COMMON JUDGMENT: INTRODUCTION These four appeals are interconnected. The property dispute raised in appeals is with reference to various items of immovable property in plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule of O.S.No.13 of 19741 (hereafter called, first suit), against which, first defendant filed A.S.No.2219 of 1982 and defendant Nos.3 and 4 filed A.S.No.212 of 1981. Tr.A.S.No.1277 of 1991 is filed by third defendant, who lost her separate suit for declaration and possession, being O.S.No.21 of 1975 (hereafter called, second suit). Similarly, Tr.A.S.No.1274 of 1991 is filed by fourth defendant when his suit, being O.S.No.22 of 1975 (hereafter called, third suit) for declaration of title was dismissed by the lower Court, by impugned common judgment. The trial Court decreed O.S.No.13 of 1974 for partition overruling objections of defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 that some of the items of plaint A and B schedule properties are not joint family properties and that they ceased to be joint family properties by reason of various alienations made by manager of the family for family necessities. Who is who 2. The entire controversy and litigation is in relation to property of Kanumarlapudi family of Reddipalem Village of Kandukuru Mandal in Prakasam District. For the purpose of this case one can look at, not beyond Kanumarlapudi Subbaiah and his family in 1950 and thereafter. Subbaiah is vysya gentleman. Basically, he was a Kirana merchant selling sundry items. He and his wife, Mahalakshmamma @ Venkata Lakshmamma (plaintiff No.3), had five sons and four daughters. Venkata Narasimham, Venkateswarlu (defendant No.1), Rathaiah (plaintiff No.1), Subba Rao (plaintiff No.2) and Tirupathaiah (defendant No.2) are sons. Venkata Narasimham died on 05.06.1958, but his wife, Kanthamma, is defendant No.10 in first suit. It appears she remarried after death of her husband. 3. Apart from members of Subbaiah's core family as above, there are other closely related players, who significantly contributed to the litigation. Modadugu Venkata Subbamma is the sister of Maha Lakshmamma. All along, she was staying in Reddipalem with Subbaiah's family. Bysani Venkateswarlu (fifth defendant) is younger brother of Maha Lakshmamma and Venkata Subbamma. The son of fifth defendant is Bysani Krishna Rao (defendant No.4). In addition to these closely related persons, Vavilala Venkata Lakshmamma (defendant No.6), Thikkavarapu Krishna Reddy (seventh defendant) and Dasari Peddanna (ninth defendant) also set up claims in an item or two of plaint schedule properties. Bysani Venkateswarlu (fifth defendant) is younger brother of Maha Lakshmamma and Venkata Subbamma. The son of fifth defendant is Bysani Krishna Rao (defendant No.4). In addition to these closely related persons, Vavilala Venkata Lakshmamma (defendant No.6), Thikkavarapu Krishna Reddy (seventh defendant) and Dasari Peddanna (ninth defendant) also set up claims in an item or two of plaint schedule properties. One Kanakamma, younger sister of Subbaiah, at one stage played significant role in the family affairs. Who instituted what 4. First suit is filed by Rathaiah, Subba Rao and Maha Lakshmamma - sons and wife of Subbaiah, for partition of plaint 'A' 'B' and 'C' schedule properties against other two sons as well as Venkata Subbamma, Krishna Rao, Bysani Venkateswarlu and others. Second suit is filed by Venkata Subbamma for declaration and possession contending that certain items of property sold to her by the first defendant are her exclusive properties. Third suit was filed by Krishna Rao, the cousin of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 and defendant Nos.1 and 2, claiming certain items as having purchased from first defendant. Vavilala Venkata Lakshamma, a distant relative of Subbaiah, also filed O.S.No.23 of 1974 for recovery of money based on a promissory note allegedly executed by first defendant and obtained attachment before judgment in respect of the properties claimed by defendant Nos.3 and 4. They filed claim petitions, which were dismissed. Third defendant therefore filed Tr.A.S. No.1278 of 1991 and fourth defendant filed Tr.A.S. No.1276 of 1991. However, having regard to the subsequent event that the entire decree in O.S.No.23 of 1974 was satisfied and a memo having been filed to that effect, a separate order is passed in those matters dismissing the same. 5. For the purpose of this judgment, the pleadings in first suit alone are required to be noticed. Be it also noted that the battle lines are clearly drawn even prior to filing of the suit. First defendant, who is eldest among surviving sons of Subbaiah, his maternal aunt - Venkata Subbamma, maternal uncle and his son form one group. Wife of Subbaiah, two sons (plaintiff Nos.1 and 2) and son (second defendant) form another group in the legal battle. The case of the plaintiffs 6. Kanumarlapudi Subbaiah, his wife and five sons constituted Hindu joint family. After death of father, the eldest son Venkata Narasimham managed family. He died on 05.06.1958, leaving behind his wife, tenth defendant. Wife of Subbaiah, two sons (plaintiff Nos.1 and 2) and son (second defendant) form another group in the legal battle. The case of the plaintiffs 6. Kanumarlapudi Subbaiah, his wife and five sons constituted Hindu joint family. After death of father, the eldest son Venkata Narasimham managed family. He died on 05.06.1958, leaving behind his wife, tenth defendant. Since then, first defendant managed the properties. Even during the lifetime of Subbaiah, plaintiffs 1 and 2 set up Kirana business in Bapatla. The business is not joint family business. First defendant was a Kirana merchant in Reddipalem Village. Second defendant sometime carried business in Bapatla, but subsequently, their maternal uncle - fifth defendant took over the business. Defendant Nos. 1, 5 and fourth defendant (son of defendant No.5) are carrying on the business. All these businesses set up by individual members and acquisitions made from out of the business are their separate properties. The plaintiffs reposed utmost confidence and trust in first defendant, but in a systematic scheming manner, first defendant diverted joint family properties and abused confidence. 7. The plaintiffs' family owns Acs.10.00 of wet land, Acs.8.00 of dry land, Acs.3.00 of Lime Garden in Reddipalem Village and Acs.13.00 in Gudavarikadriga, besides a house. The first defendant is in possession of Acs.0.78 cents of wet land belonging to third plaintiff and Acs.1.00 of land belonging to one Modadugu Rama Lakshmamma given to her by Subbaiah's family. From these assets, first defendant is receiving income of Rs.20,000/- all these years and there is no necessity or occasion for the first defendant to borrow from others creating liabilities for the family. 8. In 1973, plaintiffs issued notices to defendant Nos.3 to 6 complaining about collusive actions of first defendant to divert the joint family properties, prejudicial to the interests of the plaintiffs. Refusing to take notices, suits were filed by these defendants. Defendant Nos.5 and 6 filed O.S.No.241 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Bapatla, for recovery of about Rs.4, 000/-. Sixth defendant filed O.S.No.27 of 1973 on the file of the Court of the Sub-ordinate Judge, Kandukur, for recovery of Rs.11, 000/-. Refusing to take notices, suits were filed by these defendants. Defendant Nos.5 and 6 filed O.S.No.241 of 1975 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Bapatla, for recovery of about Rs.4, 000/-. Sixth defendant filed O.S.No.27 of 1973 on the file of the Court of the Sub-ordinate Judge, Kandukur, for recovery of Rs.11, 000/-. Third defendant also filed O.S.No.517 of 1973 (renumbered as O.S.No.21 of 1975) on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Kandukur, for possession of six items of property belonging to joint family and fourth defendant filed O.S.No.11 of 1974 (renumbered as O.S.No.22 of 1975) on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Kandukur, for recovery of three items of joint family property. First defendant diverted funds of the family as well as funds sent by plaintiffs 1 and 2. These funds were given to defendant Nos.4 and 5, who initially were not well to do, but became prosperous business persons in Bapatla. In collusion with these defendants, first defendant dishonestly created false liabilities in favour of third parties with a view to proceed against plaintiffs' share. 9. First defendant executed nominal documents in favour of defendant Nos.3 and 4 alienating joint family properties. As this is objected to by the plaintiffs, he got the suits filed by defendant Nos. 3 and 4. He also executed nominal documents in favour of defendant Nos.8 and 9 in respect of items 12 and 13 of plaint A schedule properties. But, except items 12 and 13, all the rest of the items of suit schedule properties are in possession of the plaintiffs family. All the sale deeds executed by first defendant in favour of defendant Nos.3 to 9 are not true. They are fictitious and devoid of consideration and they are denied. They are executed by first defendant to deprive the plaintiffs of their legitimate share. When a demand is made, defendant Nos.1 and 2 did not come forward for amicable partition. The case of the defendants 10. Second defendant did not file written statement, but he supported the case of the plaintiffs. Ninth defendant also did not file written statement. Defendant Nos.1, 3 and 6 to 8 filed separate written statements and defendant Nos.4 and 5 filed a joint written statement. The case of the defendants 10. Second defendant did not file written statement, but he supported the case of the plaintiffs. Ninth defendant also did not file written statement. Defendant Nos.1, 3 and 6 to 8 filed separate written statements and defendant Nos.4 and 5 filed a joint written statement. The written statement filed by first defendant opposing partition of plaint A and B schedule properties also reflects case of other defendants. Therefore, it is not necessary to burden this judgment by extracting the summary of all the written statements. Suffice to refer written statement of first defendant. First defendant admits that items 3 and 4 are joint family properties of late Subbaiah. Insofar as other items are concerned, he alleges that some of them are sold to defendant Nos.3, 4 and 7, who claimed certain properties. In addition to this, first defendant also pleaded that by reason of subsequent transfers, he himself became owner of certain items of property and other items he claims to have purchased with his own money. According to first defendant claims of defendants are as follows. Items claimed by third defendant 12. Modadugu Venkata Subbamma, sister-in-law of Subbaiah and aunt of plaintiffs 1 and 2 and defendant Nos.1 and 2 claimed items 2, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 16 of plaint A schedule properties. She alleges that first defendant and Venkata Narasimham sold items 1, 2, 5 and 6 under registered sale deed, dated 14.04.1954. She also claimed to have purchased another part in item 1 admeasuring Acs.0.10 cents under registered sale deed, dated 15.10.1959 executed by first defendant. She further claimed to have purchased items 10, 11 and 16 from other persons. As already mentioned, she herself filed O.S.No.21 of 1975 for declaration and possession. The suit was dismissed and she filed Transfer A.S.No.1271 of 1977. Items claimed by fourth defendant 13. Fourth defendant is son of fifth defendant, who is maternal uncle of defendant Nos.1 and 2 and plaintiffs 1 and 2. He alleges that he has purchased Acs.0.10 cents in item 1 of plaint A schedule and items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule and Acs.0.76 cents in item 8 of plaint A schedule from first defendant. He also alleges that first defendant incurred debts for family necessities and therefore, as manager of joint family to discharge debts sold these items to him. Items claimed by first defendant 14. He also alleges that first defendant incurred debts for family necessities and therefore, as manager of joint family to discharge debts sold these items to him. Items claimed by first defendant 14. Subbaiah had executed promissory note, dated 01.08.1951 for Rs.1,500/- in favour of Jabdanki Narsimham. He transferred the said promissory note to Smt.Pebbishetti Kanakamma (sister of Subbaiah). First defendant executed renewal promissory note on 31.07.1954. On the same day, an agreement of sale was executed in favour of Kanakamma in respect of items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule and part of item 8 of plaint A schedule for a consideration of Rs.1,500/-. The renewal promissory note was cancelled and subsequently, first defendant executed sale deed, 19.01.1955 in favour of Kanakamma in discharge and adjustment of family debt. On 29.05.1959, Kanakamma executed registered settlement deed in favour of first defendant. In turn, he sold part of item 8 to fourth defendant under registered sale deed, dated 04.05.1973 and items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule under registered sale deed, dated 11.06.1973. He, therefore, contends that the property has gone out of joint family by reason of these transactions. First defendant further alleged that from out of the savings and from the property settled on him by Kanakamma, he purchased a part of Acs.0.10 of item 1 of plaint A schedule under registered sale deed, dated 20.08.1968. He also says that he purchased another Acs.0.10 in item 1 under another registered sale deed. Yet another allegation made by him is in relation to item 15, which he claims to have purchased from Nalagam Venkata Reddy from out of the property he got from Kanakamma. Items claimed by other defendants 15. Seventh defendant claims to have purchased item 7 under registered sale deed dated 10.05.1973. He alleges that item 7 never belong to Kanumarlapudi family. First defendant alleged that item 12 was obtained by the joint family by way of exchange of their property at Cherukuru from Kolli Laxmaiah under a registered exchange deed, dated 12.10.1965. Subsequently, the same was allegedly sold by first defendant to ninth defendant. However, ninth defendant did not file written statement and remained ex parte. Written Statement schedules 16. In addition to the case set up by first defendant as above, he also pleaded that six items shown in schedule to written statement are also liable for partition. Subsequently, the same was allegedly sold by first defendant to ninth defendant. However, ninth defendant did not file written statement and remained ex parte. Written Statement schedules 16. In addition to the case set up by first defendant as above, he also pleaded that six items shown in schedule to written statement are also liable for partition. These are: (i) land admeasuring Acs.1.00 in survey No.172/1 situated in Adivi village of Bapatla Mandal in Guntur District, which was purchased allegedly with joint family funds in the name of wife of first plaintiff. (ii) Terrace building of cement sheets in Bapatla, which stands in the name of second plaintiff. It is also alleged by first defendant that the property was purchased under registered sale deed, dated 05.11.1960 for which amount was paid by first defendant. (iii) Three extents of lands (three items) situated in Ponnaluru, which were allegedly purchased with the joint family funds in the name of second defendant and agricultural wet land admeasuring Acs.0.75 cents in survey No.51/2 (patta No.69) situated at Ponnaluru Village. First defendant alleges that this item stands in the name of mother Mahalakshmamma, but he paid the sale consideration for purchasing the same. Issues framed by the trial Court 17. The trial Court framed as many as 18 issues. These can be conveniently grouped into four categories. Issues 1 to 3, 7, 10, and 12 form first category of issues. They deal with the question as to whether certain items of plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. The second category is issues 6, 8 and 13, which deal with the question whether certain items are self-acquired properties of first defendant. The third category are issues 15 to 17, which deal with the question whether alleged family debts are incurred for joint family necessities and were binding on the plaintiffs and issue No.5 is the lone issue in fourth category, which deals with the question whether the alienations made by first defendant in favour of defendant Nos.3, 4 and 7 to 9 are valid and binding on the plaintiffs. 18. Internecine family dispute among the children of late Kanumarlapudi Subbaiah appears to be long drawn legal battle, commencing from 1974. Indeed, trial commenced on 20.11.1978 and the trial Court pronounced the judgment on 11.09.1980. During the trial, PWs.1 to 6 were examined. Among them, PWs.5 and 6 are party witnesses and others are third parties. 18. Internecine family dispute among the children of late Kanumarlapudi Subbaiah appears to be long drawn legal battle, commencing from 1974. Indeed, trial commenced on 20.11.1978 and the trial Court pronounced the judgment on 11.09.1980. During the trial, PWs.1 to 6 were examined. Among them, PWs.5 and 6 are party witnesses and others are third parties. Defendants examined DWs.1 to 34. Among them, DW.1 (first defendant), DW.13 (fourth defendant), DW.24 (fifth defendant) and DW.33 (seventh defendant) are party witnesses and others are third parties. Plaintiffs also brought in Exs.A1 to A51. Defendants marked Exs.B1 to B278. Third party witnesses marked Exs.X1 to X34. Findings of Trial Court 19. On considering oral and documentary evidence learned trial Judge recorded appropriate findings on all issues and decreed O.S.No.13 of 1974 directing partition of items 1 to 9, 12, 15 and 16 of plaint A schedule and items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule and item 6 of A schedule annexed to written statement of first defendant into 12 shares by metes and bounds having regard to good and bad qualities thereof and put plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 in possession of seven such shares. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 were directed to be put in possession of 1/6th share each. Decree was also passed for partition of items 1 to 4 of plaint C schedule. The claim for partition of items 10, 11, 13 and 14 of plaint A schedule and items 1 to 5 of A schedule annexed to written statement was dismissed. The trial Court recorded a finding that the debts incurred by first defendant are not true and not incurred for family necessities and that alienations made by first defendant in favour of defendant Nos.3, 4, 7 and 9 were nominal documents and are not binding on the plaintiffs. A finding was also recorded that after death of Venkata Narasimham (eldest son of Subbaiah), it was first defendant who was managing joint family properties. Insofar as kirana business at Bapatla and Reddipalem, trial Court came to the conclusion that first defendant failed to prove that they are joint family properties. Insofar as the claim of first defendant for partition of items 1 and 2 of A schedule annexed to written statement, the finding was against first defendant. The question of partition of items 3 to 5 of A schedule annexed to written statement was left open. 20. Insofar as the claim of first defendant for partition of items 1 and 2 of A schedule annexed to written statement, the finding was against first defendant. The question of partition of items 3 to 5 of A schedule annexed to written statement was left open. 20. Second suit was filed by third defendant for declaration and possession in respect of items 2, 5, 6 and a part of item 1 was rejected. Third suit filed by fourth defendant was also dismissed. Against these two decrees, the respective plaintiffs filed appeals, which now stand transferred to this Court. As noticed supra, O.S.No.23 of 1975 was filed by Vavilala Venkatalaxmamma (defendant No.6) for recovery of money under promissory note executed by first defendant. This suit was against the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 and 2. She obtained an order of attachment before judgment in respect of certain properties. Therefore, third defendant filed claim petition being I.A.No.29 of 1974. Similarly fourth defendant also filed I.A.No.30 of 1974. Both these applications were also considered along with first suit and they were dismissed. The appeals filed against them were dismissed as stated supra. Scope of this appeal 21. As entire claim of the plaintiffs for partition of plaint A and B schedule properties was not decreed, plaintiffs filed cross-objections. But for want of necessary steps in serving notices on the respondents therein, cross- objections were dismissed for default. Thus insofar as items 10, 11, 13 and 14 of plaint A schedule and item 6 of A schedule annexed to written statement, the impugned decree in the first suit has become final. This position is accepted by both the counsel. Be it also noted that item 12 was claimed by ninth defendant as having been purchased from first defendant. But he did not file any written statement and remained ex parte. There is also no dispute with regard to this item, which is available for partition. 22. First defendant in the written statement admitted that items 3 and 4 are joint family properties. The trial Court directed for partition of these items also. Therefore, partition of these two items also is not in issue. There is also no dispute with regard to this item, which is available for partition. 22. First defendant in the written statement admitted that items 3 and 4 are joint family properties. The trial Court directed for partition of these items also. Therefore, partition of these two items also is not in issue. Leaving these seven items about which there is no dispute, chief question in these appeals is whether items 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15 and 16 (nine items) of plaint A schedule are liable for partition ignoring claims set up by defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 7 either independently or as a result of interconnected transactions. A question also arises whether kirana shops/business at Bapatla run by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 is joint family business or not. Partition of Business 23. Issue No.2 framed by the trial Court is "whether the plaintiffs started business at Bapatla with joint family funds." The plaint case is that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2, even before Subbaiah died, went to Bapatla and started sundry trade on their own, and are trading as kirana merchants without any any family investment. First defendant denies the allegations. According to him before death of Subbaiah plaintiff Nos.1 and 2, defendant Nos.1 and 2 and husband of tenth defendant were engaged in kirana and commission business at Reddipalem. As the scope and ambit of business is too small and members of family are many, first defendant decided to set up another kirana shop at Bapatla. According to him by that time, sons of sister of third plaintiff - Venkatalakshmamma were already doing business at Bapatla. He, therefore, invested an amount of Rs.400/- to open the shop and entrusted the business to plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. It is also alleged that he sent funds, commodities, grains and chillies for Bapatla business. 24. The plaintiffs let in oral evidence by examining P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 and also marked documents like municipality licences. All these witnesses asserted that Bapatla business was started by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 alone without any assistance from joint family. Besides examining himself as D.W.1 first defendant also brought D.W.24, his material uncle, and his son D.W.13. He also marked Exs.B136 to B198 and Exs.B199 to B225, which are receipts issued by wholesale merchants in favour of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. Besides examining himself as D.W.1 first defendant also brought D.W.24, his material uncle, and his son D.W.13. He also marked Exs.B136 to B198 and Exs.B199 to B225, which are receipts issued by wholesale merchants in favour of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. Before considering the evidence, the legal principles applicable in the matter of business set up by a member of joint family need to be noticed. Legal Principles 25. A Hindu family unless contrary is proved is presumed to be joint family. Nevertheless, there can never be a presumption that Hindu joint family at all times owns and possesses joint property nor can it be said that the property in the hands of members is joint family property liable for partition. This principle is equally applicable when applied to the business carried on by a member of the joint family. Every business carried by each and every member of a joint family cannot be treated as joint business though such joint business is, if established, treated as an asset of the joint family. A reference may be made to Bhuru Mal v Jagannath2, wherein the Judicial Committee laid down as under. Though a business, if it belongs to a Hindu joint family, is an item of joint family property, special considerations apply to the question whether or not a business belongs to the family or to the individual member who carries it on..... Whether or not it can be said that if a joint family is possessed of some joint property, there is a presumption that any property in the hands of an individual member is not his separate individual property but joint property, no such presumption can be applied to a business. A member of a joint undivided family can make separate acquisition of property for his own benefit and, unless it can be shown that the business grew from joint family property or that the earnings were blended with joint family estate they remain free and separate...The question whether a business carried on by a member of a joint Hindu family was begun or carried on with the assistance of joint family property is a question of fact upon which the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff who claims a share in the business. The burden of proving that the business was separate in its inception cannot be cast upon the defendant who asserts it. The burden of proving that the business was separate in its inception cannot be cast upon the defendant who asserts it. Jointness may be proved by evidence that the business was carried on as a family business, by proof that the profits were treated as joint family property being brought to one account or divided among the members. (emphasis supplied) 26. A reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in G.Narayana Raju v G. Chamaraju3 wherein Supreme Court after referring to Bhuru Mal's case held that there is no presumption under Hindu law that a business standing in the name of any member of the joint family is a joint family business even if that member is the manager of the joint family. Unless it could be shown that the business in the hands of the coparcener grew up with the assistance of the joint family property or joint family funds or that the earnings of the business were blended with the joint family estate, the business remains free and separate. The Supreme Court also ruled that adverse inference against member of joint family that business carried on by him was not his individual business, cannot be drawn merely on proof that he treated his younger brothers with ordinary kindness, supporting them when they were not earning, helping them to support business and seeing to their marriage and so forth. When a dispute crops up as to whether business carried on by member of the joint family is a joint business of the family, burden entirely rests on such person, who alleges such state of affair. The evidence let in must be clinching and not by way of drawing inferences. 27. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in R.Selvaraj v R.Radhakrishna4 explained rule of burden of proof as under. The contention, however, is that the grandfather was also interested in his son's business and that he contributed sufficient labour for raising a presumption that there was a joint family activity. It is not every sporadic or unimpressive contribution by a member of the joint family, may be the father that would make the resultant activity, a joint family activity. The contention, however, is that the grandfather was also interested in his son's business and that he contributed sufficient labour for raising a presumption that there was a joint family activity. It is not every sporadic or unimpressive contribution by a member of the joint family, may be the father that would make the resultant activity, a joint family activity. The contribution of labour, service or money by one member of the joint family to the other should be so conspicuous and impressive that on a prima facie examination of such material, a reasonable and prudent person should gain the impression that the two members were so associated with the common object of exploiting a commercial activity to the advantage of the joint family as a whole and in general. 28. Applying the above principles, it must be held that first defendant who alleges Bapatla business to be joint failed to prove the existence of such state of affair. A strong contention is made by the learned counsel for first defendant that Exs.B136 to B198, which are the receipts issued by the wholesale traders in connection with Bapatla business, came from the custody of first defendant and therefore, an inference should be drawn from them. The submission is too far fetched. Though the explanation offered by P.Ws.1 and 6 that sometime before filing the suit first defendant had stolen these documents from Bapatla cannot be totally accepted, legally the mere fact that these documents came from the custody of first defendant does not lead to an inference that amounts were held by first defendant. As noticed supra even if some contribution is made by first defendant in 1954 when the business was started, and even if his allegation that off and on he used to supply commodities from Reddipalem is true, it would not lead to an inference that Bapatla business was joint. Secondly, before and after death of their father Subbaiah, joint family was allegedly in debts and there was not even money for performing obsequies of Subbaiah. It is quite unimaginable and improbable as to how first defendant could have arranged funds and commodities for the business of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. Thirdly, the evidence let in by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 that they borrowed an amount of Rs.50/- from Kanakamma, their paternal aunt, and commenced business is not impossible. It is quite unimaginable and improbable as to how first defendant could have arranged funds and commodities for the business of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. Thirdly, the evidence let in by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 that they borrowed an amount of Rs.50/- from Kanakamma, their paternal aunt, and commenced business is not impossible. One should remember that in 1950s an amount of Rs.50/- was considerable money and there is abundant record to show that even by 1960, second plaintiff purchased house site under sale deed-Ex.A4 dated 05.11.1960. A perusal of Exs.B136 to B198 would show that all these receipts either stand in the name of first plaintiff or second plaintiff and merely because they were produced from the custody of first defendant would not support that it is first defendant who was managing the business as manager of the joint family. Accordingly this Court holds that business carried on by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 at Bapatla is not joint family business and first defendant has failed to discharge burden of proof that it is joint family business. The point is answered accordingly against appellants. Partition of Plaint A schedule properties 29. As noticed supra, the appeal is argued only with reference to nine items of plaint A schedule property. Defendant Nos.2, 3, 4 and 7 claimed to have purchased from first defendant. First defendant claims to have purchased some properties besides supporting them. Therefore, for the sake of convenience issue of partition of plaint A schedule insofar as these appeals are concerned, can be considered with reference to alienations in their favour after noticing relevant legal principles of Hindu law. Applicable legal principles 30. Joint family confers certain rights on the members of the family. Unless there is severance of the joint family status, nobody can be denied these rights including right to common roof, common shelter and community. Joint family also attaches certain liabilities to its members. All able bodied must strive to contribute to family. They must be fair to each other and must act with consensus. One of the important obligations of a member of a joint family is discharge of debts incurred by father or the debt incurred to discharge an earlier debt. Hindu law treats obligation to discharge the debt of the family as a religious one. They must be fair to each other and must act with consensus. One of the important obligations of a member of a joint family is discharge of debts incurred by father or the debt incurred to discharge an earlier debt. Hindu law treats obligation to discharge the debt of the family as a religious one. The debt incurred by the father is always first charge upon the inheritance and must be paid in full before there can be any surplus for division. However, the debts of the father, which are avyavaharika like debts for lust, liquor, gambling etc., and commercial debts incurred by father need not be discharged by the sons. If the debt is antecedent, in the sense, such debt was incurred by a grandfather and acknowledged by father, it is pious obligation of the son to discharge such antecedent debt. But if such antecedent debt is shown to have incurred for an illegal or immoral purposes, no obligation would arise for discharging the same. 31. The son or manager of the family may discharge father's debts incurred for the family from the surplus funds of the family. In case such surplus funds are not available, the kartha or manager of the family can even dispose of the immovable property including his share and shares of other members for the purpose of satisfying the debt. In such an event, the sale or mortgage for discharge of antecedent family debt can be enforced not only against the manager, but also against all other members of the joint family. But the right of manager to alienate joint family properties for discharge of the debts is circumscribed by certain restrictions. In Brij Narain v Mangala Prasad, the Privy Council laid down five propositions. In Luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal8, the Supreme Court quoted the following principles with approval. 1. The managing member of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity; but 2. If he is the father and the other members are the sons, he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt. 3. If he is the father and the other members are the sons, he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt. 3. If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate. 4. Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact, as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached. 5. There is no rule that this result is affected by the question whether the father, who contracted the debt or burdens the estate, is alive or dead. 32. The alienations made by the kartha or manager of the joint family for discharge of debts incurred by father or the debts incurred by himself for legal necessities are justified, but the existence of such legal necessity and justification therefor are to be proved. The alienations made by a manager for family necessity or for the benefit of estate bind all undivided members of the family. However, as observed by Privy Council, power to alienate is not unqualified power. It can only be exercised in case of need or for the benefit of family estate. Even when alienations are made, the manager of the joint family must bona fide act like a prudent owner. The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon the family are relevant9 while considering the validity of alienations made by the manager. 33. Family necessity and legal necessity are not one and the same, though they have certain similarities. Legal necessity is absolutely indispensable. Unless a necessity is regarded as reasonable and proper to protect the interest of the family and its estate, every requirement cannot be treated as legal necessity. The necessity for payment of debts of the family, claims of Government on account of land revenue, cesses, taxes and other dues, rents to landlords, maintenance of family members, marriage of a coparcener and/or debts of the family, family ceremonies including funerals, litigation expenses, money for carrying out ancestral business, or repairs to the family house etc., are regarded as family necessities. The legal necessity justifying a sale arises only when these and similar purposes cannot be met out of available family income. 34. When alienations made by the manager of the joint family for meeting family necessities or legal necessities are under challenge, the burden lies on the alienee or transferee of the property to discharge the burden to justify such alienations. Mere proof of debt documents like promissory notes, mortgage deeds etc., would not be sufficient. The alienee must also show that the income of the family was not sufficient to pay the debts or that family had no cash in hand to pay the debts. If the creditor whose debt is discharged by alienating joint family property is a close relative of the joint family, much more heavy burden lies on such person as to why such alienations became necessary and why such alienations could not have been avoided. Alienations in favour of third defendant 35. Third defendant opposed the suit in respect of Acs.0.40 in item No.1 and item Nos.2, 5 and 6 in entirety. She also claims to have purchased item No.16 (Acs.1.90 cents of dry land) from Dara Ramaiah, father of D.W.11, under registered sale deed, Ex.B97, dated 31.10.1954. Learned Counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 3 submits that item Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6 of plaint A schedule were sold to third defendant (D.W.29) for legal necessities of the family. He relies on the evidence of P.W.1 and Exs.B1 and B2, dated 09.06.1952 (promissory notes), executed by Subbaiah in favour of third defendant. According to him, Subbaiah borrowed Rs.200/- from first defendant under Ex.B1. He had also borrowed Rs.300/- under Ex.B2. Subbaiah died on 19.02.1954. To meet the necessities at the time of obsequies, third defendant supplied 10 tooms (1 toom is 62 kgs) of paddy to the family costing about Rs.160/-. She got issued notice, Ex.B60, dated 10.04.1954, demanding repayment. So as to discharge these debts, first defendant and Venkata Narasimham executed Ex.B73, sale deed, in favour of third defendant. He submits that when P.W.1 admitted signature of Subbaiah on Exs.B1 and B2 and also deposed that late Venkata Narasimham managed family properties without any complaint, third defendant discharged burden to prove legal necessities of the family for alienating item Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6. These contentions are opposed by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. 36. He submits that when P.W.1 admitted signature of Subbaiah on Exs.B1 and B2 and also deposed that late Venkata Narasimham managed family properties without any complaint, third defendant discharged burden to prove legal necessities of the family for alienating item Nos.1, 2, 5 and 6. These contentions are opposed by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. 36. Legal necessity propounded by first defendant is the debt of Subbaiah under Exs.B1 and B2. The signature of promissor on these two documents is admitted by P.W.1. Does it amount to discharge of burden by third defendant regarding legal necessity? The answer must be against defendant Nos.1 and 3. The reasons are as follows. First, admittedly, third defendant is sister of third plaintiff and sister-in-law of Subbaiah. She lost her husband, Pitchaiah, at a young age, and came to Reddipalem to stay with Subbaiah's family. As to why Subbaiah borrowed an amount of Rs.200/- under Ex.B1 and another amount of Rs.300/- under Ex.B2 from his own sister-in-law under a promissory note is a mystery. It is unimaginable that close member of family like third defendant would have insisted upon execution of promissory note for the sum she lent to Subbaiah, especially, when the latter was inferentially her guardian under whose custody and care she was staying in Reddipalem. Secondly, Subbaiah died on 19.02.1954. Death of head of a family would certainly bring in gloom to everybody. Even before expiry of two months third defendant issued Ex.B60 - notice, which is acknowledged by first defendant under Ex.B72. Ex.B60 is a hand delivered notice like its acknowledgment. When Ex.B60 is an unregistered notice, it is inexplicable as to why third defendant who was staying with family of Subbaiah along with first defendant had written a notice and first defendant acknowledged the receipt of the same. Thirdly, after receiving Ex.B60, dated 10.04.1954, first defendant did not make any efforts to execute a renewal promissory note and take some time for discharging promissory note debt. He received notice and immediately on the next day he executed Ex.B73, dated 14.04.1954. Thereafter, third defendant made cancellation endorsement Ex.B107 on Ex.B1 and Ex.B108 on Ex.B2. Apart from the scheme of things that is projected before the Court below, something somewhere defendant Nos.1 and 3 are certainly withholding an important relevant aspect from the Court. He received notice and immediately on the next day he executed Ex.B73, dated 14.04.1954. Thereafter, third defendant made cancellation endorsement Ex.B107 on Ex.B1 and Ex.B108 on Ex.B2. Apart from the scheme of things that is projected before the Court below, something somewhere defendant Nos.1 and 3 are certainly withholding an important relevant aspect from the Court. When first defendant, his mother and three brothers and third defendant are admittedly joint family members, it is very peculiar that within a period of three days without any further negotiations first defendant as manager executed Ex.B73. 37. As noticed earlier, mere debt of the family does not amount to legal necessity. There should be something more. Manager or alienee must be able to show that the legal necessity arose, as the family had no surplus funds or was not able to discharge the antecedent debt under Ex.B1 and B2 from out of the family income. After death of Subbaiah in February 1954, Ex.B73 was executed in April 1954. Reddipalem and Kandukuru are dry land areas, and naturally, that is harvest season and no explanation is offered by D.W.1 as to why he could not pay at least some amount by selling crops to third defendant and avoid alienation. Lastly, by the time Ex.B73 was executed there were also other third party creditors who were holding promissory notes, Ex.B36 to B43, executed by late Subbaiah. Curiously, none of them gave any notice of demand to first defendant. Third defendant alone that too being member of family, chose to give notice. It is also important to notice that one Naralla Yelamandha had filed O.S.No.193 of 1954 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Kandukuru, for recovery of promissory note amount. Under Ex.B54 first defendant paid some amount after taking three years time to pay balance. Which factors prevented first defendant to take recourse to such method by taking time from third defendant, his maternal aunt? No explanation is coming forth from defendant Nos.1 and 3. 38. The alienations made by the manager of the joint family for family necessities/legal necessities are certainly binding on the other members of the family. But, when existence of family necessity or legal necessity has not been proved by the alienee and also not corroborated by the alienor, Court cannot approve such alienations. 38. The alienations made by the manager of the joint family for family necessities/legal necessities are certainly binding on the other members of the family. But, when existence of family necessity or legal necessity has not been proved by the alienee and also not corroborated by the alienor, Court cannot approve such alienations. They are not binding on the other members of the joint family and the property continues to be joint family property. Plaintiffs alleged that first defendant is managing the family after death of Venkata Narasimham. They also allege that all plaint schedule properties are in possession of first defendant alone. This allegation stands proved by the mere fact that third defendant herself filed O.S.No.21 of 1975 for declaration and possession of items 2, 5 and 6, and Acs.0.40 of item No.1 of plaint A schedule. This also improbablises case of first defendant that these items were sold under Ex.B73 to third defendant for meeting family necessities and legal necessities and for discharge of debts incurred by Subbaiah. For these reasons, this Court is not able to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for defendant Nos.1 and 3 that the alienations made by first defendant under Ex.B73 are for family/legal necessities. Point is answered accordingly. Alienations to defendant No.4 39. Defendant No.5, Bysani Venkateswarlu, is brother of third plaintiff and third defendant. He is maternal uncle of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 and defendant Nos.1 and 2. Defendant No.4 is son of defendant No.5. The daughter of defendant No.5 (sister of fourth defendant) is married to first defendant. Thus, defendant Nos.1, 4 and 5 expectedly and in reality are close to each other, than when compared to plaintiffs and second defendant. Be that as it is, Pebbishetti Kanakamma, is sister of Subbaiah (as admitted by fifth defendant in his evidence as D.W.24). Fourth defendant claims to have purchased item Nos.1 and 2 of plaint B schedule and Acs.0.40 in item No.8 and Acs.0.10 in item No.1 of plaint A schedule under sale deed Ex.B87A, dated 04.06.1973. The vendor of this document is first defendant. 40. The sequence of events leading to Ex.B87A is very interesting. Late Subbaiah executed promissory note Ex.B3 dated 01.08.1951 for an amount of Rs.1,500/- in favour of Jaldanki Narasimham (D.W.26). After death of Subbaiah, Narasimham transferred Ex.B3 in favour of Pebbishetti Kanakamma. The vendor of this document is first defendant. 40. The sequence of events leading to Ex.B87A is very interesting. Late Subbaiah executed promissory note Ex.B3 dated 01.08.1951 for an amount of Rs.1,500/- in favour of Jaldanki Narasimham (D.W.26). After death of Subbaiah, Narasimham transferred Ex.B3 in favour of Pebbishetti Kanakamma. On the next day first defendant under Ex.B77 agreed to sell these items to Kanakamma in full and final settlement of Ex.B3 amount. On the same day, Kanakamma made cancellation endorsement Ex.B76 on Ex.B3. Pursuant to Ex.B77, first defendant executed sale deed Ex.B79 dated 19.01.1955 in favour of Kanakamma. She in turn conveyed three items of property to first defendant under registered settlement deed Ex.B82 dated 29.05.1959. Attestor of this document is D.W.31. According to first defendant, items settled on him by Kanakamma under Ex.B82 remained with him till he alienated the same to fourth defendant. 41. After first defendant became Manager of joint family, he executed promissory note Ex.B84 dated 05.02.1957 for a sum of Rs.1,000/- in favour of third defendant. This promissory note was renewed. Two years thereafter by executing Ex.B85 dated 09.06.1973, first defendant duly cancelled Ex.B84. Likewise, Ex.B6 dated 10.10.1962, Ex.B8 dated 06.10.1965, Ex.B10 dated 09.10.1968 and Ex.B12 dated 07.10.1971 were executed by first defendant duly canceling earlier ones. Venkata Subbamma transferred Ex.B12 promissory note to fourth defendant under endorsement Ex.B85 dated 09.06.1973. First defendant now states that he executed that sale deed Ex.B87A for Rs.3,000/- in favour of fourth defendant, when latter demanded for payment of debt under Ex.B12. Item No.1 (Acs.0.10) and item No.8 (Acs.0.40) of plaint A schedule and items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule were conveyed under this document. Burden of proof lies on fourth defendant to prove that properties are alienated to him under Ex.B87A for legal necessities. P.W.1 admitted Subbaiah's signature on Ex.B3 and Jabdanki Narasimham's son was examined as D.W.6 to prove Ex.B3, promissory note. The allegation made by plaintiffs is that first defendant abused trust reposed on him by alienating joint family properties in a clandestine manner. Insofar as items covered under Ex.B87A are concerned their allegation stands proved on probabilities of the case. 42. Jabdanki Narasimham, promisee in Ex.B3 is third party to the family but Kanakamma who obtained transfer endorsement Ex.B76 is none other than sister of Subbaiah. Insofar as items covered under Ex.B87A are concerned their allegation stands proved on probabilities of the case. 42. Jabdanki Narasimham, promisee in Ex.B3 is third party to the family but Kanakamma who obtained transfer endorsement Ex.B76 is none other than sister of Subbaiah. Assuming that to wriggle family out of debt owed to Narasimham, she came to the rescue and got Ex.B76, is it probable that Kanakamma would have insisted that first defendant should execute an agreement of sale for debt? Was there such necessity to transfer valuable property to an aunt when transfer endorsement itself was made on 30.07.1954 and there was sufficient time for first defendant to discharge debts from out of family income? All these questions remain unanswered. Curiously transfer endorsement, agreement of sale, cancellation endorsement, Ex.B78 happened in a quick succession on 30th and 31st July 1954. This leads to suspicion. Any prudent man like first defendant could not have ventured to alienate joint family properties for discharging an amount of Rs.1,500/- that too when holder in due course of such promissory note is paternal aunt. This suspicion becomes very strong when we look at the subsequent events. 43. Kanakamma as sister of Subbaiah had three nephews and four nieces. No evidence is let in to show that she had special affection for first defendant. Indeed unlike third defendant, she was not residing in Reddipalem. She was rich lady staying in Kandukuru. Very peculiarly she picks up only first defendant ignoring all for conveying item No.1 (part) and item No.8 (part) of plaint A schedule and items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule under settlement deed Ex.B82 dated 29.05.1959. When according to first defendant she herself insisted upon execution of agreement of sale Ex.B77, after transfer endorsement Ex.B76 in satisfaction of the debt under Ex.B3, why she chose to reconvey property to first defendant. Either it must be for benefit of joint family or for some other reason, which is withheld by first defendant. Though Ex.B82 settlement deed was executed by Kanakamma she has not been examined. She would have been best witness to explain as to why she in 1959 reconveyed property under Ex.B82 settlement deed to first defendant alone when in 1954-1955 she was very particular that an agreement of sale should be executed in her favour for endorsing cancellation of Ex.B3. Though Ex.B82 settlement deed was executed by Kanakamma she has not been examined. She would have been best witness to explain as to why she in 1959 reconveyed property under Ex.B82 settlement deed to first defendant alone when in 1954-1955 she was very particular that an agreement of sale should be executed in her favour for endorsing cancellation of Ex.B3. An adverse inference has to be drawn against first defendant as well as fourth defendant who is a subsequent alienee of these items. The fact that Kanakamma reconveyed properties under settlement deed Ex.B82 creates strong suspicion and supports case of plaintiffs that these transactions were brought into existence by first defendant only to deprive all other members of joint family. 44. Plaint case is that fifth defendant and his son fourth defendant were not well to do during 1950 to 1960. When second defendant wanted to come back to Reddipalem, his kirana business was taken over by defendant Nos.4 and 5. It is also suggested that fourth defendant had no financial capacity to purchase properties. Probably for this reason, first defendant who got properties from Kanakamma under Ex.B82 dated 29.5.1959, did not choose to transfer property immediately. He waited till 1973. By that time defendant Nos.4 and 5 picked up their business and became self-sufficient. Hence Ex.B87A was executed only in June 1973. If only defendant Nos.4 and 5 were well off nothing prevented them to buy property from Kanakamma in whose favour first defendant executed sale deed Ex.B79 dated 19.01.1955. Fourth defendant had no capacity and therefore first defendant waited till 1973 and in the guise of discharging the debt under promissory note Ex.B84 in favour of third defendant, which was transferred to fourth defendant under Ex.B85, first defendant alienated properties. The burden which lies on fourth defendant that properties were transferred to Kanakamma in the first instance and thereafter they were transferred to him by first defendant to discharge debts incurred for family necessities, is not discharged. 45. Even the legal necessity for first defendant to execute promissory note for Rs.1,000/- Ex.B84 dated 05.2.1957 in favour of third defendant has not been proved. In Ex.B84, which is written by first defendant, it is just mentioned that promissory note amount is borrowed for meeting family expenses. No evidence is placed before the Court as to existence of such family necessities or legal necessities. In Ex.B84, which is written by first defendant, it is just mentioned that promissory note amount is borrowed for meeting family expenses. No evidence is placed before the Court as to existence of such family necessities or legal necessities. It cannot be certainly for discharge of any debt because as noticed earlier it is the case of first defendant that so as to discharge debt under promissory notes Exs.B1 and B2, he executed Ex.B73 sale deed in favour of third defendant and therefore it cannot be anything connected with discharge of family debt. The debt also cannot be towards any ancestral business or for commencing new business. Though first defendant alleged that he arranged Rs.400/- for commencing business by plaintiffs 1 and 2 at Bapatla, he never alleged that amount borrowed under Ex.B84 is used for commencing business. 46. Fourth defendant purchased Acs.0.10 in item No.1 and Acs.0.36 in item No.8 of plaint A schedule under Ex.B83 dated 11.05.1973 for a consideration of Rs.1,000/-. Explanation offered by first defendant is that Acs.0.10 in item No.1 was originally owned by Veeramreddy Naraiah (D.W.15) and that first defendant purchased the same under registered sale deed Ex.B75 dated 20.08.1968. He also alleges that income from property settled on him by Kanakamma under Ex.B82 was used for paying vendor of Ex.B75. Insofar as alienation of Acs.0.36 in item No.8 under Ex.B83, it is plea of first defendant that he alienated property as manager of joint family towards benefit of joint family, to discharge family debts contracted by father, Subbaiah. D.W.1 and D.W.15 are two witnesses who were produced before the Court. D.W.1 as vendee and D.W.15 as vendor of Ex.B75 are interested witnesses. Fourth defendant did not take any steps to discharge burden though entire onus lies on him to show that Ex.B83 was executed in his favour to discharge the debts and for meeting family necessities. First defendant as D.W.1 did not lead any evidence as to what is the income he derived from the property covered by Ex.B82 settlement deed. His statement that he paid sale consideration for buying Acs.0.10 in item No.1 under Ex.B75 is self-serving. Secondly his statement in paragraph 18 of written statement that he sold balance of Acs.0.36 in item No.8 to fourth defendant under Ex.B83 for discharging antecedent debts is quite improbable. His statement that he paid sale consideration for buying Acs.0.10 in item No.1 under Ex.B75 is self-serving. Secondly his statement in paragraph 18 of written statement that he sold balance of Acs.0.36 in item No.8 to fourth defendant under Ex.B83 for discharging antecedent debts is quite improbable. By the time Subbaiah died, apart from Exs.B1 and B2 executed by him, there are other promissory notes which are not time barred. For discharging debt under Ex.B3 promissory note, Ex.B79 sale deed was already executed. Therefore existence of antecedent debt as on the date of execution of Ex.B83 does not arise and it is quite improbable. In any event though fourth defendant examined himself as D.W.13, he did not prove that property was alienated to him by first defendant as manager of joint family to discharge family necessities. 47. Yet another item claimed by fourth defendant is item No.7, which he allegedly purchased under sale deed dated Ex.B96 dated 10.05.1973. In written statement filed on behalf of defendant Nos.4 and 5, it is alleged that item No.7 of plaint-A schedule does not belong to joint family of Subbaiah. According to him, total extent of item No.7 is only Acs.0.13 (as against total extent of Acs.0.21 in two bits in plaint A schedule). His case is that this item originally belonged to Kancherla Ramaiah, Moolapadu Lakshminarayana and Kancherla Chenchaiah and that they sold property to fourth defendant for a consideration of Rs.1,000/-. 48. The learned trial Judge rejected the claim of defendant Nos.1 and 4 that item 7 of plaint A schedule was self acquisition of the latter. Having held that the land admeasuring Acs.0.13 comprised in item 7 was kept fallow all along and having regard to the fact that a nearest friend of first defendant took active part in execution of Ex.B96, a conclusion was arrived at that it is a joint family property. The findings recorded by trial Court are supported not only by evidence but cogent and convincing reasons. Vadlamani Raghavulu is a nearest friend of first defendant. His son is examined as D.W.14. He identified the signature of Raghavulu as attestor of Exs.B4 to B7, B74, B75, B77, B83 and B94 and B96. Evidence on record would show that Raghavulu and first defendant were Presidents of Ponnaluru Cooperative Credit Society. They had friendly relations. Vadlamani Raghavulu is a nearest friend of first defendant. His son is examined as D.W.14. He identified the signature of Raghavulu as attestor of Exs.B4 to B7, B74, B75, B77, B83 and B94 and B96. Evidence on record would show that Raghavulu and first defendant were Presidents of Ponnaluru Cooperative Credit Society. They had friendly relations. Thus first defendant certainly took active role in execution of Ex.B96 in favour of fourth defendant. There was no evidence let in by the plaintiffs to show as to what is exact extent of each bit of item 7. However, Ex.B96 shows that the extent of item 7 is only Acs.0.13. Secondly in Ex.B96 the vendee (fourth defendant) is described as a kirana merchant of Bapatla. He would not have ventured to purchase such small extent in Reddipalem. He was found to be name lender for the purchases or acquisitions made by first defendant under Exs.B83 and B87A. In addition to this D.W.10 one of the vendors under Ex.B96 admitted that he never paid any tax for the land and that said land is kept fallow. The plaintiffs alleged that item 7 was purchased by late Subbaiah from Nelapati Yanadi of Ponnaluru under an oral sale and that joint family alone was in possession of the property. They also let in evidence by marking Ex.A36, which is cist receipt in the name of the first defendant. Lastly Ex.B96 was executed by three persons including D.W.10. They did not lead any evidence to trace their title. In the absence of any such evidence, it is not possible to accept correctness of the contents of Ex.B96. In view of the preponderance of probabilities with regard to item 7, the contention of defendant Nos.1 and 4 that it is self-acquired property of fourth defendant cannot be accepted. Alienations to seventh defendant 49. Agricultural dry land in survey No.372 admeasuring Acs.5.00 at Reddipalem (Item 9 of plaint A schedule) is alleged to have been purchased by first defendant under sale deed - Ex.B86 dated 22.07.1965 from Mula Brahmayya, Bompalli Peda Jalayya and China Jalayya. He further alleged that he sold this item to seventh defendant under Ex.B92 dated 21.09.1973. In the evidence of D.W.33 (seventh defendant) it is brought out that first defendant executed three promissory notes - Ex.B90 dated 06.09.1971, Ex.B88 dated 25.08.1972 and Ex.B91 dated 26.09.1972. He further alleged that he sold this item to seventh defendant under Ex.B92 dated 21.09.1973. In the evidence of D.W.33 (seventh defendant) it is brought out that first defendant executed three promissory notes - Ex.B90 dated 06.09.1971, Ex.B88 dated 25.08.1972 and Ex.B91 dated 26.09.1972. To discharge the debt under these promissory notes, first defendant allegedly executed sale deed dated Ex.B92 dated 21.09.1973. 50. The learned counsel for first defendant submits that first defendant purchased item 9 under two separate sale deeds from three persons - Exs.B86 and B88, and to discharge the debts under Exs.B88, B90 and B91, he sold item 9 to seventh defendant. He relies on the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.33 (seventh defendant). The contention is opposed by the other side submitting that first defendant had no income of his own either on the date of execution of Ex.B86 or Ex.B88. Therefore, the funds used for purchase of the property under Ex.B92 must be deemed to have come from joint family funds and therefore, the property must be treated as joint family property. Secondly he submits that the three promissory notes executed by first defendant are sham and nominal and D.W.33 had no capacity to lend money. On a perusal of the evidence of D.W.33 and Ex.A42, first defendant's version is quite improbable. D.W.33 admits that in 1971 when he was working as Inspector of Cooperative Central Bank, Nellore, Kandukuru branch, his monthly income was between Rs.500/- to Rs.600/-. Therefore, when he says that since he came into contact with first defendant during 1966 to 1970, he has lent Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- to first defendant, it is certainly a concocted story. Though he denied the suggestion that Ex.B92 is a nominal document to deprive the plaintiffs of their legitimate share, in the absence of any independent evidence to support the evidence of D.W.33 regarding his capacity to lend money, case of defendant Nos.1 and 7 cannot be accepted. 51. First defendant failed to prove that he had any independent income in July, 1965 and August, 1972 when item 9 was purchased by him. His statement that he borrowed funds for buying item 9 cannot be believed. Even if his plea that he borrowed money is believed, it must be deemed to have been borrowed on behalf of joint family and therefore, item 9 cannot be treated as self-acquired property of first defendant. His statement that he borrowed funds for buying item 9 cannot be believed. Even if his plea that he borrowed money is believed, it must be deemed to have been borrowed on behalf of joint family and therefore, item 9 cannot be treated as self-acquired property of first defendant. A contention was raised by defendant Nos.1 and 7 that seventh defendant who purchased item 9 under Ex.B92 sold the property to one Kancherla Varadayya under registered sale deed. Even if it is true as rightly pointed out by the learned trial Judge, in the partition, the property that falls to share of first defendant can be equitably adjusted so that the rights of Varadayya, will not be prejudiced. 52. Yet another item of plaint A schedule which is allegedly purchased by first defendant is item 15. According to him he purchased item 15 from Nallaganu Venkata Reddy under two registered sale deeds Ex.B227 dated 25.07.1963 and Ex.B228 dated 25.05.1966. The sources of funds for buying these two items allegedly came from the property conveyed to first defendant by Kanakamma under Ex.B82. Dealing with similar contentions this Court has already held that in the absence of any evidence as to annual income derived by first defendant under Ex.B82, his explanation cannot be accepted. Secondly under Ex.B79 sale deed executed by first defendant in favour of Kanakamma, items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule a house and vacant site, and an extent of Acs.0.10 in item 1 and Acs.0.36 in item 8 were sold. The same property was conveyed under settlement deed Ex.B82. The sale consideration paid under Ex.B227 dated 25.07.1963 is Rs.500/-. When Kanakamma conveyed the property under Ex.B82 settlement deed on 29.05.1959, it is rather irrational to probabilise that within a period of about three years first defendant would have saved said amount after meeting expenditure for cultivating an extent of Acs.0.46 in items 1 and 8. This reasoning is equally applicable with regard to first defendant's sources for buying the property under Ex.B228. It is nobody's case that first defendant leased out items 1 and 2 of plaint B schedule property to derive some rent. When the alienations in favour of Kanakamma made by first defendant for family/legal necessities are found to be not true and binding, it is also not possible to accept that first defendant derived some savings to buy item 15 property. 53. When the alienations in favour of Kanakamma made by first defendant for family/legal necessities are found to be not true and binding, it is also not possible to accept that first defendant derived some savings to buy item 15 property. 53. Other alienations (a) Items 10 and 11 of plaint A schedule were acquired by third defendant. It is not disputed that she is the nearest reversioner to the said property owned by Vavilala Ramalaxmamma (not a party to the suit) who is also related to Subbaiah. For coming to such conclusion the learned trial Judge considered the fact that items 10 and 11 stood in the name of Vavilala Ramalaxmamma. The suit insofar as these two items was, therefore, dismissed. There is no cross appeal or cross objections by plaintiffs. (b) Item 12 was sold by first defendant to ninth defendant. Again reason given is family necessities. However, ninth defendant remained ex parte. He did not even file written statement. Law requires alienee to prove that alienation made by manager is for benefit of joint family for meeting family necessities. As ninth defendant remained ex parte, no controversy would arise in this appeal with regard to this item. (c) Item 13 was purchased by eighth defendant under registered sale deed dated 19.07.1969 from one Karna Kotayya @ Bangarayya. He had in turn purchased said item under registered sale deed Ex.B45 dated 10.12.1965. P.Ws.1, 5 and 6 did not seriously contest this and therefore, it was held as not available for partition. (d) Item 14 is also the property acquired by first defendant. It is his case that he occupied item 14 in the Inam Village - Gudavari Kandriga and subsequently he obtained ryotwari patta from the Government. The evidence was let in by examining D.W.23 (Revenue Officer) to show that the joint family was not in possession of this item and hence, it should not be treated as joint family property. Learned trial Judge held against the plaintiffs. As rightly pointed out ryotwari patta was granted to first defendant alone. In the absence of any indication that patta was given to joint family or that first defendant blended property by throwing it into hotchpot, the same cannot be treated as joint family property. (e) Agricultural dry land in an extent of Acs.1.90 is shown as item 16 in plaint schedule. First defendant denied that it is joint family property. In the absence of any indication that patta was given to joint family or that first defendant blended property by throwing it into hotchpot, the same cannot be treated as joint family property. (e) Agricultural dry land in an extent of Acs.1.90 is shown as item 16 in plaint schedule. First defendant denied that it is joint family property. He contends that the land originally belonged to Dara Ramayya which was subsequently purchased by third defendant. Third defendant in her written statement supported this plea. Third defendant gave evidence as D.W.29. She deposed that she purchased said item under registered sale deed dated Ex.B97 dated 31.10.1954. Subsequently on 10.12.1973, she obtained rough patta - Ex.B9 and fair patta - Ex.B193. She also exhibited Exs.B10 to B14, which are cist receipts. In these bunch of documents except Ex.B97 dated 31.03.1954 all other documents were subsequent to 1973 when disputes arose between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 and 2. This is a very strong circumstance to disbelieve defendant Nos.1 and 3. It is well settled that documentary evidence post litem motam should be viewed very cautiously because parties to the litigation always tend to support their case by resorting to documentary evidence available after filing the suit. Exs.B109, B133, B310 to B114 being post litem motam, cannot support her case. Secondly though third defendant obtained sale deed Ex.B97 in respect of item 16, there was not even an iota of evidence to show that she was in possession of the property. Therefore, claim of third defendant was rightly rejected. P.W.5 - wife of Subbaiah, deposed that item 16 was purchased by her husband Subbaiah from Dara Ramayya. The evidence of P.W.5 who is the best person to speak about the joint family properties remained unimpeached. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. Written statement schedule properties 54. The learned trial Judge, as noticed supra, decreed partition of item 6 of written statement schedule. The claim of first defendant for partition of items 3 to 5 was left open. Items 1 and 2 of written statement A schedule stood in the name of wife of first plaintiff and second plaintiff respectively. (a) Item 1 was purchased in the name of wife of first plaintiff under Ex.A34 dated 09.05.1973. The claim of first defendant for partition of items 3 to 5 was left open. Items 1 and 2 of written statement A schedule stood in the name of wife of first plaintiff and second plaintiff respectively. (a) Item 1 was purchased in the name of wife of first plaintiff under Ex.A34 dated 09.05.1973. First defendant deposed that he borrowed the amount from D.W.33 (seventh defendant) and paid it towards sale consideration; this cannot be belied. As already observed, it is the case of first defendant that he borrowed amounts from D.W.33 under Exs.B88, B89 and B90, B91 and in discharge of said debt he executed sale deed Ex.B92 in respect of item 9 of plaint schedule properties. Therefore, the case set up by first defendant insofar as item 1 of written statement A schedule is inconsistent. Secondly by the date of Ex.A34 business of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 at Bapatla prospered and there is no great surprise even if first plaintiff purchased some property under Ex.A34 in the name of his wife for an amount of Rs.2,250/-. First defendant's submission is therefore rejected. (b) To say that item 2 of A schedule of written statement was purchased in the name of second plaintiff by the money paid by defendant Nos.1 and 2 first defendant placed reliance on the endorsement made on Ex.A4 sale deed dated 05.11.1960. There is no such direct evidence to prove this. The Registration Act, 1908 does not require the Sub-Registrar to make a mention of source of funds towards sale consideration. The Sub-Registrar is only required to endorse that execution is admitted by the executor of the document and also, if required, endorse that sale consideration is paid before him. Except endorsement on Ex.A4 made by the Sub-Registrar, there is no direct evidence and in the absence of the same, item 2 of written statement A schedule cannot be treated as joint family property. In view of this, there are no strong reasons to interfere with the finding of trial Court on this aspect. (c) Item 6 of written statement A schedule is agricultural wet land admeasuring Acs.0.75 situated at Ponnaluru Village. Though it stands in the name of third plaintiff by virtue of registered sale deed Ex.B69 dated 22.03.1962, partition of this item has been decreed. Therefore, no issue is raised with regard to this item. 55. (c) Item 6 of written statement A schedule is agricultural wet land admeasuring Acs.0.75 situated at Ponnaluru Village. Though it stands in the name of third plaintiff by virtue of registered sale deed Ex.B69 dated 22.03.1962, partition of this item has been decreed. Therefore, no issue is raised with regard to this item. 55. Before parting with the case, this Court may observe that after death of father in February, 1954, first defendant took over reigns of joint family. First plaintiff and second defendant were majors. Second plaintiff was minor. The eldest son of Subbaiah, Venkata Narasimham was also alive and he managed the properties till he died on 05.06.1968. Even though Venkata Narasimham was made to sign Ex.B73 sale deed, the way the transactions were effected by first defendant purportedly acting for the benefit of the joint family would make his conduct doubtful. He went on adopting dubiously ingenious methods in executing promissory notes as manager allegedly for family/legal necessities as well as discharge of antecedent debts and saw to it that family properties are sold, in such a manner that they came to him or to his henchmen like defendant Nos.4 and 5. Third defendant and Pebbishetti Kanakamma also appear to have become partners unwittingly in plan hatched by first defendant to divert joint family properties in such a manner that he always remained in control. In respect of certain transactions as noticed supra, first defendant comes forward with a case that joint family was facing financial hardship and suffering penury. In the same breath, he again says that he borrowed amount from third parties and purchased properties either in the name of his brothers or himself. Applying the principles that must guide manager of joint family to make alienations for discharging family debt and/or to meet family/legal necessities, this Court is convinced that first defendant managed to bring into existence various documents to divest property from joint family fold. The trial Judge took great pains in analysing enormous amount of evidence and giving elaborate reasons for his findings. The well-considered judgment of the trial Court does not warrant any interference. 56. In the result, for the above reasons, judgment of trial Court is confirmed and A.S.No.212 of 1981, 2219 of 1985 and TR.A.S.Nos.1274 and 1277 of 1991 are dismissed with costs. ? The well-considered judgment of the trial Court does not warrant any interference. 56. In the result, for the above reasons, judgment of trial Court is confirmed and A.S.No.212 of 1981, 2219 of 1985 and TR.A.S.Nos.1274 and 1277 of 1991 are dismissed with costs. ? 1 In this common judgment all the parties are referred to as they are arrayed in O.S.No.13 of 1974. 2 AIR (29) 1942 PC 13 3 AIR 1968 SC 1276 4 AIR 1976 Madras 156 5 See para 361 of Mayne's Hindu Law (16th Edn.) 6 'Antecedent' means, indebtedness of the father prior in time to and independent in origin of the particular dealing with the family property, whether by way of sale, mortgage or other disposition in favour of the original creditor which it is sought to enforce against the son.