Judgment :- 1. The above Criminal Original Petition has been filed by the petitioner, who is the first accused in Cr.No.124 of 2008 on the file of the first respondent, seeking to quash the F.I.R. 2. The allegations in the F.I.R. are to the following effect:- a. Totally there are three accused in the case. A1 is the father of A2 and A3 is the wife of A2. The defacto complainant had business transactions through one Sanjay Talati with A1 to A3. It is further alleged that at the behest of A1, when the defacto complainant contacted A2 and A3, they told that they would keep a constant watch on the stock market and place the shares at the right time and to the right person in order to fetch the best prices for the shares. The defacto complainant, relying upon the representations of the accused, transferred three lakhs shares to the demat account of A2 with a specific instruction that the shares should be sold for a price between Rs.250/- and Rs.275/-. It is further alleged that the defacto complainant transferred a sum of Rs.5.87 crores to the account of A2. The grievance of the defacto complainant is that the the accused are said to have sold the shares without obtaining the consent from him on various dates at different prices in contravention of the express understanding reached between the defacto complainant and the accused and thereby, the accused caused loss to the tune of Rs.18.00 crores. It is pertinent to note that as far as A1 is concerned, he is said to have played a role of introducing A2 and A3 by stating that they are doing the business of shares very well and hence, the defacto complainant had the business of shares with A2 and A3. In the F.I.R. reference is made to various documents and records, namely, particulars of shares and cheques and other connected documents relating to the transaction between the defacto complainant and the accused. 2a. Heard both. 3. On the aforesaid allegations, a case in Cr.No.124 of 2008 for the alleged offences under Sections 406, 418 r/w 34 I.P.C. had been registered by the first respondent. 4. Mr. 2a. Heard both. 3. On the aforesaid allegations, a case in Cr.No.124 of 2008 for the alleged offences under Sections 406, 418 r/w 34 I.P.C. had been registered by the first respondent. 4. Mr. P.R. Raman, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent has no territorial jurisdiction to take the complaint on file since as per the complaint itself no offence was committed in Chennai by the petitioner or any other accused. The so-called assurances given by the petitioner are also in Mumbai, the accounts of other accused credited with money and shares are also in Mumbai, the shares were sold in Mumbai and the alleged threat given by the petitioner to the complainant is also implied to be over phone and hence, the first respondent ought not to have registered the complaint. 5. The learned counsel further submitted that the defacto complainant has suppressed the fact of approaching the Economic Offences Wing, Crawford Market, Mumbai earlier on 212. 2007 with an identical complaint and the said police had already started the investigation and hence, the F.I.R. registered by the first respondent is a clear abuse of process of law. The learned counsel further submitted that there cannot be two parallel investigation into the same set of facts. 6. The learned counsel further submitted that the complaint is absurd and improbable and other than the allegations that the petitioner introduced his son and daughter-in-law and the alleged assurance to Sanjay Talati, no specific allegation has been made against the petitioner in the complaint. The learned counsel further submitted that the allegations contained in the complaint do not disclose the ingredients of the offences, for which the case has been registered. The learned counsel further submitted that there is no allegation of an act of inducement on the part of the accused and an intention to cheat the complainant from the very inception. 7. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in 2004 (8) SCC 100 (Y.ABRAHAM AJITH AND OTHERS V. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CHENNAI AND ANOTHER), wherein, in paragraphs 12 and 19, it is laid down as under:- "12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 19. When the aforesaid legal principles are applied, to the factual scenario disclosed by the complainant in the complaint petition, the inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and therefore, the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The proceedings are quashed. The complaint be returned to Respondent 2 who, if she so chooses, may file the same in the appropriate court to be dealt with in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed." 8. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2005) 3 SCC 507 (RAMESH AND OTHERS V. STATE OF T.N.). In the said decision after referring to the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 and the facts of the case, the Apex Court has observed that the acts which were alleged to have constituted the offences under Sections 498-A, 406 I.P.C., and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, were committed mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai but no acts constituting the alleged offences were committed at Trichy and the informant wife also moved a transfer petition seeking transfer of the petition filed by the husband for dissolution of the marriage to the Family Court at Chennai and having regard to the relevant aspects viz. background and history of the case, the matrimonial case was directed to be transferred to Chennai. 9. The learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 7 SCC 373 (VIR PRAKASH SHARMA V. ANIT KUMAR AGARWAL AND ANOTHER), wherein, in paragraph 16, it is laid down as under:- "16. Furthermore, admittedly, their residences are in different districts. Whereas the appellant is a resident of the district of Ajamgarh, the respondent is a resident of the district of Rampur. Cheques were admittedly issued by the appellant at his place. There is nothing on record to show that any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. Whereas the appellant is a resident of the district of Ajamgarh, the respondent is a resident of the district of Rampur. Cheques were admittedly issued by the appellant at his place. There is nothing on record to show that any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. Even if such statements had been made, the same admittedly have been made only at the place where the appellant resides. The learned Magistrate, therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue the summons. (See Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd.). 10. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 1 SCC 262 (MANISH RATAN AND OTHERS V. STATE OF M.P. AND ANOTHER). In the said decision after referring to the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 and other cases and after making the following observation in paragraph 7, which reads as under:- "7. It is not denied or disputed that no part of cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Datia court. Section 177 of the Code ordains that every offence shall be ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.", the Honble Apex Court by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India directed the transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. 11. The learned counsel by referring to Section 181(4) Cr.P.C, which reads as follows:- "181. Place of trial in case of certain offences:-(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any pat of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.", submitted that since the alleged offence of criminal breach of trust has not been committed or any of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person within the territorial limits of the first respondent, the first respondent has no jurisdiction to register the case. 12. 12. In support of his contention, the learned counsel referred to the judgments of various High Courts. Since, for reasons to be recorded hereunder, this Court is taking a different view based on the allegations in the F.I.R., all those decisions are not being referred to. 13. The learned counsel further submitted that a reading of the complaint does not reveal that there was any inducement on the part of the petitioner to deliver the property by the defacto complainant and hence, the offence of cheating is not made out. 14. Countering the said submissions, the learned counsel for the defacto complainant/second respondent submitted that since the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands as per the law laid down in 1996 Cri.L.J. 2378 and 1985 Cri.L.J.1389, the above Crl.O.P. is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel submitted that this Court while granting anticipatory bail imposed certain conditions but the petitioner had not complied with the conditions and absconded and as such the petitioner, who is absconding, is not entitled to seek the discretionary relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 15. The learned counsel for the second respondent brought to the notice of this Court the following allegations in the F.I.R. viz.,:- "Mr. Santkumar Jhunjhunwala also assured that he would constantly monitor the manner in which my shares were dealt with by Mr. Sudhir Jhunjhunwala and Mrs. Madhu Jhunjhunwala and would ensure that my money was returned in 6-7 months." "Relying upon the representations of Mr. Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Mr. Santkumar Jhunjhunwala I transferred Rs.3 lakh shares." "Further I transferred the shares believing the representations of Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Santkumar Jhunjhunwala." "Mr. Sudhir Jhunjhunwala further stated that as the transaction has to be completed within a few minutes he always preferred that his clients transfer the shares to his demat account so that he had the freedom and flexibility to deal with them immediately." "...he further requested to lend him about Rs.6 crores as a hand loan. He stated that he would either repay the same within 6 months or invest it in appropriate shares so that I get a return in 6-7 months." "I further learnt that the shares have been sold without my consent between me and Mr.Sudhir Jhunjhunwala." "Relying upon the representations of Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Mr. He stated that he would either repay the same within 6 months or invest it in appropriate shares so that I get a return in 6-7 months." "I further learnt that the shares have been sold without my consent between me and Mr.Sudhir Jhunjhunwala." "Relying upon the representations of Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Mr. Santkumar Jhunjhunwala I transferred Rs.3 lakh shares." "Further I transferred a sum of Rs.5.87 crores." "Further I transferred the shares believing the representations of Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Santkumar Jhunjhunwala." "I further learnt that the shares have been sold without my consent between me and Mr. Sudhir Jhunjhunwala." "They have sold shares entrusted to them contrary to my instructions and have also misappropriated the proceeds, thereby causing loss of atleast 18.00 crores to me. They have also misappropriated the money that I had lent to them "When I demanded return of money I have been threatened with dire consequences." 15a. By referring to the aforesaid allegations the learned counsel submitted that the ingredients of the offence of cheating have been made out. Since, according to the learned counsel, the aforesaid allegations do reveal that there was deception and inducement on the part of the petitioner and there was fraudulent and dishonest intention and but for the same, the defacto complainant would not have delivered any property or consented for the accused to retain any property and because of the deception and fraud played upon by the accused, financial loss has been caused to the second respondent and as such, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ingredients of the offence under Section 420 I.P.C. is not made out, cannot be accepted. The learned counsel further submitted that there are allegations to the effect that three lakhs shares were transferred in favour of Mr.Sudhir Jhunjhunwala and Mrs.Madu Jhunjhunwala and the shares were sold by them and the proceeds were misappropriated. There is a specific allegation, namely, "they have sold the shares entrusted to them contrary to the instructions of the second respondent and also misappropriated the proceeds". The said allegations do reveal that there was dishonest conversion or disposal of the shares by the accused to their own use contrary to the contract and therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. are made out. The said allegations do reveal that there was dishonest conversion or disposal of the shares by the accused to their own use contrary to the contract and therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. are made out. The learned counsel further submitted that there are also allegations as to the common intention on the part of the accused to attract Section 34 I.P.C. The learned counsel submitted that there are allegations to the effect that the accused induced and also threatened him and these allegations have to be investigated and at the investigation stage, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ought not to be entertained. 16. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1992 SC1930 (Para 4); (2004) 6 SCC 522 ; AIR 2000 SC 1869 ; AIR 1994 SC 1256 (Para 8). 17. The learned counsel further submitted that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no territorial jurisdiction for the first respondent to register the case cannot be countenanced in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1999 SC 3596 (Paras 8, 9 and 10), wherein it has been held that F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The learned counsel further submitted that there are materials to show that the second respondent spoke from Chennai to the petitioner, who was at Mumbai, over phone and therefore, inducement and deceit took place at Chennai, and hence, prima facie, the first respondent has jurisdiction to register the case as laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1957 SC 857 (Paras 22 and 23). The learned counsel further submitted that as the shares were transferred from Chennai through telecommunication, as per Section 182 Cr.P.C., the first respondent has jurisdiction to register the case and investigate the same as laid down in the decision reported in 1982 Cri.L.J. 1482(Paras 16, 17 and 18). The learned counsel further submitted that the decision reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case as that was pertaining to a private complaint filed before the court. 18. The learned counsel further submitted that the decision reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case as that was pertaining to a private complaint filed before the court. 18. As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the present F.I.R. is based on the second complaint on the same set of facts, the learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the said contention has not been substantiated by producing the materials and submitted that no F.I.R. has been registered by the Mumbai Police and as such this is the only case registered on the basis of the complaint of the second respondent and as such it cannot be said that the present complaint is the second complaint. 19. As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the allegations contained in the complaint are false, the learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the same cannot be gone into at this stage. 20. The learned counsel further submitted that in the light of the following allegations in the complaint, namely, "Mr.Sankkumar Jhunjhunwala also assured that he would constantly monitor the manner in which my shares were dealt with by Sudhir and Madu and will ensure that my money was returned in 6-7 months." ....... "relying upon the representations of Mr.Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Mr.Santkumar Jhunjhunwala I transferred 3 lakhs shares"..... " I transferred shares believing the representations of Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Santkumar Jhunjhunwala.", the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the F.I.R. does not disclose any inducement on the part of the petitioner cannot be countenanced. 21. Basing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2003) 6 SCC 175 (SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI AND OTHRS V. TAPAN KUMAR SINGH), the learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that F.I.R. need not disclose all the facts and details and the second respondent in his statement has clearly said that he spoke to the petitioner over phone and the petitioner made representations, which induced the second respondent to transfer his shares and money in the name of the petitioners son and daughter-in-law. 22. I have carefully considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 23. 22. I have carefully considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 23. At the outset, it has to be pointed out that a perusal of the allegations contained in the F.I.R., as pointed out by the learned counsel for the second respondent and which has been extracted above, do constitute the ingredients of the offences under Sections 406, 418 r/w 34 I.P.C. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer to Section 418 I.P.C. "418. Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect- Whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to a person whose interest in the transaction to which the cheating relates, he was bound, either by law, or by a legal contract, to protect, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." 24. In this case, there is allegation to the effect that relying upon the representations of Mr. Sudhir Jhunjhunwala, Mrs. Madhu Jhunjhunwala and Mr. Santkumar Jhunjhunwala, the second respondent transferred the three lakhs shares to the demat account of Mr.Sudhir Jhunjhunwala in the manner stated in the complaint with the specific direction that they should be sold for a price between Rs.250/- and Rs.275/- and further it is alleged that they would ensure that the same are sold on obtaining the consent of the second respondent and the money realised by such sale would be remitted to him and further he transferred the money only because of the assurances of the accused. But contrary to the representations and contrary to the instructions, the shares have been sold and the proceeds of the same have been misappropriated and the cash paid by the second respondent have also been misappropriated. The sum and substance of the complaint is that but for the inducement and representations made by the accused, the second respondent would not have parted with such valuable shares and the money and it is not the case of the accused that the proceeds of the sale of the shares were returned to the second respondent and as such, in the considered view of this court, the offence under Section 406 I.P.C. is made out. Similarly, the offence under Section 418 I.P.C. is also made out since the accused, who were bound by the contract to protect the interest in the share transaction, cheated with the knowledge that they are likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to the second respondent had disposed of the shares without the consent of the second respondent for an amount lesser than the amount agreed to be sold and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary cannot be countenanced. 25. Since the offence under Section 418 I.P.C., has been found to have been made out and the representations made by the accused from Mumbai over phone has been received by the second respondent at Chennai, the inducement has taken place at Chennai and in pursuance of such inducement the shares have also been transferred from Chennai through demat account and further the reading of the allegations would show that the proceeds of the share transaction should have been returned or accounted for by the accused persons. The accused, who are entrusted with the shares/property of the second respondent had the dominion over the property and have been alleged to have transferred the shares contrary to the instructions and without the consent of the second respondent and it is further alleged that they have not returned the sale proceeds of such sale of shares and normally, the accused are placed in the position of debtors and it is the bounden duty of the debtors to find their creditors, namely, the second respondent, who is stationed at Chennai and return the proceeds of the share transactions and as such, the accused would have to return the sale proceeds of the shares to the second respondent only at Chennai and as such as provided under Section 181(4) Cr.P.C., the first respondent at chennai has got territorial jurisdiction to register the complaint. Since, even otherwise, the offence under Section 420 I.P.C. has been committed at Chennai, the first respondent would have jurisdiction to register the complaint and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. 26. Since, even otherwise, the offence under Section 420 I.P.C. has been committed at Chennai, the first respondent would have jurisdiction to register the complaint and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. 26. In the light of the aforesaid findings of this Court, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 is not applicable to the facts of the case and further as laid down in AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 3596 (SATVINDER KAUR V. STATE (GOVT. OF N.C.T. OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER), the Station House Officer has statutory authority under Section 156 Cr.P.C. to investigate any cognizable case for which an F.I.R. is lodged and at the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the Investigating Officer has no territorial jurisdiction and after investigation is over, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 Cr.P.C. and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. 27. In the very same decision, the Apex Court has further laid down that if an offence is disclosed the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the Court does not normally stop the investigation. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced, whereas, the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the second respondent merits acceptance. 29. Further, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent since the petitioner, admittedly, was absconding and he has approached this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and also the said fact has not been disclosed in the petition, it has to be held that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and the remedy under Section 482 Cr.P.C., being discretionary the same cannot be availed of by such a person. 30. In the decision reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 (S.P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU (DEAD) BY LRS. V. JAGANNATH (DEAD) BY LRS. 30. In the decision reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 (S.P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU (DEAD) BY LRS. V. JAGANNATH (DEAD) BY LRS. AND OTHERS), the Apex Court has held that the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties and one who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. 31. In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, the above Crl.O.P. is liable to be dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, the above Crl.O.P. fails and the same is dismissed. However, it is made clear that nothing said in this judgment should be construed as an expression of opinion on the merit of the case. It is for the investigating officer to collect all necessary evidence and take such steps as may be justified, having regard to the evidence collected by it. This Court should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the report on the basis of which the investigation was undertaken. Connected M.P. is also dismissed.