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2008 DIGILAW 45 (GAU)

Alekh Tossa v. State of Assam

2008-01-22

H.BARUAH

body2008
JUDGMENT H. Barua, J. 1. Appellant Sri Alekh Tossa was tried under Section 376 IPC by the learned Sessions Judge (Adhoc) FTC, Biswanath Charia and was convicted and sentenced to under go seven years I with fine of Rs. 5000/- in default of payment of fine simple imprisonment for three months. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of conviction so rendered by the learned trial Court, this present appeal has been filed challenging its legality and correctness. 3. Heard Mr. N. Mahammad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional P. P. for the State of Assam. 4. The briefcase for the prosecution is summarized as under: PW 1 the prosecutrix was in need of a quarter, who is a tea garden labour of Monabari Tea Estate. Appellant Alekh Tossa was at the relevant point of time the President of Mazdoor Sangha of the said tea estate. PW 1 approached this appellant, he being the president of the said Mazdoor Sangha for allotment of a quarter to her. On her approach, he assured that she would be provided with a quarter and accordingly asked her to come to his residence for the purpose of performing some formalities in this context of allotment of the quarter. On the relevant date she had been to the house of the appellant. Appellant had taken her unto to a Club House with a pretext that some document shall have to be executed in the said Club House. At this stage, it would be proper to say that victim PW 1 went to Club House with her minor son. Both went and reached the Club House. There was a T.V. in the Club House itself. The appellant opened the T.V. and engaged the minor boy in attending the programme that was going on at that time. Appellant thereafter took the prosecutrix to a different room where the appellant after gagging had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. The matter was reported to PW-6, who was the Secretary of a Woman Organization under name and style "Matri Sangha". Effort was made to make an amicable settlement by bringing the matter into the notice of the several organizations. But no fruitful result surfaced. The prosecutrix (PW1) finding no other alternative, approached PW 6, being the Secretary of the Woman Organization. PW 6 lodged an FIR (Ext. Effort was made to make an amicable settlement by bringing the matter into the notice of the several organizations. But no fruitful result surfaced. The prosecutrix (PW1) finding no other alternative, approached PW 6, being the Secretary of the Woman Organization. PW 6 lodged an FIR (Ext. 1) narrating the incident that occurred on the fateful day. The occurrence occurred at about 10.00 A.M. In the said Club House a school run from 4.30 P.M. to 7.30 P.M. Admittedly, at the time of occurrence there was no school going on at that time. The case was registered and the investigation commenced. Charge sheet laid under Section 376 IPC. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, having found materials, framed charge under Section 376 IPC against the appellant. Trial commenced. Prosecution examined some of the witnesses, whose names find place in the charge sheet including the prosecutrix and the informant. Doctor was of course not examined by the prosecution. The reason is best known to the prosecution. Defence also examined 5 witnesses. Court, examined 3 witnesses as CWs. At the conclusion of the trial found the appellant guilty under Section 376 IPC for committing rape on PW 1 on the relevant date. 5. Having scrutinized the facts and circumstances appearing in the case and the evidence on record, both oral and documentary we have come across that the witnesses so far examined by the prosecution, the evidence of PW 1 and PW 6 play a pivotal role in the case of the prosecution that projected. Learned Counsel for the appellant during the course of his argument also has submitted that the evidence of the other witnesses are not very much vital for proof of charge under Section 376 IPC. According to him the entire case of the prosecution revolves around on the evidence of PW 1 & PW 6. 6. Therefore, we are to see and scrutinize whether the conviction under Section 376 IPC can be had on the basis of the evidence of P.W. 1 in combination of the evidence of P.W. 6. Mr. N. Mahammad, learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the Judgment and order of conviction so rendered by the Trial Court on the following grounds: i) Delay in filing the FIR is not properly explained by the prosecution. ii) The Doctor who examined P.W. 1, the prosecutrix has been withheld by the prosecution. iii) The FIR (Ext. Mr. N. Mahammad, learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the Judgment and order of conviction so rendered by the Trial Court on the following grounds: i) Delay in filing the FIR is not properly explained by the prosecution. ii) The Doctor who examined P.W. 1, the prosecutrix has been withheld by the prosecution. iii) The FIR (Ext. 1) is hit by Section 162 of the Cr.PC. 7. Admittedly, FIR was lodged after 10 days of the occurrence. It is argued by Sri N. Mahammad that no explanation is offered in the FIR regarding delay in its lodgment. The evidence on record in respect of delay in filing the FIR, according the Mr. N. Mahammad is not sufficient to arrest the situation or in other words to dispel concoction or embellishment etc. It is argued by him that the delay in filing the FIR gives ample opportunity to the informant and others to introduce embellishment, concoction etc. When delay is not explained properly, there is every scope to ponder over that the case of the prosecution is embellished, concocted and manufactured and the same is lodged to put the offender in harassment due to some reason or the other probably due to some enmity. Mr. Munir learned P. P. controverting the submission so advanced by Sri N. Mahammad has submitted that delay cannot take away the case of the prosecution in view of the explanation so offered by P. W. 1 and P.W. 6. 8. In this context of the submission so advanced by the either party, we have perused the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 6 carefully wherefrom it has become evident that plausible explanation has been offered by the witnesses. It is found from the evidence that the matter so placed for consideration before the Organizations warranted no fruitful result which prompted P.W. 6 to seek redressal from the Investigating Agency. After careful scrutiny of the evidence of both the witnesses, this Court does not find any laches, loopholes on the part of the prosecution in explaining the cause of delay in the lodgment of the FIR. Cause of delay in lodgment of the FIR may not find place in the FIR itself. When the delay is explained properly by the informant the prosecution case cannot get a jolt that the prosecution case is tainted with concoction and embellishment. Cause of delay in lodgment of the FIR may not find place in the FIR itself. When the delay is explained properly by the informant the prosecution case cannot get a jolt that the prosecution case is tainted with concoction and embellishment. After due consideration of the evidence on record, we do not find any substance or force in the submission of Sri N. Mahammad, learned Counsel for the appellant. 9. Doctor was not examined by the prosecution, the reason is best known to the prosecution itself but question is whether absentia of the evidence of the Doctor, conviction under Section 376 can be sustained. Prudence in Criminal case is to obtain corroboration from amongst the witnesses to warrant of conviction. In the present case we have found that prosecutrix was examined by the Doctor and it is in her evidence on record that the appellant not only had committed rape on her but also in the process he bite on her cheek. 10. In that view of the matter, it would have been wise on the part of the prosecution to bring the said Doctor unto the Witness Box in order to have a finding by the Court that it was the appellant and the appellant alone who committed rape on the prosecutrix (P W 1). But that shelter was not taken by the prosecution and left the matter over to the Court to assert reasonableness on the part of the prosecution while projecting the evidence of P.W. 1 and accepting the same. However, the medical examination report prepared by the Doctor concerned marked and proved as Ext. 3, speaks for that doctor did not find any sign of sexual intercourse or mark(s) of violence either in the private part or on the body of the prosecutrix. Prosecutrix appeared before the Investigating Agency on the day of lodgment of the FIR. However, the victim who produced before the doctor after a considerable lapse of time. It was perhaps not possible to discover any sign or symptoms of rape. When a married women is raped unless some signs or injuries are discovered, it is not possible on the part of the doctor to definitely opine that she has been raped. PW 1 was produced before the doctor after 10 days of the occurrence, it is natural on the part of the doctor not to record any finding of rape. 11. PW 1 was produced before the doctor after 10 days of the occurrence, it is natural on the part of the doctor not to record any finding of rape. 11. The argument put forward by the appellant's counsel that non examination of the doctor vitiates the entire trial can not be accepted. In the case between the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dayal Sahu reported in 2005 CriLJ 4375 their lordships of the Supreme Court held that under a charge 376 IPC non-examination of the Doctor is not fatal to the prosecution. If the statement of the victim/prosecutrix inspire confidence in the mind of the Court. In para 14 and 15 of the Judgment their lordships held as under: 14. A plethora decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law bit a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor's report would not be fatal to the prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspite confidence. It is also noticed that the court while acquitting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere technicalities. 15. Reverting back to the facts of the case, the testimony of the prosecutrix PW 1 that she has been ravished by the accused at 4.00 a.m. on 1.4.1991 remains unimpeached. She was subjected to cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to demolish the statement-in-chief. Her statement was corroborated by the statements of PWs 2,4 and 5 in material particulars coupled with the FSL report Ext. P-8 and Ext. P-9, which has been accepted by the trial court and even by the High Court. She was subjected to cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to demolish the statement-in-chief. Her statement was corroborated by the statements of PWs 2,4 and 5 in material particulars coupled with the FSL report Ext. P-8 and Ext. P-9, which has been accepted by the trial court and even by the High Court. The High Court totally erred in law in recording the acquittal of the accused by giving him benefit of doubt for non-examination of doctor, thereby committed grave miscarriage of justice. 12. Again Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Gurmit Singh reported in (1996) 2 SCC 389 held that corroboration is not at all required in accepting the evidence of the prosecution if the evidence of prosecutrix is found truthful and acceptable. Court can act on the basis of her evidence without seeking any help from other prosecution witnesses de hors the evidence of the doctor. 13. In the instant case, we have found from the perusal of the evidence of the P. W. 1 that she was in need of a quarter and approached the appellant who at the relevant time was the President of the Mazdoor Sangha. Admittedly this appellant at the relevant point of time being the President of Sangha, had some hold in allotting the quarters to the needy labourers, P.W. 1 being one of such needy persons, therefore approached this appellant. The appellant taking advantage of her approach committed rape on her. P.W. 1 is a married woman aged about 30 years having children, she is used to sex. Normally signs of rape is not always possible on such woman. In this case also we have come across some the above situation and therefore perhaps the doctor was unable to find any sign of rape on the prosecutrix. The law is very much clear in respect of the assessment of the evidence of prosecutrix and acceptance of the same. This Court after careful scrutiny of the evidence of P. W. 1 does not find her evidence unacceptable. Hence, this Court does not find any force in the argument so advanced by Sri N. Mahammad, learned Counsel for the appellant. 14. The Judgment so rendered by the learned trial Court is also carefully perused. This Court after careful scrutiny of the evidence of P. W. 1 does not find her evidence unacceptable. Hence, this Court does not find any force in the argument so advanced by Sri N. Mahammad, learned Counsel for the appellant. 14. The Judgment so rendered by the learned trial Court is also carefully perused. Learned trial court has rightly relied on the evidence of P. W. 1, the prosecutrix and also the evidence of P.W. 6, who was the Secretary of Women Organization at the relevant point of time. 15. Mr. N. Mahammad has also challenged the Judgment on the ground that the prosecution case is not based on truth. The FIR Ext. 1 which had been lodged by P.W. 6 is before us. Taking the Court through the evidence of P.W. 1, it is argued by Sri N. Mahammad that this aspect of the matter has not been projected by the prosecution since it has withheld the first information report filed first in time. Mr. N. Mahammad submitted that when P.W. 1, the prosecutrix herself stated that she lodged an FIR with the Police. Withheldment of the said FIR makes the entire case of the prosecution unacceptable inasmuch as the true picture of the case of the prosecution was not placed before the Trial Court. No explanation is offered in this context by the prosecution. Prosecution relied on the Ext. 1. No queries even have been put to I/O by the appellant as to the veracity of the statement of P.W. 1. Therefore, this Court does not find any cogent ground to accept the submission of Mr. N. Mahammad. 16. Mr. K. Munir, learned Additional P. P. representing the State respondent submits that there is no cogent reason appearing why the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 6 cannot be accepted, 17. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record both oral and documentary and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that there is no wrong in the judgment. Learned Trial Court accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 as truthful without any embellishment. Therefore, we do not find any impediment in upholding the Judgment and order of conviction so rendered by the learned Trial Court. Punishment under Section 376 IPC can also be extended for life but it shall not be less than 7 years. Learned Trial Court accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 as truthful without any embellishment. Therefore, we do not find any impediment in upholding the Judgment and order of conviction so rendered by the learned Trial Court. Punishment under Section 376 IPC can also be extended for life but it shall not be less than 7 years. Learned trial Court awarded the punishment as prescribed under Section 376 IPC. We, therefore, do not find any ground to interfere with the sentence so awarded. The Judgment rendered by the learned Trial Court is accordingly affirmed. 18. The appeal stands dismissed. 19. Send back the LCR. Appeal dismissed