ORDER: 1. Heard Sri M.A.K. Mukheed, the learned Counsel representing the Revision Petitioner and Sri Suresh representing Sri Mahipathi Rao, Counsel for respondents 2 and 3. 2. This Court ordered notice before admission on 17-4-2008 and granted interim stay for a limited period. 3. The Civil Revision Petition is filed by the unsuccessful petitioner/4th defendant in I.A.No.7/2008 in O.S.No.8/2008 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court-Mahabubnagar. The said application was filed under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act praying for permission to impound the relinquishment deed dated 11-8-1991 by sending the same to the District Collector, Mahabubnagar in the interest of justice. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court-Mahabubnagar after recording reasons dismissed the said application as being devoid of merit and hence aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/4th defendant had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Sri Mukheed, the learned Counsel representing the Revision Petitioner would maintain that the order made by this Court in C.R.P.No.1747/2007 may not come in the way of this Court in making an appropriate order by issuing suitable directions permitting the petitioner to have the impounding of the relinquishment deed dated 11-8-1991 by sending it to the District Collector, Mahabubnagar. The learned Counsel also would maintain that in the light of Sections 18, 32, 33, 38 and 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, the document should have been sent for the purpose of impounding so that the Revision Petitioner could have marked the said document at the appropriate stage in accordance with Law. The learned Counsel also incidentally had referred to Sections 38 and 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act and also further had taken this Court through the other relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act as well. The Counsel also would explain that the mere fact that an order was made by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court-Mahabubnagar dated 2- 3-2007 in O.S.No.8/1998 suo motu making certain observations relating to the document in question both on the ground of non-registration and also the liability of stamp duty and penalty, the said order would not come in the way of this Court in granting appropriate relief. The learned Counsel also placed strong reliance on Nalajala Jagannadham Vs. Veerepally Mangamma, Khaja Habeebuddin Vs. Md.Ibrahim and others and C.S.Kumaraswami Gounder Vs. Aravagiri Gounder and another. 5. The learned Counsel also placed strong reliance on Nalajala Jagannadham Vs. Veerepally Mangamma, Khaja Habeebuddin Vs. Md.Ibrahim and others and C.S.Kumaraswami Gounder Vs. Aravagiri Gounder and another. 5. On the contrary, Sri Suresh, the learned Counsel representing the respondents 2 and 3 had taken this Court through the order made by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court-Mahabubnagar dated 2-3-2007 in O.S.No.8/1998 and would maintain that it may be true that the said order was made by the Court itself and not by any application as such moved by either of the parties, but the fact remains that the self-same document was held to be inadmissible in evidence both on the ground of non-registration and also on the ground of deficit stamp duty. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the said order was challenged by the plaintiff in C.R.P.No.1747/2007 and this Court by order dated 18-7-2007 having observed that the Civil Revision Petition was filed only by the plaintiff who is not a party who sought to mark the document, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the said order on the ground that the 4th defendant who in fact is the aggrieved party had not preferred the Civil Revision Petition and accordingly dismissed the same. The Counsel would maintain that inasmuch as the said order made in O.S.No.8/1998 dated 2-3-2007 on the admissibility of the self-same document in a way had attained finality, the same cannot be reagitated again in the present Civil Revision Petition and even otherwise sending the self-same document for the purpose of impounding would not serve any purpose at all in the light of the said order. 6. The petitioner/4th defendant aggrieved by the dismissal of application I.A.No.7/2008 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court-Mahabubnagar had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is stated that even in the certified copy in stead of specifying as O.S.No.8/1998 it was shown as O.S.No.8/2008 and the same is a mistake. The said mistake may have to be rectified. 7. The said application I.A.No.7/2008 was filed under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act praying for permission to impound the relinquishment deed dated 11-8-1991 by sending the same to District Collector, Mahaboobnagar. The petitioner/4th defendant filed the said document dated 11-8-1991 for the purpose of marking the same as exhibit. The said mistake may have to be rectified. 7. The said application I.A.No.7/2008 was filed under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act praying for permission to impound the relinquishment deed dated 11-8-1991 by sending the same to District Collector, Mahaboobnagar. The petitioner/4th defendant filed the said document dated 11-8-1991 for the purpose of marking the same as exhibit. It is not in serious controversy that on 2-3- 2007, the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court, at Mahaboobnagar made an order treating the document as relinquishment deed and the same as inadmissible for want of registration and also for proper stamp duty payable on the said document. It appears, in the light of the objection taken to the marking of the document, the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge- Fast Track Court-Mahaboobnagar appeared to have made the said order. Certain submissions were made that this order was made by the learned Judge suo motu and not on any application made by either of the parties. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, this would not seriously alter the situation. The learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court, Mahaboobnagar at para-13 observed : "Hence under the above circumstances, the subject disputed document for all purposes is a Relinquishment Deed falls within the ambit of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and is a compulsorily registrable document, and since not registered, is not admissible in evidence. Further the subject disputed document was also not engrossed on a sufficient stamp paper as required under Schedule-I.A of Stamp Act and as such is inadmissible for want of proper stamp duty in view of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. Hence under the above circumstances, the subject disputed document namely document dated 11-8-1991 styled as Relinquishment Deed is a Relinquishment Deed and is inadmissible in evidence for want of Registration and proper stamp duty, for any purpose including for any collateral purpose and accordingly the point is answered against to plaintiff and defendants 4 to 12." 8. Hence under the above circumstances, the subject disputed document namely document dated 11-8-1991 styled as Relinquishment Deed is a Relinquishment Deed and is inadmissible in evidence for want of Registration and proper stamp duty, for any purpose including for any collateral purpose and accordingly the point is answered against to plaintiff and defendants 4 to 12." 8. The 4th defendant who made an attempt to mark the document had not preferred the C.R.P, but the plaintiff had carried the matter by way of C.R.P.No.1747/2007 and this Court by order dated 18-7-2007 on the ground that such plaintiff is not an aggrieved party, was not inclined to interfere and dismissed the C.R.P. It is stated that the 4th defendant had not challenged the said order. Certain submissions were made relating to collusion between the petitioner/4th defendant and also the 1st respondent/plaintiff in the suit on the ground that these parties are sister and brother. This aspect need not detain this Court any further in deciding the merits and demerits of the present Civil Revision Petition in the light of the order already made by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-Fast Track Court, Mahaboobnagar which had been already specified supra. It is pertinent to note that in the prior order, the learned Judge specifically held that the self-same document as inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and also on the ground of liability to pay the stamp duty. It is no doubt true that as far as the second ground is concerned, may be the petitioner is at liberty to pray for sending of the said document for the purpose of impounding in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act. But however, the other objection relating to the inadmissibility of the document in question for want of registration stands intact being undisturbed. The Counsel for Revision Petitioner placed strong reliance on the decision referred (1) supra wherein the learned Judge at para-7 observed : "From this it is clear that the authority impounding the instrument under Section 35 of the Act has to send the instrument to the Collector an authenticated copy of the instrument with a certificate in writing stating the amount of duty and penalty levied in respect thereof and shall send the amount authorised officer collected to the Collector, under Section 38 of the Act. In every other case the officer concerned after impounding shall send it in original to the Collector who is expected to take action as contemplated under Section 40 of the Act. Under Section 39 of the Act it is made clear that when once the instrument is received by the Collector under Section 38(1) of the Act if he thinks fit he may refund any portion of the penalty in excess of Rs.5/- which has been paid in respect of such instrument. In fact under Section 39(2) of the Act it is made clear that when once the instrument is received by the Collector under Section 38(1) of the Act if he thinks fit he may refund any portion of the penalty in excess of Rs.5/- which has been paid in respect of such instrument. In fact under Section 39(2) if the instrument is impounded because it was written in contravention of Section 13 or 14, the Collector is empowered to refund the whole penalty so paid. From the language employed in Sections 31, 32, 39 and 40 of the Act, the ultimate power to decide the nature of the instrument and the stamp duty payable on such instrument rests with the Collector but no other authority. Even though a person in-charge of public office is given the power to admit, the document in evidence by collecting the insufficient stamp duty and also levies penalty under Section 35(a) of the Act. It is only a provisional order and the said authority has to send it to the Collector for final assessment of the value of the stamp duty payable on the instrument and pass either of the orders contemplated under Section 39 or Section 40 of the Act. The words used in Section 35 "any person having, by law or consent of parties, "authority to receive evidence" and the words used in Section 38 "when the person impounding any instrument in Section 33 has", by law or consent of the parties, authority to receive evidence or admits such instrument in evidence" gives an impression that he can impound the document himself with the consent of the parties but not otherwise before admitting the same in evidence or he can forward the same to the Collector who is the ultimate authority under the Act to decide the nature of the document and duty to be paid thereon with or without penalty. I am fortified in my view in the light of the language used in Section 38(2) of the Act which says in every other case the person so impounding an instrument shall send it in original to the Collector. Though under Section 35(a) a power is given to the person in-charge of public office who is given authority to admit the document in evidence by collecting the proper stamp duty and also by levying penalty for purpose of admitting the instrument in evidence. If the parties have not consented for deciding the nature of the instrument and the stamp duty payable thereon and the penalty to be levied by the person in-charge holding public office he shall simply forward the same to the Collector for impounding the document". 9. Further, reliance was placed on the decision referred (2) supra wherein the learned Judge at para-5 observed : "In the suit for partition filed by the 1st respondent, the petitioner raised a plea of prior partition. He intended to prove and establish his plea on the basis of the two documents referred to above. It is not in dispute that they were neither stamped nor registered. The trial Court took the view that the contents of one of the documents dated 16-8-1957 indicate that it is a partition deed and in the absence of registration, it is not admissible in evidence. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner has made an attempt to impress upon this Court that the documents cannot be treated as partition deed by itself, the contents of the same disclose that it provides for the extent of shares of various persons and intends to bring about a partition. Under these circumstances, no exception can be taken to the finding of the trial Court that the document is partition deed. The admissibility of an unregistered partition deed has been the subject matter of discussion by this Court in several cases. A larger Bench of this Court in its decision rendered in Muthyalareddy Vs. Venkatareddy (1969(1) A.L.T. 375= AIR 1969 A.P. 242 (L.B.) held that even an unregistered partition deed can be received in evidence for the collateral purposes. In Kaheeda Moin Vs. Md.Iqbal Ali (1988(5) A.L.T. 704), this Court analysed the nature of purposes which can be treated as collateral or otherwise, in the context of partition. Venkatareddy (1969(1) A.L.T. 375= AIR 1969 A.P. 242 (L.B.) held that even an unregistered partition deed can be received in evidence for the collateral purposes. In Kaheeda Moin Vs. Md.Iqbal Ali (1988(5) A.L.T. 704), this Court analysed the nature of purposes which can be treated as collateral or otherwise, in the context of partition. It was held therein that the whole process of partition contemplates three phases viz., (a) Severance of status, (b) Division of joint property by metes and bounds; and (c) Nature of possession of the various shares." 10. Reliance also was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of Madras High Court referred (3) supra wherein it was observed at para-10 as hereunder:- ".......Thus it will be seen that in the case of an express, completed partition there will be three different stages - (i) the stage of effecting a division in status, (ii) the stage of dividing the properties by metes and bounds, and (iii) the stage of each party taking possession of the properties allotted to his share. As far as these three stages are concerned, it is conceded, having regard to the decided cases, that each and every one of them can be effected orally without there being a document. Even if there is a written document in respect of the first and third stages, then also it is conceded that the document does not require registration, because neither the division in status nor the actual taking possession of the properties can be said to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest to or in immovable property. Therefore, it is only with regard to the second stage, namely, division of properties in different shares and allotment thereof to the various members, if the same is reduced to writing, it requires registration under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Under the Hindu law, it is well settled that, severance in status can take place either by the unilateral declaration of one of the coparceners or by agreement between all the coparceners. Where severance is effected as above, it is not a transaction which requires any writing and even if it is effected by means of any instrument in writing, that will not fall within the scope of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Similar will be the position with regard to taking possession of the properties. Where severance is effected as above, it is not a transaction which requires any writing and even if it is effected by means of any instrument in writing, that will not fall within the scope of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Similar will be the position with regard to taking possession of the properties. From the very nature of the case, once a division of the properties by metes and bounds has taken place as between the members of a coparcenary and the parties take possession as exclusive owners of the respective items allotted to them, such a partition assumes a division in status having taken place between the parties. Therefore, though an unregistered partition deed cannot be admitted in evidence to prove the terms of the partition, it can certainly be admitted in evidence for proving the division in status and the fact of partition, as pointed out by several decisions based on the judgment of the Privy Council in Rajangam Ayyar Vs. Rajangam Ayyar, 50 Ind.App. 134 = (AIR 1922 P.C. 266). Similarly, taking possession of the shares allotted to each one of the parties at the partition will be a purpose collateral to the purpose of partition and such taking possession not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest to or in immovable property, will not require registration and therefore an unregistered deed of partition can be used for the collateral purpose, namely, for proving the nature and character of the possession of the respective items of properties in the hands of the members of the coparcenary. In Bai Gulabbai Vs. Sri Datgarji, (1907) 9 Bom.L.R. 393, it was pointed out that a collateral purpose is any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. Therefore a collateral transaction within the meaning of the proviso to Section 49 of the Act means a transaction other than the transaction affecting immovable property, but which is in some way connected with it. In Ramlaxmi v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1953 Bom. 50, the Bombay High Court pointed out - "The expression 'collateral' transaction is used not in the sense of an ancillary transaction to a principal transaction or a subsidiary transaction to a main transaction. The root meaning of the word 'collateral' is running together or running on parallel lines. In Ramlaxmi v. Bank of Baroda, AIR 1953 Bom. 50, the Bombay High Court pointed out - "The expression 'collateral' transaction is used not in the sense of an ancillary transaction to a principal transaction or a subsidiary transaction to a main transaction. The root meaning of the word 'collateral' is running together or running on parallel lines. The transaction as recorded would be a particular or specific transaction. But it would be possible to read in that transaction what may be called the purpose of the transaction and what may be called a collateral purpose, the fulfillment of that collateral purpose would bring into existence a collateral transaction, a transaction which may be said to be a part and parcel of the transaction but nonetheless a transaction which runs together with or on parallel lines with the same. An obvious illustration of this is the transaction which is recorded in the memo of petition before us. The transaction therein recorded was a transaction of partition of the movable and immovable properties belonging to the joint family. These properties were allotted to the shares of the respective members of the family. A partition was in fact effected by this document and that transaction took place under the terms of the document itself. The memo of partition thus required registration and not being registered could not be admitted in evidence under the terms of Section 49, Registration Act. There was, however, involved in this transaction itself a collateral transaction viz., that of the severance of the joint status which transaction by itself did not require to be registered by any law for the time being in force. A severance of joint status could be effected under Hindu law in various modes, one of the modes being an unequivocal expression of an intention to separate. A partition could be effected orally as well as by a written document, and it would be open to a party to prove that there was a partition or severance of joint status effected between the parties without its being effected by a registered instrument. A partition i.e., severance of joint status thus would be a collateral transaction, and would certainly fall within the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act". 11. A partition i.e., severance of joint status thus would be a collateral transaction, and would certainly fall within the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act". 11. Here is a case where the learned Judge, when an attempt was made to mark the self-same document, had made an order holding that the said document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and also on the ground of liability of stamp duty and penalty. Inasmuch as the first ground of attack that the document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration when the said order made in a way had attained finality, sending the self-same document for the purpose of impounding to the District Collector would be a futile exercise since the same cannot be marked on the ground of want of registration in the light of the prior order already referred to above. In the light of the same, the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. It is needless to say that if the petitioner is aggrieved of that portion of the order holding the document as inadmissible for want of registration, liberty is given to the petitioner to question the same by way of appropriate proceedings. 12. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs. ?1 1997(2) A.L.D. 549 2 2004(3) A.L.T. 51 3 AIR 1974 Mad.239