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2008 DIGILAW 435 (RAJ)

Janpriya Cement Ltd. v. Judge, Labour Court

2008-02-13

MAHESH CHANDRA SHARMA

body2008
JUDGMENT 1. By way of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed that the award dated 18.05.2002 (Annexure-1) passed by the learned Labour Court No.2, Jaipur in L.C.R. No. 1393/98 and award dated 03.05.2003 (Annex.6) passed by the learned Labour Court No.2, Jaipur in L.C.R. No. 10/2002 (1393/98) be quashed and set aside. He has also prayed that the order dated 05.02.2003 (Annexure-5) passed by Payment of Wages Authority in Case No. PWA/5/2002 be quashed and set aside and also prayed for other appropriate order or direction to this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that a Reference under Section 10(1)(d) Industrial Disputes Act., 1947 was made to the learned Labour Court No.2, Jaipur for deciding the question: "Whether the termination of Ranglal (respondent No.3) s/o Shri Mahar Singh on 29.11.1990 by the Manager, Janpriya Cement Limited, Dalpatpura, Via-Patan, Tehsil Neem Ka Thana, Distt. Sikar was correct and valid? If not the labourer was entitled to what relief?" 3. The respondent No.3 Ranglal was being employed on the post of burner and was paid Rs. 950/- per month from 01.09.1985 to 28.11.1990. It was also averred that the employer institution had got some papers signed by him forcefully and had denied him taking in service with effect from 29.11.1990. It was, therefore, prayed that the aforesaid conduct without compliance of provisions of Section 25(f), 25(g), 25(h) of the Act of 1947 was illegal and illegal termination dated 29.11.1990 was prayed to be declared as void. 4. The reply to the statement of claim submitted by the petitioner wherein it was submitted that the respondent No.3 was not terminated from his service but he himself and without any information and prior permission and without getting his leave sanctioned, on his sweet will started remaining absent on and after 29.11.1990 and thus, it was not a matter covered under Section 2(a) of the Act and was also not a matter of discharge, dismissal, termination, retrenchment and thus it was prayed that the claim was not maintainable. The said contention was also made before the Labour Court and Conciliation Officer and also that the respondent No.3 was covered under the Employees State Insurance Scheme and had not made him present in the employer institution on or after 29.11.1990. The said contention was also made before the Labour Court and Conciliation Officer and also that the respondent No.3 was covered under the Employees State Insurance Scheme and had not made him present in the employer institution on or after 29.11.1990. It was also denied that none of the officers of the factory had given any threat to its employee and it was further denied that no papers were forcefully got signed by the employer. Ultimately it was prayed that the respondent No.3 claim be dismissed with costs. 5. Thereafter the case was fixed for evidence wherein the respondent No.3 had submitted the affidavits and the petitioner had cross-examined him. No affidavit on behalf of the petitioner was submitted. 6. The learned Labour Court after hearing the arguments vide impugned awarded dated 18.05.2002 declared the order dated 29.11.1990 as illegal and void and had held the services during the aforesaid period to be in continuity and has reinstated the respondent No.3. During the aforesaid period, the Labour Court further has awarded 50% back wages. 7. After passing of the award dated 18.05.2002, an application for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings dated 17.05.2002 and ex parte award dated 18.05.2002 was submitted on 14.11.2002 wherein it was submitted that the respondent No.3 have continuously remained present in the Labour Court No.1 and after the transfer of the case to Labour Court No.2, before it. It was also submitted that on 02.12.2000 when Ranglal (respondent No.3) has submitted his affidavit, the petitioner has cross-examined him on 11.1.2001. 8. Learned counsel Mr. A.K. Sharma has also submitted that since there was no production going on in the Company and the Company having being closed from the last many years, there was no employee or staff employed by the company. It was also submitted that an application before the Bureau of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) was submitted for declaring the company as sick and in such circumstances, there was no competent officer or employee available in the company and despite letters sent by the counsel, nobody could appear before the learned Labour Court for pleading evidence. The non-presence before the learned Labour Court was neither intentional nor with any ill motive or to delay the proceedings but on account of company being closed from last many years and no competent officer or person available in it. The non-presence before the learned Labour Court was neither intentional nor with any ill motive or to delay the proceedings but on account of company being closed from last many years and no competent officer or person available in it. The absence of the petitioner was bona fide "and and was beyond their control if impugned award dated 18.05.2002 were quashed, no prejudice would be caused. 9. Mr. Sharma further submits that during the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the respondent No.3 had submitted an application before the authority prescribed under the Payment of Wages Act, Sikar, which came to be numbered as PWA/5/2002 and the learned authority prescribed under the Payment of Wages Act, on account of impugned award dated 18.5.2002 has held the respondent No.3 for granting 50% wages from 29.11.1990 to 31.8.2002 amounting to Rs. 66,975/- and had further imposed a penalty of the same amount, thus totaling to Rs. 1,33,950/- vide impugned order dated 05.02.2003. 10. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent Mr. And Sharma has appeared and prayed to this Court that the award passed by the Labour Court is correct in the eyes of law. 11. The Division Bench of this Court in (1) Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. Vs. Ishwar Chand D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 423/1997 and The Management M/s. Bharatpur Nutritional Products Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 422/1997 has considered the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 12. Having carefully scanned the impugned order I notice that all the contentions raised before me were analyzed and considered in great details by the Labour Court. The scope of supervisory jurisdiction was explained by the Supreme Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Company Limited (2003) (3) S.C. 524 which runs in (Para 7): "The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the faced of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision." 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 14. The wide jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 has to be exercised with great circumspection. The High Court cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over Tribunals. Article 226/227 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. In a case of this nature, it is true, the High Court exercising the power of judicial review, would not interfere with the discretion of a Tribunal unless the same is found to be illegal or irrational. In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is very limited. It can quash the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal is wholly perverse. It is also a settled law that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court acts only in a supervisory capacity and not as an appellate tribunal. It does not review the evidence upon which the inferior tribunal proposed to base its conclusion, it simply demolished the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or manifestly erroneous, but does not, as a rule, substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. 15. In the present matter I do not find any jurisdictional error, perversity and illegality in the award passed by the labour Court. The finding of the labour court is based on the basis of material placed before him. There is no error apparent in the face on record. I therefore do not find any justification to interfere with the award. In my view the writ petition does not call for any interference. The same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******