ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The prime question, which this criminal revision has raised, is this: whether the date of drawing of a cheque or the period of validity of a cheque shall, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation of six months, as prescribed by Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'the NI Act'), include the date on which the cheque is drawn by the drawer. Yet another equally important question, raised in this criminal revision, is: whether the period of limitation shall, as prescribed by Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act be computed from the date of presentation of the cheque to the payee's bank or from the date of presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank? 2. The opposite party herein has lodged, as complainant, a complaint, on 13.04.2005, in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Golaghat, and this complaint has given rise to CR Case No. 463/2005, the complaint's case being, in brief, thus: The complainant is the President of Golaghat Truck Owners Association, which is an association of carrying and handling contractors of the Food Corporation of India. The accused has been hiring trucks from the complainant association from time to time. The accused had handed over to the complainant association a cheque, dated 25.07.2004, for Rs. 1,20,000.00 drawn on Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch. The complainant, on 22.01.2005, deposited the said cheque with Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, in the account of the complainant association, for collection. By a memo, dated 25.01.2005, the drawee bank, i.e., Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch, returned the cheque for reasons of insufficiency of fund. The then President of the complainant association issued, through their lawyer, a notice, on 22.02.2005, demanding payment of the cheque amount of Rs. 1,20,000.00 within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. Though the accused received the said notice on 25.02.2005, no payment was made and it was then that the complaint aforementioned was lodged, as indicated hereinbefore, on 13.04.2005. 3. 1,20,000.00 within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice. Though the accused received the said notice on 25.02.2005, no payment was made and it was then that the complaint aforementioned was lodged, as indicated hereinbefore, on 13.04.2005. 3. Having taken cognizance of an offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the NI Act, when summons was issued to the accused, the accused impugned the same by way of revision, which gave rise to Criminal Revision No. 691/2005, on two grounds, namely, (i) That the cheque, in question, was not presented to the drawee bank within the period of six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn and, hence, the complaint was, in terms of the provisions of Section 138(a), not maintainable, and (ii) that the complaint being barred by limitation and the limitation having not been condoned, taking of cognizance by the learned Court below was without jurisdiction and illegal and, hence, not maintainable. 4. By order, dated 14.12.2005, the revision was disposed of with direction to the accused-petitioner to appear in the trial Court. By order, dated 14.12.2005, aforementioned, the High Court also directed the learned Court below to decide the two questions aforestated, which had been raised by the accused-petitioner. The matter was accordingly heard and by order, dated 13.09.2006, the learned Court below has held that the cheque was presented within the statutory period of six months as contemplated by Section 138(a) of the NI Act, but there was, in all, a delay of two days in filing the complaint. Having reached these conclusions, the learned Court below accordingly condoned the delay. Aggrieved by the order, dated 14.12.2005, aforementioned, the accused has, now, impugned the same in the present revision. 5. I have heard Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior counsel for the accused-petitioner and Mr. T. J. Mahanta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party. 6. As this revision requires interpretation of the provisions of Section 138, the same is reproduced hereinbelow: 138. 5. I have heard Mr. K. K. Mahanta, learned Senior counsel for the accused-petitioner and Mr. T. J. Mahanta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party. 6. As this revision requires interpretation of the provisions of Section 138, the same is reproduced hereinbelow: 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account-Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for (a term which may be extended to two years), or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque (within thirty days) of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days or the receipt of the said notice. 7. 7. From a bare reading of Section 138, what transpires is that where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a 'banker' for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of the said account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by 'the bank' unpaid, either because of the fact that the amount of money, standing to the credit of the said amount, is insufficient to honour the cheque or that the amount for which the cheque is drawn exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence punishable with imprisonment as prescribed therein. 8. It is, now, worth pointing out that Section 3 of the NI Act defines the term 'banker' to include any person acting as a banker and any post office savings bank. Section 72 of the NI Act provides that a cheque must, in order to charge the 'drawer', be presented at 'the bank' upon which it is drawn before the relation between the drawer and his banker has been altered to the prejudice of the drawer. Clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 are conditions, which must be satisfied before a person is held to have committed an offence under Section 138. Clause (a) provides that the cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The expression 'bank' would obviously mean 'the bank' with which the drawer of the cheque maintained his account at the time, when the cheque was drawn. Hence, a cheque, issued by a drawer, shall have to be presented to the bank with which the drawer of the cheque maintains the account. It does not, however, mean that a cheque must always be presented to the drawer's bank on which the cheque is issued. Hence, a cheque, issued by a drawer, shall have to be presented to the bank with which the drawer of the cheque maintains the account. It does not, however, mean that a cheque must always be presented to the drawer's bank on which the cheque is issued. In fact, the payee of the cheque has the option to present the cheque in any bank including the bank, where he has his account; but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque, the payee of the payee's banker shall present the cheque with the drawee bank within a period of six months from the date on which the cheque is shown to have been drawn by the drawer. (see Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v.Jayaswals NECO' Ltd. reported in 2001 CriLJ 1250). 9. In the present case, the cheque was drawn at Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch, and it was presented, according to the complaint, with the complainant's bank, namely, Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, for collection. Since the cheque, in question, is alleged to have been drawn on 25.07.2004, the said cheque ought to have been presented to the Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch, within a period of six month from the date on which the cheque was drawn. Since the cheque was drawn on Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch, presentation of the cheque by the complainant to their association's banker, namely, Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, for the purpose of collection, was not a presentation of the cheque within the meaning of Section 138. 10. Thus, in the present case, while the cheque, issued on 25.07.2004, was deposited for collection, on 22.01.2005, with the Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, the said cheque was, eventually, returned by the Punjab and Sind Bank, Jorhat Branch, on 25.01.2005. In the face of these facts, it is clear that the deposit of the cheque by the complainant, on 22.01.2005, with the Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, is immaterial. What is material is the date of the return of the cheque by the drawee bank, namely, Punjab and Sindh Bank, Jorhat Branch. In the face of these facts, it is clear that the deposit of the cheque by the complainant, on 22.01.2005, with the Indian Bank, Golaghat Branch, is immaterial. What is material is the date of the return of the cheque by the drawee bank, namely, Punjab and Sindh Bank, Jorhat Branch. Since the date of presentation of the cheque with the drawee bank is not discernible from the materials on record, the question is as to whether the presentation of the said cheque to the drawee bank can be said to be within the period of limitation of six months as contemplated by Section 138(a). 11. The question, posed above, gives rise to yet another question and the question is: whether the date of issuance of the cheque shall be included, while computing the period of six months within which a cheque, according to Section 138(a), must be presented. We must remember that as a general rule of construction, the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. This principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which, inter alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'to'. This position of law becomes clear and explicit if one reads the observations made by the Apex Court in Ham Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1972 CriLJ 872, wherein the Apex Court has observed thus: These decisions show that Courts have drawn a distinction between a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmith Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company (1904) 1 KB 1). The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmith Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company (1904) 1 KB 1). This rule was followed in Cartwrright v. Maccormack (1963) 1 All ER 11 at 13, where the expression "fifteen days from the commencement of the policy" in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of the day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. (1961) 2 QB 135, a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chapman(1951) 2 KB 792 and In re. North, Ex parte Wasluck (1895) 2 QB 264). Thus, as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day and within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day to include the last day. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.), Vol. 37, pp. 92 and 95). There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here. 12. In Saketh India Ltd. and Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. 1999 CriLJ 1822, referring to the case of Haru Das Gupta (supra), the Apex Court has further held: 7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned in incorporated in Section 12 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provisions is made in Sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or review. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provisions is made in Sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'to'. 13. In fact, in M/s Saketh India Ltd. (supra), wherein the Apex Court had the occasion to explain how to compute the period of limitation in a case under the NI Act, observed and held thus: 8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last. Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. Period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14th October, 1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15th October, 1995. That day (15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The result would be that the complaint filed on 15th November is within time. 14. In the backdrop of the authorities cited above, it is clear that while computing the period of six months, as prescribed in Section 138(a), the date on which the cheque is issued or drawn will have to be excluded; but the last day of the period of six months shall have to be included. 15. 14. In the backdrop of the authorities cited above, it is clear that while computing the period of six months, as prescribed in Section 138(a), the date on which the cheque is issued or drawn will have to be excluded; but the last day of the period of six months shall have to be included. 15. In the present case, the cheque was drawn on 25th July, 2004; hence, in the light of the decision in Haru Das Gupta (supra) and M/s Saketh India Ltd. (supra), 25th July, 2004, must be excluded. This apart, 25th July, 2004, being a holiday, the cheque could not have been presented even with the banker of the accused, (i.e., with the drawee bank), on 25.07.2004. Thus, the period of limitation of six months, in the present case, commenced from 26.07.2004. Consequently, the cheque ought to have been presented to the drawee bank on or before 25.01.2005. Since the cheque, in question, was returned by the drawee bank on 25.01.2005, the dishonour of the cheque by the drawee bank for insufficiency of fund was within the period of six months as contemplated in Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. Thus, the presentation of the cheque did not, contrary to what the accused-petitioner contends and/or the learned Court below has concluded, suffer from any limitation within the meaning of Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138(a) of the NI Act. 16. Since the presentation of the cheque, in question, was within the period of limitation, the question is as to whether the filing of the complaint, on 13.04.2005, suffered from any period of limitation. In this regard, it needs to be noted that Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act provides that the payee or the holder, in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, must make a demand for the payment of the cheque amount by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. 17. In the case at hand, the drawee bank, admittedly, returned the cheque on 25.01.2005. 17. In the case at hand, the drawee bank, admittedly, returned the cheque on 25.01.2005. In terms of the provisions of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138, the notice of demand ought to have been raised within thirty days of the receipt of the information of dishonour of the cheque by the payee, i.e., the complainant association. In the present case, the notice of demand was raised on 22.02.2005. Hence, the notice of demand too was, according to the complainant, within the period of limitation as prescribed by Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. Consequently, in the light of the complainant's case, which may or may not be true, the payment, in the face of the provisions of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, ought to have been made by the accused-petitioner within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. While computing this period of fifteen days, the date of receipt of the notice by the accused-petitioner must, in terms of the law discussed above, be excluded. 18. It is the finding of the learned Court below that the notice, in question, was received by the accused-petitioner on 25.02.2005. This finding has not been disputed before this Court. It, therefore, logically follows that the period of limitation, for the purpose of Clause (c) aforementioned, started running, in the present case, from 26.02.2005. Hence, the requisite payment, according to the complainant, ought to have made on or before 12.03.2005. As the payment was, admittedly, not made till 12.03.2005, the cause of action for lodging of the complaint, arose on 13.3.2005. As the accused-petitioner did not, admittedly, make payment within 12.3.2005, the complaint thus, ought to have been made, in terms of the provisions of Clause (b) of Section 142, within a period of one month of the date on which cause of action had arisen. In computing this period of one month, the date on which the cause of action arose must be excluded. Hence, while computing the period of one month under Section 142(b), 13.03.2005 needs to be excluded. (See Jindal Steel and Power Ltd., and Anr. v. Ashoka Steel Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2006) 9 SCC 340 ). Hence, the period of limitation of one month, for the purpose of filing of the complaint, started running on 14.03.2005. Hence, while computing the period of one month under Section 142(b), 13.03.2005 needs to be excluded. (See Jindal Steel and Power Ltd., and Anr. v. Ashoka Steel Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2006) 9 SCC 340 ). Hence, the period of limitation of one month, for the purpose of filing of the complaint, started running on 14.03.2005. This period of one month was, thus, to end on 13.04.2005 and the complaint, in question, was filed on 13.04.2005; hence, the making of the complaint suffered from no infirmity of limitation at all. 19. What surfaces from the above discussion is that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the complaint did not suffer from any of the period of limitation. In the face of the facts so disclosed by the complaint, in question, the learned Court below was wholly competent, in the present case, to take cognizance of offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the NI Act. Viewed thus, it is clear that the impugned order cannot be interfered with, particularly, because it was wrongly held by the learned Court below that the complaint was filed beyond the period of limitation. It is not material that the complainant himself has stated in the complaint that there was delay in filing the complaint. It is not the complainant, but the Court, which is required under the law to determine as to whether a complaint, lodged for prosecution of a person under Section 138 read with Section142 of the NI Act, suffers or does not suffer from the bar of the period of limitation. 20. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I do not find that the accused-petitioner has been able to make out any case warranting this Court's interference in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction with the impugned order. This revision, therefore, fails and shall accordingly stand dismissed. The interim direction of stay, passed in this revision, shall accordingly stand vacated. The accused-petitioner is hereby directed to appear in the Court of the Chief judicial Magistrate, Golaghat, on 11.02.2008, and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Golaghat, may, thereafter, either try the case himself or make over the case to any other Magistrate of competent jurisdiction for disposal in accordance with law. 21. Send forthwith a copy of this order to the learned Court below. Petition dismissed