Per Sunil Hali, J. 1. Vide order dated 31-3-2001, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ramban passed an award against the Insurance Company. It is stated that a Maruti Car bearing No. JK01-C 5553 driven by Aftab Ahmed Nizami, who was owner of the said car, died as a result of accident which occurred at Chamwalwas on National Highway on 25-11-1997. Two passengers also died in the aforesaid accident, who were traveling in the said car. As a result of the accident, three separate claim petitions came to be filed before the MACT, Ramban by the LRs of the deceased persons. The Claims Tribunal framed the following issues : Claim Petition No. 6/99 1. Whether Aftab Ahmed Nazami son of applicant died, as a result of accident of Maruti Car No. 5553 JK01C, owned by the deceased and insured with respondent-2 on 25th of November, 1997 while holding valid driving licence and driving the said vehicle? ... OPP. 2. To what compensation the applicants are entitled to. Claim Petition No. 21/98 1. Whether Mohd. Iqbal Sohil S/O Ghulam Hussain Sohil R/O Gangroo- Ramsoo Tehsil Banihal, Contractor, aged 45 years, earning Rs. 10,000/- a month died on 25-11-97, near Chamwalwas Tehsil Banihal, as a results of rash and negligent driving of Maruti Car No. JK01C 5553 owned and driven by Aftaf Ahmed Nizqami, deceased and respondent-3 which was insured with respondent no. 2 ? OPP 2. To what compensation the applicants are entitled to. Claim Petition No. 43/99 Whether Sh. Ghulam Hyder Bhat S/o Sonaullah Bhat R/O Saja Tehsil Doda, Junior Engineer PHE, Ramban aged 35 years drawing Rs. 10000/- per month, died on 25-11-97 as a result accident of Maruti Car No. JK01C 5553 insured with respondent no. 1 and owned by deceased Aftab Ahmed Nizami who was holding valid driving licence and respondent no. 3 at Chamwalwas Tehsil Banihal? 2. The Claims Tribunal after examining the witnesses, passed the following award in the aforementioned claims petitions. 3. In Claim Petition No. 6/99, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 12,96,000, in Claim Petition No. 21/98, the Claims Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- and in Claim Petition No.43/99, the Claims Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 4,58,172/-. In all the three claims petitions, the claimants are entitled to the interest of 9% per annum. 4. It is under these circumstances, the present claim petitions have been filed by the appellant. 6,00,000/- and in Claim Petition No.43/99, the Claims Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 4,58,172/-. In all the three claims petitions, the claimants are entitled to the interest of 9% per annum. 4. It is under these circumstances, the present claim petitions have been filed by the appellant. The appellant has taken two pleas in all the three appeals. 1) According to the appellant, the claims under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act are based on fault liability and it is necessary that in order to be entitled to the claim, the proof of rash and negligent driving, is required to be proved. 2) That the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation without any documentary proof. So, in essence, the appellant has questioned the quantum of the award. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 1st plea raised by the appellant that the owner of the vehicle, who caused the accident would not be liable for any compensation. The appellant has proceeded on the assumption that the claim petition has been filed under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He states that no issue with regard to the rash and negligent driving was framed by the trial court as the petition is admittedly under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 6. I have perused the record and the claim petitions filed by the claimants. All the claim petitions reveal this information that these claim petitions were not filed under section 166 but filed under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. Even though the nomenclature of the petitions has been as under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act but on deeper scrutiny, it is found that there is no column in the claim petition, which deals as to whether accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving. Looking to the claim petition, the information supplied therein, the complexion of issues framed by the Court and the evidence have been led in regard thereto, the claim petitions were under section 163-A and not under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as claimed by the learned counsel for the appellant. This being the position, there was no need for the Tribunal to frame issue with regard to the question as to whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving. 8. This being the position, there was no need for the Tribunal to frame issue with regard to the question as to whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving. 8. The connected question that would arise as to whether the driver of the vehicle who happens to be the owner, fall within the definition of the expression the victim appearing under section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. This issue is also no longer res-integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court titled Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others Vs. United India Insurance Co. reported as 2004 ACJ 934, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced as under: The question may be considered from different angles. As for example, if in the proceedings under section 166 of the Act, after obtaining compensation under section 163-A, the awardee fails to prove that the accident took place owing to negligence on the part of the driver or if it is found as of fact that the deceased or the victim himself was responsible therefore as a consequence whereto the Tribunal refuses to grant any compensation; would it be within its jurisdiction to direct refund either in whole or in part the amount of compensation already paid on the basis of structured formula? Furthermore, if in a case the Tribunal upon considering the relevant material comes to the conclusion that no case has been made out for awarding the compensation under Section 166 of the Act, would it be at liberty award compensation in terms of section 163-A thereof. The answer to both the aforementioned questions must be rendered in the negative. In other words, the question of adjustment or refund will invariably arise in the event if it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the proceedings under section 163-A of the Act is interim in nature. The answer to both the aforementioned questions must be rendered in the negative. In other words, the question of adjustment or refund will invariably arise in the event if it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the proceedings under section 163-A of the Act is interim in nature. It is, therefore, evident that whenever Parliament intended to provide for adjustment or refund of the compensation payable on the basis of no fault liability, as for example, sections 140 and 161 in cases of hit and run motor accident, from the amount of compensation payable under the award on the basis of fault liability under Section 168 of the Act, the same has expressly been provided for and having regard to the fact that no such procedure for refund or adjustment of compensation has been provided for in relation to the proceedings under section 163-A of the Act, it must be held that the scheme of the provisions under section 163-A and 166 are distinct and separate in nature. It is also not of much relevance that in terms of section 140 of the Act, the owner of the vehicle has been fastened with the statutory liability and in section 163-A thereof both the owner as also his authorized insurer has been made so liable. In sub-section (5) of section 140 of the Act the expression also has been used which is indicative of the fact that the owner of the vehicle would be additionally liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force. Proviso appended to sub section (5) of section 140 states that the amount of compensation payable under any other law for the time being in force is to be reduced from the amount of the compensation payable under sub-section (2) thereof or under section 163-A of the Act. Right of claim compensation under section 140, having regard to the provisions contained in section 141 is in addition to any other right to claim compensation on the principle of fault liability. Such a provision does not exist in section 163-A. If no amount is payable under the fault liability or the compensation which may be received from any other law, no refund of the amount received by the claimant under section 140 is postulated in the scheme. Such a provision does not exist in section 163-A. If no amount is payable under the fault liability or the compensation which may be received from any other law, no refund of the amount received by the claimant under section 140 is postulated in the scheme. Section 163-A, on the other hand, nowhere provides that the payment of compensation of no fault liability in terms of the structured formula is in addition to the liability to pay compensation in accordance with the right to get compensation on the principle of fault liability. It is also not correct to contend that the expression any other law for the time being in force used in Section 140(5) would include any other provision of the Motor vehicles Act. Had the intention of Parliament been to include the other provisions of Motor Vehicles Act within the meaning of the expression any other law for the time being in force; it could have said so expressly. The very fact that Parliament has chosen to use the expression any other law, the same, in our considered opinion, would mean a law other than the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. The proviso appended to sub-section (5) of section 140 of the Act is required to be given a purposive meaning. It is not in dispute that the claim of compensation irrespective of the death or bodily injury may arise under other statutes as, for example, Workmens Compensation Act, Factories Act, Fatal Accidents Act and other Acts governing various industries including hazardous industries. In the event, the motor vehicle in question is insured, ultimately the liability would also be fastened upon the insurer having regard to the provision laid down in Chapter XI of the Act. We may also notice that rule 211 (1) of Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules provides for the application for compensation in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Act. A claim application is to be filed in Form Comp. A. Rule 231 thereof provides for an application for compensation in respect of liability without fault and for the said purpose the claim application prescribed therefore is to be filed in Form No. CWF. The very fact that different forms had been prescribed as regard determination of the final compensation is also suggestive of the fact that both proceedings are meant to be final in nature. The very fact that different forms had been prescribed as regard determination of the final compensation is also suggestive of the fact that both proceedings are meant to be final in nature. Column No. 10 in Form Comp. A requires the claimant to give brief particulars of the accident which would include the nature and extent of fault on the part of the driver of the vehicle, but no such column is provided for in Form CWF. Subject to the said distinction, all other particulars required to be furnished are almost identical. We may notice that section 167 of the Act provides that where death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to claim of compensation under the Act and also under the Workmens compensation Act, 1923, he cannot claim compensation under both the Act. The Motor Vehicles Act contains different expressions as, for example under the provision of the Act, provisions of this Act under any other provisions of this Act or any other law or otherwise In section 163-A, the expression notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force has been used, which goes to show that Parliament intended to insert a non obstinate clause of wide nature which would mean that the provisions of section 163-A would apply despite the contrary provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 163-A of the Act covers cases where even negligence is on the part of the victim. It is by way of an exception to section 166 and the concept of social justice has been duly taken care of. 9. This view has been followed by the co-ordinate bench of this court in CIMA NO. 101/2001 decided on 30-4-2008. In view of the law laid by the Honble Supreme Court in this respect, the expression `the victim appearing in section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act does not contemplate any restrictive meaning which was ascribed to it by the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court. 101/2001 decided on 30-4-2008. In view of the law laid by the Honble Supreme Court in this respect, the expression `the victim appearing in section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act does not contemplate any restrictive meaning which was ascribed to it by the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court. This expression of the Karnataka High Court, on the other hand, needs to be interpreted liberally keeping in view the social purpose sought to be achieved by enacting section 163- A of the Motor Vehicles Act and arming it with a non-obstinate clause creating a special provision, over and above the existing provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The principle laid down is that a tortfeasor may not be entitled to claim compensation for injuries caused to him because of his own fault under the general law, will not be applicable where claim is laid down under section 163-A by victim himself or by his LRs. The submission of Mr. Baldev Singh, learned counsel for the appellants in this respect, is rejected. In respect to the co-passengers traveling in the car, the insurer i.e. the Insurance Company has agreed to indemnify insured under section 147 of the Act against all sums which insured become liable to pay in respect to death or bodily injury to any person. Thus, expression any person would include occupant of car who is gratuitously traveling in car. 10. I am fortified with the judgment of the Supreme Court titled Amrit Lal Sood and another Vs. Smt. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, AIR 1998 SC 1433. Thus, under the policy, the Insurance Company has agreed to indemnify insured against all sums to which he is legally liable to pay in respect of death or bodily injury to any person. Thus the expression `any person undoubtedly would include an occupant of car who is gratuitously traveling in the car. 11. So far as claim petition No. 21 and 43 are concerned, the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is applied as there was nobody to explain as to how the accident took place. The document itself speaks the story on part of driver of the vehicle involved in an accident to the facts, but there is no sufficient evidence and circumstances to determine the fact that how the accident took place. However, this question may be necessarily arise in the present claim petitions in view of the discussion made hereinabove. The document itself speaks the story on part of driver of the vehicle involved in an accident to the facts, but there is no sufficient evidence and circumstances to determine the fact that how the accident took place. However, this question may be necessarily arise in the present claim petitions in view of the discussion made hereinabove. 12. The appellants have not filed application under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Tribunal for taking any defence. It is evident that no permission has been sought from the Tribunal to contest the respondents claim on the grounds of quantum other than those available to insurer under the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant had therefore, no right to appeal against the award, which is accordingly dismissed. Cross Objections No. D 14-A/02 13. Cross appeal has been filed by Shahida Begum. The ground taken by the respondent in these cross objections, is that the Claims Tribunal has while awarding the compensation deducted seven years pay, which the claimant would receive on account of death of her husband. She has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court titled Mrs. Helen C. Rebello and Others Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another reported in AIR 1998 3191. The thrust of the argument is that Claims Tribunal could not have while awarding the compensation deducted seven years pay, which the claimant would be entitled to get on account of death of her husband, who was a government employee. It is very clear that Motor Vehicles Act delivers compensation to the claimant only on account of accidental injury or death, not on account of any other death. Thus, the pecuniary advantage accruing under this Act has to be deciphered, correlating with the accidental death. The compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is on account of pecuniary loss to the claimant by accidental injury or death. If the pecuniary advantage resulting from death means pecuniary advantage coming under all forms of death then it will include all the assets movable, immovable, shares, bank accounts, cash and every amount receivable under any contract. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant. In essence, the compensation is payable under the statute on account of injury or death caused. In other words, all heritable assets including what is willed by the deceased. This would obliterate both, all possible conferment of economic security to the claimant. In essence, the compensation is payable under the statute on account of injury or death caused. It cannot include any other benefit accrued as a result of death caused by any other mode. It is not in dispute that the death of the deceased who was a government servant, in any form entitles his family to receive salary for a period of seven years. This is payable on the death of the government employee caused due to any form of death. The Tribunal was wrong in deducting this amount while awarding the compensation. 14. I, therefore, direct that the claimants would be entitled to compensation on the basis of income assessed by applying multiplier of 11. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Insurance Company are dismissed and the Cross Objections filed by the claimants are allowed to the extent stated hereinabove. 15. The amount payable in this cross appeal is to be worked out by the registry of this court on the basis of annual income assessed by the Tribunal by applying the multiplier of 11. After the same is done, the Insurance Company will pay this amount to the claimants after deducting the amount which the claimants might have taken.