H. N. DEVANI, J. ( 1 ) BY this appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appellant challenges the judgement and order dated 25th July, 2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 1158 of 2008, whereby the petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed. ( 2 ) THE facts stated briefly are that land bearing Block No. 350, admeasuring Acre 1-18 Gunthas of village Kathodara, Taluka Kamrej, District Surat was held by one Kalyanbhai Makanbhai Kantharia (hereinafter referred to as the landholder) as a new tenure land. The landholder wanted to sell the said land; hence, on 25. 4. 1985 he made an application to the Deputy Collector, Olpad Division, Surat for changing the tenure of the land from new tenure to old tenure. By an order dated 10. 3. 86 the said application was rejected. The landholder made an application for review of the order dated 10. 3. 86 before the Deputy Collector. By an order dated 21. 4. 1988, the Deputy Collector permitted change of tenure for the non-agricultural use of constructing a transport godown, subject to certain conditions on depositing an amount of Rs. 21,256/- by way of premium. It may be pertinent to note that one of the conditions was that the landholder should obtain permission from the competent authority under section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 within a period of three months from the date of the order. Hence it is apparent that by the said order only change of tenure was permitted, but non-agricultural permission had not been granted. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, by a will dated 16. 4. 89 the said land was bequeathed in favour of the appellant. The landholder expired on 27. 5. 1990 whereupon the appellant became the owner of the said land and corresponding mutation entry was made in the Village Form No. 6 on 11. 3. 1992. It is the say of the appellant that after following the requisite formalities, the appellant constructed a godown on the said land. ( 4 ) AS the aforesaid order passed by the Deputy Collector was beyond his powers, the Collector, Surat, took the same in suo motu revision. Vide order dated 23. 5. 3. 1992. It is the say of the appellant that after following the requisite formalities, the appellant constructed a godown on the said land. ( 4 ) AS the aforesaid order passed by the Deputy Collector was beyond his powers, the Collector, Surat, took the same in suo motu revision. Vide order dated 23. 5. 1996, the Collector, Surat quashed and set aside the order dated 24th April, 1988 passed by the Deputy Collector and directed that the restrictions of new and impartible tenure be again made applicable to the said land. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the landholder preferred a revision application before the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat, who vide order dated 5th April, 1997 partly allowed the revision application, holding that the power to permit change of new tenure land for non-agricultural purposes was vested in the State Government and accordingly quashed the order of the Collector and directed the Collector to prepare a fresh detailed proposal for regularization of the breach and forward the same to the State Government and accordingly remanded the case to the Collector to decide in accordance with the decision that may be given by the Government. Pursuant to the said order, the Collector submitted a proposal to the State Government. Vide communication dated 27th November, 2003 the State Government informed the Collector that as the landholder was not ready to pay premium as determined by the State Government, the proposal for regularization of non-agricultural use without permission is rejected and further directed the Collector to take action in accordance with law in respect of breach of conditions pursuant to which the Collector called upon the appellant to show cause notice as to why the said land should not be forfeited to the Government for putting up construction for non-agricultural use over new tenure land without prior permission of the competent authority. ( 5 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, vide order dated 4-9. 11. 2003 the Collector, quashed the order dated 21. 4. 88 passed by the Deputy Collector, Olpad Prant, Surat and held that there was a breach of the provisions of section 68 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, as well as provisions of the Government Resolution dated 16. 3. 82 and directed that the said land be vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. 4. 88 passed by the Deputy Collector, Olpad Prant, Surat and held that there was a breach of the provisions of section 68 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, as well as provisions of the Government Resolution dated 16. 3. 82 and directed that the said land be vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The appellant carried the aforesaid order in revision before the State Government under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Vide order dated 17. 1. 2004 the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department rejected the revision application. However, it was observed that if the appellant is willing to pay premium at the prevailing market rate he could make a fresh application before the Collector. Pursuant to the aforesaid order the appellant made an application for change of tenure upon payment of premium on 23. 2. 2004. By an order dated 15. 3. 2005, the Collector determined the market value at Rs. 500/- per sq. mt. and accordingly called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 20,17,894/- towards premium. Pursuant to the aforesaid order the appellant deposited the said amount, and consequently the Collector by an order dated 15. 7. 2005 regularised the breach and permitted change of tenure from new tenure to old tenure. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the appellant challenged the aforesaid orders dated 15. 3. 2005 and 15. 7. 2005 before the Secretary (Appeals) on the ground that the Collector ought to have fixed the premium on the basis of the market value as on 1988 when the original application was made and to hold that the amount of premium determined by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 21. 4. 1988 was just and proper. By an order dated 1st September, 2007 the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department rejected the Revision Application and confirmed both the aforesaid orders passed by the Collector. Being aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court by way of the aforesaid writ petition challenging the order dated 1st September, 2007 confirming the aforesaid orders of the Collector, Surat. Later on, by way of an amendment, the appellant also challenged the order dated 17. 1. 2004/12. 2. 2004 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. ( 7 ) BY the impugned judgement and order dated 25th July, 2008 the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition, holding thus: "having heard learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Mihir Thakor with Mr. Later on, by way of an amendment, the appellant also challenged the order dated 17. 1. 2004/12. 2. 2004 passed by the Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department. ( 7 ) BY the impugned judgement and order dated 25th July, 2008 the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition, holding thus: "having heard learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Mihir Thakor with Mr. Devang Shah for the petitioner and learned AGP Mr. J. K. Shah for the State, I find that the Revenue Secretary on 17. 01. 2004 put final lid on the challenge of the petitioner so far as the action of the revenue authorities in recalling the order of the Deputy Collector's granting conversion of land in the year 1988. As already noted, this process went through number of stages including the remand and ultimately, got culminated into the Revenue Secretary's order dated 17. 01. 2004. It perhaps was at that time possible for the petitioner to challenge the same. The Revenue Secretary in his order noted that at one stage, Government in fact contemplated regularisation of unauthorised construction upon collection of premium. The petitioner was, however, not willing to pay premium. Due to which, the proposal failed. Be that may it may. While finally rejecting the revision application of the petitioner and upholding that the Deputy Collector was not authorised to grant conversion of land, the Revenue Secretary provided that despite the order if the petitioner is willing to pay premium at the current market price, it would be open to him to approach the Collector with such application. As already stated, it was open for the petitioner to challenge the entire order in question and its legality thereof. The petitioner, however, pursuant to the said order dated 17. 01. 2004 promptly applied to Collector on 23. 02. 2004 for regularisation of the construction and use of land. He, in fact, indicated in no uncertain terms that the application is being made pursuant to the above mentioned order of the Secretary. He also indicated willingness to pay premium at the current market price. The petitioner had thus acquiesced in the order passed by the Revenue Secretary. Consequently, his application was acted upon, processed and allowed. The Collector fixed the premium to be paid at the prevailing market rate. He also indicated willingness to pay premium at the current market price. The petitioner had thus acquiesced in the order passed by the Revenue Secretary. Consequently, his application was acted upon, processed and allowed. The Collector fixed the premium to be paid at the prevailing market rate. Therefore, at this stage, it would not be possible for the petitioner to resile from his stand before the Collector that he accepted the order of the Secretary and undertook to pay premium at the prevailing market price. His belated challenge to the order of Secretary in this factual background, cannot be examined. Had the petitioner, at the outset, not accepted the order of the Secretary and challenged the same in accordance with law, the situation would have been different. In the present case, however, he not only accepted the order, also got benefit thereunder by seeking regularisation of the unauthorised construction and change of use of the land. So far as the quantification of the premium is concerned, the Collector as well as the Secretary have taken into account various factual aspects and no serious arguments were made before me to question such quantification at the prevailing market rate. The petitioner has also paid full premium way back in the year 2005. Nearly three years thereafter, he seeks to challenge the authority of the Government to collect the premium. His petition cannot be entertained. The same is dismissed. " ( 8 ) BEFORE this Court, the only submission advanced on behalf of the appellant is that in view of the fact that the appellant had paid the amount of premium determined by the Government and the Collector only under a bonafide mistake of law and under an apprehension that if the amount of premium would not be paid by him as directed by the Collector, it would amount to disobedience of the order of the Government and the construction put up by him would be demolished by the authorities below, he is entitled to refund of such amount. It is urged that the payment made by the appellant under bonafide mistake and apprehension, would not amount to acquiescence on the part of the appellant. It is urged that the payment made by the appellant under bonafide mistake and apprehension, would not amount to acquiescence on the part of the appellant. This submission is based on the contention that once development permission had been granted by the Surat Urban Development Authority, in view of the provisions of section 117 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (TP Act), it was not necessary to obtain any permission under any other law. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon the decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 28th September, 1995 in the case of Karimbhai Kalubhai Belim and Others v. State of Gujarat and another, 1996 (1) GLH 200 wherein it has been held that once development permission is granted under section 29 (1) of the TP Act, section 117 thereof comes into operation, as well as the subsequent decision dated 20th March, 1996 in Motiben Somaji and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1996 (3) GCD 442 reiterating the view taken in the case of Karimbhai Kalubhai Belim. It obliterates requirement of any other permission under any other law. It was, accordingly held that even permission under section 65 of the Code would not be necessary in respect of a land if the development permission under section 29 of the Act is obtained. The learned Advocate for the appellant, accordingly contended that it was not necessary for the appellant to obtain any permission from the State Government, hence the appellant was entitled to refund of the amount of premium paid under mistake of law. Reference is made to the provisions of section 72 of the Contract Act to submit that any money paid under a mistake is required to be refunded. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Kishore and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 1 for the proposition that money paid under mistake of law is refundable under section 72 of the Contract Act. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Kishore and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 1 for the proposition that money paid under mistake of law is refundable under section 72 of the Contract Act. ( 9 ) AT the outset it may be pertinent to note that clause (a) of section 117 of the TP Act which provided that when permission for development in respect of any land has been obtained under the TP Act, such development shall not be deemed to be unlawfully undertaken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under such other law for such development has not been obtained, in the context of which the decision in the case of Karimbhai K. Belim was rendered has been deleted by Guj Act No. 2 of 1999. Even otherwise, on a plain reading of section 117 of the TP Act, it is apparent that the permission envisaged in the said provision is development permission. This is where there is a basic fallacy in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants, namely that premium was paid for obtaining permission for developing the lands in question. From the facts noted hereinabove, it is apparent that the appellant has paid premium for regularization of breach of conditions of tenure and not towards development permission as envisaged under the provisions of the TP Act. As is apparent from the facts noted hereinabove, the appellant had made an application for change of tenure as he wanted to sell the lands in question. By the order dated 21st April, 1988 the Deputy Collector had permitted change of tenure for the non-agricultural use of constructing a transport godown upon payment of premium. Consequently, it was only the tenure of the land that was changed from new tenure to old tenure. By the very same order the appellant was still required to obtain non-agricultural permission from the competent authority under the provisions of section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. ( 10 ) AS the appellant has tried to mix up two issues namely change of tenure and obtaining development permission as envisaged under the TP Act, it would be pertinent to examine the concept of new tenure land. ( 10 ) AS the appellant has tried to mix up two issues namely change of tenure and obtaining development permission as envisaged under the TP Act, it would be pertinent to examine the concept of new tenure land. The issue of tenure of land under the Bombay Land Revenue Code arises from the nature of occupancy. Lands which have accrued to the occupant, without any concession from the State, or have devolved on an occupant not as a consequence of operation of various Land Reform Legislations, are treated as Old Tenure lands. Contrarily, those lands which have been assigned to an occupant by waiving a portion of the State's claim, either in the form of a remission or waiver of land revenue or as a consequence of operation of any land reform legislation, devolve upon the occupant as "new Tenure" lands i. e. , tenure that subsumes some interest of the State. Such New Tenure lands are subject to certain restrictions as to their use. It is the policy of the State that should any occupant of such a land desire to put it to any alternate use, then he is duty bound to approach the Collector of the District who would grant such permission after the occupant pays a premium as fixed from time to time. The premium that is due to the Government is charged in lieu of waiving the State's interest in a particular new tenure land and permitting the occupant to put it to non-restricted use i. e. old tenure. Such restrictions are also placed to ensure that lands acquired under some beneficial legislation or under some welfare scheme are not transferred for profit, thereby defeating the very purpose of the grant. Thus the removal of restrictions attached to the land, has nothing to do with development permission as envisaged under the provisions of the Town Planning Act. ( 11 ) ADVERTING to the facts of the present case, the record of the case indicates that the lands in question had devolved upon the original landowner under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act as new tenure lands. As is apparent from the facts noted above, even the order dated 21. 4. ( 11 ) ADVERTING to the facts of the present case, the record of the case indicates that the lands in question had devolved upon the original landowner under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act as new tenure lands. As is apparent from the facts noted above, even the order dated 21. 4. 1988 passed by the Deputy Collector, whereby the tenure of the land was changed from new tenure to old tenure laid down a condition that the landholder should obtain permission from the competent authority under section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In the present case, the appellant is trying to mix up two issues, as regards obtaining non-agricultural permission under the provisions of the Code which could be said to be connected with development permission and change of tenure of the lands in question which has nothing to do with development permission as envisaged under the provisions of the TP Act. In the circumstances, the reliance placed upon the decisions of this court in the case of Karimbhai Kalubhai Belim (supra) and in the case of Motiben Somaji (supra) is misconceived, and based upon a misconception of law. In the aforesaid premises, the appellant was liable to pay premium in connection with the change of tenure of the lands in question, hence, the question of payment of premium under mistake of law does not arise at all. The appellant is, therefore, not entitled to refund of the amount paid by way of premium as determined by the Collector vide order dated 15. 3. 2005 and confirmed by the order of the State Government dated 1st September, 2007. In the circumstances, no case is made out so as to warrant any intervention by this Court. ( 12 ) WHILE we have held that the decisions of learned Single Judges of this Court in Karimbhai Kalubhai Belim's case (supra) and in Motiben Samaji's case (supra) are not applicable to the case at hand, we may not be treated to have expressed any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the said decisions. ( 13 ) IN view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.