JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. It is a classic case wherein an illiterate minor girl from an interior place in the State of Tripura was procured for the purpose of seducing her to illicit sexual Intercourse and ultimately sold the girl to a racket who engaged the girl for prostitution. 2. The prosecution story as could be revealed from the record is that the victim girl was first enticed by one Sankar Debnath from her native place Gouranga Till under Teliamura Police Station on 14-5-1993. Thereafter, the victim girl was taken to another place known as Tuchindrai. At this place, the present appellant, namely, Taru Das, joined the principal accused Sankar Debnath. Within moments of his introduction with the victim girl, the appellant-Taru Das expressed his desire to marry the girl. Having been persuaded for the marriage proposal, the victim girl was taken to Ambassa and finally to Silchar, a town in the State of Assam. The victim girl was allegedly handed over to one person at Silchar who again sold her to another person at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya. Finally, the victim girl landed in a brothel and by that time she was already pushed in the prostitution business. 3. While the victim girl was being pressurized to engage herself in the prostitution, somehow she fled away from the house and wrote a distress letter to her father, with the help of a person from his community. The English rendering of the contents of the letter go like this: Respected father, I am at Shillong. Address is given below. You come to this address soon and take me away. I am in much trouble here. If you be too late, they will sell me elsewhere. Moreover, the person who has kept me in captivity had sold me for rupees one thousand. For that reason, you come with rupees one thousand, or else, they will not hand me over to you. I am, secretly writing this letter in utter hurry (through) the hands of the other Bengalees. Father, do not be late. (I) am writing no more. 4. Having received the letter, the father of the victim woman lodged a written FIR at Tellamura Police Station. The FIR was registered as Tellamura P.S. Case No. 10(5)/1993, under Sections 366A/372read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (Briefly "IPC"). Father, do not be late. (I) am writing no more. 4. Having received the letter, the father of the victim woman lodged a written FIR at Tellamura Police Station. The FIR was registered as Tellamura P.S. Case No. 10(5)/1993, under Sections 366A/372read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (Briefly "IPC"). After extensive investigation, as many as 10 persons were challaned vide charge-sheet dated 7-2-1995. The list of the accused persons include Sankar Debnath who had first kidnapped the girl from her native place and all the persons who subsequently purchased the girl and engaged her in the prostitution business. Two accused persons were shown absconder in the charge-sheet itself. Unfortunately, except the present appellant, the remaining accused persons also absconded on being released on bail. 5. Although, as many as 23 persons were cited as witnesses in the charge-sheet but for some reasons the trial was concluded only after examining nine witnesses. The record shows that steps were taken to summon the remaining witnesses but the witnesses did not turn up. As transpires from the trend of cross-examination of the witnesses, the present appellant took a stance of total denial and no defence alibi was taken during the trial. 6. Having relied upon the prosecution evidence, the appellant has been convicted vide impugned judgment and order dated 4-7-2003 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Khowai In Sessions Trial No. 55 (WT/K)/2001 under Section 366-A and 372, IPC. However, the accused/appellant has been acquitted from the charge under Section 376, IPC. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has sentenced the appellant to undergo RI for 10 years for the offence under Section366-A, IPC and similar sentence with a fine of Rs.10,000/- and further RI for 3 months as default stipulation has been imposed for the offence under Section 372, IPC. Being aggrieved with the conviction and sentence, this appeal has been preferred. 7. Heard Shri S. Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the appellant and Shri R.C. Debnath, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent. I have also gone through the evidence of the prosecution as well as the impugned Judgment. 8. The impugned judgment has been basically assailed on the ground that the present appellant neither kidnapped nor procured the victim girl and as such his conviction under Section 366-A, IPC is untenable. I have also gone through the evidence of the prosecution as well as the impugned Judgment. 8. The impugned judgment has been basically assailed on the ground that the present appellant neither kidnapped nor procured the victim girl and as such his conviction under Section 366-A, IPC is untenable. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, it is the admitted position that the victim girl was initially kidnapped or enticed by one Sankar Debnath and for a brief duration the appellant met the victim girl with good intention to marry her. With regard to the conviction under Section 372, IPC, Shri Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that since the appellant did not accompany the victim girl beyond Silchar town, he could not have been convicted for this offence as well. 9. In the last more than two decades, more particularly since the case of Rafique v. State of U.P. 1980 CriLJ 1344, it has been consistently held that conviction for offences like kidnapping and sexual assault can be recorded on the sole testimony of the victim girl alone, subject to it being wholly reliable. This legal principle has by now firmly embedded in the Criminal Justice System in India. The legal principle that corroboration of the victim's testimony is not the rule has been reinstated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, virtually making this principle as a statutory law. 10. Similarly, while appreciating the evidence of a victim of sexual assault, it should be borne in mind that the crimes against woman have to be scrutinized and dealt with sensibly. Courts should not start with a presumption that the victim girl/woman must have eloped voluntarily nor any adverse inference can be drawn that the victim was promiscuous in sexual behaviour. We have to overcome with this stereotype attitude. It is because myth and prejudices have no place in justice delivery system. 11. In umpteen number of judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that out raging the modesty of a workman is not only a criminal offence but it also casts a stigma on the personal life of the victim woman as well as upon the society as a whole. 11. In umpteen number of judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that out raging the modesty of a workman is not only a criminal offence but it also casts a stigma on the personal life of the victim woman as well as upon the society as a whole. With out burdening the judgment, I am extracting below the trend-setting observations and guidelines given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the cases of State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain reported in 1990 CriLJ 889 ; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh reported in 1996 CriLJ 1728 ; 1999 CriLJ 4597 and the judgment rendered in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh reported in 1996 CriLJ 1728 which are as follows: A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and-not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain 1990 CriLJ 889. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The Court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its Judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh 1996 CriLJ 1728. Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity - it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh 1996 CriLJ 1728. 12. Keeping in mind the guiding prescriptions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I now proceed to examine the merit of the case before me. I find that the victim girl was examined as P.W. No. 7 and she has deposed that on the pretext of taking her to a fair (Charak Mela) she was enticed and taken away by the accused Sankar Debnath. The victim has further deposed that when they reached Tuichindrai, the appellant-Taru Das joined them and expressed his desire to marry her. The victim has further deposed that although she had rejected the proposal but ultimately she was persuaded. Accordingly, she was taken to another place known as Ambassa and again to Silchar in a Truck and kept her there in the house of another person. The victim has further deposed that although she had rejected the proposal but ultimately she was persuaded. Accordingly, she was taken to another place known as Ambassa and again to Silchar in a Truck and kept her there in the house of another person. The victim has further deposed that thereafter, both Sankar Debnath and Taru Das absconded and then she realized the eminent disaster going to befall in her life. Her cry for freedom failed to deaf ears and ultimately she was sold to one after another person and pushed in the prostitution business. 13. The first point raised by Shri Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim girl was below 18 years of age to bring the offence within the parameters of Section 366-A, IPC. From the record, I find that although the victim girl was medically examined by a Doctor but unfortunately the Medical Officer was not examined by the prosecution. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the Court may presume existence of certain facts. Under Illustration (e) of Section 114 it can be presumed that judicial and official acts had been regularly performed. Besides this, in the case of Rampal Pithwa Rahidass v. State of Maharashtra the Hon'ble High Court has held that petitions, which are part of judicial record, can also be looked into for coming to a just and right conclusion. On the basis of the support getting from the Evidence Act as well as from the authority of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I have looked into the Medical Report. Basically, the victim was medically examined to ascertain whether she was subjected to sexual intercourse and the Doctor has given a positive finding in this regard. At the time of medical examination also, the victim girl disclosed before the Doctor that she was 17 years old. Strangely, no suggestion was given either to the victim girl or to her parents that the victim was an adult one. In this way the prosecution case that the victim girl was minor remained unassailed and undisputed. 14. The above apart, it appears to me that the ingredients of offence under Sections 366 and 366-A, IPC are by and large identical. In this way the prosecution case that the victim girl was minor remained unassailed and undisputed. 14. The above apart, it appears to me that the ingredients of offence under Sections 366 and 366-A, IPC are by and large identical. Section 366-A is basically to punish a person who procures or takes away a girl of less than 18 years of age for seducing her to illicit intercourse with another person whereas Section 366, IPC embraces the motive of the offender to compel the girl to marry him or for having illicit intercourse with the kidnapper or with unknown persons. In this way, the ingredients of law incorporated under Section 366-A, IPC are also part of Section 366, IPC. In other words, the offence under Section 366-A, IPC is a restrictive one and the offence under Section 366, IPC is wider than that. I have distinguished the similarity of both the provisions to bring home the fact that even enacting or abducting an adult woman with ill-intention of illicit sexual intercourse would attract Section 366, IPC and the accused can alternatively be convicted under this provision. However, in the instant case the evidence proves that the victim was less than 18 years old. 15. From the evidence, I find that the testimony of the victim girl that she was taken to different places for the purpose of seducing her to illicit sexual intercourse finds support from independent witnesses i.e. P.Ws. 2 and 3. These witnesses have spoken about extra-judicial confession of the accused persons during questioning. It is also evident from the record that the victim girl was finally recovered from a brothel, which also establishes the offences under Section 366-A and 372, IPC. 16. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Taru Das did not kidnap or entice the victim girl to leave her native place is of no help. In my opinion, even if the victim girl was initially enticed by the co-accused, giving company to the main accused in the half-way for taking the girl to different places would be sufficient to affirm the conviction under Section 366-A as well. In other words, I hold that taking away a minor girl from the house of her parents/guardian is not sine qua non. For ready reference, Sections 359 and 361, IPC, which relates to kidnapping of minor girls are reproduced below: 359. In other words, I hold that taking away a minor girl from the house of her parents/guardian is not sine qua non. For ready reference, Sections 359 and 361, IPC, which relates to kidnapping of minor girls are reproduced below: 359. Kidnapping.- Kidnapping is of two kinds : kidnapping from India, and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. 361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.- Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. 17. A bare perusal of the provisions clearly shows that the legislature did not confine to constitute the offence only if a minor girl is taken away from the place where she used to reside but the emphasis is upon taking away the girl from the "lawful guardianship" (Emphasis supplied). In my considered view Sections 359 and 361, IPC do not spell-out any territorial jurisdiction for committing the offence. In my view the rigour of the law travels with the ward/subject and any person involving himself or herself in the offence of kidnapping or procuring a minor girl at any point of time would also come within the purview of Sections 359 and 361, IPC. Having scrutinized the entire evidence on record, I hold that there is no infirmity in convicting the appellant under Section 366-A and 372, IPC. Accordingly, the convictions are hereby approved. 18. Coming to the question of sentence, Shri Kar Bhowmik, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is in custody from the beginning of the trial and by now he has completed five and half years in custody. According to the learned Counsel, this period is enough for commuting the sentence, moreso in view of the fact that the victim girl was initially enticed by other person. 19. In my considered opinion, even, if there was limited role of the appellant for selling the victim girl for the prostitution business, no leniency can be shown to the appellant inasmuch as he was a part of the racket to push the illiterate and innocent victim girl in the immoral profession. 19. In my considered opinion, even, if there was limited role of the appellant for selling the victim girl for the prostitution business, no leniency can be shown to the appellant inasmuch as he was a part of the racket to push the illiterate and innocent victim girl in the immoral profession. In the case of Kamal Kishore v. State of H.P. 2000 CriLJ 2292 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there must be adequate and special reasons for lesser sentence. In my opinion if any leniency for committing offence like pushing a minor girl in prostitution profession is shown it would amount to going contrary to the law and intention of legislature. This is simply unwarranted in this case as I do not find any such special or mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the prayer is turned down. 20. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.