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Gauhati High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 450 (GAU)

James Sebastian v. State of Assam

2008-06-23

I.A.ANSARI

body2008
ORDER I.A. Ansari, J. 1. What is a 'complaint' under the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, 'the Code')? How does a 'complaint' differ from a 'police report' as defined in the Code? Whether a report, submitted to a Judicial Magistrate by police on completion of investigation, which commenced on the basis of a direction issued by a Magistrate in exercise of the latter's powers under Section 202 of the Code, can also be regarded as a 'police report' as defined in the Code? What is 'cognizance'? When a 'complaint' is made to a Magistrate alleging commission of a cognizable offence, is the Magistrate bound to take 'cognizance' of the offence, which such a 'complaint' may disclose, or has the Magistrate any discretion to direct registration of the 'complaint' as a First Information Report (in short, 'the FIR') and investigation into the offence as may have been alleged, in the 'complaint,' to have been committed. When the Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of a 'complaint' in order to determine whether or not the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence, 'cognizable' or 'non-cognizable,' can the Magistrate be said to have been taken 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which such a 'complaint' may disclose, or is it only when the Magistrate decides to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the 'complaint' and proceed with the 'complaint,' as a 'complaint case,' that it can be said that the Magistrate has taken 'cognizance'? When can a Magistrate be said to have taken 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'complaint'? How does taking of 'cognizance' by a Magistrate on the basis of a 'complaint' differ from taking of 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'police report'? What are the various modes of taking 'cognizance' by a Magistrate? Can a petition, filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging commission of an offence and requesting a direction to the police to investigate the same be treated as a 'complaint' and, if so, whether such a 'complaint' can be sent to the police for registering the same as an FIR and taking up investigation into the commission of offence(s), which such a petition may prima facie disclose to have been committed? Whether a Magistrate has the power to direct investigation by police on a mere 'information' given to him by any person alleging commission of an offence even if no request or prayer has been made, while furnishing such 'information,' that the offence, which such 'information' may disclose to have been committed, be enquired into and investigated? Is it necessary that a person must exhaust the remedies available, under Sections 154 to 156 of the Code, before coming to the Court and lodging a 'complaint' as defined in the Code? These are some of the important questions, which have been raised in the present criminal petition, made under Section 482, Cr. P.C., by the petitioners, who stand named as accused in the FIR, which has given rise to Silchar Police Station Case No. 388/2008 (corresponding to GR Case No. 727/2008) under Sections 417/325/406/273/34, I.P.C. 2. Before dealing with the questions posed above, it is necessary to take note of the material facts, which have led to the making of the present criminal petition. These facts may, in brief, be set out as follows: (i) A complaint was made, on 5-3-2008, by the opposite party No. 2 herein alleging, inter alia, thus : On 13-2-2008, when the petitioner's-son, a student of Class I, in St. Thomas Residential School, Silchar, was attending Science class, he could not, due to his illness, properly read out a few lines from a lesson, his teacher, accused No. 2, (i.e., the petitioner No. 2 herein) beat the complainant's-son mercilessly with a stick causing multiple injuries. On being informed, when the complainant contacted the accused No. 1, who is the principal of the said school, accused No. 1 did not respond; rather, the accused No. 1 asked the complainant to go to the Supreme Court for remedy of his grievances. On 14-2-2008, when the complainant met the accused petitioner No. 1 with his son and showed to accused No. 1 the injuries on various parts of the body of his son and though, on noticing the injuries, accused No. 1 assured the complainant that he would talk to the accused No. 2 to behave properly, no such thing was done and even the complainant's-son was not provided with any medical aid. As the accused No. 2 had become hostile, the child became unwilling to study in the school. As the accused No. 2 had become hostile, the child became unwilling to study in the school. Petitioner No. 1 demanded Rs.10,000/- from the complainant promising to make arrangement for the child's accommodation in a different hostel and, being compelled by circumstances, the complainant paid the money; but after having received the money, accused No. 1 refused to accommodate the said child. The petitioner No. 1 sold some books @ Rs.25/-, though the books were provided, free of cost, by the State Government to the students under Sarba Siksha Abhijan. The complainant's child was kept, in unhygienic condition, in a room, which was like a store room. (ii) On receiving the 'complaint,' learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Silchar, passed an order, on 8-3-2008, directing the police to register the same as FIR and investigate. Based on this direction, the 'complaint,' in question, was registered as FIR and Silchar Police Station Case No. 388/2008, under Section 417/325/406/273/34, I.P.C, accordingly came into existence. This case was formally registered as GR Case No. 727/2008. It is the direction to the police to register the 'complaint' as FIR and investigate the same, which stands impugned in the present criminal petition. Yet another ground on which the 'complaint' is assailed is that the 'complaint,' in question, does not disclose commission of any offence. 3. I have heard Dr. B. Ahmed, learned Counsel for the accused-petitioners, and Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam, appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 1. 4. Assailing the directions given to the police to register the 'complaint.' in question, as FIR and investigate the same, Dr. Ahmed contended that it is not permissible for a Magistrate to send to the police a 'complaint' with direction to register the same as FIR and/or conduct investigation into the allegations made therein. In fact, it is contended by Dr. Ahmed that there is no specific provision, in the Code, empowering a Magistrate to direct registration of a 'complaint' as an FIR and investigate the offence, which such a 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed. 5. It is also contended by Dr. In fact, it is contended by Dr. Ahmed that there is no specific provision, in the Code, empowering a Magistrate to direct registration of a 'complaint' as an FIR and investigate the offence, which such a 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed. 5. It is also contended by Dr. Ahmed that when a 'complaint' is made, the Magistrate is bound to proceed with the 'complaint,' in the form of a 'complaint case,' by examining the complainant under Section 200 of the Code and hold, if necessary, an enquiry Under Section 202 and, thereafter, either dismiss the 'complaint,' in exercise of powers under Section 203, when the 'complaint' does not disclose commission of any offence or when the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding or, in a given case, the Magistrate may, in exercise of powers under Section 204, direct issuance of process to the person named as accused if, in the opinion of the Magistrate, there is sufficient ground for proceeding against such a person. Dr. Ahmed further contended that the Magistrate has no discretion to send a 'complaint' made to him to the police with direction to register the same as FIR and/or investigate the same inasmuch as the Magistrate, reiterates Dr. Ahmed, is bound to treat a 'complaint,' made to him, as a 'complaint case' and proceed with the same in terms of the provisions contained in Sections 202, 203 and 204 of the Code. 6. It is next contended by Dr. Ahmed that if anyone is aggrieved by, or receives an 'information' of, commission of a 'cognizable offence,' his remedy lies in lodging 'information' with the police, the police is bound to register such an 'information' as FIR and, then, investigate the same and it is only when the police refuses to register such an 'information' as FIR that the person, who feels aggrieved by such denial, can go to the Court and lodge a 'complaint' with a Magistrate. In other words, what Dr. Ahmed submits is that only after exhausting the remedy, available to a person under Section 154of the Code, that such a person can present a 'complaint' to a Magistrate. 7. Dr. In other words, what Dr. Ahmed submits is that only after exhausting the remedy, available to a person under Section 154of the Code, that such a person can present a 'complaint' to a Magistrate. 7. Dr. Ahmed has further submitted that the 'complaint,' in the present case, does not disclose commission of any offence and in such circumstances, the learned Court below ought not to have sent the 'complaint' to the police for registering the same as FIR and for investigating the case. Viewed from this angle also, the entire 'complaint,' the registration of the same as FIR and the subsequent investigation are, according to Dr. Ahmed, not maintainable in law and may be set aside and quashed. 8. Appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. Kamar, learned Public Prosecutor, submits that in some of the districts in Assam, when a 'complaint' is made to a Chief Judicial Magistrate, the 'complaint' is not registered at all as a 'complaint case, but the same is straightaway sent to the police with direction to register the same as FIR and investigate the case; whereas, in some districts, such a 'complaint' is registered as a complaint' and entry is accordingly made in the complaint register of the establishment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and, then, either 'cognizance' is taken under the scheme of the Code as embodied in Section 200 and subsequent provisions relevant thereto or a direction is issued to the officer-in-charge of the Police Station concerned to register the 'complaint' as FIR and investigate the case. Many a times, submits learned Public Prosecutor, a mere 'petition,' submitted to a Judicial Magistrate, is sent by the Magistrate to the police for registering the same as FIR and for investigating the case, which such a 'petition' may disclose to have been committed. Sending of such a 'petition' to the police to register the 'petition' as an FIR and investigate the same without, first, making entry into the complaint register, are all, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Code. 9. In tune with the submissions of Dr. Sending of such a 'petition' to the police to register the 'petition' as an FIR and investigate the same without, first, making entry into the complaint register, are all, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Code. 9. In tune with the submissions of Dr. Ahmed, learned Public Prosecutor, however, submits that the remedy of a person, who may feel aggrieved by the commission of a 'cognizable offence,' lies in lodging appropriate 'information' with the police, registration of such an 'information' as FIR and investigation of such a case by the police and, hence, without exhausting such a remedy, a person cannot approach the Court and file a 'complaint' with regard to commission of a 'cognizable offence.' Agreeing with the submissions of Dr. Ahmed, learned Public Prosecutor also submits that a Magistrate has no discretion to send a 'complaint' to the police for registration of a case or for investigation, particularly, when the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence, which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session, for, Section 202, points out the learned Public Prosecutor, prohibits Magistrates from sending any complaint to the police for investigation if the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence, which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. 10. Lending support to the submissions of Dr. Ahmed, the learned Public Prosecutor reiterates that when a 'complaint' is made to a Judicial Magistrate, the Judicial Magistrate must proceed with the same as a 'complaint case' and that a Magistrate has no discretion, under the law, in such a case, but to proceed to examine the complainant under Section 200 of the Code and, then, take resort to the subsequent provisions contained in Sections 202 to 204 of the Code. 11. While, however, lending support to the submissions made by Dr. 11. While, however, lending support to the submissions made by Dr. Ahmed that a Magistrate has no discretion to send a 'complaint' to the police for registering the same as FIR and for conducting investigation into the same, the learned Public Prosecutor contends that in the present case, the 'complaint' does disclose commission of offence of, at least, criminal breach of trust, cheating and extortion inasmuch as the 'complaint' discloses, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, that the accused have been selling books at the rates of Rs.25/- each, though these books have been provided by the Government, under a scheme, known as Sarba Siksha Abhijan free of cost; hence, in such a case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate ought to have, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, taken cognizance of the offences, which the 'complaint,' in question, disclosed and proceed accordingly in terms of the provisions of Sections 200 to 204. 12. In the light of the submissions noted above, let me, now, determine the correctness or otherwise of the submissions so made. 13. Let me, first, deal with the scheme of the Code with regard to a police officer's power to register an FIR and conduct investigation into the same. 14. While considering the above aspect of law, it is necessary to bear in mind that 'cognizance' has not been defined under the Code. The word 'cognizance' really indicates the stage, when a Magistrate or a Judge, first, takes judicial notice of offence(s) and not of person(s) accused of such offence(s). In view of the fact that it is Section 190 of the Code, which deals with taking of cognizance of offences by a Magistrate, it is appropriate that the provisions of this section are taken note of Section190 runs as follows: 190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class especially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2) may take cognizance of any offence: (a) upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 15. 15. Sub-section (1) of Section 190, thus, embodies three different modes of taking 'cognizance' inasmuch as it enacts that any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class, specially empowered in this behalf, under Sub-section (2) of Section 190, may take 'cognizance' of any offence : (a) upon receiving a 'complaint' of facts, which constitute such offence, or (b) upon a 'police report' of such facts, or (c) upon 'information' received from any person, other than a police officer, or upon his 'own knowledge', that such offence has been committed. 16. It, now, needs to be pointed out that Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, deals with 'information' to the police and their powers to investigate. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 provides that every 'information' relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station, shall be reduced, into writing, by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant and that every such 'information,' whether given in writing or reduced to writing, shall be signed by the person giving it. 17. Let me, now, turn to Section 156, which reads as under: 156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases.- (1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XVII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an 'investigation' as above mentioned. 18. A combined reading of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 156 shows that Sub-section (1) of Section 156 vests, in the officer-in-charge of every police station, the power to investigate any 'cognizable case' without the order of a Magistrate. However, Sub-section (3) of that section authorises the Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation' as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 156. However, Sub-section (3) of that section authorises the Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Section 190, to order an 'investigation' as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 156. Thus, a Magistrate, who is, otherwise, empowered to take cognizance of an offence, is also competent, in the light of the provisions of Section 156(3), to direct Officer-in-charge of a Police Station to investigate a case. What is, now, pertinent to note is that while Section 156(1) permits a police officer to investigate a 'cognizable case;' but Section 155(2) bars the police from investigating a 'non-cognizable case' without the order of a Magistrate, who has the power to try the case or commit the case for trial. When, however, a police officer receives, in terms of Section 156(3), from a Magistrate, an order to investigate a 'non-cognizable case,' he will have, according to Section 155(3), same powers of 'investigation' as he has in a 'cognizable case.' 19. What shall an officer-in-charge of a police station do, on completion of 'investigation,' is set out in Section 173. Sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 provides that as soon as 'investigation' is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station concerned shall forward to the Magistrate, empowered to take 'cognizance' of the offence on a 'police report,' a report, in the form prescribed by the State Government, setting out various particulars including whether, in the opinion of the officer, any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom. 20. Let me pause, for a moment, and point out that Section 2(r) of the Code, which defines 'police report,' lays down that a 'police report' means a report, which is forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Sub-section (2) of Section 173. When the definition of 'police report,' as given under Section 2(r), is read, in the light of the provisions of Section 173(2)(i) of the Code, it becomes clear that 'police report' means a 'report,' which the police, in terms of the provisions of Section173(2)(i), submits on completion of investigation, which may have commenced with the registration of an FIR irrespective of the fact as to whether the FIR was registered on the basis of the 'information' received from a person at the Police Station or the FIR was registered on the basis of a direction given by a Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 156(3). 21. What may also be noted is that when a 'police report,' within the meaning of Section 2(r) of the Code, is submitted to a Magistrate for taking of 'cognizance,' the Magistrate may, in terms of Clause (b) of Section 190(1) of the Code, take 'cognizance' if the 'police report' discloses commission of an offence. The Magistrate may also, instead of taking 'cognizance,' on the basis of such 'police report,' direct, in the light of what has been held in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police reported in 1985 CriLJ 1521 further investigation.' 22. In sum, when a Magistrate considers a 'police report' submitted to him under Section 173(2)(i), he has three options, namely, (i) that he may, upon finding that the "investigation" does not disclose commission of any offence(s), drop the proceeding or (ii) he may direct further 'investigation' or (iii) he may take cognizance of offence(s) as may be disclosed by the police report and issue processes to the person(s) accused of having committed the offence(s). If the Magistrate decides to drop the proceeding, he must, in the light of the decision, in Bhagwant Singh (supra), give notice to the informant before an order dropping the proceeding is actually passed. 23. What emerges from the above discussion is that when a Magistrate considers the question as to whether a 'police report' discloses commission of offence(s), which he is competent to try or competent to commit for trial, and, upon such consideration, when he forms the opinion that the 'investigation' discloses commission of offence(s) and decides to issue processes to the persons, who appear to have committed the offence(s), the Magistrate shall be said to have taken 'cognizance' inasmuch as he could not have directed issuance of process without taking 'cognizance.' Though, ideally, an order, taking 'cognizance,' must be a speaking order, yet even when an order, whereby process is issued, is not a speaking order, it will nevertheless be regarded as an order having been passed on taking 'cognizance,' for, as already indicated hereinbefore, no process can be directed to be issued by a Magistrate to a person, as an accused, on the basis of a 'police report' without taking 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which such a 'police report' may disclose to have been committed. 24. 24. What further emerges from the discussion held above is that Sub-section (3) of Section 156 is independent of other provisions of the Code inasmuch as it empowers a Magistrate, who is, otherwise, competent to take 'cognizance' in terms of Section 190(1) of any offence, to direct, in a given case, an officer-in-charge of a Police Station to investigate a case, which may disclose commission of a cognizable' or 'non-cognizable' offence. This apart, since Section 156(3) empowers a Magistrate to direct investigation provided that the Magistrate is competent to take 'cognizance' of an offence under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, it logically follows that a Magistrate may, in exercise of powers under Section 156(3), direct investigation on the basis of a 'complaint' or on the basis of an 'information' or even on the basis of 'his own knowledge' that an offence, 'cognizable' or 'non-cognizable,' has been committed. Moreover, even when a Magistrate has not directed registration of an FIR and/or investigation of a case, but, in terms of Section 173(2)(i), receives, on completion of investigation into an FIR, a 'police report,' the Magistrate has the power, in the light of the provisions of Section 156(3) read with Section 190(1)(b), not to accept the 'police report' and direct, as already mentioned above, 'further investigation' of the case. 25. The above position of law clearly emerges if the decision in Md. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan reported in 2006 CriLJ 788, is carefully considered, for, in Md. Yousuf (supra), the Apex Court has, in this regard, clarifying the position of law has held as under: 7. Chapter XII of the Code contains provisions relating to "information to the police and their powers to investigate," whereas Chapter XV, which contains Section 202, deals with provisions relating to the steps which a Magistrate has to adopt while and after taking cognizance of any offence on a complaint. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. Provisions of the above two chapters deal with two different facets altogether, though there could be a common factor i.e. complaint filed by a person. Section 156, falling within Chapter XII deals with powers of the police officers to investigate cognizable offences. True, Section 202, which falls under Chapter XV, also refers to the power of a Magistrate to "direct an investigation by a police officer." But the investigation envisaged in Section 202 is different from the investigation contemplated in Section 156 of the Code. 8. The various steps to be adopted for investigation under Section 156 of the Code have been elaborated in Chapter XII of the Code. Such investigation would start with making the entry in a book to be kept by the officer-in-charge of a police station, of the substance of the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The investigation started thereafter can end up only with the report filed by the police as indicated in Section 173 of the Code. The investigation contemplated in that chapter can be commenced by the police even without the order of a Magistrate. But that does not mean that when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) it would be a different kind of investigation. Such investigation must also end up only with the report contemplated in Section 173 of the Code. But the significant point to be noticed is, when a Magistrate orders investigation under Chapter XII he does so before he takes cognizance of the offence. 9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202(1) of the Code makes the position clear that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. The Magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a police officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 202(1) i.e. or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. 10. This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. 12. The above position was highlighted in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. 26. What also clearly emerges from the above discussion is that a Magistrate is not bound to take 'cognizance' of offence on the basis of a 'complaint,' which is made to him and proceed with the same as a complaint case'; rather, he has the discretion to direct 'investigation' into such a 'complaint.' 27. What also clearly emerges from the above discussion is that a Magistrate is not bound to take 'cognizance' of offence on the basis of a 'complaint,' which is made to him and proceed with the same as a complaint case'; rather, he has the discretion to direct 'investigation' into such a 'complaint.' 27. In fact, in Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, similar submissions were made, as have been made in the present case, that once a 'complaint' is filed, a Magistrate is duty bound to take 'cognizance' if the facts stated in the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence and that the Magistrate, in such a case, has no discretion to direct 'investigation.' Rejecting such a submission, the Apex Court in Gopal Das Sindhi (supra), has, at para 7, observed and held as under: 7. When the complaint was received by Mr. Thomas on 3-8-1957, his order, which we have already quoted, clearly indicates that he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code to the officer-in-charge of Police Station Gauhati for investigation. Section 156(3) states 'any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such investigation as abovementioned.' Mr. Thomas was certainly a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190 and he was empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint. He, however, decided not to take cognizance but to send the complaint to the police for investigation as Sections 147, 342 and 448 were cognizable offences. It was, however, urged that once a complaint was filed the Magistrate was bound to take cognizance and proceed under Chapter XVI of the Code. It is clear, however, that Chapter XVI would come into play only if the Magistrate had taken cognizance of an offence on the complaint filed before him, because Section200 states that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint. We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word 'may' in Section 190 to mean 'must.' The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. Numerous cases were cited before us in support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain submissions were also made as to what is meant by 'taking cognizance.' It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. The following observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta in the case of Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal 437 . 'What is taking cognizance' has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a). Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this chapter - proceeding under Section 200and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this chapter - proceeding under Section 200and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence' were approved by this Court in R.R. Chart v. State of U.P. 1951 CriLJ 775. It would be clear from the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta that when a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta above referred to were also approved by this Court in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v.State of W.B. 1959 CriLJ 1368. It will be clear, therefore, that in the present case neither the Additional District Magistrate nor Mr. Thomas applied his mind to the complaint filed on 3-8-1957, with a view to taking cognizance of an offence. The Additional District Magistrate passed on the complaint to Mr. Thomas to deal with it. Mr. Thomas seeing that cognizable offences were mentioned in the complaint did not apply his mind to it with a view to taking cognizance of any offence; on the contrary in his opinion it was a matter to be investigated by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The action of Mr. Thomas comes within the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta. In these circumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of the appellants has any substance. 28. The action of Mr. Thomas comes within the observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta. In these circumstances, we do not think that the first contention on behalf of the appellants has any substance. 28. Since the Magistrate is, thus, empowered to direct 'investigation' into a case even on the basis of an 'information,' there can be no escape from the conclusion that even when a Magistrate receives a 'petition' or an 'information,' which discloses commission of an offence, he is empowered to direct investigation into such 'petition' or 'information,' as the case may be, provided that such 'petition' or 'information' discloses commission of an offence, 'cognizable' or 'non-cognizable.' It cannot, therefore, be said, contrary to what have been submitted by Dr. Ahmed and also the learned Public Prosecutor, that a Magistrate cannot, on the basis of a mere 'petition' or 'information' disclosing commission of an offence, direct investigation by the police. 29. Coupled with the above, one can also ignore that a 'complaint,' as defined in Section 2(d), means, any allegation made, orally or in writing, to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a 'police report.' 30. A patient and close scrutiny of the definition of 'complaint', as given in Section 2(d), discloses that a 'complaint' does not necessarily mean that the maker of the allegation must aim at making the Magistrate proceed with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case.' Even when a 'petition' is filed, which contains allegations that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence and such a 'petition' is made with a prayer to direct the police to register a case and investigate, it would mean that the Magistrate shall take action under the Code. Such a 'petition' can, therefore, be very well regarded as a 'complaint' within the meaning of Section 2(d). Such a 'petition' can, therefore, be very well regarded as a 'complaint' within the meaning of Section 2(d). Thus, when a 'petition' is made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code, i.e., with a view to either enabling the Magistrate to direct an investigation or with a view to enabling the Magistrate to proceed with the 'petition' as a 'complaint case,' such a 'petition' would be treated in either case, as a 'complaint' if the 'petition' discloses that some person, known or unknown, has committed an offence and the maker intends that some action be taken, under the Code, against the offender. 31. It is, therefore, in the light of the definition of 'complaint', as given in Section 2(d), quite clear, contrary to what Dr. Ahmed and the learned Public Prosecutor have submitted, that a Magistrate has the power to direct 'investigation' on the basis of a 'complaint' or even on the basis of a 'petition' if the 'complaint' or the 'petition,' as the case may be, discloses that some person, known or unknown, has committed an offence and the complainant of such a 'complaint' or the petitioner of such a 'petition' intends that some action, under the Code, be taken by the Magistrate, for, the definition of 'complaint' enables the Magistrate to take action under the Code and taking of such action would include not only proceeding with the 'complaint' (or a 'petition', which can be treated to be a 'complaint') as a 'complaint case,' but also, in an appropriate case, issuing of direction for 'investigation' of the case by the police. The fact that even a 'petition,' in a given case, can be treated as a 'complaint' and that there is no particular format prescribed by the Code, as regards making of a 'complaint,' has been made clear, in the case of Mohd. Yousuf (supra), by the Apex Court. The relevant observations made, in this regard, read as under: A faint plea was made by learned Counsel for respondent 1 that the petition filed by the appellant was not a complaint in the strict sense of the term. The plea is clearly untenable. The nomenclature of a petition is inconsequential. Yousuf (supra), by the Apex Court. The relevant observations made, in this regard, read as under: A faint plea was made by learned Counsel for respondent 1 that the petition filed by the appellant was not a complaint in the strict sense of the term. The plea is clearly untenable. The nomenclature of a petition is inconsequential. Section 2(d) of the Code defines 'complaint' as follows: 2(d) 'complaint' means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation : A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such a report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant There is no particular format of a complaint. A petition addressed to the Magistrate containing an allegation that an offence has been committed, and ending with a prayer that the culprits be suitably dealt with, as in the instant case, is a complaint. 32. Apart from the fact that I have already indicated above that Section 156(3) empowers a Magistrate, independent of the other provisions of the Code, to direct 'investigation' into a case on the basis of even a 'complaint.' it is, now, necessary, in order to appreciate the correct position of law, in this regard, to turn to the question as to when and how a Magistrate can take 'cognizance' or can be said to have taken 'cognizance' of offence under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, i.e., upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence. This aspect of law necessarily involves analysis of the provisions of Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204. Section 200 of the Code, if I may point out, reads as follows: 200. This aspect of law necessarily involves analysis of the provisions of Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204. Section 200 of the Code, if I may point out, reads as follows: 200. Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, shall examine, upon oath, the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint, or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192. Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them. 33. Whether a Magistrate has or has not, on the basis of a 'complaint,' taken 'cognizance' of an offence may, in a given case, be reflected by the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, which the Magistrate may have taken. When the Magistrate, in order to ascertain if, on the basis of a 'complaint,' he shall issue process to the person(s), who may have been alleged to have committed an offence, proceeds to examine the complainant under Section 200, he can be said to have taken 'cognizance,' for, he cannot proceed to examine the complainant without taking 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which the 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed. When, however, the Magistrate takes, on the basis of a 'complaint,' an action other than one, which is indicated hereinbefore, such as, when he directs 'investigation' by the police, he cannot be held to have taken 'cognizance,' for, such exercise of power of directing 'investigation' is pursuant to the provisions of Section 156(3). 34. When, however, the Magistrate takes, on the basis of a 'complaint,' an action other than one, which is indicated hereinbefore, such as, when he directs 'investigation' by the police, he cannot be held to have taken 'cognizance,' for, such exercise of power of directing 'investigation' is pursuant to the provisions of Section 156(3). 34. The Supreme Court, in R.R. Chari v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in quoted with approval the observations made by Kulada Charan Das Gupta, J., in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerji AIR 1950 Cal 437 , with regard to the question as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'complaint.' The relevant observations read thus, "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering 'investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the 'investigation,' he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." 35. Broadly speaking, thus, when, on receiving a 'complaint,' the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections contained in Chapter XV of the Code, he is said to have taken 'cognizance' of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as, ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. (See Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v.Narayana Reddy reported in 1976 CriLJ 1361. 36. If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as, ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. (See Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v.Narayana Reddy reported in 1976 CriLJ 1361. 36. In short, in the light of the decision in Abani Kumar Banerji (supra), approved in R.R. Chari (supra), and in view of what Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra) lays down, it becomes abundantly clear that when a Magistrate applies his mind to the contents of a 'complaint' for the purpose of proceeding in accordance with the subsequent provisions of the Code, particularly, Section200 thereof, he can be taken to have taken 'cognizance.' When, however, the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XV of the Code, but for taking action of some other kind, such as, ordering 'investigation' under Section 156(3) or directing issuance of search warrant, etc., he cannot be said to have taken 'cognizance.' 37. It is also worth noticing that the proviso to Section 200 makes it abundantly clear that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses is not necessary, when the 'complaint' is made, in writing, by a public servant or when a Magistrate makes over the case, for inquiry and trial, to another Magistrate under Section 192 of the Code. If a Magistrate takes 'cognizance' of an offence, he must (i) examine, on oath, the complainant, though the complaint may be in writing, and the witnesses present, if any, and (ii) reduce the substance of such examination to writing. By examining the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, what the Magistrate essentially does is to determine as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. If the Magistrate is of the opinion, on examining the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can issue process, in terms of Section 204 of the Code. If the Magistrate is of the opinion, on examining the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he can issue process, in terms of Section 204 of the Code. When, after examining the complainant and the witnesses, if present, in terms of Section 200, the Magistrate finds that there exists some materials against the accused, but the same are insufficient for issuance of process, the appropriate statutory mechanism is engrafted under Section 202, which empowers the Magistrate to either direct investigation or inquire into the case himself to decide if the process deserves to be issued against the accused. This 'inquiry' or 'investigation' is really for the purpose of determining as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. If the Magistrate chooses to hold the 'inquiry' himself under Section 202 of the Code, this 'inquiry' may result into either, as already mentioned above, issuance of process against the accused under Section 204 or dismissal thereof under Section 203, for, Section 203 makes it clear that if, upon considering the statements on oath, if any, of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the 'inquiry' or 'investigation,' if any, under Section 202, the Magistrate is of the opinion that sufficient grounds do not exist for proceeding further, it is obligatory on him to dismiss the 'complaint,' though, while dismissing the 'complaint,' the Magistrate is duty bound to record reasons for so doing. Similarly, 'investigation,' ordered by the Magistrate under Section 202, would result into submission of a report by the police and if the report, so submitted, does not disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding, the Magistrate has the discretion to dismiss the 'complaint' under Section203; but when such a report, submitted by the police, discloses commission of an offence, the Magistrate is duty bound to direct issuance of process against the person(s), who may appear to have committed offence(s), which such a report may disclose. 38. The question, now, is this : whether a 'report,' submitted by the police, on having carried out an 'investigation' on the direction given by a Magistrate in exercise of the Magistrate's powers under Section 202 of the Code, is a 'police report,' within the meaning of the definition of the term 'police report' as given in Section 2(r)? 38. The question, now, is this : whether a 'report,' submitted by the police, on having carried out an 'investigation' on the direction given by a Magistrate in exercise of the Magistrate's powers under Section 202 of the Code, is a 'police report,' within the meaning of the definition of the term 'police report' as given in Section 2(r)? The answer to this question is not very far to seek, for, an investigation, under Section 202, can be directed by a Magistrate only when some materials, on examining the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, have already surfaced against the persons, who may have been alleged to have committed offence(s), but such materials may not be considered sufficient by the Magistrate to direct issuance of process against such accused. An 'investigation,' thus, directed, under Section 202, aims at helping the Magistrate determine if the process needs to be issued to the persons against whom some materials may have surfaced on examination of the complainant and his witnesses present, if any. The report, which the police may submit on having carried out an investigation, in terms of directions, given under Section 202, is not a 'police report' within the meaning of Section 2(r), for, a 'police report,' as defined in Section 2(r), means that particular report, which a police officer, under Section 173(2}(i), submits, on completion of investigation of a case, which commenced on the basis of an FIR registered by the police irrespective of the fact as to whether the FIR was registered on the basis of a direction issued by a Magistrate in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) or otherwise. 39. What may also be pointed out is that when a 'complaint' is presented before a Magistrate and even if the same discloses commission of an offence, 'cognizable' or 'non-cognizable', the Magistrate still has the option, to either take, under Clause (a) of Section 190(1) of the Code, 'cognizance' of the offence, which the 'complaint' may disclose to have been committed, or he may direct 'investigation' to be conducted by police in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. In other words, what is of paramount importance to note is that when a Magistrate receives a 'complaint', he is not bound to take 'cognizance' even if the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence. This, as held in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. In other words, what is of paramount importance to note is that when a Magistrate receives a 'complaint', he is not bound to take 'cognizance' even if the 'complaint' discloses commission of an offence. This, as held in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. 1976 CriLJ 1361, becomes clear from the use of words "may take cognizance", which cannot be equated with the expression "must take cognizance". Clarified the Supreme Court, in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra), the position of law, in this regard, as follows: ...If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegation therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for 'investigation' under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the magistrate from being wasted in inquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. (Emphasis is added) 40. The above observations, made in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra), leave no room for doubt that it is not mandatory for a Magistrate to take 'cognizance' of an offence, which a 'complaint' may disclose, nor is Magistrate bound to proceed with such a 'complaint' as a 'complaint case'. It is, therefore, not correct to contend, as have been done by Dr. Ahmed and the learned Public Prosecutor, that a Magistrate is powerless to send such a 'complaint' to the police with direction to register the same as FIR and conduct 'investigation'. As a matter of fact, in the light of the observations made in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra), what becomes clear is that ordinarily, a Magistrate shall send a 'complaint' to the police for 'investigation' rather than proceeding with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case'. It is, therefore, clear, if I may reiterate, contrary to what Dr. Ahmed and the learned Public Prosecutor have submitted, that the Magistrate is not bound to take 'cognizance' of an offence, which a 'complaint' may disclose and/or proceed with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case' inasmuch as the Magistrate has the discretion to direct registration of the 'complaint' as FIR and conduct 'investigation'. 41. Ahmed and the learned Public Prosecutor have submitted, that the Magistrate is not bound to take 'cognizance' of an offence, which a 'complaint' may disclose and/or proceed with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case' inasmuch as the Magistrate has the discretion to direct registration of the 'complaint' as FIR and conduct 'investigation'. 41. What surfaces from the above discussion is that the process of taking of 'cognizance' under Clause (a) of Section 190, (i.e. upon receipt of a complaint of facts, which constitute such offence) is distinct and different from the manner in which 'cognizance' is taken under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, i.e. upon a police report of such facts. Taking of 'cognizance', in the case of a 'complaint', implies application of mind by a Magistrate to the contents of the 'complaint' in order to decide as to whether the 'complaint' discloses commission of offence(s) and whether he shall proceed to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, present and, upon such consideration, when he examines the complainant, he can be safely held to have taken 'cognizance', for, he could not have examined the complainant, under Section 200, without taking 'cognizance'. On the other hand, taking of 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'police report' submitted under Section 173(2), implies application of mind by a Magistrate to the contents of such a 'police report' to determine if there are materials reflecting commission of offence(s), which he is competent to try or commit for trial, and, upon such consideration, when he decides to issue process, he can be safely held to have taken 'cognizance', for, he could not have issued process without taking 'cognizance'. It is for this reason that in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh reported in the Apex Court has held that when a Magistrate initially applies his mind to the contents of a complaint, becomes conscious and aware of the allegations made therein and decide to examine the validity of the said complaint by examining the complainant, he can be said to have taken 'cognizance'. (See also Pradyut Das v. Ajit Borah reported in 2006 (2) GLT 574. 42. (See also Pradyut Das v. Ajit Borah reported in 2006 (2) GLT 574. 42. Let me, now, turn to the question as to how and when can a Magistrate be said to have taken cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 190(1)(c), i.e. upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his knowledge that such offence has been committed. 43. In order to effectively understand as to when and how a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance under Clause (c) of Section 190, a careful reading of Section 191 too is imperative. Section 191 reads: 191. Transfer on application of the accused.- When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, the accused shall, before any evidence is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case enquired into or tried by another Magistrate, and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one, objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance, the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this behalf. 44. From a bare reading of Section 191, what becomes transparent is that in a case, where 'cognizance' of offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Section 190(1)(c), it is obligatory for the Magistrate, to inform the accused before the evidence is taken that he (accused) is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by another Magistrate and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one, objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking 'cognizance' under Section 190(1)(c), the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate as may be specified by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in this behalf. These provisions, contained in Section 191, show that the obligation to inform the accused that he is entitled to have the case enquired into or tried by another Magistrate arises only when the stage of taking of evidence is reached meaning thereby that there is no impediment to the issuance of process by the Magistrate on the basis of the 'information' received from any person other than a police officer or upon his 'own knowledge' as contemplated by Clause (c) of Section 190. Thus, when the provisions, contained in Section 190(1)(c), are read in the light of the provisions contained in Section 191, it logically follows that when a Magistrate, upon receiving 'information' or upon his 'own knowledge', as envisaged by Section 190(1)(c), decides to issue process, he can be treated to have taken 'cognizance'. I may, however, hasten to point out that there is a difference between 'information', which indicates commission of offence, and a 'complaint', for, a 'complaint', as defined in Section 2(d), means any allegation made, orally or in writing, to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a 'police report'. Thus, in order to be a 'complaint', the contents thereof must not only disclose that an offence has been committed, but it must also show that the person, who makes accusations, wants that some action be taken by the Magistrate on his accusations. If, on the other hand, a mere 'information' of commission of an offence is received by a Magistrate, it is not a 'complaint'; yet, on the basis of such 'information' too, a Magistrate is entitled, under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, to take 'cognizance' of the offence(s), which such 'information' may disclose. 45. Turning to the submissions made by the learned Public Prosecutor that in the light of the proviso (a) to Sub-section (1) of Section 202, a Magistrate is debarred from directing 'investigation' into a 'complaint', which discloses commission of an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session, it is necessary to point out that Section 156(3) appears in Chapter XII under the heading, "Information to the police and their powers to investigate"; whereas Section 202 is enacted in Chapter XV, which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrate". Section 202 deals with a stage, when a Magistrate, who is empowered to take 'cognizance' of offence on the basis of 'complaint', takes 'cognizance' of the offence, which a 'complaint' may disclose, but postpones issuance of process against the accused and decides to hold 'enquiry' into the 'complaint' himself or direct an 'investigation' to be made by the police for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient grounds for proceeding. Section 202 does not envisage those cases, wherein the Magistrate sends the 'complaint', without taking 'cognizance' at all, to the police for 'investigation'. Such a power of sending a 'complaint' for 'investigation' to the police is really in exercise of Magistrate's powers under Section 156(3). The power given to a Magistrate to order 'investigation' by police, under Section 156(3), is quite different from the power given by Section 202(1) to the Magistrate to direct 'investigation'. These two powers are resorted to in distinctly different spheres at two distinct and different stages. While Section 156(3) deals with Magistrate's power at "pre-cognizance" stage of the offence, Section 202deals with such Magistrate's power at 'post-cognizance' stage. If a Magistrate, instead of sending a 'complaint' to the police for 'investigation' in exercise of powers under Section 156(3), opts to take 'cognizance' and proceeds with the 'complaint' as a 'complaint case' by examining the complainant, the Magistrate cannot switch back to the 'pre-cognizance' stage and avail of his powers under Section 156(3). While the direction to 'investigate' given under Section 156(3) embraces the entire process of 'investigation' into a 'complaint' culminating into submission of 'police report' under Section 173(2)(i), Section 202 comes into play at a stage, when some evidence have already been collected by the Magistrate by examining the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, but the same is deemed insufficient by him to take next step in the prescribed procedure, namely, issuance of process against the accused. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered, under Section 202, to direct 'investigation' for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. (See Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. Narayana Reddy and Ors. 1976 CriLJ 1361 and Khireswar Bora v. State of Assam reported in 2005 (Supp) GLT 618. 46. Thus, the object of an 'investigation', under Section 202, is not to initiate a fresh case on 'police report', but the 'investigation' aims at assisting the Magistrate in completing the proceedings already instituted upon a 'complaint' made to the Magistrate. 1976 CriLJ 1361 and Khireswar Bora v. State of Assam reported in 2005 (Supp) GLT 618. 46. Thus, the object of an 'investigation', under Section 202, is not to initiate a fresh case on 'police report', but the 'investigation' aims at assisting the Magistrate in completing the proceedings already instituted upon a 'complaint' made to the Magistrate. If a Magistrate takes 'cognizance' of an offence, examines the complainant and, upon such examination of the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, when the Magistrate postpones issuance of process, he can, in the light of the provisions of Section 202, hold only an 'enquiry' if the materials, collected by the Magistrate by way of examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if any, disclose commission of an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session, for, in a case, where, upon taking 'cognizance', when the Magistrate examines the complainant and his witnesses present, if any, and if the materials, so collected, disclose commission of an offence, which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session, the Magistrate is debarred from directing 'investigation' by the police in exercise of his powers under Section 202. Thus, the bar on the Magistrate's power to direct 'investigation' by police, imposed by Section 202, comes into play only when 'cognizance' has already been taken on the basis of a 'complaint' and the stage, as indicated in Section 202, is entered into by the Magistrate. Section 202, in no way, restricts or abridges the express power of a Magistrate to direct 'investigation' under Section 156(3) even if the 'complaint' or 'information' received by him discloses commission of an offence, which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. 47. What crystallizes from the above discussion, held, as a whole, is thus: A 'complaint' is nothing, but allegations brought, orally or in writing, to the notice of a Magistrate that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence and the maker of such accusation or informant intends that some action, under the Code, is taken against the offender. What crystallizes from the above discussion, held, as a whole, is thus: A 'complaint' is nothing, but allegations brought, orally or in writing, to the notice of a Magistrate that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence and the maker of such accusation or informant intends that some action, under the Code, is taken against the offender. It is, therefore, not necessary that a 'petition' or an 'information' cannot be treated as a 'complaint' if the maker of the accusations seek a direction to be given to the police to enter the information of commission of offence into the register maintained by them in terms of Section 154, treat such entry as FIR and investigate the case. A 'police report' is a report, which is submitted, in terms of Section 173(2)(i), to a Magistrate on completion of investigation, which may have been carried out on registration of FIR. A report, which a police officer may submit, on completion of 'investigation', which was directed under Section 202, cannot be treated as a 'police report' within the meaning of Section 2(r) inasmuch as such a report is not the report, which Section 173(2)(i) envisages; rather, such a report is meant to help the Magistrate make up his mind if process needs to be issued to the person, who is accused to have committed an offence. Taking of 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'complaint', is different from that of taking of 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'police report'. When a Magistrate, on receipt of a 'complaint', decides to examine the veracity or sufficiency of the accusations, made in the 'complaint', in order to determine if process needs to be issued to the offender and, for this purpose, examines the complainant, 'cognizance' can be said to have been taken. When a Magistrate applies his mind to a 'police report', submitted under Section 173(2)(i), to determine if process needs to be issued against the person, who is accused to have committed an offence, 'cognizance' is taken. Thus, 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'police report' implies making of mind of the Magistrate if process needs to be issued to the accused; whereas 'cognizance', in a case of 'complaint', means the Magistrate's application of mind for the purpose of deciding as to whether the 'complaint' needs to be proceeded as a 'complaint case'. Thus, 'cognizance', on the basis of a 'police report' implies making of mind of the Magistrate if process needs to be issued to the accused; whereas 'cognizance', in a case of 'complaint', means the Magistrate's application of mind for the purpose of deciding as to whether the 'complaint' needs to be proceeded as a 'complaint case'. A Magistrate is not bound to take 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'complaint' and he has the discretion to straightaway send a 'complaint' to the police with direction to register the same as FIR and investigate the case. A 'complaint' has no specific format and even a 'petition', which, while making accusations that some person, known or unknown, has committed an offence, seeks some action, under the Code, against the offender, would amount to 'complaint' within the meaning of Section 2(d). The power of the Magistrate to direct 'investigation', under Section 156(3), is independent of the power of the Magistrate to take 'cognizance' on the basis of a 'complaint'. There is no limitation, on the power of the Magistrate, to direct registration of a 'complaint' as FIR even if the 'complaint' discloses commission of offence, which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. The foundation for taking 'cognizance' need not necessarily be a 'complaint' or 'police report', for, 'cognizance' is possible to be taken even on the basis of 'information' received by a Magistrate or on his 'own knowledge'. When a 'complaint', within the meaning of Section 2(d), is made to a Magistrate, whether in the form of a 'petition' or otherwise, such a 'complaint' must be registered as a 'complaint' and, thereafter, only, the Magistrate may pass, if he deems necessary, order(s) directing the police to register the 'complaint' as FIR and investigate the case. When an 'information' is given to a Magistrate, and even when such an 'information' does not amount to 'complaint', within the meaning of Section 2(d) it would nevertheless be legally permissible for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence(s), which such 'information' may reveal to have been committed. When an 'information' is given to a Magistrate, and even when such an 'information' does not amount to 'complaint', within the meaning of Section 2(d) it would nevertheless be legally permissible for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence(s), which such 'information' may reveal to have been committed. The passing of the order directing registration of a 'complaint' as an FIR or investigation of a case is not a mechanical exercise of power and it cannot be left to the office of a Magistrate to decide as to whether a 'complaint' would or would not be sent to the police for registering the same as a case and for investigating the same, for, if the Magistrate does not apply his mind before direction to register a 'complaint' as an FIR is passed, he may, unknowingly and unconsciously, even direct registration of a case against his ownself without even knowing that the accusations are made against him. Such unconscious exercise of power cannot but be deprecated. 48. Turning to the question as to whether 'complaint', in question, discloses commission of any offence, it needs to be pointed out that in the case at hand, the accusations made in the 'complaint', if assumed to be true, do make out a case of commission of offence of criminal breach of trust and even of the offence of extortion. Whether the allegations made in the 'complaint', in question, which has already been registered as FIR are true or not are questions, which can be determined only by way of investigation and not otherwise. In such circumstances, the 'complaint', in question, cannot be quashed. See State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajanlal and Ors. reported in R.P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab 1960 CriLJ 1239. Quashing of a 'complaint' or FIR is possible only in rarest of rare cases and the present one is not one of such cases. (See State of Bihar and Anr. v. Mohd. Khalique and Anr. reported in 2002 CriLJ 553. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this criminal petition fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed. Petition dismissed.