Judgment : Petitioner seeks writ of certiorarified mandamus, to quash the order of the first respondent in R.C. No. 30803/F1/2000, dated 16. 2002 and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as Chief Superintendent of the third respondent College with all monetary benefits inducing back wages from 4. 2000 todate. 2. Brief facts which led to the filing of writ petition are as follows: (i) Petitioner joined the service of the third respondent/College ever since its inception, namely 1974 as Head Clerk. Thereafter, petitioner was promoted as Superintendent as on 8. 1988 and in that capacity, he has been working till 4. 2000 and on the same, day the Petitioner was suspended. (ii) On 38. 1979, the petitioner gave a resignation letter to the third respondent which was withdrawn by him on the same day. However, the third respondent relieved the petitioner from service after two years, namely on 33. 1981. Aggrieved by the same petitioner filed W.P.No. 9635 of 1983, judgment dated 10. 1991, this Court allowed the petition and quashed the relieving order and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner. (iii) Third respondent reinstated the petitioner on 14. 1993. According to petitioner, inspite of several representations by the petitioner for the period, from 4. 1981 to 14. 1993 the petitioner was not paid back wages and arrears of monetary benefits. The Government passed a Government Order on 29. 1996 regularising the period of strike and directing payment of salary. (iv) Petitioner was suddenly suspended by the third respondent on 4. 2000 on the allegation that petitioner has misappropriated certain amount from a student of the college. In regard to this, a criminal complaint was filed and the petitioner was released on anticipatory bail. Thereafter, a Charge Memo was issued by the 3rd respondent dated 25. 2000, that the petitioner has received Rs. 15,000/-from a second year M.B.A. Student. The petitioner has submitted his explanation on 26. 2000. (v) The third respondent appointed one Dr. V. Subramaniam, as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. On completing the enquiry on 27. 2000, the enquiry officer submitted the report to the third respondent without furnishing a copy to the petitioner. The third respondent has issued a minutes of the College Committee meeting on 27. 2000 in which the third respondent has stated that the petitioner found guilty of charges. On 9. On completing the enquiry on 27. 2000, the enquiry officer submitted the report to the third respondent without furnishing a copy to the petitioner. The third respondent has issued a minutes of the College Committee meeting on 27. 2000 in which the third respondent has stated that the petitioner found guilty of charges. On 9. 2000, college committee has taken a decision to remove the petitioner from service permanently and retrospectively from 4. 2000. The 3rd respondent has sent the proposal to the 2nd respondent on 29. 2000 for prior approval. The 2nd respondent Competent Authority by his order dated 30.3.2001 disapproved the proposal of the 3rd respondent to remove the petitioner from service. (vi) Aggrieved by the order of the 2nd respondent Competent Authority, the 3rd respondent preferred an appeal on 24. 2001 to the 1 st respondent under Section 37 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulations) Act, 1976. By the impugned order in Rc. No. 30803/F1/2000 dated 16. 2002 (served on the petitioner on 26. 2002) first respondent allowed the appeal of the third respondent and consequently, setting aside the order of the second respondent and the same is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 3. Opposing the petition, the first respondent has filed counter stating that the Appeal preferred by the third respondent/College under Section 37 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act (for short “Act”), was allowed by the first respondent by the impugned Order dated 16. 2002. It is further averred that the decision to dismiss the petitioner from service was taken in the resolution of the College Committee by a clear majority. It is averred that after going through all the records, the first respondent has allowed the Appeal, setting aside the order passed by the second respondent. .4. The third respondent has filed counter stating that on the basis of findings of the Enquiry Officers Report and taking into account the gravity of misconduct committed by the petitioner, the College Committee in its meeting held on 27. 2000 resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service. However, one P. Thirunavukkarasu, University Nominee, did not agree with the punishment of dismissal from service and expressed his opinion that a minor punishment be awarded. On 27. 2000 resolved to dismiss the petitioner from service. However, one P. Thirunavukkarasu, University Nominee, did not agree with the punishment of dismissal from service and expressed his opinion that a minor punishment be awarded. On 27. 2000, the decision of the College Committee to award a major punishment of dismissal from service was communicated to the petitioner along with the copy of Enquiry Report. 5. Mr. K. Vijayan, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has contended that by well considered reasonings, the second respondent has disapproved the proposal sent by the third respo0ndent/College. It was further contended that without considering the matter in proper perspective, by a cryptic order, the first respondent has allowed the Appeal granting approval for the proposed punishment of dismissal from service. Drawing Court’s attention to the judgment of the Criminal Court in C.C. No. 406 of 2001 on the file of Judicial Magistrate I, Coimbatore, which ended in acquittal and placing reliance upon M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited AIR 1999 SC 1416 : (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999-I-LLJ-1094, the learned senior counsel contended that in view of acquittal of the Criminal Case, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner has to be reversed. Drawing Court’s attention to the letter of the first respondent to the third respondent/College (dated 15. 2004), the learned senior counsel further contended that when the first respondent himself called upon the third respondent to reconsider the matter, there is no question of termination of petitioner’s service. 6. The learned Government Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 Ms. Geetha Thamaraiselvan has submitted that as per Section 19(1) and (2) of the Act, the Competent Authority has to grant formal approval for the dismissal of the employees. It was further submitted that after careful examination of the entire matter and after conducting an enquiry by giving opportunity to both parties, the first respondent being the Appellate Authority as per Section 20 of the Act issued the Order dated 16. 2002 allowing the Appeal preferred by the third respondent/College and set aside the order passed by the second respondent and the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity calling for interference. .7. On behalf of third respondent, the learned senior counsel Mr. A.L. Somayaji, has contended that the charges against the petitioner are grave in nature and after due enquiry., the College Committee found the charges are proved. .7. On behalf of third respondent, the learned senior counsel Mr. A.L. Somayaji, has contended that the charges against the petitioner are grave in nature and after due enquiry., the College Committee found the charges are proved. It was further submitted that as the charges are grave charges, the College has imposed the punishment of dismissal from service and the first respondent has rightly granted approval by allowing the Appeal. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that the order of the second respondent in declining to grant approval is based on surmises and conjectures and was rightly set aside by the first respondent/Appellate Authority. 8. The petitioner, while working as Office Superintendent of third respondent/College is alleged to have committed misconduct by unauthorized collection of money from students studying in self-financing course. The following charges were framed against the writ petitioner. i) The delinquent collected Rs. 15,000/- from T.C. Ashok Kumar, II MBA class student and issued temporary receipt and had not brought the amount into the college account and had misappropriated. ii) Temporary misappropriation of tuition fees paid by N.R. Vanitha, Anusuya, T. Dhanalakshmi and K. Karthik. iii) The delinquent had no authority or permission to collect any fees. Without Authority having collected fees had misappropriated the same and the conduct of delinquent is Gross misconduct. The total amount of misappropriation involved was more than Rs. 35,700/-. A police complaint was lodged and a case was registered under Section 408 IPC in Cr. No. 81 of 2000 on 4. 2000 and the case was charge-sheeted : Owing to allegations of misappropriation of money, the petitioner was suspended from service w.e.f. 4. 2000. The third respondent appointed Dr. V. Subramanian, Retired Joint Director of Collegiate Education and Member of College Committee as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the various charges against the writ petitioner. The Enquiry Officer held a detailed enquiry and the hearings were spread over for various dates. During the enquiry, the third respondent/College examined as many as 12 witnesses and marked 13 documents. Students, viz., N.R. Vanitha, Anusuya and T. Dhanalakshmi and K. Karthik, were examined. One Rajendran (father of N.R. Vanitha) was also examined as the Management Witness. All of them have spoken to about the payment of money to the petitioner and that the petitioner had not issued any receipt. From N.R. Vanitha, the petitioner is said to have collected Rs. 3,200/- on 2. One Rajendran (father of N.R. Vanitha) was also examined as the Management Witness. All of them have spoken to about the payment of money to the petitioner and that the petitioner had not issued any receipt. From N.R. Vanitha, the petitioner is said to have collected Rs. 3,200/- on 2. 2000, but only after complaint was given, that amount was paid into the College on 22. 2000. Based on the evidence, the Enquiry Officer arrived at the conclusion that there was temporary misappropriation of the amount and found the petitioner guilty of the charges of misappropriation of tuition fees collected and gross misconduct. 9. Accepting the findings of Enquiry Officer’s Report and taking into account the gravity of misconduct, the College Committee proposed to award major punishment of “dismissal from service.” Enclosing the Enquiry Report, the petitioner was called upon to submit his written reply on the proposed punishment. Stating that the reply received from the Delinquent/petitioner was not convincing and satisfactory. On 9. 2000 the College Committee decided to impose the punishment of “dismissal from service.” 10. The third respondent/College sought for approval of the second respondent for dismissal of the petitioner forwarding the entire papers along with the letter dated 29. 2000. By the Order dated 30.3.2001, the second respondent declined to approve the decision of the College Committee for dismissal of the writ petitioner on the following grounds. The third respondent/College appears to have adopted a victimizing attitude towards the petitioner. The Management has not paid the salary from 8. 2000 till the period of suspension; The Criminal Case filed against the writ petitioner was not decided nor the writ petitioner was found guilty. Despite directions, the Management has not paid earlier arrears of salary to the writ petitioner from 8. 1988 to 14. 1993. In the order, the second respondent inter alia pointed out that the Constitution of College Committee is not in accordance with Rules. Observing that writ petitioner has put in 25 years of service and that he has been honoured by the Management for his 25 years of dedicated service, the second respondent declined to grant approval to the proposed punishment of “dismissal from service.” 11. In the Appeal preferred to the first respondent (Appellate Authority) under Section 37 of the Act, the first respondent allowed the Appeal by the impugned order dated 16. In the Appeal preferred to the first respondent (Appellate Authority) under Section 37 of the Act, the first respondent allowed the Appeal by the impugned order dated 16. 2002 and set aside the order of the second respondent. In the impugned order, the first respondent has observed that the order of Joint Director of Collegiate Education is based on surmises and conjectures. 12. Challenging the order of first respondent granting approval for imposing punishment of dismissal from service, the learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner firstly contended that the Constitution of the College Committee is not in accordance with Rule 8(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules. The Constitution of College Committee under Rule 8 of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, has been amended by the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Amendment Act of 1998, which has come into effect from 11. 1998. After the said amendment, the Constitution of the College Committee consisting of the following persons in every private college is in the following manner. 1. The Principal 2. The senior most Selection Grade Lecturer or Reader. 3. One other Selection Grade Lecturer; and 4. The senior most Superintendent. 13. The grievance of the petitioner is that as per Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules, the petitioner was the senior most Superintendent, who was legally entitled to be included as a Member of the College Committee as on. 11. 1998. The learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner contended that the next senior most Superintendent Kothandaraman, ought to have been included in the Constitution of the Committee. It was further argued that two senior most Selection Grade Lecturers were not induced in the College Committee and therefore, the punishment imposed by the College Committee is not proper. 14. The College Committee was duly constituted w.e.f. 6. 1998 including two Selection Grade Lecturers as per Section 11 of the Act, which was in force at that time. Members – Prof. N.R. Ravi Shankar of Department of Mathematics and Prof. S. Ramachandran, Head of the Department of English are the senior most professors. The term of office of the members nominated to the College Committee was for a period of 3 years from the date of their nomination and the term of Office of then sitting Committee expired only on 35. 2001. The Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Regulation (Amendment) Act came into force w.e.f. 11. 1998. The term of office of the members nominated to the College Committee was for a period of 3 years from the date of their nomination and the term of Office of then sitting Committee expired only on 35. 2001. The Tamil Nadu Private Colleges Regulation (Amendment) Act came into force w.e.f. 11. 1998. Therefore, the College Committee constituted earlier as per Section 11 of the Act continued till expiry of its term 35. 2001. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the order imposing punishment by the College Committee is vitiated on that score. Several administrative decisions including appointments, promotions and reemployment of staff were approved by the same College Committee constituted w.e.f. 6. 1998 as per Section 11 of the Act. In any event, non-compliance of Rule 8(3)(c) in Constitution of College Committee would not affect the final decision taken by the College Committee. 15. Ultimately, it narrows down to the point of prejudice. The recent trend however is of prejudice. Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal or unlawful unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the Applicant. 16. Observing that in matters of enforcement of discipline, Court must be slow in interference. In Controller of Examinations and Others v. G.S. Sunder and Another (1993) (Supp) SCC 82, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, as under: “10. We have given our careful consideration to the above submissions. One thing must be put beyond doubt, in matters of enforcement of discipline this Court must be very slow in interference. After all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to co0nduct examinations fairly and property know best how to deal with situations of this character. One cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales. In the present system of education, the system of examinations is the best suited to assess the progress of the student so long s they re fairly conducted. Interference by Court m every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce…….” Based on evidence and materials when the Enquiry Officer arrived at the findings holding that the charges are proved, the evidence cannot be reappreciated. 17. Interference by Court m every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce…….” Based on evidence and materials when the Enquiry Officer arrived at the findings holding that the charges are proved, the evidence cannot be reappreciated. 17. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner further contended that the second respondent has passed the detailed order declining approval and while so, by a cryptic order, the first respondent erred in reversing the finding of the second respondent. It was further contended that several aspects of victimization of the petitioner pointed out by the second respondent was not kept in view by the first respondent. 18. As pointed out earlier, the Report of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence and the Enquiry Officer has held that the charges are proved. Exercising the power under Section 19 (1) and (2) of the Act, the second respondent cannot go into the merits of the matter in detail. Being Quasi-judicial Authority, the second respondent was to consider whether Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules have been complied with. The College Committee has gone into the report and accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer. While so, the second respondent was not right in saying that the writ petitioner was victimized. The first respondent being an Appellate Authority, set aside the order of the second respondent and the same cannot be faulted with. 19. In the Criminal Case in C.C. No. 406 of 2001 under Section 408 IPC on the file of Judicial Magistrate I, Coimbatore, ended in acquittal.. Placing reliance upon M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (supra), the learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that when the Criminal Case and the Departmental proceedings are based upon same set of facts and when the Criminal Case ended in acquittal, the departmental proceedings are to be terminated. The learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (supra) at p. 1103 of LLJ: “34. ……….. As pointed out earlier, the Criminal Case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts namely. The learned senior counsel placed reliance upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (supra) at p. 1103 of LLJ: “34. ……….. As pointed out earlier, the Criminal Case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts namely. ‘the raid conducted at the appellant’s residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.’ The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by police Officers, and Panch Witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were, examined in the Criminal Case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the ‘raid and recovery’ at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the exparte departmental proceedings, to stand. 20. When the acquittal of Criminal Case was brought to the notice of the first respondent, the first respondent sent the communication (dated 15. 2004) to the third respondent and directed the third respondent to reconsider the punishment imposed upon the petitioner. Laying emphasis upon the letter of the first respondent, dated 15. 2004, it was contended that the first respondent/Appellate Authority has directed the Management to (sic) reconsider the matter. It was further argued that the Criminal Case and the Departmental Proceedings proceed on the same set of facts and therefore, as per the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited (supra) the Departmental proceedings are to be terminated. 21. It is fairly well settled, that the initiation of departmental proceedings is permissible even after the judgment of acquittal is recorded by the Criminal Court. In T.N.C.S. Corpn. 21. It is fairly well settled, that the initiation of departmental proceedings is permissible even after the judgment of acquittal is recorded by the Criminal Court. In T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Meembai (2006) 2 SCC 255 : 2006-I-LLJ-826, the Supreme Court has held as under t p. 834 of LLJ: “31. The scope of disciplinary proceedings and the scope of criminal proceedings in a Court of criminal law are quite distinct, exclusive and independent of each other. The prosecution proceedings launched against the respondent herein were in respect of offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A IPC, whereas the departmental proceedings as initiated against her were in respect of the charges of misappropriation and other fraudulent practices such as deliberate omission to bring into account the stock received showing bogus issues in the records, falsification of accounts, submission of defective accounts, tampering of records, manipulation of accounts and records, etc. Thus, the respondent herein was proceeded against for quite different charges and on different sets of facts before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the one hand, and before the departmental enquiry on the other.” 22. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 4217 : (2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005-III-LLJ-1129 the Supreme Court has held that acquittal of a delinquent by a criminal Court would not preclude an employer from taking action by the disciplinary authority, if it is otherwise permissible. Such a departmental proceeding, however, cannot be initiated mala fide. It must be conducted in accordance with law. An acquittal of a delinquent ipso facto may not absolve him from undergoing disciplinary inquiry. However, where the charges are absolutely identical, ordinarily the same would not be taken resorted (sic resort) to. 23. In Commissioner of Police v. Narender Singh AIR 2006 SC 1800 : (2006) 4 SCC 265 wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a police constable, who was accused of committing theft of arms. He made a confession of his involvement. It was found to be inadmissible in the criminal proceeding. In that factual backdrop, the Supreme Court has held as under; “12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. He made a confession of his involvement. It was found to be inadmissible in the criminal proceeding. In that factual backdrop, the Supreme Court has held as under; “12. It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different. Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. (See Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. AIR 2001 SC 3846 : (2002) 1 SCC 555 ). 13. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed.” 24. In Uttaranchal Road Transport Corporation and Others v. Mansaram Nainwal, AIR 2006 SC 2840 : (2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006-III-LLJ-505, the Supreme Court has held that whether continuation of departmental proceedings would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As held by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions, criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings are different. Decision in one does not ipso facto result in the decision of another. 25. It emerges from the above decisions that the acquittal in Criminal Case would not ipso facto make the disciplinary proceedings invalid. The scope of departmental proceedings and the scope of criminal proceedings are quite distinct and independent of each other. Normally, in a criminal case, allegation against the accused is that whether he has committed an act which amount to offence under Indian Penal Code or any other substantive law relating to such offence and punishment be imposed on him, but in the case of departmental proceedings, the scope of enquiry is whether the allegations leveled against the delinquent would amount to misconduct under relevant service Rules, Regulations and Standing Orders. As pointed out earlier, criminal case and the charges leveled against the petitioner stand on different set of facts. In the disciplinary proceeding, Charge No. 3 was whether “by collecting the amount and not issuing the receipts” the petitioner has betrayed the confidence reposed in him s the Superintendent of the College. As pointed out earlier, criminal case and the charges leveled against the petitioner stand on different set of facts. In the disciplinary proceeding, Charge No. 3 was whether “by collecting the amount and not issuing the receipts” the petitioner has betrayed the confidence reposed in him s the Superintendent of the College. Scope of charge No.3 is different from the charges in the Criminal Case. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the acquittal in Criminal Case would automatically terminate the disciplinary proceedings. This is all the more so, when the petitioner was given only the benefit of doubt by the Criminal Court. 26. The next question to be considered is the quantum of punishment. In service matters, considering the quantum of sentence, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process. Unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, the High Court would not interfere with the quantum of punishment. 27. Learned senior counsel, for the third respondent Mr. A.L. Somayaji raised strong objection in reviewing the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner. The learned senior counsel contended that petitioner had only challenged the order of the first respondent in Na.Ka. No. 30803/F1/2000 dated 16. 2002, which only grants approval to the proposal sent by the third respondent/College for imposing punishment of dismissal from service, it was further contended that pursuant to approval granted by the first respondent, the third respondent/College has imposed the punishment of dismissal from service by his proceedings in Ref. No. B.200/2002 dated 26. 2002. The learned senior counsel further contended that unless the said order has been challenged, the Court cannot go into the quantum of punishment. 28. The learned senior counsel further argued that as per the provision of Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, the writ petitioner ought to have challenged the order of imposing punishment dated 26. 2002 only before the Competent Authority, The learned senior counsel further argued that when the order passed has been by the 3rd respondent imposing punishment of dismissal from service and when efficacious alternative remedy is available, Court cannot take up the exercise of going into the quantum of punishment. As pointed out earlier, the Criminal Case ended, in acquittal, which is a factor to be reckoned with. As pointed out earlier, the Criminal Case ended, in acquittal, which is a factor to be reckoned with. In fact, when acquittal of Criminal Case was brought to the notice of the first respondent, the first respondent by the letter Na.Ka. No. 35083/F1/2002 dated 15. 2004 asked third respondent/College to consider the case of the petitioner taking note of the subsequent events i.e., acquittal of Criminal Case. This subsequent event has to necessarily taken note of by this Court. 29. In a writ proceedings, Writ Court can always take note of the subsequent event into consideration and either grant or refuse relief on that score. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor General Traders AIR 1975 SC 1409 : (1975) 1 SCC 770 the Supreme Court has held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the Court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the Court cannot be blinked at. 30. Observing that the Court can take note of subsequent events, in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyak AIR 2002 SC 665 : (2002) 2 SCC 256 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law.” 31. Alternative remedy of departmental-Appeal is not a bar for maintainability of a writ petition, where the order is in utter violation of rules of natural justice. The rule of exclusion of Writ Jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of the availability of an alternative remedy, the writ Court may still exercise discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review in M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation and Another v. Jahan khan (2007) AIR. SCW 5712, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “10. In an appropriate case, inspite of the availability of an alternative remedy, the writ Court may still exercise discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review in M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation and Another v. Jahan khan (2007) AIR. SCW 5712, the Supreme Court has held as follows: “10. Before parting with the case, we may also deal with the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that a remedy by way of an appeal being available to the respondent/the High Court ought not to have entertained his petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. There is no gainsaying that in a given case. the High Court may not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said to be of universal application. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ Court may still exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three contingencies, namely, (1) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) Where there is failure of principles of natural justice of (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances, an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. (see: Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade marks AIR 1999 SC 22 : (1998) 8 SCC1, Harbanslal Sahnia and Another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd and Others AIR 2003 SC 2120 : (2003) 2 SCC 107 , State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 3936 : (2005) 6 SCC 499 , and Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. AIR 2005 SC 3454 : (2005) 8 SCC 242 ).” .32. No doubt, when alternative remedy is available, the writ petitioner should be required to pursue his remedy before appropriate forum. No doubt, when alternative remedy is available, the writ petitioner should be required to pursue his remedy before appropriate forum. The availability of other remedies or the pendency of other proceedings is no bar to the High Court issuing writs, passing orders, or giving directions under Article 226 of the Constitution, and it is for the High Court to consider in each case the necessity or desirability of interference, not withstanding the availability or existence of other remedies or proceedings. In the present case, the writ petitioner is already retired and the Writ petition is pending for a long time. While so, it would not be appropriate to direct the writ petitioner to have recourse to another round of litigation to challenge the order of Third respondent in Ref. No. B.200 of 2002, dated 26. 2002 imposing punishment of dismissal from service. In my considered view, the petitioner ought to have challenged the order of third respondent dated 26. 2002 imposing quantum of punishment. But that order is almost a consequential order passed imposing the punishment of dismissal from service which the Management has already proposed. This Court being a Court of equity, can certainly go into the proportionality of quantum of punishment. 33. While exercising power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty, if the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court, it would appropriately mould the relief, either by directing the disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v. Ashok Kumar Arora AIR 1997 SC 1030 : (1997) 3 SCC 72 : 2002-IV-Suppl-LLJ-794, the Supreme Court has held that the Court would not interfere unless the punishment is wholly disproportionate. Only when the Court finds that the punishment imposed is grossly excessive compared to the gravity of alleged misconduct, the Court will interfere with the quantum of punishment. 34. An Authority which is conferred with a statutory discretionary power is bound to take into consideration all the attending facts and circumstances of the case before imposing an order of punishment. Only when the Court finds that the punishment imposed is grossly excessive compared to the gravity of alleged misconduct, the Court will interfere with the quantum of punishment. 34. An Authority which is conferred with a statutory discretionary power is bound to take into consideration all the attending facts and circumstances of the case before imposing an order of punishment. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra and Others AIR 2000 SC 1151 : (2000) 3 SCC 450 : 2000-I-LLJ-1113, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, where the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee shocks the conscience of the Court, the High Court can interfere on the ground that it is disproportionate. .35. In the present case, the petitioner is alleged to have unauthorisedly collected the amount from the students. The petitioner has paid the amount to the College, as pointed out by the second respondent in the proceedings in Na.Ka. No.10376-C3-2000, dated 30.3.2001. For his dedicated service of 25 years, the College-Management had issued certificate of appreciation. Apart from the number of charges, there seems to be no past history except one earlier Writ Petition filed by the writ petitioner. Having regard to the nature of proved charges and the length of service of the petitioner and that there are no previous misconduct, in my considered view, the quantum of punishment of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the gravity of the alleged misconduct. Having regard to the long service of the petitioner and other circumstances, the punishment of dismissal from service is modified as compulsory retirement as on 26. 2002, when third respondent/College has passed the order of imposing punishment of dismissal from service. 36. In the result, The writ petition is partly allowed. The order of first respondent in Na.Ka. No. 30803/F1/2000, dated 16. 2002 and the order of third respondent in Ref. No. B.200 of 2002 dated 26. 2002, are set aside. The quantum of punishment of dismissal from service is modified as one of compulsory retirement as on 26. 2002. The petitioner shall be entitled to all permissible retrial benefits. Third respondent/College shall disburse all retrial benefits to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 2002, are set aside. The quantum of punishment of dismissal from service is modified as one of compulsory retirement as on 26. 2002. The petitioner shall be entitled to all permissible retrial benefits. Third respondent/College shall disburse all retrial benefits to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Third respondent/College shall process the pension papers within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There is no order as to costs.