JUDGMENT In this writ petition, filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, order dated 18th January, 1999 passed by respondent No. 1 is under challenge. Vide this Order, respondent No. 1, exercising his jurisdiction under Section 12 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (‘1972 Act’ for short) read with Rules 8 & 9 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (‘1972 Rules’ for short), notified the vacancy with respect to a residential portion comprising of a room, a store and a courtyard in Quarter No. 6 in the Shiv Mandir Trust Property. 2. Shorn of all unnecessary details, the undisputed facts are that Sri Brahma Nand was the admitted tenant in the property in question, who died in the year 1990. In normal circumstances, owing to the fact of the death of Sri Brahma Nand, the property should have fallen vacant and should have been deemed and declared as such, but in this case, the petitioner herein Sri Sudhir Kumar Tyagi claiming himself to be the nephew of Late Brahma Nand, further claimed that he being the tenant of the property in question, he was not deemed to have ceased to occupy the property nor could the property be treated or notified as vacant in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 12 of 1972 Act. Respondent No. 2, the landlord, refuted the aforesaid contention of the petitioner. Respondent No. 1, after adjudication, held in the impugned Order that even though Late Brahma Nand was in legitimate occupant of the property in question at the time of his death, the petitioner, merely being his nephew, could not be treated as a legitimate occupant of the property and, therefore, he could not be treated as a tenant or a legal heir of deceased Brahma Nand. 3. Mr. Sharad Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 has raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this writ petition, as according to him, in terms of Section 18 of 1972 Act, a revision against the order finally allotting the property or finally releasing it would have been maintainable. The writ petition, according to Mr. Sharad Sharma, is not maintainable. 4. In the case of Achal Misra Vs. The writ petition, according to Mr. Sharad Sharma, is not maintainable. 4. In the case of Achal Misra Vs. Rama Shankar Singh & Other reported in (2005) 5 SCC 531, a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of maintainability of the writ petition filed against an order passed under Section 12 of 1972 Act declaring a vacancy, considered the question. The following observations are pertinent, which I quote herein below : “14. It is thus clear that an order notifying a vacancy which leads to the final order of allotment can be challenged in a proceeding taken to challenge the final process of decision-making in passing the final order. Hence, in a revision against the final order of allotment which is provided for by the Act, the order notifying the vacancy could be challenged. The decision in Ganpat Roy case which has disapproved the ratio of the decision in Trilok Singh and Co. cannot be understood as laying down that the failure to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there, would result in the loss of right to the aggrieved person of challenging the notifying of vacancy itself, in a revision against the final order of allotment. It has only clarified that even the order notifying the vacancy could be immediately and independently challenged. The High Court, in our view, has misunderstood the effect of the decision of this Court in Ganpat Roy case and has not kept in mind the general principles of law governing such a question as expounded by the Privy Council and by this Court. It is nobody’s case that there is anything in the Act corresponding either to Section 97 or to Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 precluding a challenge in respect of an order which ultimately leads to the final order. We overrule the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the present case and in Kunj Lata v. Xth ADJ that in a revision against the final order, the order notifying the vacancy could not be challenged and that the failure to independently challenge the order notifying the vacancy would preclude a successful challenge to the allotment order itself. In fact, the person aggrieved by the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available. In fact, the person aggrieved by the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available. Either to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there by way of a writ petition or to make the statutory challenge after a final order of allotment has been made and if he is aggrieved even thereafter, to approach the High Court. It would really be a case of election of remedies.” 5. The clear observation is that the person aggrieved by the order notifying the vacancy can be said to have two options available to him, either to challenge the order notifying the vacancy then and there by way of writ petition or to make a statutory challenge after a final order of allotment has been made and, if he feels himself aggrieved of the same, to approach the High Court. As per the clear declaration of law by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, a writ petition against an order notifying a vacancy is maintainable. The preliminary objection raised by Mr. Sharad Sharma, therefore, is overruled. 6. Coming to the facts of the case, what I find is that respondent No. 1 rejected the claim of the petitioner of his being a tenant in the property on two grounds; firstly, that merely by claiming himself to be the nephew of deceased Brahma Nand, he could not be treated as his legal heir and, secondly, he could not have been treated as a co-tenant along with Late Brahma Nand. In coming to this conclusion, respondent No. 1 fell in error in not noticing two important provisions of 1972 Act. The expressions, “tenant” and “family” have been defined in clauses (a) and (g) respectively of Section 3 of 1972 Act. For ready reference, the aforesaid definitions are extracted herein below, which read thus : “(a) “tenant”, in relation to a building, meaning a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant’s death or his heirs; (1) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death; (2) in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs. (g) “family” in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means, his or her – (h) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building.” 7. The expression “tenant”, insofar as it relates after the original tenant’s death, includes his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death. Respondent No. 1 did not return any finding disbelieving the contention of the petitioner that, on a question of fact, he was the nephew of deceased Brahma Nand and, at the time of his death, was residing with him. A plain reading of the definition of “tenant” leads to only one conclusion and that is that at the time of the death of Late Brahma Nand, the petitioner, being his nephew and therefore, being his heir, was residing with him and, therefore, could be termed as a tenant of the building in question. 8. Secondly, the definition of the expression “family”, used in clause (g) supra, includes male lineal descendant. As per Section 8 read with Section 9 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in the light of the inclusion and description of Class I and Class II heirs mentioned in the Schedule to the said Act, the brother’s son indeed is a male lineal descendant. I do not agree with the finding of respondent No. 1 that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not attracted or is not applicable to proceedings under 1972 Act. 9. Looking from any of the two aforesaid angles, it can be clearly said that because the petitioner, at the time of the death of Late Brahma Nand, was residing with him in the property in question and because he is the heir of Late Brahma Nand, he can be said to be the tenant of the property in question. That being the case, the notification of the vacancy in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 12 of 1972 Act was totally illegal. The impugned Order accordingly is set aside with all the consequences. 10. The writ petition is allowed.