ORDER This writ petition is filed for a writ of mandamus to declare the inaction of the respondents in referring the claim of the petitioner under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') to the extent of his land acquired under Award No.13 of 1984 dated 30.3.1984, as illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Sri C.B. Rammohan Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition. 3. An extent of Ac.2.56 cents in Sy.No.3 of Boravelli Village, Manopad Mandal, Mahabubnagar District belonging to the petitioner was acquired for providing house sites to the weaker sections. Award No.13/1984 dated 30.3.1984 was passed fixing the market value at Rs.2,500/- per acre. The petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 4,002/- on 17.5.1984 towards first instalment under protest. On the same day, he applied for reference of the dispute to civil Court under Section 18 of the Act regarding enhancement of market value. This was followed up by another request dated 20.6.1984. As no action was taken for more than 20 years, the petitioner caused legal notice dated 17.6.2005 issued to the respondents. Respondent No.1 called for report from the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal and after considering report dated 16.9.2005 submitted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, he rejected the petitioner's request on the ground that the claim suffers from laches. 4. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, it is averred that award was passed on 30.3.1984 and the petitioner was paid the compensation amount on 17.5.1984 and that on the same day the petitioner filed a protest petition and sought for reference of the dispute to civil Court. He also admitted that the petitioner gave a legal notice on 17.6.2005. It is, however, stated that respondent No.1, after examining the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal, observed that the petitioner's claim for reference cannot be considered after a lapse of 21 years. 5. It is further averred that this Court dismissed WP No.5106 of 1998 on 10.12.1998 filed by the petitioner therein on the ground of laches and the said judgment was confirmed by order dated 29.12.1998 in W A No.2225 of 1998. 5. It is further averred that this Court dismissed WP No.5106 of 1998 on 10.12.1998 filed by the petitioner therein on the ground of laches and the said judgment was confirmed by order dated 29.12.1998 in W A No.2225 of 1998. The answering respondent also relied on order dated 7.12.1998 in WP No.29480 of 1998, which was passed following the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1999 (10) JT 336 , wherein it was held that delay defeats equity and where no period of limitation is prescribed, the period of three years prescribed as limitation for civil suit is the guiding factor. 6. The petitioner filed a copy of report dated 16.9.2005 submitted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal to respondent: No.1, in pursuance of the latter's direction to submit such a report vide his letter dated 7.7.2005. The respondents have not denied the authenticity of the said report. In the said report, Revenue Divisional Officer stated that the award was passed on 30.3.1984, that notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was served on the nephew of the petitioner on 15.4.1984, that the petitioner received the first instalment of Rs 4,002/- under protest on 17.5.1984 and that on the same day i.e., on 17.5.1984 he filed a protest petition, wherein he stated that the value of the land was not less than Rs.25,000/- per acre and requested for reference of his claim to civil Court. He marked the endorsement of the officer as ‘A7' in his report. It is further stated in the report that by another letter dated 20.6.1984, the petitioner again requested for reference of his claim to civil Court and that the office Superintendent endorsed as "The awardee is expected to file objection petition for the enhancement within a period of six weeks from the date of pronouncement of award A7. Put up award proceedings." The Revenue Divisional Officer in his report further stated that in paragraph Nos.26 and 27 of page 14 of note file it is mentioned as "Kindly peruse the application submitted by Chandrasekhar Reddy resident of Boravelly Village in which he has requested to refer the case to subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar for proper market value. Put up award proceedings." The Revenue Divisional Officer in his report further stated that in paragraph Nos.26 and 27 of page 14 of note file it is mentioned as "Kindly peruse the application submitted by Chandrasekhar Reddy resident of Boravelly Village in which he has requested to refer the case to subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar for proper market value. Draft letter addressed to subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar is up for approval." It is further mentioned in the letter that the said draft letter was approved by the officer on 27.6.1984 and that in the current file no approval letter was found and the original petition of the petitioner was found in the file, but not sent to the Court. The Revenue Divisional Officer in his report opined that the interested persons were not present at the time of pronouncement of the award and hence, notices were served on the relative of the interested persons on 15.4.1984 and the petitioner was expected to file his petition within two months from the date of service of notice i.e., on or before 14.6.1984 and that the petitioner filed the petition under Section 18 of the Act on 17.5.1984. He therefore opined that the petition filed by the petitioner is within the time and the conditions stipulated under Section 18 of the Act are fulfilled. 7. Section 18 of the Act vests a valuable right in the owner of the land, who is not satisfied with the quantum of compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, to refer the dispute regarding the market value of the acquired land to the competent civil Court. If he satisfies the requirement of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act by seeking such a reference within the time prescribed by the said provision, there is no option left to the Land Acquisition Officer other than referring the dispute to the civil Court. 8. As discussed above, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal, categorically found that the petitioner satisfied the requirement of the provisions of Section 18 for reference by making a request within the stipulated time. The report further revealed that the draft letter addressed to the Subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar, referring the dispute was approved on 27.6.1984, but curiously the approved letter was not found in the file. The report further revealed that the draft letter addressed to the Subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar, referring the dispute was approved on 27.6.1984, but curiously the approved letter was not found in the file. In the light of these undisputed facts, the sustainability of the reason for rejection assigned by respondent No.1, namely, that reference of the dispute after a long lapse of 21 years cannot be made, is required to be considered. 9. It is no doubt true that the petitioner did not avail his remedy against the inaction of the• respondents in referring the dispute for 20 years. When he got legal notice dated 17.6.2005 issued, respondent No.1, instead of ignoring the said notice on the purported ground of delay of 20 years, called for the report from the Revenue Divisional Officer, who, as noted supra found that the petitioner approached the Land Acquisition Officer within the time prescribed by Section 18 of the Act. 10. Though the language of Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not in express terms prescribe limitation for exercise of power by the High Courts, the superior Courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint including the one that the High Court will not entertain belated claims (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 , Tilokchand and Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and another, AIR 1970 SC 898 , and the judgment of a nine Judge Constitution Bench in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 ). However, in R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1974 SC 259 , the Supreme Court laid down that if the petitioner is able to make out a case on merits, he cannot be non-suited on the jejune grounds of delay and laches or the like, provided that the result of the writ petition is not likely to affect the third party rights. While reiterating the abovementioned principle of law, the Supreme Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company v. District Board, Bhojpur and others, (1992) 2 SCC 598 , held as under: "The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale• claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay infilling the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is cremed and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand's case (supra), relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed." (Emphasis added) 11. Thus, while the doctrine of laches is not an absolute and unqualified one, one of the main tests being applied by the Superior Courts is whether due to long lapse of time, any rights came to be vested in others and granting of relief would unsettle such rights and cause prejudice to their interest. 12. In the light of the above-discussed law laid down by the Supreme Court and the facts, which were noted hereinabove, I am of the considered view that the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground of laches. 12. In the light of the above-discussed law laid down by the Supreme Court and the facts, which were noted hereinabove, I am of the considered view that the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground of laches. While the petitioner approached the respondents at the right time by invoking his valuable right under Section 18, the respondents entertained his request and had even approved the letter to be addressed to the civil Court of competent jurisdiction to refer his claim to the civil Court. For reasons, which are neither known nor explained by the respondents, the said letter along with the petitioner's application was not sent to the civil Court. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the petitioner is only an agriculturist, who is not presumed to be a person well versed with the legal procedure. Though he has not explained the reason for not initiating necessary legal steps for getting his dispute referred to the civil Court, considering the fact that he lost his valuable land and the further fact that he is sought to be denied his precious legal right of getting proper market value fixed for his land, I am not prepared to throw out this writ petition merely on the ground that he did not assert his legal right for a period of 20 years. The fact that no third party rights have crept in during the period of delay further weighed with me in taking this view. By referring the dispute to the civil Court, none of the settled rights of the respondents or third parties will get unsettled. If the petitioner succeeds in his dispute, all that he would be entitled to is to the enhanced market value along with statutory benefits. Hence, I have not felt persuaded to accept the reason put forth by respondent No.1 in rejecting the petitioner's request for reference. 13. With reference to the averment that the petitioner filed WP.No.5106 of 1998 and that the same was dismissed on 10.12.1998 by this Court, I have summoned the file relating to the said case and found that the petitioner is not a party to the said writ petition and the same is in no way connected with the dispute raised in this writ petition. The said writ petition was filed by one Gopal Reddy and ten others in connection with the lands situated in Deverampally Village, Mominpet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The petitioners therein sought for a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents therein in depriving their property without taking recourse to the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional. The learned Judge, who dismissed the writ petition found that the claim of the petitioners therein that they are entitled to compensation for the lands said to have been taken possession in the year 1969, suffered from laches as the writ petition was filed almost 30 years thereafter. The learned Judge, as a fact, found that the said lands were not submerged under the tank and not affected. 14. On a careful perusal of the said judgment, I am satisfied that the same has no application to the present case. Similarly, I find no nexus between the case on hand and order dated 7.12.1998 passed in WP No.29480 of 1998 disposed of on the basis of the judgment of Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra's case (supra), because the said order and the judgment referred to in the counter-affidavit turned on the individual facts of the cases decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court respectively. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to refer the claim of the petitioner under Section 18 of the Act to the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 16. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition in the manner indicated above, WPMP No.33314 of 2005 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as in fructuous.