Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation, (Villupuram Div. II) Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Vellore & Another
2008-11-18
M.JAICHANDREN
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner Corporation, challenging the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, made in I.D.No.386 of 1993. .3. It has been stated that the second respondent was working as a Driver in the petitioner Corporation. While so, on 7. 88, while he was driving a passenger bus, bearing Registration No.TML-3221, belonging to the petitioner Corporation, he had caused a fatal accident by knocking down a cyclist, who was on the right side of the road, due to his rash and negligent driving. The second respondent was charge sheeted and a domestic enquiry had been ordered. During the enquiry, the second respondent had been given a reasonable opportunity to defend his case. A co-worker was also allowed to assist the second respondent. The second respondent had cross examined the management witness, during the course of the enquiry. After considering the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary, the enquiry officer had come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the second respondent had been proved. Based on the report of the enquiry officer, the management of the petitioner Corporation had dismissed the second respondent from service, on 8. 89. Aggrieved by the said order, the second respondent had raised an industrial dispute, in I.D.No.386 of 1993, on the file of the first respondent Labour Court, Vellore. 4. It has been further stated that the first respondent Labour Court, on an erroneous view of the law and the facts involved in the case, had passed an award, dated 4. 2002, setting aside the order of dismissal passed against the second respondent and directing the management of the petitioner Corporation to pay 50% of the backwages due to the second respondent, from the date of his dismissal from service upto the date of his superannuation. Further, the period from the date of his dismissal to the date of his attaining the age of superannuation was ordered to be treated as though the second respondent workman had continued in service, for the purpose of receiving his retiral benefits. Aggrieved by the said award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4.
Further, the period from the date of his dismissal to the date of his attaining the age of superannuation was ordered to be treated as though the second respondent workman had continued in service, for the purpose of receiving his retiral benefits. Aggrieved by the said award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, the petitioner has come before this Court by way of a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. .5. The main contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Corporation are that the award of the Labour Court is contrary to law and the facts of the case. It is not based on the evidence on record and it is contrary to the probabilities of the case. The first respondent Labour Court ought to have found that the fatal accident caused by the second respondent workman was due to his rash and negligent driving. The Labour Court ought to have held that the domestic enquiry conducted against the second respondent workman was fair and proper, as it was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The first respondent Labour Court ought to have held that the second respondent was guilty of the charges levelled against him and that the punishment of dismissal from service, imposed on him by the management of the petitioner Corporation, is proper and valid in law. The first respondent Labourt Court had directed the petitioner Corporation to pay 50% of the backwages to the second respondent, invoking Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No reasons have been given by the first respondent Labour Court to invoke Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to modify the order of dismissal issued by the petitioner Corporation, dismissing the second respondent from service. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent workman had contented that the award of the first respondent Labour Court, directing the management of the petitioner Corporation to pay 50% of the backwages, is valid, as it is in accordance with law. By the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, it has been held that the non-employment of the second respondent cannot be justified.
By the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, it has been held that the non-employment of the second respondent cannot be justified. Since the second respondent had attained the age of superannuation before the award had been passed, the first respondent Labour Court had directed the management of the petitioner Corporation to pay 50% of the backwages due to the second respondent workman and to pay the terminal benefits, treating the period of his non-employment as continuous service. The first respondent Labour Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary, to come to the conclusion that the order passed by the petitioner Corporation, terminating the service of the second respondent, is arbitrary and illegal. 7. The first respondent Labour Court had given sufficient reasons in Paragraph-10 of its award, dated 4. 2002, made in I.D.No.386 of 1993, to set aside the order of dismissal passed by the management of the petitioner Corporation, dismissing the second respondent from service. It has been stated that, on a perusal of the past records of the second respondent workman, there is nothing to show that he had been performing his duties, negligently, or that he was involved in causing serious misconducts in the past. The extreme punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the second respondent, by the management of the petitioner Corporation, is not supported by sufficient evidence. It could not be sufficiently shown that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the second respondent workman. Merely because the cyclist, who was involved in the accident, had died, it could not be presumed that the second respondent was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle belonging to the petitioner Corporation. 8. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner Corporation, as well as the second respondent workman, and on a perusal of the records available, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner Corporation has not shown sufficient cause or reason for this Court to interfere with the award of the Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, made in I.D.No.386 of 1993. 9. It is seen that the Labour Court had come to its conclusions by sufficiently appreciating the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary.
2002, made in I.D.No.386 of 1993. 9. It is seen that the Labour Court had come to its conclusions by sufficiently appreciating the evidence on record, both oral as well as documentary. Since the second respondent had attained the age of superannuation during the pendency of the industrial dispute, the first respondent Labour court had directed the management of the petitioner corporation to pay 50% of the backwages to the second respondent workman and to consider the period from the date of his dismissal from service upto the date of his superannuation, as continuity of service, for the purpose of payment of his retrial benefits. It is also seen that sufficient reasons have been given by the first respondent Labour Court to hold that the petitioner Corporation had not proved the charge of rash and negligent driving against the second respondent workman. In such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner Corporation, seeking to set aside the award of the first respondent Labour Court, dated 4. 2002, made in I.D.No.386 of 1993. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.