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Gujarat High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 460 (GUJ)

Rajnish Kumar Rai v. Gujarat University

2008-10-16

JAYANT PATEL

body2008
Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—The short facts of the case appears to be that the petitioner, though an IPS Officer, in capacity as a student of LL.B., appeared for the examinations of the Second Semester of 1st LL.B. On 25.04.2008, there was paper of Banking and Negotiable Instruments Act. The timings were from 10.30 a.m., to 1.30 p.m. As per the petitioner, one lady observer had accosted another girl student in the class-room and started addressing to such girl student in loud voice. At that stage, the petitioner requested the lady Supervisor to speak softly as he was being disturbed. The said lady Observer came to the desk of the petitioner after few minutes and started examining the petitioner’s belongings. She opened pencil box and took out 6 inch long foot-ruler(scale) from the said box. As per the petitioner, the said foot-ruler belonged to his six-and-a-half year old son and the petitioner, with a view to make use of the foot-ruler at the time of preparing tables in the examination, had carried the same. The lady Supervisor as per the petitioner raised the objection that something was inscribed on the foot-ruler, which the petitioner stated, might have been written by his 6 ½ old son. In spite of his explanation, the petitioner was prohibited for half-a-hour to write the answer-book. It appears that there was no reporting of such incident before the University, but as the aforesaid incident was reported in press, the University called upon the Supervisor and the other officer to submit the report. Based thereon, on 26.04.2008 the Sr. Supervisor of the University, Shri R.Y. Mankad gave a report to the Director of Examinations, copy whereof is produced on page 163 and in the said report he has narrated the incident happened during the supervision on 25.04.2008 in the Examination Centre of Siddharth Law College at Gandhinagar. The other aspects may not be relevant, but in the said report he has referred to the information provided to him by Prajapati and the observer, which has been reproduced in quotes, English meaning thereof can be extracted as under:— “When I was checking in the block, at that time, the said officer informed me that I am being disturbed and the class is being disturbed. At that time, the lady informed him that I am observer and I am discharging my duty. At that time, the lady informed him that I am observer and I am discharging my duty. The officer also informed her that I am a responsible officer and I am also IPS responsible officer. Therefore, I undertook the checking of the compass box and the aforesaid literature of the examination was found”. 2. In the earlier portion of the report, there is reference that one Mr. Prajapati informed him(Shri Mankad) that the observer is calling him and observer informed him that one student had brought literature of the examination in the examination hall and it was found during the checking and the said writing was over small plastic foot-ruler and 5 to 6 points were there of the examination paper of the same day. It further appears that the observer also gave statement, in which she first referred to the checking of the compass box and thereafter referred to the talk by her with the petitioner about getting disturbance and the discharge of the duty. She also stated that as and when the University calls her for further inquiry she shall remain present. The pertinent aspect is that in the said statement of Rajeshree H. Mengar, random checking and the talk for disturbance is referred to during the period of 3 O’clock to 6 O’clock in the evening and the random checking, which she had referred to is of 4.30 p.m., whereas for the inspection in the first session, the time shown is at 11.30 a.m., of the random checking. It also appears that the report was submitted on 26.04.2008 by Incharge Principle, Ms. Meenakshi Darekhan, in which it has been stated that the student was one of the two girls and there was doubt that something was written and, therefore, the paper was taken away by him and it was instructed to give him after half-an-hour. The foot-ruler was of a small size of 6 inch and a thin chit, which can be removed was affixed on the same, over which it was appearing that some points were written, which was seen by her and observer. Thereafter on the spot the same was torn off and the foot-ruler was broken and was thrown away in the dustbin. She has referred to the seat numbers of three students, which included the seat number of the petitioner. It also appears that the statement of Mr. D.D. Prajapati, who was Jr. Thereafter on the spot the same was torn off and the foot-ruler was broken and was thrown away in the dustbin. She has referred to the seat numbers of three students, which included the seat number of the petitioner. It also appears that the statement of Mr. D.D. Prajapati, who was Jr. Supervisor was also recorded in which there was reference to the foot-ruler with writing found from one student, who was permitted to write the answer paper after half-an-hour. 3. It appears that thereafter the University based on the aforesaid report and the statement proceeded to initiate action against the petitioner by issuing notice and the petitioner had appeared in response thereto and had asked for certain documents, which as per the petitioner, were not supplied and the petitioner apprehended that the inquiry may be hushed up. At that stage, the petitioner preferred Special Civil Application No. 7292 of 2008. This Court in the said proceedings passed the following order:— 1. The petitioner has preferred the petition for appropriate writ to hold and declare that the action of the respondents herein in proceeding to inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner without supplying necessary documents be declared as unlawful and highhanded or arbitrary. 2. When the matter is taken up for hearing, Mr. Shelat, learned Counsel for Mrs. Nanavati, learned Counsel appearing for the University declared before the Court as under: 1. The University will issue an additional notice containing the details, the material which is to be used against the petitioner in the inquiry in question. 2. The punishment which is proposed to be imposed upon the petitioner shall also be stated in the said notice. 3. The material which may be referred to in the next notice and to be used against the petitioner shall also be supplied to the petitioner. 3. After the aforesaid details are supplied to the petitioner, opportunity of hearing shall be given and thereafter, appropriate decision shall be taken. 4. In the above view of the matter, Mr. Raval, learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press the petition at this stage. Permission granted. Disposed of as withdrawn.” 4. Thereafter, the show-cause notice has been issued and the petitioner submitted reply. 4. In the above view of the matter, Mr. Raval, learned Counsel for the petitioner does not press the petition at this stage. Permission granted. Disposed of as withdrawn.” 4. Thereafter, the show-cause notice has been issued and the petitioner submitted reply. There are various, inter se, disputes between the petitioner and the University on the aspects as to whether all documents were supplied to the petitioner or not and as per the petitioner, opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses was expressly demanded. However, conduct committee, which is known as ‘Suddhi Samithi’ called the petitioner for personal explanation and the hearing and ultimately the committee took the decision, whereby it found that the misconduct was committed and the punishment recommended was for cancellation of the result and be declared failed. The said declaration of Suddhi Samithi has been considered by the body of the University on 10.06.2008 and after deliberations amongst various members of the Executive Council, it was decided by the majority that there was no question of giving any cross-examination, since such permission for cross-examination is never granted to any student in the history of the University and it was also observed that if such permission was granted considering the status of the petitioner, contradictions may arise in the statements of the witnesses. Thereafter the majority resolved for going by the recommendations of the Suddhi Samithi for imposition of the punishment. It is under these circumstances the present petition before this Court by the petitioner herein. 5. As per the petitioner, he is a very upright, honest, sincere and strict IPS Officer and while on duty he has conducted large number of important and sensitive cases, wherein high dignitaries and high officials were arrested/interrogated, whose details are given by him on pages 6 and 7 of the memo of the petition. It is the case of the University that all such things, even if they were, are irrelevant. However, as per the petitioner, he is having a bright educational career and there is no reason for him to indulge into alleged misconduct. As per the petitioner, as he is having reputed good service record, the finding of misconduct and/or the punishment on such ground would tarnish his image as IPS officer, whereas as per the University all such aspects are irrelevant since the capacity of the petitioner is as student of LL.B., only. 6. Heard Mr. As per the petitioner, as he is having reputed good service record, the finding of misconduct and/or the punishment on such ground would tarnish his image as IPS officer, whereas as per the University all such aspects are irrelevant since the capacity of the petitioner is as student of LL.B., only. 6. Heard Mr. Raval, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. S.N. Shelat, learned Counsel with Mrs. Nanavati for the University, Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General for Vice Chancellor of the University and Mr. Umang Oza, learned AGP for the State Government at length. 7. In order to examine the factual controversy, reference to certain legal position, which may have bearing to the scope of the judicial scrutiny by this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be relevant. It can hardly be disputed that the proceedings of the action to be taken by the Suddhi Samithi or the University, as the case may be, are at par with the domestic Tribunal and, therefore, the principles of natural justice as it may require considering the facts and circumstances of each case would, in any case, be required to be followed by such domestic Tribunal. It is by now well settled that observance of principles of natural justice cannot be applied like an absolute straight-jacket formula, but its scope and ambit may vary from case to case. But in all cases the crucial test for extending the scope and ambit of the observance of principles of natural justice would be as to whether giving of such an opportunity would have enabled the Tribunal to have a fair and a detailed scrutiny of the matter or not. It can hardly be disputed that imposition of the penalty by Suddhi Samithi or the University, as the case may be, is by way of penal action upon the student concerned. Therefore, when the penal action is to be taken by such domestic Tribunal like that of Suddhi Samithi or the University, as the case may be, it would be required for such domestic Tribunal to follow the principles of natural justice against the person or the student, as the case may be, who is to face the ultimate decision, may be of punishment or no punishment. On the aspects of applicability of principles of natural justice to such proceedings as it exists in the present case, for consideration by this Court, there is no dispute, therefore, no more discussion may be required on the said aspect. However, in cases where there is non-observance of principles of natural justice and a complaint is brought to this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, law has developed further and the same is that unless the prejudice is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court, this Court may decline the entertainment of the complaint for non-observance of the principles of natural justice. 8. The attempt on the part of the learned Counsel for the respondent University was to rely upon the decision of this Court in the case of “Upadhyaya Sharad Pravinchandra vs. The Gujarat University, Ahmedabad” decided on 17.08.1978(in Special Civil Application No. 1097 of 1978 and allied matters) to contend that the cross-examination should not be permitted in the educational matter, where domestic Tribunal has to decide the question. But the pertinent aspect is that in the very decision, the Division Bench of this Court did observe as under:— “Now, there is no invariable rule of natural justice, which requires that the cross examination of the persons whose statements have been recorded and relied upon must be given. The rules of natural justice require that a party against whom an allegation is made should be given a hearing. Right of hearing does not include the right to cross examine. Whether to permit cross examination in each case must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.” 9. Thereafter, the facts of those cases were examined by the Division Bench and it was found that the cross-examination was not necessary. 10. This Court in another unreported decision in Special Civil Application No. 357 of 1975 decided on 10.04.1975 did observe that the observance of the principles of natural justice in their strict form may destroy the very purpose and may be more damage than their non-observance would do, but in that decision also, the Court reiterated that the principles of natural justice are flexible and their applicability would differ in different circumstances. This Court, having found the misconduct was committed, did not upset the decision on the ground of breach of the principles of natural justice. This Court, having found the misconduct was committed, did not upset the decision on the ground of breach of the principles of natural justice. In the decision of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Mohinder Singh Jamwal vs. University of Jammu and Ors., reported in 1984(J.K.), 40, it was, inter alia, found at para 10 that the question of violation of natural justice comes up when something is done against a person to his detriment, without hearing him and such was not the case found by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, but in the said decision also, no departure is made from the observance of the principles of natural justice and considering the facts of that case, the High Court found that there was observance of principles of natural justice and, therefore, further opportunity was not required. 11. This Court in the case of Hindustan Finstock Limited vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India, reported in 2002(3) GLR, 2565, did observe, inter alia, at Para 12 as under:— “12. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified is in dispute, right of cross examination must inevitably form part of play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances, there is no requirement of cross examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, that no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision aggrieved at fair play.” (Emphasis supplied) After observing above, this Court further found, in the facts of that case, that it was not required for SEBI to permit cross-examination while observing the principles of natural justice. In the very decision, on the aspects of entertaining the complaint of breach of principles of natural justice, it was, inter alia, observed at Para 13 as under:— “13. ... In the very decision, on the aspects of entertaining the complaint of breach of principles of natural justice, it was, inter alia, observed at Para 13 as under:— “13. ... Therefore, ultimate analysis of various case laws comes to conclusion that the court may strike down the action of the authority if taken in breach of principles of natural justice only if the prejudice is shown or proved and the action is in breach of principles of natural justice.” Thereafter, the Court in the facts of that case, observed that no prejudice was caused and, therefore, mere denial of cross-examination could not be said as prejudice caused in the facts of that case. 12. This Court in the case of Rajesh Chandulal Purohit vs. Saurashtra University and Anr., reported in 1997(1) GLR 317 did observe that if there is no notice/no hearing or no opportunity whatsoever, it would be a void action for non-observance of principles of natural justice, but in a case where the hearing has been given, but alleged as not adequate, the question of prejudice may be required to be examined and the action, pre se, would not be bad on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice. 13. The Apex Court, in case of Karnataka Public Service Commission and Others vs. B.M. Vijaya Shankar and Ors, reported in AIR 1992 SC, 952 did observe, inter alia, at para 4 as under:— “4. . . Natural justice is a concept which has succeeded in keeping the arbitrary action within limits and preserving the rule of law. But with all the religious rigidity with which it should be observed, since it is ultimately weighed in balance of fairness, the Courts have been circumspect in extending it to situations where it would cause more injustice than justice. Even though the procedure of affording hearing is as important as decisions on merits yet urgency of the matter, or public interest at times require flexibility in application of the rule as the circumstances of the case and the nature of the matter required to be dealt may serve interest of justice better by denying opportunity of hearing and permitting the person concerned to challenge the order itself on merits not for lack of hearing to establish bona fide or innocence but for being otherwise arbitrary or against rules.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Thereafter in the facts of that case, it was also observed by the Apex Court in the said decision, inter alia, at para 5 as under:— “5. . . .The Tribunal appears to have been swayed by principles applied by this Court where an examinee is found copying or using unfair means in the examination. But in doing so the Tribunal ignored a vital distinction that there may be cases where the right of hearing may be excluded by the very nature of the power or absence of any expectation that the hearing shall be afforded. Rule of hearing has been construed strictly in academic disciplines. It should be construed more strictly in such cases where an examinee is competing for Civil Service post. The very nature of the competition requires that it should be fair, above board and must infuse confidence. If this is ignored then, as stated earlier, it is not only against public interest but it also erodes the social sense of equality.” (Emphasis supplied) Ultimately, in the facts of that case, the Apex Court found that the Tribunal had misdirected itself and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal could not be maintained. 15. The aforesaid goes to show that the observance of principles of natural justice before imposition of the penalty is a must by any domestic Tribunal like that of the University or the Suddhi Samithi, as the case may be. What shall be the scope and ambit of the observance of the principles of natural justice may vary from facts to facts. If it is found that there is variations in the statements of the witnesses upon which the reliance is placed for initiating action or a reasonable case based on probability may be on circumstantial evidence or otherwise, cannot be gathered, it may require total observance of principles of natural justice, which may include permitting cross-examination of the witnesses, who made statement or, who stated for explaining the circumstances or the material, as the case may be. All such, in any case, may be required, if this Court, while entertaining the complaints of non-observance of principles of natural justice, finds that prejudice is caused to the person concerned on account of no opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses and thereby to explore the truth. 16. All such, in any case, may be required, if this Court, while entertaining the complaints of non-observance of principles of natural justice, finds that prejudice is caused to the person concerned on account of no opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses and thereby to explore the truth. 16. On the aspects of attracting the power of the University for imposition of the punishment, much grievance has been raised on behalf of the petitioner as well as by the University. The attempt on the part of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was to contend that the material has to be relevant to the examination and the material which is not at all relevant to the subject of the examination cannot be made as the basis for imposition of the punishment, whereas on the behalf of the University, it was contended that once any material is found, the punishment can be imposed. In support of the said contention, the Counsel for the University relied upon the instructions in the question paper. It was stated that instruction No. 10 as under:— “10. Exchange of written materials, pencil or other instructions/article is prohibited.” 17. Further at item No. 13, it was provided as under:— “13. If you are found in possession of written material in any form of mobile phone of programmed calculator or found talking with other candidates or found in regular or caught absconding with written or blank answer book, you will be immediately expelled and penal action will be initiated after the matter is reported to the authorities.” 18. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel for the university that as per the instructions being guidelines to the Suddhi Samithi, for imposition of penalty of cancellation of the result as failed plus only(A + O only) the same has been permitted if any of the conditions from(a) to(d) are satisfied. Condition No.(d) of such guidelines was pressed in service, whose English translation can be stated as under :— “Small chit, small writing on foot-ruler, writing on rubber, indication or numbers are found.” 19. It was, therefore, submitted that irrespective of the contents of the material once such materials are found, whether it has any relevance to the subject of the examination or not, the punishment can be imposed. 20. It was, therefore, submitted that irrespective of the contents of the material once such materials are found, whether it has any relevance to the subject of the examination or not, the punishment can be imposed. 20. It is true that what shall be the discipline at the time of examination are essentially to be left to the academicians for maintaining the standards at the examination. However, as per the settled principles of interpretation of statutes, it must be meaningful and it must have nexus to the object to be achieved for maintaining the standard at the examination and any clause cannot be interpreted, which may result into creating absurdity. If the condition is tested either as prudence or as an academicians, such material must have the relevance to the subject or the examination. It is not necessary that the material must be relevant to the questions asked in the examination, nor it is necessary to see that whether copied or not but it must have direct or indirect nexus with the subject or the examination. If the condition is read in absolute irrespective of the contents of the material, it would result into creating an absurdity while enforcing the condition. Suppose a blank chit is found or a writing of name is found on foot-ruler or writing of name is found on rubber, such can by no stretch of imagination be the basis for imposing punishment on the ground of breach of the discipline. If the condition is to be interpreted with reasonable prudence, keeping in view the object to be achieved, there cannot be any inevitable conclusion that it must be related directly or indirectly to the examination or its subject. The condition as it is not providing for the express language of ‘irrespective of any contents thereof’, nor does it provide expressly that its contents ‘must relate to the subject or the examination’. Therefore, it is more required for giving correct interpretation of the condition for the real effect, keeping in view the object to be achieved and to avoid the creation of absurd situation on a non-germane circumstance. Therefore, the only inevitable conclusion can be recorded is that the material which is found in the examination must directly or indirectly relate to the examination or the subject of the examination, then only it can be termed as an incriminating material or undesired material. 21. Therefore, the only inevitable conclusion can be recorded is that the material which is found in the examination must directly or indirectly relate to the examination or the subject of the examination, then only it can be termed as an incriminating material or undesired material. 21. In the decision of this Court in case of Sardar Patel University vs. Minal R. Jogi and Anr., reported 2000(2) GLH 199 , the Division Bench of this Court did record that the writing on the ruler pertain to the question of Impact of subsidies on fiscal management of economics and its relevance from the view point of global effectiveness. At para 4, it was, inter alia, observed as under:— “4. . . .So far as the departmental inquiries are concerned, there is no question of strict burden of proof and the matter is to be decided on the yard stick of preponderance of probability. So far as the misconduct committed at the examination is concerned, sometimes the burden would be not even to the extent of yard stick of preponderance of probability but less than that. Mere finding of incriminating material is sufficient to hold the examinee guilty of misconduct. Whether incriminating material was intended for copying or was actually used or was innocently possessed may be relevant for imposing punishment. The body conducting the examination has to point out the misconduct. It is irrelevant whether the student has used the material for the purpose of answering the question or not. It is not necessary that the material which was found from the student must have been utilised for the purpose of answering the question. To hold the student guilty of misconduct it is sufficient if the material is found from the student pertaining to the subjects.” Thereafter, it was found by the Court that the material was pertaining to the subject and, therefore, the misconduct was committed. The pertinent aspect is that the principles of relevancy of the material to the subject of the examination is not departed from even the said decision. 22. The Apex Court in case of “Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabadand Anr. vs. Bagleshwar Prasad and Anr.”, reported in AIR 1966 SC 875 , did inter alia observe at Para 12 as under:— “12. . . 22. The Apex Court in case of “Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabadand Anr. vs. Bagleshwar Prasad and Anr.”, reported in AIR 1966 SC 875 , did inter alia observe at Para 12 as under:— “12. . . .it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant questions in the light of the evidence adduced before them. In the matter of adoption of unfair means, direct evidence may sometimes be available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light of probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which education institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunal appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Art. 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision in question; its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true that if the impugned order is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunals must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice; but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary Courts of law.” Thereafter, the Apex Court found in the facts of that case that the inquiry had been fair and respondent was given opportunity of making his defence and, therefore, the decision of the High Court for quashing the decision of the University was interfered with. 23. 23. The Apex Court in case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. IRS Gandhi, reported in AIR 1991(2) SC 716, has taken the same view of the Apex Court in its earlier decision in the case of “Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabadand Anr.”(Supra). 24. It was further, inter alia, observed by the Apex Court at Para 37 as under:— “37. . . .It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc., seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred, as much as is practical, as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt “but” the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries” (Emphasis supplied) Thereafter, in the facts of that case, it was found by the Apex Court that the evidence deduced by the Education Standing Committee to record the findings that at the best of either the examinee or the parent or guardian is based on the evidence on record were part of fabrication and, therefore, the order of the High Court for quashing and setting aside the decision was interfered with. 25. The Apex Court, in the case of “Central Board of Secondary Education vs. Vineeta Mahajan”, reported in 1994 SC, 733, inter alia, observed at Para 5 as under:— “5. ...The Rule clearly defines “the use of unfair means at the examination” and lays down in simple language that a candidate having in possession, papers relevant to the examination in the paper concerned, shall be deemed to have used unfair means at the examination. The sine qua non, for the misconduct under the rule, is the recovery of the incriminating material from the possession of the candidate. Once the candidate is found to be in possession of papers relevant to the examination, the requirement of the Rule is satisfied and there is no escape from the conclusion that the candidate has used unfair means at the examination. The Rule does not make any distinction between bona fide or mala fide possession of the incriminating material.” (Emphasis supplied) Thereafter, the Apex Court interfered with the decision of the High Court, which was on the basis that the material was not used by the student, as was an irrelevant consideration for examining the question of imposition of the penalty. 26. In light of the aforesaid decisions, the legal position can be summarized as under:— (A) The power for imposition of the penalty on account of the misconduct with the domestic Tribunal like that of Suddhi Samiti or the University, as the case may be, are to be exercised after following the principles of natural justice. However, the scope and ambit of observance of principles of natural justice may vary from facts to facts, depending upon each case. However, the scope and ambit of observance of principles of natural justice may vary from facts to facts, depending upon each case. (B) If no notice has been given to the student concerned, the decision of such Tribunal can be said as void. (C) If the notice has been given to the student concerned to show cause and thereafter reply is submitted and the action is taken, while examining the question of the scope and ambit of the application of the principles of natural justice, this Court may consider the question of prejudice caused to the student concerned, in case there is any breach of such principles by the domestic Tribunal before taking any final decision. (D) The observance of principles of natural justice and its scope and ambit, though may vary from facts to facts, but has to be on the basis of fair play action and would depend upon the particular subject matter of the case to be examined by the domestic Tribunal. (E) Permitting cross-examination is not sine qua non to the concept of fair play action in every case, but can be made available if the facts and circumstances so demands of a particular case. (F) If the credibility of any person, who has testified or given some information, is in doubt or if the version or the statement of the person, who has testified is in dispute, the right of cross-examination would inevitably form part of fair play inaction, but where there is “no lis” regarding the facts, but certain explanation of the circumstances only, there is no requirement of cross-examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play action. (G) Where on the facts there is no dispute that no real prejudice has been caused to any party by an order in absence of any formal opportunity to cross-examination, per se, would not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fair play. (H) This Court may interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if there is breach of the observance of the principles of natural justice and thereby breach of fair play action on the part of the authority while imposing punishment. (H) This Court may interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if there is breach of the observance of the principles of natural justice and thereby breach of fair play action on the part of the authority while imposing punishment. (I) This Court may quash the action of imposition of the punishment if such an order is not supported by any evidence and while considering the question of sufficiency of evidence, this Court may also consider as to whether the probabilities and the circumstantial evidence do or do not justify the conclusion arrived at by such domestic Tribunal or not. (J) If the material relevant to the examination is found from the student concerned and there is an admission of the student for such purpose, the scope of the applicability of the principles of natural justice would be narrow, but in a case where the existence of the material or its relevancy is at serious doubt, the applicability of the principles of natural justice and the fair play action may be wide, but of course subject to the facts and circumstances of each case. (K) The standard of proof as envisaged in domestic Tribunal would be the same as that of civil case in domestic inquiries and not like the strict rules of Evidence Act to be observed at the time of trial in the criminal case. (L) The inference from the evidence and the circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures and speculations. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adopt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form part of one connected to all. Therefore, there must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inference in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inference unless there are objective facts direct or circumstantial form, which to infer the other facts, which it is sought to establish. In some cases, the other facts can be inferred inasmuch as practical, as if they had been actually observed. In other cases, the inference do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial, from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjectures. In other cases, the inference do not go beyond reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial, from which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjectures. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been established, there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such inference can be drawn. (M) The material found must have relevancy to the subject or the examination irrespective of the fact that whether the material has been actually used or not for attracting the power for imposition of punishment. However, the actual use of such material at the examination would be relevant at the time of proportionalities or quantum or gravity of the punishment/s. (N) If circumstantial evidences do not permit a conclusion on reasonable prudence, more elaborate examination of facts may be required, but the gap cannot be filled up on speculation or conjectures. However, if the reasonable prudence permits drawing of inference, such elaborate examination may not be required. 27. If the facts of the present case are examined in light of the aforesaid legal position, the factual situation appears to be as under:- (1) The petitioner has appeared in the examination of LL.B. At the time when the petitioner appeared at the examination, there was some altercation of words between the petitioner and the observer, since he was being disturbed on account of the inquiry was being made by the observer with the other student. The same tempted the observer to examine the compass box of the petitioner. (2) As per the statement of the observer of the University, foot-ruler was found from the petitioner, over which there was writing of banking subjects. The timing for inspection is shown as ‘at 11.30 a.m., and the observer had instructed to hand-over the foot-ruler to the Principal. In the same statement there is a reference to the random checking at 4.30 p.m., and at that time the talk for disturbance with one student in one block with the observer. The timing for inspection is shown as ‘at 11.30 a.m., and the observer had instructed to hand-over the foot-ruler to the Principal. In the same statement there is a reference to the random checking at 4.30 p.m., and at that time the talk for disturbance with one student in one block with the observer. (3) The statement of the Principal Smt. Meenakshi Darekhan refers to some writing on foot-ruler, but does not speak for the contents of the writing and further states that a removable chit was sticked/affixed on six-inch long foot-ruler and she stated that it was appearing that some points were written, which was seen by her and the observer. There also, there is no reference to the contents of the writing as to whether for the subject of banking or any other subject. In the statement, it has been further stated that the chit was torn off by her and the foot-ruler was broken by her and was thrown in the waste box by her. (4) The existence of the material of foot-ruler or the chit on the foot-ruler as alleged were neither made available to the Shuddi Samiti, nor any statement was recorded of the student concerned and the material was destroyed by the Principal of the College herself in presence of the observer. (5) In the statement of Jr. Supervisor, Shri D.D. Prajapti, there is a reference to the writing on foot-ruler found from one student, who was permitted to right the answer paper after half-an-hour. (6) In the statement of Sr. Supervisor, Shri R.Y. Mankad he refers to the reporting by the observer for imposing punishment for prohibition to right answer-book for half-an-hour, but the pertinent aspect is that the information provided to him by the observer are reproduced in quotes(“ ”) in exact words. If the same is considered, it supports to the extent that on account of the altercation of the words for being disturbed between the petitioner and the observer, the checking was made of the compass box of the petitioner and the material was found for the examination. (7) If the statement of Shri R.Y. Mankad, Sr. Supervisor, Mrs. Rajeshreeben Manger, Observer, Incharge Principal and Sr. Supervisor, Ms. Meenakshi Darekhan and the Jr. (7) If the statement of Shri R.Y. Mankad, Sr. Supervisor, Mrs. Rajeshreeben Manger, Observer, Incharge Principal and Sr. Supervisor, Ms. Meenakshi Darekhan and the Jr. Supervisor, Shri D.D. Prajapati, are considered, the following appears to be undisputed position:— (1) The petitioner has appeared at the examination of LL.B. (2) There was altercation of words for disturbance being created by the observer and the petitioner. (3) The inspection of compass box of the petitioner was made by the observer. (4) The foot-ruler was taken away. (5) It was appearing that there was writing on foot-ruler. 28. The apparent basic discrepancies in the statements are on the following points:— (1) Whether writing on foot-ruler was there or a chit was affixed with the writing on the foot-ruler. (2) The contents of the writing on the aspects as to whether pertaining to the subject or the examination or other writing. (3) As per the observer and the examiner such foot-ruler did not attract the punishment exceeding prohibition for half-an-hour in writing answer paper and, therefore, the foot-ruler or the alleged chit, both, were destroyed after imposition of the punishment by the observer and the Sr. Supervisor and the Principal. (4) There is basic discrepancies in the reporting by the Sr. Supervisor, Shri Mankad and there is no unanimity on the aspects of contents of the writing of the foot-ruler and also as to whether such writing was over the foot ruler or over the chit. (5) As per the petitioner, the foot-ruler was taken by him in the examination since tabular statement may be required to be prepared and since the compass box and the foot-ruler were of his child aged 6 ½ years, he might have written, but such writing, in any case, was not having any relevancy to the subject or the examination. 29. If the material itself is available before the domestic Tribunal or the Suddhi Samithi or the University, as the case may be, it stands on a different footing or if statement was recorded of the petitioner by the Supervisor or the observer, as the case may be, on the spot, when such material was found, including the contents thereof, it may also stand on a different footing. But it appears that the observer and the supervisor were satisfied with the punishment for prohibition of half-an-hour at the examination and, therefore, destroyed the foot-ruler. But it appears that the observer and the supervisor were satisfied with the punishment for prohibition of half-an-hour at the examination and, therefore, destroyed the foot-ruler. The University initiated the proceedings at the later stage when it came to its notice. As against the same, the defence of the petitioner was that the foot-ruler did not contain any material relevant to the subject or the examination. Such defence would essentially require the testification of the facts on the aspects of contents of the writing on foot-ruler. The same would be more required, because of ex-facie basic discrepancies in the statements of the observer, principal, and its reporting to the Sr. Supervisor, Shri Mankad and his statement. Whether writing was there on the foot-ruler or a chit was affixed itself is at serious doubt. Further no statements were recorded before Suddhi Samithi or in presence of the petitioner. 30. Therefore, under these circumstances, it appears that the information which has been given by way of a statement itself are in serious doubt and there is no chain of inference traceable on the basis of reasonable prudence. 31. Therefore, if the test of fair play action by observance of the principles of natural justice was to be satisfied, it was essentially a case for giving opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses, whose statements were recorded namely that of Shri R.Y. Mankad, Sr. Supervisor, Ms. Rajeshree H. Mengar, Observer, Ms. Meenakshi Darekhan, Principal and Sr. Supervisor and Mr. Prajapati, Jr. Supervisor to explore the truth by testing the statement made. Hence, it appears that considering the facts and circumstances and the basic doubts apparent from the statements recorded, the cross-examination was if permitted, would have revealed the truth if any really existed. 32. It is an admitted position that the petitioner did demand for permitting cross-examination and he had been repeatedly demanding, whereas Suddhi Samithi has not permitted the same. Not only that but it appears from the proceedings of the Executive Council of the University that while considering the recommendations of the Suddhi Samithi, some of the members did express the view that the opportunity of cross-examination has not been given and, therefore, the punishment may not be imposed. Not only that but it appears from the proceedings of the Executive Council of the University that while considering the recommendations of the Suddhi Samithi, some of the members did express the view that the opportunity of cross-examination has not been given and, therefore, the punishment may not be imposed. However, it appears that in the proceedings of the Executive Council of the University, it has been recorded that after considering the report of Suddhi Samithi, one of the members, Shri D.G. Patel in support of the opinion/recommendation of the Suddhi Samithi, expressed his view whose English meaning can be extracted as under:— (1) There is no question of giving any cross-examination, because in the history of the University whenever any misconduct is committed, such opportunity is not given to any student. If such permission is granted, keeping in view the post held by Shri Rajnish Kumar Rai, it may raise contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Further, after considering the representation made by one of the Members, Shri Pankaj shukla, it was inter alia recorded, the English meaning thereof can be extracted as under:— “The observer, Jr. Supervisor, Sr. Supervisor, Principal, etc., are responsible persons sent by the University and they have discharged their duties in a proper manner. Therefore, no doubt can be raised on their statements. Under these circumstances, the proceedings adopted by Suddhi Samithi, is proper.” Ultimately, by majority the decision was taken to accept the recommendation of the Suddhi Samithi. 33. If the decision to deny cross-examination is based on the impression or tradition of the University in past that no such permission has not been granted, the same can hardly be said as a valid reason for denying cross-examination, so as to meet with the observance of principles of natural justice in fair play action. Had Suddhi Samithi, or the University examined and weighed each evidence on a reasonable prudence, but with the discrepancies and basic infirmities and distinctions in the statements of the officers of the University and thereafter denied the cross-examination, possibly the matter could have been differently considered. Had Suddhi Samithi, or the University examined and weighed each evidence on a reasonable prudence, but with the discrepancies and basic infirmities and distinctions in the statements of the officers of the University and thereafter denied the cross-examination, possibly the matter could have been differently considered. But if the Suddhi Samithi, or the University has proceeded on a premise that there is no question of giving opportunity of cross-examination since in past in the history of the University such permission has not been granted, the same can neither be countenanced in the fair play action, nor such can be said as germane to the exercise of the power in observance of the principles of natural justice and thereby the fair play action. 34. Further, if the denial of cross-examination is on the ground that it may give rise to the contradictions of the statements of the witnesses, such a ground can be said as to hush up the inquiry, instead of completing the same in fair play manner. It is hardly expected for the Suddhi Samithi, or the University, as the case may be, who is to exercise the power as a domestic Tribunal to hush up the inquiry and thereby to foreclose the opportunity of cross-examination on surmises and conjectures that it may give rise to the contradictions of the statements of the witnesses. Had the Suddhi Samithi, or the University, as the case may be, examined the statements of the Observer, Jr. and Sr. Supervisors and the Principal by applying the test of reasonable prudence, it would have been recorded that there were basic contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, inter se and not only that but if such contractions were excluded, there was huge gap to draw inference even on probabilities, including the principles that the mind is prone to infer that the writing was there on the foot-ruler or chit was fixed on the foot-ruler and as the relevancy of the writing was to the subject or the examination. If there was no evidence even on probabilities that the writing did exist relevant to the subject or the examination, neither the power for punishment could be attracted, nor the punishment itself could be maintained. If there was no evidence even on probabilities that the writing did exist relevant to the subject or the examination, neither the power for punishment could be attracted, nor the punishment itself could be maintained. Therefore, denial of cross-examination to the petitioner on surmises that it may create contradictions in the statements of the witnesses can be said as failure to give reasonable opportunity in a domestic Tribunal not meeting with the test of fair play, more particularly when it is not even the case of the respondent University that any of the statements was recorded in the presence of the petitioner or before Suddhi Samithi. The essential purpose of the cross-examination is not only to explore the truth, but is also to observe the principles of fair play action. If the inquiry is hushed up, there would not be any fairness as expected for the domestic Tribunal. Merely because the petitioner is holding the post of IPS Officer could also not be said as a valid ground to deny the cross-examination, when he was being treated in capacity as the student and he had to defend the case as the student. It is true that holding the post by any persons concerned may not confer any additional right under the law, but at the same time, it can hardly be disputed that holding the post by any person would result into disadvantageous position for enjoying the rights if otherwise available in law. There was no material on record to show that the petitioner in capacity as IPS Officer did try to prevail over any of the witnesses or there was any attempt directly or indirectly or even remotely to tamper the evidence by the petitioner. 35. Under these circumstances, if the denial of cross-examination is on the basis that the petitioner is holding the post and, therefore, it may give rise to the contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, the same can only be read as not only unfair action, but taking away the right for cross-examination, which otherwise exists under the law, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. If the University has full faith upon its Observer, Jr. and Sr. If the University has full faith upon its Observer, Jr. and Sr. supervisors, or the Principal, as referred to in the proceedings of the Executive Council, denial of the cross-examination to the petitioner on the ground that such may create contradictions in the statements in view of the post held by the petitioner, can be termed as only an attempt to hush up the inquiry in an unfair manner and to avoid the exploration of the truth at the cross-examination. If the conduct of the inquiry is examined in light of the past back-ground, it appears that on the one hand, just on the statements, without issuing any show-cause notice, the petitioner was called upon to submit explanation as to why the punishment should not be imposed and at that stage, Special Civil Application No. 7292 of 2008 was preferred and the University agreed for giving additional notice containing details and the proposed punishment to be imposed. Thereafter, at the inquiry, except supplying statements and to give opportunity of submitting reply in spite of the specific demand made for cross-examination after denial of the allegation, the same has not been given. Under these circumstances, the proceedings as conducted before the domestic Tribunal and its consideration thereof by the Executive Council of the University could be said as in breach of the principles of natural justice and not meeting with the test of fair play action as was required in the present case. 36. The attempt by the learned Counsel for the respondent University was to contend that in certain cases this Court has found that the witnesses may be won-over is one of the valid consideration for denial of cross-examination and it was submitted that such was in the present case and, therefore, the action on the part of the Suddhi Samithi, to deny cross-examination or, in any case, by the University could said as valid. 37. I am afraid such contention can be accepted on the face of basic discrepancies in the statements of the Observer, Jr. and Sr. Supervisors and the Principal of the University. 37. I am afraid such contention can be accepted on the face of basic discrepancies in the statements of the Observer, Jr. and Sr. Supervisors and the Principal of the University. If statements are not recorded in the presence of the student concerned and there are basic infirmities in the statements and if the material is non-existent before Suddhi Samithi, had the Suddhi Samithi, desired to conduct inquiry in a fair manner, it was required for Suddhi Samithi, to permit cross-examination, keeping in view the peculiar circumstances. The fact situation of the case upon which the reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the University wherein observations were made by this Court that the witnesses may be won-over cannot be equated with the facts of the present case as narrated hereinabove, in earlier paragraphs. 38. It was also attempted to submit by the learned Counsel for the University that if the statements are read based on the probabilities and a reasonable prudence, it goes to show that the petitioner committed misconduct and, therefore, this Court may not re-appreciate the evidence as if the Court of the appeal by recording a different conclusion based on the facts. 39. It is true that this Court would not sit in appeal, but ensuring the observance of principles of natural justice and fair play action is a basic element to be observed by any domestic Tribunal like that of Suddhi Samithi, or the University, as the case may be. If this Court has found that the statements recorded are at basic variance and there is basic proof lacking in an un-controverted manner for the material/writing having nexus to the subject or the examination, the cross-examination was required to be permitted, more particularly when writing or the material were non-existent at the time when the inquiry was conducted, such consideration would not be as that of the Court of appeal. But would be to scan and to undertake the judicial scrutiny of the procedure undertaken by the Suddhi Samithi, where by observance of the principles of natural justice, which is the basic requirement and thereby a fair play action has resulted or not. But would be to scan and to undertake the judicial scrutiny of the procedure undertaken by the Suddhi Samithi, where by observance of the principles of natural justice, which is the basic requirement and thereby a fair play action has resulted or not. This Court may not re-appreciate the evidence as that of the Court of appeal, but if the basic infirmity exists upon the evidence available on record as that of the statements, which, in any case, are not recorded in presence of the petitioner and, in any case, there is no direct evidence available on record to show that the writing did exist having relevancy to the subject or the examination, complaint of not giving cross-examination and thereby breach of principles of justice cannot be thrown away on the so-called findings recorded by the Suddhi Samithi, or the University, as the case may be on surmises and conjectures, which are titled as on probabilities by the University. The test to be applied to such probabilities would be reasonable prudence with impartiality and not as that of the presumption of the guilt on the part of the student. If such basic things are lacking and the attempt is to hush up the inquiry by foreclosing a valuable right of fair play action, it can hardly be said that the conclusion recorded for finding guilt are on a valid inference on probabilities, but it appears to the Court, on surmises and conjectures, therefore, can also be said as no sufficient evidence to prove the guilt or the vitiation of the proceedings before the domestic Tribunal ultimately culminated into imposition of punishment. 40. In view of the aforesaid observations, the impugned decision on the part of the Suddhi Samithi, or the University, as the case may be for imposition of the punishment upon the petitioner for declaring him as failed(F + O) cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Hence, quashed and set aside. Consequently, the University shall be required to declare the result of the petitioner of the concerned examinations forthwith. Order Below Civil Application No. 11120 of 2008 : 41. Hence, quashed and set aside. Consequently, the University shall be required to declare the result of the petitioner of the concerned examinations forthwith. Order Below Civil Application No. 11120 of 2008 : 41. The application No. 11120 of 2008 is preferred by the petitioner, which is simultaneously heard with the main Special Civil Application, to direct the University to declare the result of the applicant - petitioner and to direct the University to take admission of the applicant in any of its affiliated Law Colleges in First Semester, Second Year LL.B., in the year 2008-09. 42. In view of the judgement/order passed by this Court in the main Special Civil Application, whereby the decision of the University is quashed and set aside for imposition of the punishment upon the applicant - petitioner and the University is directed to declare the result of the petitioner. As a consequence thereof, the prayer to that extent would not survive, except observing that the University shall declare the result of the examinations of Second Semester of First LL.B. 43. Concerning to the prayer to direct the University to grant admission in any of the affiliated Colleges in First Semester, Second LL.B. Academic Year is concerned, as such the same was not the subject matter of the petition. However, the attempt on the part of the learned Counsel for the applicant-petitioner was that it is on account of the impugned decision of the University, the result of the petitioner could not be declared and as a consequence thereof the petitioner could not take admission in the First Semester of Second Year LL.B., and it was submitted that if this Court has allowed the main Special Civil Application, the prejudice caused to the petitioner-applicant may be undone. It was also submitted that if delay had taken place during the pendency of the main Special Civil Application, it may also not operate adverse to the petitioner. 44. Whereas on behalf of the University, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the University and the Vice Chancellor that the applicant-petitioner has actually not applied or taken admission in any of the affiliated colleges and, therefore, such direction may not be given. 44. Whereas on behalf of the University, it was submitted by the learned Counsel for the University and the Vice Chancellor that the applicant-petitioner has actually not applied or taken admission in any of the affiliated colleges and, therefore, such direction may not be given. It was also submitted that the examination of the First Semester of Second LL.B., is to commence on 5.11.2008, but in absence of the admission taken by the petitioner in any of the affiliated colleges or in absence of the required attendance or filling up of the examination form, this Court may not direct for permitting the appearance of the petitioner - applicant at the said examination as prayed for by the learned Counsel for the applicant-petitioner. 45. As such it is true that on account of the impugned decision of the University, prejudice, if any, caused to the applicant-petitioner may be undone and had the result been declared well in time, the applicant-petitioner could have got admission in First Semester of Second LL.B., provided he was declared as passed. There is no material produced on record for declaration of such result as passed and the mark-sheet for such purpose. Therefore, this Court cannot proceed on the basis that after the quashing of the order of the University for imposition of the punishment, the applicant-petitioner is declared as passed by the University and he was entitled to apply for admission in First Semester of Second Year LL.B., as if passed. The fact also remains that the applicant-petitioner was prevented from applying for admission in the First Semester of Second Year LL.B., on account of the impugned decision of the University, which is ultimately set aside by this Court. It is also an admitted position that the examinations are to start of First Semester of Second on 05.11 2008. If the matter is strictly viewed, in absence of the admission taken by the applicant-petitioner in First Semester of Second LL.B., and having not filled up the forms for such examination, the University cannot be directed to permit the petitioner-applicant’s appearance at the examination of First Semester of Second LL.B, which is to commence on 5.11.2008. If the matter is strictly viewed, in absence of the admission taken by the applicant-petitioner in First Semester of Second LL.B., and having not filled up the forms for such examination, the University cannot be directed to permit the petitioner-applicant’s appearance at the examination of First Semester of Second LL.B, which is to commence on 5.11.2008. However, had the result of the petitioner-applicant been declared by the University well in time and if the petitioner was declared as passed, in normal course, he would have been entitled for admission in First Semester of Second LL.B., and he could have undergone the studies and also could have filled up the examination form for examination to be held on 5.11.2008. Since the time was consumed in the present litigation, such complication has arisen and irreversible situation has been created. 46. It has also been submitted by the University that if the present punishment is quashed and the applicant-petitioner is desirous to appear in both the semesters’ examinations of Second LL.B., in the next academic session, which will be held in April, 2009, the same can be considered and there are instances in past for such purpose. It was also submitted that if the result of the petitioner-applicant is ultimately declared and if he is declared passed in the Second Semester of First LL.B., which is the subject matter in the main petition and he takes admission in the affiliated college, the presence aspects can be considered for condonation or otherwise and such, in any case, would not result into wastage of academic period of the petitioner-applicant. 47. It appears that the irreversible situation has arisen on account of the time consumed in the litigation, but at the same time it would be required for the University to take consequential effect upon the career of the student. 47. It appears that the irreversible situation has arisen on account of the time consumed in the litigation, but at the same time it would be required for the University to take consequential effect upon the career of the student. If the decision of the University of imposition is ultimately set aside and on account of the time consumed in the present litigation and the decision rendered by this Court, the result of the petitioner was not declared and the petitioner was prevented from applying for admission in First Semester of Second LL.B., or Second Year of LL.B., such situation can be salvaged if the result of the applicant - petitioner is declared and the petitioner takes admission in the Second Year of LL.B., for both the semesters and as and when the examinations of the Second Year LL.B., for both the Semesters are held in April - May, 2009, in view of the peculiar circumstances, requisite period may be regularized or condoned so as to make the applicant-petitioner eligible to appear in the examinations of First Semester of Second LL.B., together with the examinations of Second Semester of Second LL.B. Such observations deserve to be made to salvage the situation from the damage caused on account of the impugned decision of the University, which is ultimately quashed by this Court. 48. Hence, it is further directed that the University shall declare the result of the applicant - petitioner on or before 14.11.2008. After the declaration of the result, if the petitioner - applicant is declared passed, he shall be at liberty to take admission in Second Year LL.B., of First Semester as well as of Second Semester simultaneously and shall also be at liberty to prosecute studies in accordance with law. It is also observed that in case of any shortage of requisite number of days of attendance or studies for complying the eligibility to appear in the next examinations of First Semester as well as Second Semester of Second LL.B., it would be open to the petitioner to apply the College or the University, as the case may be, for regularizing the period or for condoning the period on account of the aforesaid unavoidable circumstances and the delay caused in litigation as well as on account of the decision of the University, which is ultimately quashed by this Court. 49. Hence, ordered accordingly. 49. Hence, ordered accordingly. Special Civil Application as well as the Civil Application shall stand allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs.