Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 4265 (MAD)

A. Neelavathy & Others v. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government & Others

2008-11-19

K.CHANDRU

body2008
Judgment :- The petitioners in these three writ petitions were land owners in Survey Nos.187/1-A, 1B, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 181/3 and 188 to an extent of 3.7 acres at Alamelumangapuram, Vellore Taluk and District. These lands were originally acquired by the Government for the purpose of providing housing units by the Housing Board. The acquisition proceedings were challenged by the original land owner by name Kanniappa Mandhiri in W.P.No.6411 of 1989. An interim stay was granted initially against the acquisition and ultimately, the writ petition itself came to be allowed by an order dated 19. 1991. It is after the quashing of the proceedings, the original land owner sold the portion of the notified area to the petitioners herein, while one set of petitioners purchased the land in 1992, the other set of petitioners purchased the land in 1994 to an extent of 4 acres and 50 cents. Thereafter, they obtained a lay out approval by the concerned authorities and plotted out the land and sold it to several persons. 2. In the meanwhile, the State filed an appeal before this Court against the order passed by the learned Judge quashing the proceedings in W.A.No.248 of 1995. The writ appeal came to be allowed by a judgment dated 10. 1997. In the writ appeal, the original owner alone were made a party and the subsequent purchasers were not aware of the writ appeal, and it was brought before the Court with an inordinate delay of 4 years and was allowed after a period of six years. However, at the instance of the present petitioners, the original owner as well as the petitioners filed a review application before this Court in C.M.P.No.3 of 1998 to review the order passed by the Division Bench. The Division Bench, by its order dated 2. 1998, passed the following order:- "Learned counsel for the petitioners very lucidly and vociferously on the sole ground, contended that in view of the delay in filing the appeal during which they purchased the land and further sold it to the small plot holder, the acquisition held to be valid be set aside to the extent the land has been purchased on equitable grounds or at least the State be directed to release the same. .2. In our considered view, it is not a sufficient ground for reviewing the order on merits. .2. In our considered view, it is not a sufficient ground for reviewing the order on merits. Be that as it is, as it has already been observed that any owner of the land which includes the applicants also will be at liberty to approach the State bringing out the true facts to their notice for appropriate relief in accordance with law. We have no doubt in the impartiality of the State in considering the representation. Review applications are dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.381 of 1998 is also dismissed. In view of this, no orders are required in C.M.P.No.473 of 1998." 3. Taking advantage of the said observation, the present petitioners as well as the original owner, Kanniappa Mandhiri, filed applications before the State Government invoking the power under Section 48B of the Land Acquisition Act and sought for reconveyance of the land. On the basis of the applications made by the petitioners including the original owner in W.P.No.1091/2000, the State called for remarks from the Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. Then, upon taking the opinion of the Housing Board, they passed the impugned order dated 6. 1999 stating that the request of the petitioners was considered in consultation with the Housing Board. It was stated that the Tamil Nadu Housing Board has also taken possession of the lands and are also implementing the schemes and the lands are also required for the integrated housing scheme. Therefore, the Government had expressed his inability to re-convey the lands of the petitioners. It is this order, which is the subject matter of challenge in the three writ petitions. 4. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that it was a hot case where the petitioners in W.P.Nos.11645 and 20340 of 1999 were made to purchase the lands after the quashing of the acquisition proceedings by this Court dated 19. 1991 and they have also obtained approval for lay out and sold the lands to various persons and the present owners are small land holders. Further, the Housing Board has not done any improvement in the said lands. The lands are kept idle and therefore, the order of the Government, inasmuch as it has not taken into account these material factors, is liable to be set aside. .5. The arguments of the learned senior counsel have been carefully examined. Further, the Housing Board has not done any improvement in the said lands. The lands are kept idle and therefore, the order of the Government, inasmuch as it has not taken into account these material factors, is liable to be set aside. .5. The arguments of the learned senior counsel have been carefully examined. The fact that there was a delay in filing the writ appeal cannot be a ground to be put against the State, because the delay has been condoned by the Division Bench and ultimately, the Division Bench has allowed the said appeal. The Division Bench has only given a limited liberty to the petitioners to approach the Government for re-conveyance after setting out the relevant facts in their favour. A reading of Section 48B clearly shows that the said provision is available only to the original owner of the land, namely, C.Kanniappa Mandhiri, petitioner in W.P.No.1091/2000. The other petitioners cannot be a person who could avail the remedy under Section 48B. It may be precisely for this reason that the Division Bench in the review petition made an observation and that they did not make any reference to Section 48B. With reference to Kanniappa Mandhiri, petitioner in W.P.No.1091/2000, inasmuch as he has sold the lands, he cannot be said to be a person interested in the present proceedings. May be, he has been dragged to file the present writ petition in order to have locus standi to invoke Section 48B. In any event, Section 48B will be made available only when the Government is satisfied that the land is not required for the purpose for which it is acquired or for any other public purpose and only in such cases, the Government may transfer the land to the original owner. 6. In the present case, the State has consulted the Housing Board, which is a requisitioning body and they have decided at their instance that the land cannot be parted with by the requisitioning body and since the lands are not available in the hands of the Government, the question of re-conveyance does not arise. 7. The argument of the learned senior counsel that the Housing Board has not utilised the said lands so far cannot be gone into, since the Housing Board has not been made a party in the present case. 7. The argument of the learned senior counsel that the Housing Board has not utilised the said lands so far cannot be gone into, since the Housing Board has not been made a party in the present case. Such an allegation, in the absence of necessary and proper party cannot be gone into. In any event, in the impugned orders, there is a reference to the letters written by the Managing Director of the Housing Board dated 28. 1998 and 3. 1999 and therefore, going by the records, it is the definite stand of the Housing Board not to part with the lands. If the requisitioning body is not agreeable to part with the lands, the question of invocation of Section 48B does not arise. 8. Further, the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board Vs. Keeravani Ammal And Others(2007 Air Scw 2602), In Paragraph 11 has observed as follows:- "11. We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. The State can dispose of the property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired, only for the market value that may be fetched for the property as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine of public trust would disable the State from giving back the property for anything less than the market value. In State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. M.Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr.((1997) 5 S.C.C.432) in a similar situation, this Court observed: "The question emerges: Whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting higher value." Section 48B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here." In the light of the limited power available to the State Government, the power of this Court to review such an order is highly restricted. In the light of the above, there is no case made out for interfering with the impugned orders. Hence, all the three writ petitions will stand dismissed. No costs.