ORAL JUDGMENT: - Heard. 2. By the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the order of termination of his services by the respondent including the decision to abolish the post which the petitioner was holding till the date of his termination. 3. The respondent has raised two preliminary objections. The first is relating to the non-maintainability of the petition on the 1 ground that no writ lies against the Co-operative Society and the respondent is a Cooperative Society and secondly, on the ground that there is alternative remedy to the petitioner by way of appeal to the General Body of the respondent -Society in terms I of the Society's Bye Laws as well as the petitioner being entitled to get the matter referred under section 83 of The Goa Co-operative Societies Act, 2001. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has sought to rely upon the decisions of the Apex Court in (S.S. Rana Vs. Registrar, Co-op. Societies and another, reported in 2006 DGLS (soft) 252: 2006(11) S.C.C. 634 and (Bhadra Shahakari S.K. Niyamita Vs. Chitradurga Mazdoor Sangh and others, reported in 2006 DGLS (soft) 786 : 2006(8) S.C.C. 552 in support of his contention about the non maintainability of the writ petition and has also drawn our attention to the case of (State of Haryana Vs. Satyender Singh Rathore), reported in 2005 DGLS (soft) 574 : 2005(7) S.C.C. 518 in support of his contention as regards non maintainability on account of alternative remedy; 5. As regards the objection regarding non maintainability of writ petition on the ground that the respondent is a Co-operative Society, it is the contention on behalf of the respondent that the petition nowhere discloses that the respondent-society has been formed or created by any statutory provision or that it is the agency of the Government nor there is anything to show that the respondent performs a public function as such. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the Government is a major share-holder of the respondent-Society and also performs a public function inasmuch as that the respondent caters to the supply of milk in the State of Goa. As regards the share-holding regarding the performance of the public function, it is the contention on behalf of the respondent that there are only Rs. 8 lakhs shares owned by the Government in a share capital of Rs. As regards the share-holding regarding the performance of the public function, it is the contention on behalf of the respondent that there are only Rs. 8 lakhs shares owned by the Government in a share capital of Rs. 1 crore of the respondent and as regards the supply of milk in the State of Goa, there are two more dairies making such supply. 6. Before dealing with these rival contentions as regards non maintainability of the alternative remedy, it would be appropriate to reproduce para 4 of the petition and the contents of para 4 of the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent. Para 4 of the petition reads thus: "The respondent is the Federation of Milk Producer's Societies commonly known as 'Goa Dairy' or "Goa Milk Union' (hereinafter referred to as GMU for brevity). The Government of Goa owns 16000 shares (out of a total 1 crore shares). The 'Goa Dairy' consists of the Dairy Plant, Cattle Feed Plant (hereinafter referred to as CFP for brevity) and Administrative Office which are owned by the Government of Goa and have been leased to the respondent, i.e. The Goa Milk Union for a period of 99 years. The respondent is the only Dairy in the State of Goa and caters to the demand of milk for the entire State of Goa. As such, the respondent is an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The respondent has been constituted to perform a public function, i.e. to cater to the supply of milk for the State of Goa". Para 4 of the affidavit in reply is as under: "With reference to paragraph 4 of the petition, (a) I say that the respondents are a cooperative society that funds, manages and controls its own affairs. I say that the paid up share capital of the respondents is over Rs. 1 crore, of which only Rs. 8 lakhs is the paid up share capital of the Government. I say that in addition to the respondents there are two other dairies operating in Goa, carrying on business volume in milk supply that is more than that of the respondents. (b) I deny that the respondents are an instrumentality of the State or under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. I say that in addition to the respondents there are two other dairies operating in Goa, carrying on business volume in milk supply that is more than that of the respondents. (b) I deny that the respondents are an instrumentality of the State or under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. I deny that the respondents cater to the demand of milk of the entire State of Goa or that the respondents perform any public function. I say that a co-operative society like the respondents is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction, nor are its employees entitled to any protection under Article 311 of the Constitution nor have any status". 7. Perusal of the contents of para 4 of the petition would reveal that the respondent society has full control over the Goa Dairy and the Government owns about 16,000 shares out of 1 crore shares of the respondent-Society and also that the respondent caters to the supply of milk to the State of Goa. Perusal of the affidavit in reply and also para 4 would reveal that the total share capital of the respondent-Society is Rs. 1 crore out of which Rs. 8 lakhs belongs to the Government and there are two other dairies operating in the State of Goa for milk supply in the State. 8. Though, as far as the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the Government is a major share holder of the respondent Society does not appear to be convincing, the 1 fact remains that there is a categorical assertion in the petition that the respondent (performs a public function of supplying milk to the State of Goa. In answer to that, the respondent has merely stated that there are two other dairies operating in Goa and neither the affidavit nor the annexures thereto/disclose any identity of the so-called two dairies operating in the State of Goa. When a categorical statement is made by the petitioner to justify the maintainability of the petition against the respondent stating that the respondent is performing public function of supplying milk in the State of Goa, mere statement in reply by the respondent that there are two other dairies operating in s Goa is not sufficient. When a categorical statement is made by the petitioner to justify the maintainability of the petition against the respondent stating that the respondent is performing public function of supplying milk in the State of Goa, mere statement in reply by the respondent that there are two other dairies operating in s Goa is not sufficient. Though normal rules of pleading are not strictly applicable to writ 1= petitions, but when the statement in the petition relates to the facts relevant for the decision on the point of the maintainability of the petition and the respondent wants to dispute such facts stated in the writ petition, it u is necessary for the respondent to make the a complete disclosure of facts necessary to controvert the assertions in the petition and bare denial or vague averments would not be sufficient. In fact, that is the import of Order 19 C.P.C. which deals with the manner in which 1 the affidavits are required to be filed. Since the respondent wanted to dispute the contention of the petitioner that the respondent performs public function and the necessary - factual data has been disclosed in the petition, if the respondent wanted to dispute the same it should have been by disclosing the - relevant facts in that regard. No facts have been disclosed in the affidavit filed by the respondent to disprove the claim of the petitioner that the respondent performs the public function of supply of milk in the State of Goa. The milk is not a mere luxury. It is a necessity for majority of the human population. It cannot be disputed that supply thereof 1 is a public function. Once it is disclosed in the petition that the respondent caters to the l need of milk in the State of Goa, which is a public function, it would prima facie disclose that writ would lie against the institution which performs such function. 9. However, at this stage, we are not inclined to go in detail on this aspect. Since prima facie, in our opinion, the respondent performs a public function that would justify interference by us in writ jurisdiction. 10. 9. However, at this stage, we are not inclined to go in detail on this aspect. Since prima facie, in our opinion, the respondent performs a public function that would justify interference by us in writ jurisdiction. 10. The Apex Court in S.S. Rana's case was dealing with a matter where the society was not constituted under any statutory provision nor had violated any mandatory provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder nor it was the case of any public function being performed by the society, neither there was pervasive control over the Society by the Government. Being so, the decision in S. S. Rana's case is of no help to the respondent to non suit the petitioner in this petition. 11. In Bhadra Shahakari Niyamita's case the Apex Court had held that the Society was purely a non-governmental organization and did not fall within the definition of the "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the petition was not maintainable. That being the specific finding in the said case, it did not involve the issue whether the Society performed public function or not. 12. As regards the availability of alternative remedy, attention was drawn to Clause 29 of the bye-laws of the respondent-society which provides that in appeal (whenever is made), against any decision taken by the Board, would lie to the General Meeting. Section 83 of the Goa Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 to which the attention was drawn speaks of settlement of disputes between the parties who are enumerated thereunder. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the appeal under the Bye Laws cannot be considered as an efficacious remedy as there are hardly one or two General Body Meetings in a year, and, therefore the petitioner cannot wait for such meeting to be held and thereafter to prefer the appeal. 13. Undoubtedly, Clause 29 entitles the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal to the General Body of the respondent. However, as the General Body Meeting is undisputedly I held once or twice a year, it cannot be said to be efficacious remedy as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner. 13. Undoubtedly, Clause 29 entitles the aggrieved party to prefer an appeal to the General Body of the respondent. However, as the General Body Meeting is undisputedly I held once or twice a year, it cannot be said to be efficacious remedy as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner. As regards section 83 is concerned, it undoubtedly refers to the subject of settlement of disputes and though on the face of it, it may appear that t the employees of the society are not included, C the expression "Officer" as defined under the said Act includes the employees of the Society. At the same time undisputedly the provision of law does not refer to the word "Officer". It speaks of office bearers. Whether this expression is different from the Officer may be a matter of dispute. Be that as it may, before dealing with this aspect, it would be necessary to refer to certain facts which ( are stated in the petition. 14. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was initially appointed as Animal Nutrition Officer with the respondent in the year 1990. In the Office Order dated 5-1-1996, he was promoted as Manager, Cattle Feed Plant w.e.r. 1-1-1996 in the pay scale I of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500. On 13-4-2007, a notice came to be issued on the basis of BOD Meeting held on 19-4-2007 whereby the petitioner was sought to be placed under suspension with effect from t pending inquiry and issuance of charge- I sheet. However, thereafter at no point of time either any charge-sheet was issued nor any I inquiry was conducted. On the contrary, in the Meeting held on 19-4-2007 the suspension of the petitioner was sought to be revoked with the following Resolution: "After the suspension of Dr. Kossambe in spite of all the efforts from the Board of Directors, there was no proof of any allegation against Dr. Kossambe till this date". 15. Pursuant to the said Resolution under letter dated 15-10-2007, the petitioner was informed that his suspension was revoked and that he should immediately join to duties. Accordingly, the petitioner joined duties on 18-10-2007. Thereafter, in the Meeting held on 29-10-2007 the respondent resolved to abolish the post of Manager, CFP and in its place the complete charge of the CFP was handed over to the Production Officer whose post is equal to the Animal Nutrition Officer's post. Accordingly, the petitioner joined duties on 18-10-2007. Thereafter, in the Meeting held on 29-10-2007 the respondent resolved to abolish the post of Manager, CFP and in its place the complete charge of the CFP was handed over to the Production Officer whose post is equal to the Animal Nutrition Officer's post. Simultaneously, the respondent also resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 30-10-2007 by way of discharge simpliciter by payment of 3 months salary in terms of the contract of services or otherwise. The same was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 30-10- 2007. 16. The main dispute before the parties relates to the consideration on the part of the respondent that the petitioner was not a regular employee of the respondent. It is the contention of the respondent that the petitioner was a contractual employee in tenns of Appointment Letter dated 10-7-1990. 17. The letter dated 10-7-1990 related to the appointment of the petitioner as Animal Nutrition Officer on the basic salary of Rs. 2000/- per month in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-60-2300-EB-75-3200-100-3500. The terms and conditions of appointment enumerated in the Appointment Letter disclose that during the period of probation the services of the petitioner could have been terminated within 24 hours as also that the respondent had reserved the right to discontinue his services during or at the end of the probation period by giving 24 hours notice. The letter also discloses that the probation period was of one year from the date the petitioner was to report to duty. Further, the Office Order dated 5-1-1996 discloses that vide Resolution dated 22-12-1995 the respondent-BOD had promoted the petitioner 1 to the post of Manager w.e.f. 1-1-1996 in the pay scale of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500. Prima facie, therefore, all these facts disclose that the petitioner is a regular employee of the respondent and not the contractual employee as is sought to be contended on be- c half of the respondent. 18. As regards the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500. Prima facie, therefore, all these facts disclose that the petitioner is a regular employee of the respondent and not the contractual employee as is sought to be contended on be- c half of the respondent. 18. As regards the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. Satyender Singh Ratore (supra) that was a matter where the employee was on contractual basis and in that connection the Apex Court had held that "when the factual scenario of the present ' case is considered in the background of legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of termination". The legal scenario which was considered by the Apex Court is clearly revealed from para 9 of the said decision. The Apex Court held that "the question whether the inquiry purportedly held provided the motive or the foundation was required to be , considered by the High Court in detail". That has not been done. The question whether termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. (Dhananjay Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna)4, 2003(3) Bom.C.R.(S.C.) 547 : 2003 DGLS (soft) 113 : 2003(2) S.C.C. 386 : A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1175 and (Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. and others, 2003 DGLS (soft) 171 : 2003(3) S.C.C. 263 : A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1789. An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate ..." . Apparently, the Apex Court was dealing with a matter in relation to a person who was either on probation or who was employed on contract basis and not a person who was confirmed on regular basis. The decision is therefore of no help. In the facts and circumstances, therefore, as far as the contention regarding efficacious alternative remedy sought to be raised on behalf of the respondent is rejected. As far as the issue pertaining as to whether to the facts and circumstances of the case the writ would lie or not on the ground the objection is sought to be raised the issue in that regard is kept open to be decided at the stage of final hearing. Prima facie, we are convinced that the writ is maintainable and therefore Rule. 19. Prima facie, we are convinced that the writ is maintainable and therefore Rule. 19. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are also inclined to grant interim relief in terms of prayer Clause (e). Order accordingly.