in Michael Machados case (supra), with a view to prima facie discern as to whether there is a reasonable prospect of the case, as against the persons sought to be summoned, ending in conviction. The powers under Section 319 of the Code are not to be exercised mechanically or on demand but on the principles of law referred to in the judgments noticed hereinbefore. 14. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the trial Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of Section 319 of the Code. The operative part of the impugned order reads as follows: I am of the opinion that on the basis of this statement and other material discussed above, Inderjit Singh alias Bhola and Surinder Kumar Changli should also be summoned to face trial with Gurdeep Singh accused for the murder of Bhalinder Singh. The process be issued against both of them for 20.1.2004. The present PWs are discharged. 15. Apart from recording its opinion that the petitioners should be summoned to stand trial, no reasons whatsoever have been assigned for the opinion so formed. The impugned order does not set out any "reasonable satisfaction" judicial or otherwise as to why the petitioners should stand trial along with the other accused. The order in my considered opinion, does not meet the requirements of an order to be passed in exercise of powers under Section 319 of the Code. The order, has been passed mechanically, without recording reasons and without considering the entire material on record. 20. This Court in Surjit Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2006 (1) RCR (Criminal) 565 opined that while allowing an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Court is required to record its satisfaction and assign reasons to hold that a person sought to be summoned has committed an offence for which he can be tried together with other accused. Any order passed lacking reasons in support thereof under Section 319 of the Code is liable to be set aside. 21. Any order passed lacking reasons in support thereof under Section 319 of the Code is liable to be set aside. 21. In Rajbir Singh v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2006 (3) RCR (Criminal) 195, this Court opined that the object of Section 319 Cr.P.C. is to ensure that an offender does not escape the consequences of his misdeeds. The power has to be exercised with caution, in exceptional circumstances and only where on the basis of the material on record, the Court is satisfied that the persons, sought to be summoned, must be arraigned as accused. The satisfaction so recorded by the Court has to be reasonable, based upon the material on record and must be discernible from the process of reasoning leading to an order summoning the accused. An order passed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. entails serious consequences. 22. In Hukam Chand and Anr. v. State of Haryana 2007 (3) RCR 141, this Court opined as under: I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties. Concededly, the matter was investigated by the police after the FIR had been recorded on the statement of the complainant. The petitioners had been found innocent and were placed in the Column No. II. Thereafter, during the course of proceedings, the statement of the complainant was also recorded, which in fact, was merely a reiteration of what has been stated in the FIR. No other evidence was there before the Court on the basis of which complicity of the petitioners could be established. xxx xxxx xxxx For summoning under Section 319 of the Cr. P.C., there has to be some evidence before the Court which would indicate the complicity of the persons who are sought to be summoned or some material should have come on record which may prompt the court to believe that the persons so accused are likely to be involved, and their conviction is likely to result in the eventuality of their facing the trial, and the onslaught of the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. The mere statement, ipso facto, cannot form the basis of summoning the persons under Section 319 of the Cr. P.C. 23. Similar views are expressed by this Court in Manoj Kumar v. Prabhu Ram 2003 (4) RCR (Criminal) 887, Isham Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana 2004 (2) RCR (Criminal) 279, Bharat Bhushan alias Sonu v. State of Haryana and Anr. P.C. 23. Similar views are expressed by this Court in Manoj Kumar v. Prabhu Ram 2003 (4) RCR (Criminal) 887, Isham Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana 2004 (2) RCR (Criminal) 279, Bharat Bhushan alias Sonu v. State of Haryana and Anr. 2005 (1) RCR (Criminal) 976, Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab Changli 2006 (2) RCR (Criminal) 359, Smt. Rajjo and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr. 2006 (3) RCR (Criminal) 635, Om Parkash and Ors. v. State of Haryana 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 632, Ram Karan alias Roda and Anr. v. State of Haryana 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 977 and Ganesha v. State of Haryana and Anr. 2007 (2) RCR (Criminal) 633. 24. The following broad principles, as to under what circumstances power under Section 319 of the Code should be exercised, can safely be summed up from the opinion expressed by Honble the Supreme Court and this Court in various judgments referred to above. i) Power to summon an accused is discretionary and extra-ordinary power, which should be exercised sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist at any stage of case. ii) The order passed under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure summoning an additional accused should not be a mechanical exercise. Court should record reasonable satisfaction and reasons in support of the order. iii) Power cannot be exercised to conduct a fishing enquiry. iv) There should be reasonable prospects of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction. v) Step to summon an accused can be taken only on the basis of evidence adduced before the Court and not on the basis of materials available in the charge-sheet or the case-diary as such material does not constitute evidence. vi) Power can be exercised suo-moto or on an application by some one including accused already before the Court. vii) An accused is not entitled to be heard before the Court exercises power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. viii) Satisfaction of the Court is paramount before summoning an accused, which can be arrived at inter- alia upon completion of cross-examination of the witness. ix) Mere statement of the complainant without there being any other evidence on record may not be sufficient to summon the accused. Each case on this aspect needs cautious examination on facts before passing order of summoning of additional accused. ix) Mere statement of the complainant without there being any other evidence on record may not be sufficient to summon the accused. Each case on this aspect needs cautious examination on facts before passing order of summoning of additional accused. x) Each case has to be considered on its own facts as there may be different stages of the case where the Court can reach to a conclusion that a prima facie case is made out against the accused sought to be summoned. 25. In the present case, application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Code for summoning the petitioner was accepted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala merely on part examination-in chief of the complainant, which was not even completed and with no other evidence on record to corroborate the same. While accepting the prayer, learned trial Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rukhsana Khatoon (Smt.) v. Sakhawat Hussain and Ors. (2002) 10 Supreme Court Cases 661 without appreciating the facts therein where the statement of complainant was corroborated by two independent witnesses, whose evidence had also been recorded before the prayer in application under Section 319 of the Code was granted. Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala also concurred with the view of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala. 26. If the facts of the present case are examined on the touchstone of law laid down by Honble the Supreme Court and this Court in the above referred judgments, it can safely be held that material before the Court was not sufficient to record the satisfaction that the prayer made by the prosecution for summoning of petitioner could be accepted as it was mere part statement of the complainant reiterating what was stated in the FIR. There was not other material on record to corroborate the same. The person summoned is nandoi, who is living separately. The exercise of power by the Court below under Section 319 of the Code in the facts and circumstances of the present case run contrary to the law discussed above and also opinion expressed by Honble the Supreme Court and this Court in judgments referred to above. The Courts have to be cautious in summoning additional accused especially in the matrimonial cases where sometime the tendency is to involve all the family members may or may not be directly involved or connected with the offence. The Courts have to be cautious in summoning additional accused especially in the matrimonial cases where sometime the tendency is to involve all the family members may or may not be directly involved or connected with the offence. If there is sufficient material, there is no bar for summoning even a distant relation, if prima facie offence is made out against him. 27. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the impugned orders dated February 26, 2005 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala and order dated February 20, 2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala are set aside. However, the same shall not debar the prosecution from filing application under Section 319 of the Code at any subsequent stage of the proceedings in case any further material comes on record justifying the summoning of the additional accused. 28. The revision petition is disposed of in the above terms.