Judgment : A.K. Ganguly, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and also the learned Government Pleader for the respondents. 2. This writ appeal has been filed by the appellant - writ petitioner impugning a judgment and order dated 29th October, 2007 passed by a learned Judge of the writ Court, whereby the learned Judge is pleased to dismiss the writ petition. 3. The relevant facts of the case in a nutshell are:- The writ petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector of Police on or about 110. 1976 and later on he was promoted as Inspector of Police on 29.06.1988. While working as Sub-Inspector of Police in Palani Police Station, Anna District he was proceeding to the Police Station in a motor cycle on 24.06.1996. At that time his vehicle dashed against a person causing grievous injury to him. Thereafter, a case was registered against him being Crime No.856 of 1986 under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC, and later on it was referred as mistake of fact. The mother of the injured person filed a proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal claiming compensation and the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.10,000/- to the victim. The Government of Tamil Nadu paid a sum of Rs.15,458/- towards compensation with interest and costs. 4. Over the aforesaid incident a departmental proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner under Rule 3(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 (herein after referred to as the “said Rules”). The writ petitioner did not give any reply to the charge memo nor did he participate in the said departmental proceedings. In the said departmental proceedings the Superintendent of Police has come to the conclusion that the writ petitioner drove his motor cycle rashly and negligently and thus caused grievous injury and imposed on him a punishment of Deferred Censure for six months along with an order for imposition of penalty of recovery of the compensation amount awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal from the pay of the writ petitioner. The compensation amount which was to be recovered was Rs.15,458/- in 24 instalments, first of such was Rs.646/- and the rest of the 23 instalments was at Rs.644/- per month. The compensation amount which was to be recovered was Rs.15,458/- in 24 instalments, first of such was Rs.646/- and the rest of the 23 instalments was at Rs.644/- per month. It appears that this penalty is provided under Rule 2(e) of the said Rules, which is as follows:- “2(e) (1) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (2) Recovery from pay to the extent necessary of the monetary value equitable to the amount of increments ordered to be withheld where such an order cannot be given effect to.” .5. The learned Judge of the writ Court on those facts did not interfere with the punishments ordered as pointed out herein above. It may be mentioned herein that initially challenging the aforesaid order of penalty an Original Application being O.A.No.1865 of 1994 was filed before the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. But, since all the original applications, which were pending before the said Tribunal were transferred to this Court, the matter was heard and disposed of by the learned single judge. 6. The learned single judge in his judgment under appeal has held that the compensation awarded, which was given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to which the writ petitioner was a party, was not challenged by the writ petitioner even though he was advised to do so by the Superintendent of Police, Narcotics Intelligence Bureau. The learned Judge has also noted that when disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner, there also he failed to submit his objections, and therefore, the departmental proceeding went unchallenged. 7. While the matter was heard by us, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner – appellant argued that the charge memo was never served on the writ petitioner, and therefore, he could not participate in the departmental proceeding. We do not find the said submission correct from the facts of the case. 7. While the matter was heard by us, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner – appellant argued that the charge memo was never served on the writ petitioner, and therefore, he could not participate in the departmental proceeding. We do not find the said submission correct from the facts of the case. From the counter, which has been field by the department before the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal, it appears that the charge memo was served on him, and the petitioner acknowledged the charge memo on 20th August 1992, but he did not submit any explanation in spite of repeated reminders sent to him, and since he did not submit his explanation the proceeding went on ex parte (See page 11 of the typed set filed along with the writ appeal). Therefore, he did not challenge the departmental proceeding at all. .8. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner – appellant further submitted that assuming that the petitioner has done anything as a result of which the person concerned was injured, the compensation has to be paid by the government, invoking the principle of vicarious liability. It may be stated here that the petitioner was not acting as driver or otherwise, driving was not the official duty assigned to him. While the petitioner was driving his motor cycle, he was possibly going home and it has not been his plea that he is going to perform his official duties. But, he was going home in his government provided motor cycle. It is obvious that while a person is driving his motor cycle he has to drive carefully, and he is responsible for any accident which he causes in the process of driving his motor cycle. Since, admittedly he was not driving as a driver engaged by the government nor was driving in connection with any official duty, the concept of vicarious liability is not attracted. 9. The question whether the petitioner had driven negligently or not, is a concluded question now, in view of the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body with trappings of a Court, and its finding on the negligence of the petitioner cannot be assessed or gone into collaterally by the writ Court when such findings were not challenged in a regularly filed appeal. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body with trappings of a Court, and its finding on the negligence of the petitioner cannot be assessed or gone into collaterally by the writ Court when such findings were not challenged in a regularly filed appeal. It has already been noted that despite opportunities being given to the petitioner, he did not challenge the finding of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, and the judgment of the said Tribunal has also not been disclosed before us in the typed set. 10. The petitioner is placing reliance on the report given by the Inspector of Police, Palani Nagar before the II Class Judicial Magistrate, Palani in connection with the criminal case. In the said report, it has been stated that the accident took place in view of the negligence of the boy. It may be noted here that the said report was submitted by the Inspector of Police of the very same police station in which the petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector of Police. Therefore, we do not attach much reliance on the said report. In any event, in view of the said report filed in the criminal case, it does not debar the department from initiating departmental proceeding against the petitioner. The purpose of both the two proceedings are different. In a criminal proceeding the guilt of a person is assessed and if the guilt is proved, the person may lose his liberty. Whereas in a departmental proceeding only the charges are to be established, and if the charges are established the delinquent employee has to suffer civil consequences. In the instant case, the charges against the petitioner were established and the petitioner never challenged the same. 11. Even in the Original Application, which was filed before the Administrative Tribunal and later on transferred to the High Court and heard by the learned Judge of the writ Court, the findings of the departmental proceeding were not at all challenged. From the five grounds, which were taken in the said Original Application, the emphasis was on the principle of vicarious liability, which we have already discussed and held that it is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. .12. The second ground, which was taken before the Administrative Tribunal was on the question of not granting the petitioner requisite opportunity. .12. The second ground, which was taken before the Administrative Tribunal was on the question of not granting the petitioner requisite opportunity. The said question does not arise here inasmuch as the petitioner himself never challenged the departmental proceeding, nor gave any reply to the charge memo. 13. The other grounds, which have been taken, are of no consequence. Therefore, the findings of the departmental proceeding have not been actually challenged by the petitioner at any stage. 14. Before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited two judgments in order to show that in similar cases the Courts have held that compensation amount has to be paid by the department or by the employer concerned. Reliance was first placed on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of R. Nagendra Boopathi Vs. Superintendent of Police, District Police Office, Salem decided on 22.08.2008 passed in W.P.No.17856 of 2008. From the facts of that case, it appears that there was a mechanical failure of the vehicle involved and as a result of which there was an accident. Apart from that it also appears in that case that the driver of the vehicle, whose official duty was to drive the said vehicle, was a party before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal exonerated the driver. Therefore, the negligence of the driver in that case was not proved. But, in the instant case, the negligence of the petitioner has been proved inasmuch as the petitioner was found guilty by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Therefore, factually that decision is totally distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 15. The same is true with the other Division Bench judgment in the case of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam Division – II) Ltd., Vs. P.Karuppusamy reported in [ (2008) 1 MLJ 694 ]. In that case also it appears from paragraph – 19 at page 698 of the report that the guilt of the driver was not found proved by the Tribunal. Thus, this fact alone makes a vital distinction from the facts of the present case. .16. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a plea made by the department before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which found the petitioner guilty even though the department took the stand that the petitioner was not responsible for the accident. Thus, this fact alone makes a vital distinction from the facts of the present case. .16. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a plea made by the department before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which found the petitioner guilty even though the department took the stand that the petitioner was not responsible for the accident. This is normally the stand taken by the department. But, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal did not find the said stand of the department acceptable. Rather, the Tribunal found him guilty, which finding has not been challenged by the petitioner before any higher forum. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the appeal, and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.