JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties on the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 368 days in filing the second appeal as well as on merits of the second appeal also. 2. Plaintiff-respondent was allotted a plot of land measuring 104 square yard by Gram Panchayat, Manohar-thana, in the year 1978. Required premium amount was deposited. Necessary lease-deed was also issued in favour of the plaintiff. The plot was mutated in the name of plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit for injunction against the State Government as well as Gram Panchayat with a prayer that they may be restrained from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff. The State Government remained absent and ex-parte proceedings were drawn against it on 6th July, 1993. The defendant No. 2, Gram Panchayat, filed its written-statement. 3. The trial court framed six issues. The Issue No. 1 was whether the disputed plot was allotted to the plaintiff and possession whereof was handed over to him and he is in possession of the same? Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence on the record, decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and consequently decreed the suit. Being aggrieved with the same, the Gram Panchayat preferred first appeal before the first appellate court. 4. It is relevant to mention that the State Government did not prefer any first appeal. 5. The first appellate court dismissed the first appeal filed by the Gram Panchayat vide impugned judgment and decree dated 29th October, 2002. 6. It appears that the Gram Panchayat has not preferred any second appeal separately and its name has been added as appellant No. 2 in the memo of this second appeal preferred on behalf of the State Government. 7. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is supported by an affidavit of Nathu Lal Meena working as Tehsildar, who was appointed as Officer-in-charge on behalf of the State Government. There is no affidavit of any officer of Gram Panchayat in support of the application nor there is any Vakalatnama duly signed by Sarpanch or Secretary of Gram Panchayat, which is a separate and independent statutory body from the State Government, engaging the learned counsel for the appellant as counsel on its behalf. There is no affidavit of any officer of Gram Panchayat in support of the application nor there is any Vakalatnama duly signed by Sarpanch or Secretary of Gram Panchayat, which is a separate and independent statutory body from the State Government, engaging the learned counsel for the appellant as counsel on its behalf. It appears that the State Government did not prefer any first appeal, therefore, the State Government has no right to file second appeal and, in these circumstances, name of Gram Panchayat has been added as appellant No. 2 in the memo of present second appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contended that the defendant-appellant, for the first time, came to know of passing of the impugned judgment and decree when a letter dated 20th November, 2003, written by the Court of Civil Judge, Aklera, was received in the office of the defendant No. 1. The matter was thereafter examined in the legal cell, and the District Collector, vide its letter dated 20th December, 2003, i directed the Tehsildar to immediately file an appeal in the matter. The judgment of the first appellate court shows that the counsel for Gram Panchayat was present when the appeal was dismissed on 29th October, 2002. From the contents of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it reveals that in fact this second appeal has been preferred on behalf of the State' Government and not on behalf of the Gram Panchayat, but, in view of the fact that no first appeal was preferred by the State Government and as it had no right to file second appeal, therefore, Gram Panchayat has been impleaded as appellant No. 2 in present second appeal. 9. The reasons mentioned by the appellants for condonation of delay do not constitute sufficient cause so as to condone the delay of 368 days in filing the second appeal. 10. So far as merits of the case are concerned, I find that the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent but it has been observed in the judgment that the defendant shall not dispossess the plaintiff without due process of law or that the plaintiff will not be dispossessed from the disputed plot without due process of law. So far as merits of the case are concerned, I find that the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent but it has been observed in the judgment that the defendant shall not dispossess the plaintiff without due process of law or that the plaintiff will not be dispossessed from the disputed plot without due process of law. The judgment and decree passed by both the courts below appear to be justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case which do not call for any interference of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure , moreover there is concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below and no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. 11. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed and consequent thereupon the second appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation as well as on merits.Appeal dismissed. *******